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ABSTRACT
The thesis examines films, television programmes and associated 
newspaper articles from the period 1959-1989 to discover how the future has 
been talked about in popular discourses. It considers both fiction and non­
fiction in the areas of defence, nuclear issues, ecological catastrophes, space 
and artificial beings. It is particularly concerned to contrast scientific discourse 
with science fiction to discover how the distinction between them is 
maintained when the temporal setting is the future and whatever is asserted or 
depicted is characterised by not yet having happened.
The thesis begins by investigating the discursive struggle over the 
naming of the US military policy both Star Wars and SDI. It uses the concept 
of professional language and Michel Foucault's arguments about regimes of 
truth to explain the status of the more scientific term, while the popularity and 
success of the film are advanced as reasons for the appeal of the popular title. 
The following chapters attempt to discover whether this example is 
charcteristic or an oddity.
The examination of the presentation of potential eco-catastrophes, 
particularly in TV science programmes finds minimal variation and piecemeal 
presentation being used in an attempt to separate scientific discourse from SF 
and emphasise certainty. In looking at nuclear discourse the competing claims 
of the defence establishment and those people making nuclear war dramas 
for TV to speak with authority about the future are investigated to try to 
understand why there is such a paucity of depictions of the nuclear future.
It is discovered that talking about the future in space shifted with 
economic discourse became more dominant than scientific, but that this did 
not apply to those fictions, like Star Trek, which were constrained by 
precursors from the 1960s. These are the major instances of an optimistic 
future. In considering the case of artificial beings, changes are found within 
the fictions as certain categories of being become scientifically more feasible. 
An analogy with colonial discourse and the concept 'hybridity' proves 
particularly useful.
 The-thesis-concludes by finding hybrids of fiction and non-fiction^^
scientific and science fictional discourses most characteristic of popular 
discourses about the future.
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INTRODUCTION
This study examines popular discourses about the future, asking how it is 
that the future is talked about in them. The discourses are tracked across 
several media, but mainly in a selection of English language film and 
television programmes about the future from the thirty-year period 1959-1989. 
Most of these films and TV programmes are straightforwardly fictional and 
thus, because it is the most common fictional genre perceived as talking about 
the future, science fiction (SF). This is not, however, a study of SF, but of 
popular discourses about the future, it therefore also considers TV 
programmes like Tomorrow's World which claim to be 'scientific'.
The two types of material are ostensibly very different, although 
demonstrating that difference, especially when they talk about the future, is not 
necessarily easy. The distinction between them is generally held to lie in their 
abilities to make claims to speak the 'truth' - science may while SF may not. 
'Scientific' assertions about the future retain their character by adherence to 
'scientific' laws projected forward or extrapolated. Because whatever is 
asserted or depicted when the temporal setting is the future is characterised 
by not yet having happened, such projections must have a hypothetical 
component which, however disguised, immediately provides a space for the 
overtly fictional to intrude.
It is perhaps necessary to note how the distinction between the fictional 
and the non-fictional, referred to throughout this study, is being perceived. I 
am not suggesting that there is any absolute, extra-discursive foundation for 
such a distinction. Instead I am operating with an extant distinction - within the 
givens of scientific discourse, scientific statements are non-fictional; on TV, 
science programmes are (generally) non-fiction ones; SF has its fictionality 
inscribed in its name, yet this is modified by 'science'.
The paradox of the scientific which even on its own terms cannot but 
have an element of the fictional 'what-if when it talks about the future is thus 
mirrored by SF itself. More detailed attention to the genre is given later, but a 
brief indication of how the term SF is being used here is provided by Patrick 
Parrinder's gloss of Darko Suvin's definition of SF as the "literature of 
cognitive estrangement": ~ :
"[i]t is 'estranged' by the introduction of some 
novelty which transforms the author's empirical 
world, and 'cognitive' by virtue of its affiliation
to science and rationality."^
Thus this paradox is inscribed in the genre definition, as the science and 
rationality which should bring fictions closer to the empirical world are 
combined with the estrangement moving in the other direction. A principal 
concern of this study is with how, despite the shifting relationship between 
them, a distinction between fiction and non-fiction is both constructed and 
sustained in discussions about the future.
I am using the term 'science' to refer to a 'discourse' in Michel Foucault's 
sense, as a group of statements belonging to a particular discursive formation, 
as the 'fictional' is also a discourse. Foucault asserts that 'science' has a 
privileged position within the current 'regime of truth': that 'truth' is discursively 
produced and regulated, and historically contingent; and that currently 
scientific discourse and the institutions producing it are central to the 
production of ' t r u t h ' . 2  Since 'truth' is thus always a product of power, indeed 
produced within relations of power, it is inescapably political. As a 
consequence, by privileging the discourse of science (which here includes 
technology), I am inevitably concerned with politics.
Although this study is traversed by an investigation of the fictional and the 
non-fictional, there is no intention of dealing with relations between the real 
and the fictional. Attention is focussed instead on two discursive regimes 
whose very different truth claims are discursively constructed. The study 
argues that the categories repeatedly breach each other's boundaries and 
that this mixing is tolerated on only one side. SF, which calls on the 'scientific' 
in its name and definition, is enhanced by some of its imaginative 'novelties' 
becoming scientifically practical; science, on the other hand, must deny those 
of its past projections that have proved ill-founded, precisely because they 
appear no different from SF. The denial is achieved mainly by ignoring their 
having been made, but also by stressing the scientific achievements that now 
enable past 'mistakes' to be avoided and by belittling past predictions as 
'quaint'. The responses in both discourses are evidence of a discursive 
contestation which is heightened when the discursive field is the future.
’’ Patrick Parrinder- Sc/ence Fiction: Its Criticism and f ^ a c h f n g T 1980.
-_____p21. He is referring to Darko Suvin: "On what is and is not an SF narration", Science
Fiction Studies, Part 1, March 1978, p50 
^Michel Foucault: Power/Knowiedge: Selected interviews and other writings (ed. Colin 
Gordon), Brighton, Harvester, 1980. pp131-2
The adoption of the title of a science fiction/fantasy film, 'Star Wars', as 
the title of a piece of American military strategy was an apparently astonishing 
example of the deliberate and sustained transgression of the boundaries 
between SF (film) and science. The study began as an investigation of how 
and why the transgression occurred and then broadened out to consider 
whether this was a special case or characteristic of popular discourse about 
the future in general. The decision to concentrate on film and TV was taken in 
the wake of Star Wars as part of this consideration of its exceptional or typical 
status.
Despite the specific attention to SF, this is not a study of genre. In 
addition to the inclusion of non-fictional discourses, only part of the range of 
SF film and TV is considered. Minimal attention is paid, for example, to fictions 
about aliens and time travel. They are not excluded altogether, but usually 
need to occur in tandem with some more scientifically structured (which does 
not mean scientifically credible) phenomenon, as is the case in Star Trek. 
Furthermore some generic hybrids, like the SF/horror films Alien  and its 
sequel Aliens are also included because they do use scientific premises to 
talk about the future. Nonetheless this study does recognise at least one of the 
shared assumptions of writing on the SF genre noted by Annette Kuhn:
"that science fiction films operate in a network 
of meanings (and indeed activities) which 
extends beyond the films themselves."^
This may seem to apply much more widely, but it is intensified for SF as 
becomes most apparent in Chapter Five, which deals with the special case of 
Star Trek.
The focus of this study is not on the specific media of film and TV, but on 
them as the most popular and pervasive forms in and through which the future 
is talked about. 'Through' here refers to the role of images and terms drawn 
from SF film or TV but removed from their immediate filmic or televisual 
settings, like 'Star Wars' itself, as part of popular discourse about the future. 
Such discussion is charted here particularly in non-fictional TV programmes, 
but also at times in newspapers. The use of newspaper material is secondary 
to film and TV, but was important in tracking the political effects of the
^Annette Kuhn: "Introduction: Cultural Theory and Science Fiction Cinema" in Annette 
Kuhn (ed): Alien Zone: Cultural Theory and Contemporary Science Fiction Cinema, 
London, Verso, 1990. p7
discursive stuggles over talking about the future, especially the interdiscursive 
adoption of the term 'Star Wars' (which occurred before my study began). The 
Star Wars instance provides an indication of the crossing of media as well as 
discursive boundaries; it begins with a film, terms from which are taken up in 
popular political discourse, reported in the news in the press and on radio and 
TV. Clips from the film as well as newly generated pieces of video animation 
are used to explain the operation of the proposal on TV news and non-fiction 
programmes; stills from both are used in the print media. The film and its 
sequels are screened on TV and released on video. All of this is part of talking 
about the future through the use of the film title Star Wars.
Reviews of films and TV programmes and associated promotional 
material are occasionally used more generally to provide some idea of the 
extra-textual context within which texts were received. TV and film reviews are 
part of what Tony Bennett has called "the superintendence of popular reading" 
which he explains as
"hermeneutic systems which pin down the meaning 
of popular texts in particular ways, fixing Ideological 
parameters within which they are to be read."^
'Fixing' and 'pinning down' imply perhaps too great a determinacy; his later 
term 'reading triggers' seems preferable. Review material may act, insofar as it 
is attended to, to structure reading practices, by, for example, 'cueing' the 
reader to the truth claims of the particular text. It may also indicate ways in 
which past readings may have been inflected. Generic descriptions will be 
influential both on viewers' programme choices and on their expectations of 
what they are to see. Reviews, TV schedule data, information from previous 
episodes or films in a series, promotional material and magazine interviews 
with the stars all act to situate viewers before they see the film or programme 
and intervene in the reading of the text itself.
Mike Poole has pointed out how promoting a TV programme by making it 
available for previews or by-referring to it in reviews is part of the process of 
"shaping the perception of its importance".^ Programmes noticed appear 
more important than those ignored, and genres frequently reviewed (TV 
documentaries or plays, for example) given at least an illusion of importance
-^Tony Bennett: "Texts, Readers, Reading Formations", Literature and History 9{2), Autumn 
1983, pp214-227. p225 
^Mike Poole: "The Cult of the Generalist: British Television Criticism 1936-1983", Screen, 
25(2), March-April 1984, pp41 -61. pSO
greater than those, like SF, rarely or perfunctorily referred to. Little has been 
written about audience use of reviews or criticism, but the high popularity of 
television columns in newspaper 'page traffic surveys' is occasionally 
noted.® Reviews cannot be discounted.
DEFINING SF
Defining and clarifying SF is a frequent concern of critics. As Patrick 
Parrinder writes
"[d]efinitions of science fiction are not so much a 
series of logical approximations to an elusive ideal, 
as a small parasitic sub-genre in themselves."^
The description of SF developed by Vivian Sobchack for her examination 
of American SF films since 1950 is more useful than most as it emphasises 
the interaction of technology and social relations.
"SF has always taken as its distinctive generic 
task the cognitive mapping and poetic figuration 
of social relations as they are constituted and 
changed by new technological modes of 
'being-in-the-world'. "®
The reference to cognition here is an acknowledgement of the influence of 
Darko Suvin, the principal SF theorist whose definition of SF as the "literature 
of cognitive estrangement' has been quoted above.
Sobchack's reference to newness is also an acknowledgement of 
Suvin's influence, for while he finds cognition and estrangement prerequisites 
for SF, he places the 'novum' at the centre of the specificity of the genre and 
the distinctiveness of its use of estrangement. A 'novum' is a new thing, a 
novelty, an invention of the SF author. Suvin uses it as an elaboration of the 
idea of the SF 'prop'. For Suvin the novum can be more than the physical 
thing, like a faster-than-light drive, that the word 'prop' implies; it can indeed
_^See_ e.g.-Chris-Dunkley: "Langham Diary", The L/sfener, V .110,-No.2834—10—  
November 1983, p24
^Patrick Parrinder: Science Fiction, p2
®Vivian Sobchack: Screening Space (Second Enlarged Edition), New York, Ungar, 1987. 
p224-5
be the new form of social relations that Sobchack's definition involves. He 
also requires it to be more than incidental, saying
"SF is distinguished by the narrative dominance 
or hegemony of a fictional 'novum' (novelty, 
innovation) validated by cognitive logic."^
The functioning of the novum also characterizes the particular functioning of 
estrangement in SF. Suvin describes estrangement as an oscillation from the 
author's and the reader's 'norm of reality' to the narrative novelties and back 
from them to this 'reality' which is regarded anew in the light of what the 
narrative has suggested.
"However its second pole Is In SF a narrative reality 
sufficiently autonomous and intransitive to be 
explored at length as to its own properties and 
the human relationships it implies."'’®
In his recent writings on SF, Suvin has further specified SF by 
incorporating into his definition the 'absent paradigm','’ 1 an idea initially 
developed by Marc Angenot. Angenot terms SF a 'conjectural' genre, not only 
because of its method of world creating, but also because of the mode of 
reading required. While syntagmatically the rules governing its reading are no 
different from those used with other genres, they interact with "delusive 
missing paradigm s " . ' ’ 2  The work of reading the SF text involves the 
conjectural creation, or the assumption of the existence of, the other members 
of the paradigm triggered by particular cues, which may include fictive words, 
non-linguistic semiotic configurations or fragments of somë organizing 
system.■’3 In adopting Angenot's hypothesis, Suvin seems to have modified 
his novum, which now seems to be co-existent with the 'world-creating 
proposition' - his term for the syntagmatically present cues to the absent 
paradigm.
®Darko Suvin: Metamorphoses of Science Fiction, New Haven and London, Yale University 
Press, 1979. p63
■’®lbid.,p71
"’ '’ Darko Suv'm: Positions and Presuppositions in Science Fiction, London, MacMillan, 1988.
  p 204-5
1 ? Marc Angenot: "The Absent Paradigm: An Introduction to the Semiotics of Science 
Fiction", Science Fiction Studies, 6(1), 1979, pp9-19. plO 
^^Ibid., p16
The novum is now commonly connected to another characteristic of SF, a 
particular concern with temporality. Suvin explains the shift from early and 
proto-SF, where the novum involved spatial displacement, to the more 
contemporary displacement in time (i.e. most commonly the future), as being 
due both to convenience (plausible other spaces now being rare), and
"the strong tendency toward temporal extrapolation 
inherent in life based on a capitalist economy,with 
its salaries, profits and progressive ideals always 
expected in a future clock-time."’ ^
This has become more than a little debatable. Suvin however rejects the idea 
that SF is itself extrapolation, arguing that it works through analogy, usually 
with the present.
Yet there is no necessity for SF to have a future setting. In being 
concerned here only with that SF which is set in the future, I am (wittingly) 
limiting the field. It can easily be set in the present and, with only a little more 
difficulty, in the past. The temporalities of SF narratives can be quite complex. 
Christine Brooke-Rose sees SF engaging in an appeal to memory - and doing 
so overtly. Of SF she says that this refers not only to the past of the characters, 
but also to the
"past of the world as seen from the future and for 
[the] future of the undertaking."’ ®
In a related vein, Fredric Jameson has argued that under the current stage of 
capitalism, it is so difficult to represent the present that strategies of indirection 
are required to do so, and that SF is one of these strategies. Not only does SF 
not represent the future, he says, but
"its multiple mock futures serve the quite different 
function of transforming our own present into the 
determinate past of something yet to come."’ ^
’ ^ Suvin: Pos/Y/ons, p205
‘’ ^Christine Brooke-Rose: A Rhetoric of the Unreal, Cambridge, Cambrjdge_University 
Press, 1981. p99
’ ^Fredric Jameson: "Progress Versus Utopia: or. Can We Imagine the Future?", Science 
Fiction Studies, 9(2), July 1982, pp147-158. p i52
8This temporal phenomenon, that he later describes as "a trope of the future 
anterior"’ ® echoes and extends Brooke-Rose's comment.
METHODOLOGY
The period chosen was 1959 to 1989. There were several reasons for 
this apart from its providing a large number of examples. The future was talked 
about in many ways and across many discourses. Certain events centred in 
the period, particularly space flight and nuclear fear, raised the possibility of 
changes in the way the future would be talked about. The entire span of 
manned space flight (since 1961) could be examined together with two years 
before it began. A wide range of films and television programmes about the 
aftermath of a nuclear war could also be considered. Finally, choosing 1959- 
1989 made it possible to investigate the development and influence of some 
televised SF programmes, particularly Star Trek, which have continued in 
various forms from the 60s to the present day.
However, because the concern was with public discourse, a second 
period was mapped onto the first. This was the period of the research itself - 
from October 1986 to December 1989. There was no attempt to examine 
every English-language film or TV programme dealing with the future from 
1959 to 1989, instead I dealt with films and TV programmes from this period 
which were screened or transmitted in or around London in the research 
period. For the purposes of this research, the time of transmission or 
screening is more important than the time of production. This is an 
acknowledgement that some material (but not all) is screened long after its 
production and together with material of more recent origin forms part of the 
public discourses about the future. The proliferation of videos of films and TV 
programmes has increased the amount of past material that feeds into present 
discourses. Although it might have been expected that this would increase the 
proportion of film available, in contrast to TV, one of the more surprising 
discoveries consequent on the principal selection criterion was how much of 
the older TV material it was possible to see. In addition to the expected 
repeats and videos, there were celebratory screenings in cinemas and old 
programmes framed for rebroadcast.
The films referred to are those publicly screened, readily available on 
videotape or transmitted on broadcast TV; TV programmes were telecast on
’ ®Fredric Jameson: "Nostalgia for the Present", South Atlantic Quarterly, 88(2), Spring 1989, 
ppSI 7-537. p524
BBC, ITV or Channel 4 or publically available on video. The main exceptions 
are public screenings of archival TV material. Occasionally, films or TV 
programmes not able to be seen again during the research period are 
referred to, when they are inescapably relevant to material that was available 
(the nuclear dramas are the principal instance of this). This is particularly the 
case when the absence of this material from public discourse appears 
noteworthy.
Although the texts are still ultimately the choice of a single viewer (the 
researcher), and it was not possible to be sure precisely what proportion of the 
total amount of available relevant material was examined, it is my impression 
that they comprise a substantial quantity of the texts in the public domain. 
Listing magazines were checked weekly and films set in the future viewed at 
least once. TV schedules were similarly checked and programmes indicating 
by their description a concern with the future were viewed. Because material 
now enters the public domain not merely through broadcast television and 
public cinema screenings, but also through rented and purchased videos, 
high profile video titles were also included. This resulted in a very substantial 
body of material which included every Tomorrow's World programme 
broadcast for three years, five Star Trek films as well as many repeated, 
rented or purchased episodes of the TV series and a large number of one-off 
or short-serial TV dramas. There was a very conscious decision to deal with a 
wide range of material in order to determine whether there were discernible 
patterns across the most pervasive visual media, both in fiction and non­
fiction.
It was hoped that the focus on material in the public domain would 
reduce the impact of one of the problems of diachronic studies. It is not 
possible to read a thirty-year-old text as it might have been read at the time of 
its production, not even as one would oneself have done at that time. By 
reading all the texts quite overtly in the same time period, and having ones 
chosen by various schedulers, for what ever reason, as relevant to be (re-) 
screened in the late 80s, a de facto lim itation (of historical re- 
contextualization) is acknowledged.
Another selection criterion is generically based. As far as possible, the 
choice of fictional texts from the last thirty years publicly available in the last 
three, has excluded fantasy and horror. Despite the imprecision of the generic 
boundaries between these and SF, such selection has not usually proved too 
difficult, simply because fantasy and horror are rarely set in the future. As was 
indicated above, the situation is complicated by generic mixes like the horror-
10
SF Alien or the SF-fantasy Star Wars (both of which are examined). .
Although I do not deny the considerable differences between the media 
of film and TV, these differences are not often of great importance here, not 
least because so much film is consumed through TV either broadcast or on 
video. For most of the study, it is the content of the films and programmes that 
is most important, although when attention is paid to the impact of special 
effects, the medium is of greater relevance. Even here, however, the clarity of 
the distinction between electronic and cinematographic generation is blurred.
ORGANIZATION
The study has six principal chapters. It is ordered so that those chapters 
concerned with areas where scientific discourse appears dominant, the ones 
dealing with Star Wars/SDI, ecological catastrophe and nuclear war are first. I 
argue that these are also the ones in which the future appears temporally 
closer, possibly precisely because of the tendency of scientific discourse to 
talk about the future through cautious extrapolation into the 'foreseeable' 
future. The chapters placed after these examine outer space and artificial 
beings, classic subjects for SF, where the fictional element is more obvious 
and the future generally seems further away.
The first chapter looks at the example that provoked the study as a whole 
- the naming of a piece of US military policy after the science fantasy film Star 
Wars. Its focus is on the complex transactions between the the scientific and 
the overtly fictional discourses within the political arena. It examines how the 
naming came about and the discursive struggle between 'Star Wars', the 
popular name, and SDI, the more 'scientific' name. The concept of 
professional language and Michel Foucault's arguments about regimes of 
truth are used to explain the power of the more scientific term, while the 
popularity and success of the film are advanced as reasons for the appeal of 
the popular title.
The second chapter attempts to see whether the Star Wars/SDI instance 
was an oddity and examines formally designated TV science programmes to 
determine how the discourse of science is used within the programmes as a 
basis for claims to speak 'truthfully' about the future. The particular future 
examined is that envisaged "as the result of ecological catastrophes and a 
case study is presented of a Tomorrow's World programme on the 
Greenhouse Effect. I argue that the demands of a popular visual medium
11
mean that the use of Imaginative constructs and metaphor in science, which 
are usually invisible become visible and rather obvious. In an attempt to 
compensate for this lack of apparent scientific purity, the certainty of scientific 
knowledge is stressed. This however places severe limits on what can be 
said, so non-scientific and overtly fictional visions of the future have a greater 
ability to present a comprehensive picture of the catastrophic future.
The third chapter deals with nuclear discourse, thus siting the Star 
Wars/SDI case within a wider framework. Again it examines the struggles and 
the competing claims to speak with authority about the future between the 
defence establishment and those people making TV dramas about the 
consequences of nuclear war. Its central concern is to explain why there is 
such a paucity of depictions of the nuclear future. Two major explanations are 
examined: that there are politically-based restrictions placed on the area; and 
that the topic itself resists depiction, primarily through being sublime. The 
chapter notes the development of a convention of following nuclear dramas 
with discussion of the issues by various 'experts' as a device to bridge the gap 
between the competing claims and to reassert the status of scientists, 
technostrategists and politicians as 'truth-speakers'.
Chapter four deals with space. It is discovered that there have been 
several shifts and convergences during the research period in both the space- 
set SF fictions and actual space activity. The most important of the shifts 
appears to have occurred after the successful Moon landings when there was 
no immediate continuation on to Mars. During this period, the primacy of 
science in speaking about the future in space was replaced, as economic 
discourse became most powerful. An examination of both fictional and non- 
fictional portrayals of the future in space reveals the growing importance of 
economic concerns. It is suggested that this is because the agenda for space 
exploration had long been set by SF and when science was no longer able to 
deliver on the promises of SF, some other discourse was required to 'explain' 
the failure.
The fifth chapter deals with the special case of the TV and film series 
Star Trek. Unlike the majority of the space fictions considered in the previous 
chapter, the Star Trek fictions are not constrained by economic issues and, 
unlike almost all other future fictions examined, they present an optimistic view 
of the future. I argue that this is because Star Trek presents a nostalgic future.
constrained by its 60's TV genesis. The dominant discourse here is a moral- 
ideological one, and the interrelationship of Star Trek and NASA provides an 
opportunity further to explore the relevance of the concept 'hyperreality'.
12
briefly dealt with in chapter four.
The sixth chapter considers the case of artificial beings - robots, 
intelligent computers, androids and cyborgs. I use a Greimasian approach to 
explore the relationships between the categories 'human' and 'machine' 
which generate artificial beings. The changes within the fictions as certain 
categories of being become scientifically more feasible are explored. The 
characteristics of artificial humans are revealed to be analogous to those of 
the subjects of colonial discourse and the concept 'hybridity' proves 
particularly useful. Again the power of scientific discourse is limited by the 
prevalence of fiction and non-fictional coverage of related areas is shown to 
be low key and involve denial.
In the conclusion, the final examination of the role of scientific discourse 
as speaking most 'truthfully' finds this much modified by other discourses 
when the temporal setting is the future. Some techniques to manage the threat 
of fictionality are outlined. Material from the six separate areas is brought 
together to see how the personal mode, while not directly deployed in film and 
TV programmes about the future, is nonetheless detectable as an alternative 
approach, primarily telling stories about death and masculinist (re-) 
production. I also note the dominance of a pessimistic tone in talking about the 
future. 'Hybridity', which proved so explanatory for artificial beings is 
announced as more widely characteristic, as fiction and non-fiction, scientific 
and non-scientific discourses prove inevitably intermingled.
1 : STAR WARS/STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE
The simple central question of this thesis is 'how is the future talked 
about?' The focus on film and television involves examining both-how it is 
talked about in these media and also how it is talked about through them. In 
effect this is a matter of intertextual presentation, where a particular vision of 
the future is shown in a specific film or television programme, and extratextual 
deployment. For this latter, the question is how do we use film and television 
in talking about the future?
The first area cdhsidered is the very peculiar instance of talking about the 
future through film that drew me to the subject - the use of the title of the film 
Star Wars^ to name a piece of American military policy. Oddities of this 
slippage between two normally distinct discourses which will be investigated 
include: using the film's title while apparently ignoring its content; taking from 
fiction to apply to the non-fictional; and using SF without its usual derogatory 
connotations. The adoption of the term was so recent, it was possible to trace 
substantially how it had occurred. It was necessary however to do this tracing 
through newspapers since they provide the permanent record of the public 
events. The televisual evidence is no longer available.
Military policy may not initially seem to be a major way in which the future 
is talked about, but this is indeed what it is. It involves projections of, and 
extrapolations from, presently perceived threats or territorial ambitions. 
Scenarios are detailed around possible future consequences of these which 
involve both plans for the deployment of extant military technology and the 
selection of particular proposals for the development, or indeed the invention, 
of pertinent military hardware. At its most straightforward, the Star 
Wars/Strategic Defense Initiative programme envisaged a future in which the 
US would be attacked by nuclear missiles (most probably from the Soviet 
Union) but would be able to remain secure behind a protective shield.
The film Star Wars was released with very heavy promotion in 1977 and 
rapidly became the most successful film ever made in terms of non-inflation 
adjusted box office rentals. It lost this position to ET: The Extraterrestrial in
’ where 'Star Wars' is simply the title of the film, it appears in italics, where it is the title of the 
projected military programme, it does not, nor does it when it seems an amalgam of the 
two. Style and capitalisation inside quotations from other sources, are as they were in the 
source.
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1982, but still holds the second position, with its two sequels. The Empire 
Strikes Back and Return o f the Jed! holding fifth and third places 
respectively^. Since Star Wars is also the series title®, the first aspect of 
the term which should be noted is its association with the potent combination 
of financial success and pleasure.
The series is set in space but in a mythic past. Because this temporal 
setting is only referred to in the printed prologue and a space setting in all 
other SF film indicates the future, the 'pastness' of Star Wars has never been 
accorded much importance by those talking about it and, in a collapsing of 
temporal referents, it is far more likely to be referred to as talking about the 
future. In the first film the family of the young hero, Luke Skywalker, is 
destroyed on the orders of the villian Darth Vader. Luke then comes under the 
tutelage of Obi-Wan Kenobi, an adept of a mystical martial art, and joins with 
him in a rebellion against the tyrannical Evil Empire which Vader serves. 
Much of the weaponry in the film, both hand-held and projected, is 
represented by beams of light. Although the term 'laser' is never used in the 
film, current popular scientific understanding allows these weapons to be 
referred to extra-textually as 'laser weapons'. At the conclusion Luke joins in 
an attack on the Death Star, the Empire's supposedly impregnable, 'laser'- 
armed, space battle station. The mystical martial order believe in the power of 
'the Force' and Luke calls on this when, at the end of the film, he turns off the 
targetting computer in his fighter ship to rely on greater powers/instinct in 
dropping the bomb which sets off a nuclear explosion and destroys the Death
Star. ------------------------- -------
The film's catch phrase, "May the Force be with You" (the blessing of the 
adepts), rapidly became adopted as mediated common speech - in newpaper 
headlines, teenage magazines, and TV comedy programmes - and was used 
by some politicians, including Ronald Reagan, to give a light, common or 
folksy touch to their various addresses. Reagan also used the term 'Evil 
Empire' to refer to the Soviet Union in a particularly widely publicized speech.
2 Details from "Top 100 All-time Rental Champions", Variety, 24 January 1990, p46. 
{Batman was fourth.) The figures are for US-Canadian rentals only. Despite this, they are 
generally referred to as the best available.
®When Star Wars was first released In 1977, it had no formal sub-title - the first words on the 
screen after the title were "The Story Begins . and it was sometimes referred to as 
this to differentiate it from the series title. In 1982, it was formally given a sub-title, "A New 
Hope". It is hardly ever referred to as this. Little information on the name change is available. It 
was registered in the British Board of Fiim Censors Monthly List ior Aph\ 1982.
15
The language of the film, then, moved very swiftly from the text itself and 
associated entertainment material into the political arena. More, however, was 
to come. The release of the second film in 1980 and anticipatory promotion of 
the third to be released in 1983, ensured that these references remained 
current throughout the early 80s.
Use of the film in references to laser weapons can be found quite soon 
after the film's massive popularity became evident. A particularly interesting 
example is given by Peter Moss in an analysis of some 1980 issues of SSAM 
- a US Department of Defense tabloid issued to the military for both 
information and entertainment. He examines an article on laser weaponry 
which depends heavily on Star Wars to make complex weapons 
comprehensible. One of the article's illustrations is of Darth Vader and Obi- 
Wan Kenobi fighting; the overall title is "Laser - May the Force be with you" 
and the concluding paragraph tells the soldier-reader,
"[o]nce you marvelled at fictional space age heroes 
and their Amazing Ray Guns. Soon it may be 
turnabout - with Buck [Rogers], [Captain] Kirk and 
Luke [Skywalker] smacking their lips at YOUR 
tech manuals".^
Popular accessible imagery is being used here to convey information about 
the potential of directed energy weapons. This is an example of the use of SF 
to explain phenomena, characteristically used in speaking to the less 
informed.
An article published in July 1981 entitled "Star Wars Weapons May 
Come True" also does this, pointing out that
"a treaty between Washington and Moscow 
could defuse the potential for Star Wars
It describes some space-based weaponry and continues
" . . .  military experts note that the Soviet Union 
and the US are already taking the first steps
^Peter Moss: "Rhetoric of Defense in the United States: Language, Myth and Ideology" in 
Paul Chilton (ed.): Language and the Nuclear Arms Debate, London, Frances Pinter, 
1985. p54. [Original emphasis.]
®Paul Recer: "Star Wars Weapons May Come True", US News and World Report, XCI(40), 
27 July 1981, pp46-48. p46
16
toward this star-wars future".®
The plan, which involved substantial dependence on lasers, envisaged 
'space-warriors' orbiting the globe and patrolling a line between the Earth and 
the Moon. The journal obviously saw SF, not just Star Wars, as a prime 
means for conveying this kind of information to its readers, because a boxed 
insert on the same page described magnetic railguns as the manifestation of 
"Jules Verne's most exotic vision". Again SF is functioning to provide 
convertible images to explain the scientific components of a proposal to a 
popular audience.
Anti-satellite devices and other aspects of space warfare came under 
examination in Congress in 1983. On 3 February, Senator Paul Tsongas had 
introduced a resolution calling for the US
"to begin negotiations with the Soviets for a complete 
ban on space weaponry..  [and]..  for a UN effort to 
extend the 1967 Outer Space Treaty."^
In doing so, he noted
"[a]ready underway is the next, still more costly, 
step in the space war. Weapons to destroy 
ballistic missiles, including Star Wars style laser and 
particle beam weapons. Such systems are not 
just science fiction; they are now being developed 
both in this country and the Soviet Union, for 
deployment before the end of the century."®
This is a rather neutral, but still explanatory, use of the film metaphor, but one
that acknowledges the distinction between the discourses of science fiction 
and politico-military ones m setting up the opposition between,science fiction 
and 'actual' developments. Many more examples of this precise distinction, 
which I will refer to as the 'SF disclaimer', will be given in the course of this 
study. —
On 23 March 1983, President Reagan gave a televised speech to the 
nation on Military Spending and a New Defense. This has become known as
®lbid..
^Senator Larry Pressler: Star Wars: The Strategic Defense Initiative in Congress, New York, 
Praeger, 1986. p11 
®lbid., pi 2
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the Star Wars speech. What is surprising is not so much that does it not 
contain that term, but that it does not contain any reference to space. In the 
final fifth of the speech, the President announced his dissatisfaction with 
current US nuclear strategy based on Mutual Assured Destruction and 
continued,
"Let me share with you a vision of the future 
which offers hope."
In this vision, the US
"could intercept and destroy strategic ballistic 
missiles before they reached our own soil or 
that of our allies."
The ultimate aim, he said, was to render nuclear weapons "impotent and 
obsolete".® References to outer space and to directed-energy weapons 
were made only in background press briefings by White House officials, but 
these were subsequently taken to be the real substance of the proposals. 
Presumably, the interception and destruction of strategic ballistic missiles only 
makes sense if conducted in outer space. The New York Times the next day 
printed the full text of the speech and in its accompanying story used the term 
'umbrella' as its main metaphoric figure. It also referred to the 'High Frontier' 
plan (to use off-the-shelf technology to create an immediate space-based 
defense system), though it called this plan 'military utopianism' and pointed 
out Pentagon disapproval of it.’ ®
Congressional response was different. Democrats, hostile to the 
proposal, immediately deployed the language of popular culture, and 
especially SF, to emphasise the pTdposal's lack of crëdibilitÿ^ ^^  ^
speech. Congressman Les Au Coin referred to "D r Strangeiove insanity". 
Congressman Ted Weiss, in probably the first actual usage, talked about 
"futuristic Sfar Wars schemes". Congressman Thomas J. Dewey said that
"the only thing the President did not tell us last 
night was that the Evil Empire was about to 
launch the Death Star against the United States",
®Ronald Reagan: "Speech on Military Spending and a New Defense", The New York Times, 
24 March 1983, pA20 
^°lbid„ pA21
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and Congressman Edward J. Markey, in an absolute tour de force, as 
reported by Senator Larry Pressler, explained that, to the President
" "the Forces of Evil are the Soviets, They are 
Darth Vader. We are Luke Skywalker and we 
are the Force of Good." Edward Teller, the 
original ET, Mr Markey asserted, must not be 
allowed to lead us into "some kind of pinball 
outerspace war between the 'Force of Evil' and 
'the Force of Good' ". ’
In the official Democrat response to the President's speech. Senator Daniel K. 
Inouye referred not only to a "Star Wars scenario", but also to "Buck Rogers 
weapons"’ ®. The dominance of SF film references in attacks on the scheme 
is very evident from the beginning. Four different films are referred to, but more 
importantly, all but one of the five men quoted refers to Star Wars. It is 
obviously the most powerful, as well as the most recent, source of referents. 
The Democrats were using SF not as a provider of explanatory imagery, but to 
exploit its negative connotations as a popular fic tio n a l discourse, the very 
reverse of 'serious' scientific discourse. In this usage the opposition is 
absolute; if something is SF, it cannot be scientific. In describing the proposal 
as SF, the Democrats intended to dismiss it. Supporters of the President's 
plan demonstrated their recognition of the incommensurate statuses of the two 
discourses and the force of the Democrat's device by using no references to 
SF, and only doing so later to rebut attacks by rejecting the ascription.
Terms derived from Star Wars shifted from being explanatory images 
predominantly referring to weaponry and derogatory only to the extent that 
they indicated that the reader was expected to lack scientific education, to 
being used to dismiss the Presiderrt's visidn. By 27 
York Times had fully adopted the use which is still current, referring in its first 
editorial to a Star Wars competition with the Soviets, and dropping the 
inverted commas previously used to designate the film title.’ ® A page one 
article on space weapons and the Outer Space Treaty on the same day, refers 
to them as "the ray guns of science fiction", instancing perhaps that it was 
already becoming necessary to have separate terms for the instruments and
’ ’ Pressler: Star Wars. [All four Congressmen are quoted on pp66-67.] ------
’ ®Francis X. Clines: "Democrats Assert Reagan is Using Star Wars Scare to Hide Blunders", 
The New York Times, 25 March 1983, pA9 
’ ®(First Leader), The New York Times, 27 March 1983, p18E
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the scheme. On 31 March 1983, a full page advertisement for Scientific 
Am erican  opposite the leader page of The New York Times, displayed 
articles on directed energy weapons taken from the journal, with one of the 
two main captions reading
"Star Wars weapons: reason or rhetoric? Physics 
puts their feasibility in doubt as shown in Scientific 
American starting four years ago".’  ^
The separation between the discourses, with 'reason' covering physics and 
feasibility, while 'rhetoric' accounts for the SF component, is again evident. 
The same issue of The New York Times also indicates the first shift of the 
term into the Reagan camp when the "Washington Talk" page included in an 
article on problems among Reagan's aides, a reference to how,
"The proposal quickly became known as Mr.
Reagan's answer to the film Star Wars".’ ®
On the surface. Star Wars seemed an unlikely title for Reagan's vision. In 
the film, the laser weapon which led to the kind of use of the term exemplified 
earlier by the article from SSAM, was a light sabre used only in ritual hand- 
to-hand combat. The closest parallel within the film to any of the weapons or 
weapon systems under consideration, was the Death Star itself - set in space 
and laser armed. This was the possession of the Evil Empire and the target of 
the (good) rebels, whose aim throughout the film was to destroy it. The 
principal use of a space-based directed-energy weapon was when the Death 
Star destroyed the peaceful planet Alderaan. At first sight, this appears an 
unlikely source for an analogy for the benign system the President had 
envisaged." Jane C ^utiTw ho ihclL^ argument on Sfar Wars similar to 
mine in her wider examination of what she calls 'phallotechnology', sees this 
destruction of the planet as u n c o n s c io u s ly  the central moment of the 
conjunction of film and military programme.
"The shared naming is completely logical for 
each visualizes/portends the complete 
destruction of the earth."’ ®
’ ^(Advertisement), The New York Times, 31 March 1983, p24A 
’ ^"Washington Talk", The New York Times, 31 March 1983, p12B
’ ®Jane Caputi: "Seeing Elephants: The Myths of Phallotechnology", Feminist Studies, 14(3), 
Fall 1988, pp487-524. p519. [Caputi's article, which was published after the writing of the
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The purpose of the Democrats' use of the term, however, was not to point 
out the destructive potential of the proposal, but to ridicule it by using a 
discourse the connotations of which implied that the proposal was far-fetched. 
Concurrent use of other film references like Dr Strangeiove and Buck  
Rogers function in the same way. References to Dr Strangeiove carried 
implications of nuclear megalomania. Those to Buck Rogers implied good 
intentions but total impossibility and fantasy. When later, in 1984, the ex­
astronaut Senator John Glenn expressed reservations about the deployment 
of particle beam weapons, he too referred to Reagan wanting to look like Buck 
Rogers,’ 7 intensifying the negative connotations.
There does not seem to have been any intention to imply an equivalence 
between the President's plans and those of the Empire in the film. The Empire 
was not equated with the United States. The overt references to the Death 
Star, Darth Vader and the Evil Empire in the various Congressmen's 
pronouncements were all linked to the Soviet Union. In applying 'Star Wars' 
as a term of derision, it appears that the Democrats used it more as a free- 
floating signifier, disregarding the specific content of the film and simply 
exploiting the negative and fictional status of SF to accomplish the 
degradation and dismissal of the projected programme. The vehicle chosen 
for the dismissal was the highest profile SF film which included at least one 
relevant word - 'wars'. A much more relevant title of dismissal would have 
been 'Space Invaders', because of the overt similarities between the 
destruction of incoming missiles in the video-game and Reagan's vision, but 
this does not appear except in Congressman Markey's 'pinball outer space 
war'. The practice of debunking political proposals by film references of any 
kind is a fairly standard procedure; it ascribes fictionality. but not as strongly as 
using SF film, with its added denial of scientific feasibility, does.
— . The use of Star Wars as a-way of referring to the proposal was not limited 
to the US. In Britain, The Times page one article on 25 March 1983 quoted 
Senator Edward Kennedy referring to
"misleading scare tactics and the reckless Star
Wars schemes of the President".’ ®
first draft of this chapter, also uses a number of the same sources.]
’ ^Pressler: Sfar Wars, p136
’ ^Richard Owen: "Reagan Accused of Violating Pacts", The Times, 25 March 1983, ppl and 
32. pi
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On 30/3/83, again on the front page, the President's speech was twice 
described as "the Star Wars speech", though the plan was explained as 
being for a "space-age protective u m b re lla " .L a te r in the same issue, an 
article reprinted from The New York Times used two other SF references - it 
was entitled "Why Reagan is Lost in Space" and quoted the former president 
of Jerome Wiesner, who dismissed the technical feasibility of the plan 
as "Buck Rogers warfare".20 The 'Star Wars' term seemed to become 
naturalized in The Times during the year, losing both the quotation marks 
and the need to be derived from an American source.
By the end of 1983, 'Star Wars' had become the ordinary term to refer to 
the President's proposal. The media had adopted the Democrats' naming of it, 
but did not necessarily do so dismissively. Star Wars, initially the term of 
opposition derision, slipped over to a more general, and arguably more 
neutral, use. Speaking of this slippage, Keith Payne notes that at first the term
"was meant to discredit the program by making 
it seem fanciful, even silly. . .  On the other hand, 
most Americans enjoyed the movie Star Wars, 
believe that the Soviet Union is indeed an 
'Evil Empire' and, according to recent poll data, 
believe that American technology can make 
defense against nuclear weapons possible."^^
In other words, the dismissive device failed to work fully at a popular level, 
where SF was often a source of convertible images, where the film had been 
pleasurable, and where there appeared to be a 'fit' between the name and 
ideological conceptions about the proposal. All this was aided by there being 
^no other moreJormal name readiiy avaiiabie. The President's speech had 
used none and nor did subsequent White House comment. Reports referred to 
'Anti-missiie ideas*7'a Space Defense Pian' and perhaps most frequentiy to a 
'Mjssile Defense Plan', but none of these was used consistently, nor did they 
sound particularly specific - certainly they lacked any memorability or popular 
appeal. ______
It may or may not be completely incidental to the adoption of the term that
 ^^ Nicholas Ashford: "Reagan to propose missile compromise". The Times, 30 March 1983, 
pi
^^Anthony Lewis: "Why Reagan is Lost in Space", The Times, 30 March 1983, pi 2 
Keith Payne: Strategic Defense: Star Wars in Perspective, Lanham MD., Hamilton 
Press,1986. pi 9
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the third film in the Star Wars trilogy, Return o f the Jedi, was released in May 
1983. One of the major sequences in this film is the battle between the (good) 
rebels and the Empire Startroopers on the moon Endor. The rebels are trying 
to destroy a generator which is maintaining a protective shield around the 
second Death Star in orbit above Endor. Again the main space weaponry is 
offensive and belongs to the Evil Empire; the good rebels must attack it on a 
personal level - in small fighter spacecraft or in virtual hand-to-hand combat 
on Endor. The shield furthermore is designed to protect neither people nor 
countries, but the space weapon itself. There is thus again, as there was with 
the first Death Star, a very great disparity between the aggressive-destructive 
use of space-based 'laser' weaponry in the film and the protective-defensive 
use of them projected by the Star Wars proposal. It does not however appear 
to have hindered the adoption of the name.
The collapsing of the distinction between offensive and defensive 
weapons and techniques is characteristic of military policy and discussions 
about it. As the adage 'attack is the best form of defence' makes clear, the 
distinction is often irrelevant; and invasions are usually justified as being in 
defence of some group or principle. Weapon systems may be adjudged good 
or bad on the basis of whether they are 'ours' or 'theirs', so the ownership of 
the 'laser' weaponry by the Evil Empire in the films is not necessarily relevant. 
The term 'shield' is however more important, especially as it is used both in 
the film and in the proposal. A shield is regarded as a protective device, and 
therefore benign, yet a shield in its literal military use is carried only by a 
fighter; it protects the body so the arm may wield a sword or spear. The shield 
around the Death Star is precisely such a device; it protects the weaponry. As 
will be shown later in the chapter, it is a major irony of the development of the 
Star Wars/SDI programme that this initial disparity between film and proposal 
has disappeared as the current plan has come to involve 'shielding' only the 
missile silos. _______
Initially the Star Wars story did not seem to be particularly important. The 
plan was not one of the big stories in the news of 1983. The shooting down of 
KAL007 and the invasion of Grenada were both given much more 
prominence, as was the start of campaigning for the 1984 Presidential 
election. As a defence story. Star Wars soon became overwhelmed by the 
Arms Control negotiations on the one hand and the funding of the MX missile 
on the other. There were even other high profile space stories, with the Space 
Shuttle claiming a deal of attention through sending the first American woman
23
into space and then the first black. 1983 was also NASA's twenty-fifth 
anniversary and Reagan announced the start of work towards a space station 
and eventual space factories.
In November 1983, however, the screening of the TV film The Day After, 
seen by an estimated sixty per cent of the U.S. population, and the 
subsequent debate focussing public attention on the consequences of a 
nuclear attack, were probably influential in returning the Star Wars proposal to 
some prominence. So too was the passage of its first budgetary allocation, 
which began in December. Despite the increased importance of the plan, 
there was still no recognized alternative to the name 'Star Wars'.
The term Strategic Defense Initiative, which was to become the formal 
alternative, was not used at all during 1983. Although there were a few 
references to 'strategic defense' (no capitals), these seem just to have been 
taken as relatively standard defence-speak. It is possible that the new term 
was used in National Security Decision Directive 119 which was signed on 6 
January 1984.22 The earliest public use of the term SDI that I can find is on 
28 March 1984, in a story on the appointment of Lt-Gen James A. 
Abrahamson
"to be the program manager of what the Reagan 
Administration calls the "strategic defense 
initiative" [no capitals], a program suggested a 
year ago by President Reagan."2^
No doubt a more acceptable, descriptive name for the Reagan plan was 
essential once a special office had been established and budgetary 
appropriations made. On 10 April 1984, the "Washington Talk" page of The 
New York Times included an item entitled "the name game''^which readjn 
part
"Jargon, labels and acronyms are an inevitable 
part of the political process. Defense and 
Administration officiais who are involved with 
President Reagan's year-old proposals for a 
new anti-ballistic missile programe are not 
pleased with the labei 'Star Wars'. It has been
22 This seems to be suggested in Keith Payne and Colin S. Gray: "Nuclear Policy and the 
Defense Transition", Foreign Policy, 62(4), Spring 1984, pp820-842.
22charles Mohr: "Générai to Head Missile Program" The New York Times, 28 March 1984, 
pA19
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pinned on the plan and it has stuck.
The officials prefer dry letters to the more 
flamboyant use of a science fiction movie title, 
and they are now referring to the President's 
plan as "SDI" for "strategic defense initiative". "24
The new term was not rapidly, and certainly not whole-heartedly, 
adopted. News reports even at the time of writing still use 'Star Wars' before 
'SDI' and explain SDI by reference to Star Wars.
A degree of unease with both the Star Wars and SDI terms was revealed 
by the call in February 1985 from The New York Times columnist, William 
Satire, for his readers to develop a useful new acronym for the programme. 
The first leader of the same day, which attacked the pian, used Star Wars as 
the name throughout, but also directed readers to Satire's semi-serious 
p i e c e . 2 5  A month later. Satire revealed some of the responses he had 
received, but suggested that perhaps the best name would be no acronym at 
all. Instead it should be called simply the 'shield'. He admitted, however, that 
he did not expect the Administration to be able to get rid of the term 'Star 
Wars'.2G
Satire's articles emphasise that the name of the programme was 
important, it was also the subject of a struggle. The Democrat's aim in this 
struggle was to dismiss by naming. The purpose of their metaphor was not to 
hide but to reveal the 'true' nature of the proposal - that the 'true' nature was a 
fiction and not an ordinary fiction furthermore, but a science fiction fantasy. In 
popular use, the metaphor was accepted as not necessarily derogatory, but 
perhaps as having a certain explanatory content. The Republicans, accepting 
that an SF name discredited the scientific basis of their proposal, rejected the 
term until eventually coming up with an alternative free of any suggestion of 
the fictional.
“ This struggle first over the use of the Democrat's term and then between 
the opposing terms Star Wars and SDI was a particularly overt instance of a 
d iscurs ive  struggle. 'Star Wars', drawn from the world of entertainment and 
denigrating the proposal through ascribing it to the fictional, vied for primacy 
with 'SDI' which called on the formalities of the non-fictional, 'scientific' military
24 _ _ "Briefing", The New York Times, 10 April 1984, p28A
2®Wiiliam Satire: "Acronym Sought", The New York Times Magazine, 24 February 1985 
2®Wiliiam Satire: "New Name tor 'Star Wars' ", The New York Times Magazine, 24 March 1985,
Section 6, Part 1, pp15-16.
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bureaucratie.
The notion of a discursive struggie is drawn from the work of Michel 
Foucault. To understand what was happening in this particular struggle, it is 
necessary to begin by iooking at what Foucault meant by the term 'discourse'. 
He held that discourses are
"practices that systematically form the objects of 
which they speak."27
They are groups of statements whose unity is formed not through identity of 
meaning or origin, but through systems of dispersion^s. The discourses on 
which he concentrated as examples included those of grammar and medicine. 
In every society, Foucault argued,
"the production of discourse is at once controlled, 
selected, organized and redistributed by a certain 
number of procedures whose role is to ward off 
its powers and dangers, to gain mastery over its 
chance events, to evade its ponderous, 
formidable materiality."^®
In analysing discourses, he advised the use of both critical and genealogical 
practices; the former identifying the principles of sanctioning, excluding and 
delimiting discourse, and the latter looking at
"the power to constitute domains of objects in 
respect of which one can affirm or deny true or 
false propositions".^®
But what constitutes a true proposition? For Foucault, truth did not arise out of 
an equivalence between a statement and; the 'reap object to which it 
corresponded, but rather from what, following Neitzsche, he cailed the 'will to 
truth'. Foucault was insistent that the will to truth was discursively constructed 
and historically contingent.® 1 th e  truth of a statement depended on its
2^MicheI Foucault: The Archaeology of Knowledge, London, Tavistock, 1972. p 49 
28|bid., p 37-8
2®Mlchel Foucault: "The Order of Discourse" (1970), in Michael Shapiro (ed.): Language and 
Politics, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1984. pi 09 
®°lbid., p i33 
®1 Ibid., pp ll 1-2
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discursively established ciaims to truth and the reiations of power through 
which its truth was effected. He termed this combination of knowledge and 
power a ’regime of truth'. Particular regimes of truth were dominant in 
particular epochs; in medieval Europe, claims to truth needed to be couched 
in religious terms; in contemporary Western societies, scientific discourses 
dominate.
"Each society has Its regime of truth, its 'general 
politics' of truth: that is, the types of discourse 
which it accepts and makes function as true; the 
mechanisms and instances which enable one to 
distinguish true and false statements, the means 
by which each is sanctioned; the techniques and 
procedures accorded value in the acquisition of 
truth; the status of those who are charged with 
saying what counts as true."®2
He then outlined five traits of the 'political economy' of truth as they operate in 
societies 'like curs'. First, he pointed out the centrality of scientific discourse,
'' '[t]ruth' is centred on the form of scientific 
discourse and the institutions which produce it".®®
The remaining traits refer to: how truth is actively demanded for both political 
and economic purposes; how it is widely diffused and consumed through 
educational and informational apparatuses; how a limited number of powerful 
apparatuses like the university and the media dominate its production and 
transmission; and how it is itself the stake - what is at issue in "political debate 
and social confrontation".®^
The discursive struggle over the naming of Star Wars can thus be seen to 
be over a most contentious area - in what discourse 'true' statements may_ be 
made about the future. Who is able to make them, or more precisely who is 
able to make them operate as 'truth', is also important. Foucault emphasises 
the possibility of variation in the latter respect by pointing out how some 
discourses are controlled by limiting access to their use, while others appear 
"almost open to all winds".®® Satire's attempt to encourage popular renaming
^^Michel Foucault: Power/Knowledge, p131 
®®lbid..
®" l^bid., pp131-2
®®Foucault : "The Order of Discourse", p120
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suggested that this discourse was open, but his later acknowledgement that 
he (and his readers) were actually powerless to alter the name, was a 
recognition that the discourse was effectively closed.
Because it will be so important to what follows, it is necessary to expand 
further how Foucault is using the term 'scientific discourse'. Most pertinent for 
my purposes is his rejection of an equation of 'science' and 'true knowledge of 
the real'. In considering discourse, Foucault abandons a 'realist' conception of 
language and scientific knowledge.
"Knowledge is to be found not only in 
demonstrations, it can also be found in fiction, 
reflexion, narrative accounts, institutional 
regulations, and political decisions."®®
Although in the majority of his works, his principai focus is on the human 
rather than the natural sciences, the distinction between them is less important 
in The Archaeology o f Knowledge where Foucault is pondering the 
conditions in which "a region of scientificity in a given discursive formation" 
emerges.®^ He outlines a form of historical analysis situated at this very point 
of emergence, one purpose of which
"is to discover, for example, how a concept - still 
overlaid with metaphors or imaginary contents - was 
purified, and accorded the status and function of a 
scientific concept. "®®
Despite being mainly concerned here with histories of sciences, Foucault's 
emphasis on the importance of micro-relational aspects of power within 
discursive formations is characteristic. It suggests a potentially productive way 
to consider the particular problem over the title of Reagan's military policy
proposal - the impurity of its imaginary name. - _________ ____
In examining the Star Wars case I wili be paying particular attention to 
the role of science (which in this study means the 'hard' sciences and 
technology, rather than the human sciences), in the privileged regime of truth, 
questions of access, the relations between power and knowledge and the 
constraints of the will to truth elaborated in Foucault's work. I will also be 
taking from Foucault the idea that discourse is itself an object of desire,
®®Foucault : Archaeology, pp 183-4 
® l^bid., pi 84 
®®lbid., pi 90
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"not simply that which translates struggles or 
systems of domination, but. . .  the thing for 
which and by which there is struggle."®®
Desire here refers to the way in which discourse is not only a means through 
which the struggle for power and domination is effected, but the issue itself. 
Each side has made an investment in establishing the 'truth' of the discursive 
content and wants its own truth claim acknowledged.
The first discursive struggle or clash was simply over the acceptance or 
rejection of a particular name. The supporters could not accept the name, 
since that involved accepting the ascription of fantasy which the use of a 
fictional discourse entailed. They suggested no alternative, perhaps because 
the programme being suggested was still too dispersed and unfocussed. They 
concentrated instead on the question of the 'true' nature of the programme 
which they chose to approach through its feasibility. To do this they needed to 
evoke the belief in technological competence, the mastery of 'reality' by 
science and the can-do inventive spirit central to the American myth. Jeff 
Smith, for example, stresses how, in American popular culture, technology is 
not neutral, is seen as
"the product of American ingenuity and the 
backbone of this country's strength . . .
Technical advancement makes the world a 
better place, and by leading the way in 
technical advancement, America makes the 
 - __________world a better piace."^® ^
In the Star Wars speech. President Reagan was appealing to this belief. 
Dominique Pignon, writing of European responses to SDI, also points out the 
ideological aspect, arguing that those who attack the programme on its 
scientific or technological weaknesses alone are ignoring its political function.
"Technology and science have been surrounded 
_ by the media with such a magical aura that any
®®Foucault: "The Order of Discourse",p110
4®Jeff Smith: "Reagan, Star Wars and American Culture", Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 
43(1), Jan/Feb 1987, pp19-25. p21
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reservations about the possibility of technology 
could only come from 'losers' and 'Cassandras'. "41
The emphasis on technological competence needed to be spoken in formal 
'truthful' scientific language, hence 'SDI'. Through the use of 'SDI', the 
Reagan initiative became linked to American technological capability so that 
to doubt one was to impugn the other.
For the popular audience (unlike the poiitical representatives) there was 
no lack of accord between claims to technological competence and Star 
Wars referents - both of the competing terms spoke of the 'can-do' spirit. The 
film audience were never left in any doubt that Luke Skywalker would deliver 
the plans of the Death Star to the right people, nor that they would invent a 
counter or discover a weakness in it, nor that Luke would succeed in dropping 
his bomb into the thermal duct. The audience could not apply the word 
'impossible' to the activities of the good guys. Similarly, it was difficult for a 
people steeped in the belief of their nation's technological capabilities to 
accept the Democrat's assertion that the desire for a technological defense 
against nuclear weapons was itself 'impossible'.
This would seem to be a major ground on which the Democrats' attempt 
to dismiss by naming, and so win the discursive and ideological battle, failed. 
'Star Wars' was not the free-floating signifier they had assumed. It carried with 
it more than just the capability to ascribe fantasy through identification with an 
SF film. It also carried some of the narrative components of the film and some 
of the affective responses to it. The message of Star Wars embodied in the 
philosophy of the Jedi Knights, was that, if one believed in oneself and 
opposed 'the Dark Side of the Force', all was possible. Through repeated and 
not necessarily negative, media use, the name became disarticulated from its 
association with the Death Star and with fantasy and rearticulated to the can- 
do spirit and the desire for security.
The childlike character of Sfar W ars was ^ Iso  important. It spoke of 
moral certainties and admitted no shades of grey. It was
"about mankind's seemingly unlimited potential, 
above all emotionally, for goodness and greatness.
The film is indeed what Lucas has called it 'an 
Intergalactic dream of heroism' ."42
41 Dominique Pignon: "The Strategic Defense Initiative and Europe", Telos, No. 67, Spring 
1986, PP45-56, p51
42Anne Lancashire: "The Star Wars Saga: Comedy Versus Tragedy", The Dalhousie
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This aspect of the film contributed to the popular pos itive  attribution of its 
name to Reagan's plan. It was this that the Democrats called up along with the 
dismiss-as-fantasy device and this was one reason that their naming failed. 
Reagan's offer of an almost fairy-tale invulnerability from nuclear attack spoke 
clearly through this childhood dream. (Both supporters and opponents of the 
scheme were later to acknowledge the strength of childlike optimism in its 
appeal. The television commercials each side made and had broadcast in the 
US in 1986 featured children's visions. The supporters used a child's drawing 
of a rainbow protecting a house, while the opponents had a child watching the 
stars with a voice-over message wondering if further children would be able to 
do the s a m e . 4 3 )
It is possible that the positive or neutral attachment of the Star Wars 
name was an example of a more general shift in the discursive strategy of 
dismissal by allegation of science fictionality. The Democrats had attempted to 
identify Reagan's proposal with SF and thus with fictional fantasies. Yet a 
significant number of the cliches of the SF genre had become actualities. 
Technological devices like robots and waldos drew their names from 
appearances in SF before they were fully realized in actuality; communication 
satellites too appeared first in SF; spaceships, transpiants and holograms had 
become commonplace, and so had test-tube babies. It was beginning to seem 
more the case that if an SF writer could think of an invention, American 
technology could bring it about. The set phrase behind the Democrat's 
strategy, 'that's just science fiction', had become 'this may look like science 
fiction, but . . . '; the first one was just dismissive, but the second 
acknowledged the dismissal only to refute it. This second phrase, a tacit 
acknowledgement of the equivocal status of SF, has become common in 
political and popular scientific discourse, and not fust in the US (as^will 
become evident in the course of this study). A version of it has already been 
quoted earlier in this chapter in Senator Paul Tsongas' 3 February 1984 
speech. I do not wish to suggest that the practice of dismissing something by 
calling it SF is no longer valid, just that it is no longer necessarily successful. 
The equivocal status of SF comes from outside its own field of fictionality, on a 
number of achievements that are within the scientific domain, that can call on 
a scientific basis for their'truth'.
Review, 62(1), Spring 1982, pp5-13. p6 
43Mlchael Cockereii: "Debating Star Wars in rhymes and rainbows", The Listener, V.115, No
2949, 27 February 1986, pp7-8, 12.
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The attempt to dismiss Reagan's proposal solely by describing the 
proposed strategy as science fictional failed because it overlooked the 
narrowing of the gap between SF and what was seen to be technologically 
feasible. The discourses of science and SF are not as disparate as the 
Democrats had assumed. To give an example of a scientific proposal that it is 
difficult to distinguish from an SF device, a scientific report to the SDI Office by 
the Defensive Technologies Study Team (the Fletcher Panel) set up by the 
President, talked of a one hundred metric ton shield to protect the space- 
based components physically. To build such a massive object they suggested
"Material from the lunar surface or from nearby 
asteroids can be brought to the vicinity of the
Earth".44
This is an instance of a more general point; the inability to keep the referents 
of fictional and scientific discourses separate. It is often no longer possible to 
tell easily whether some future artefact is scientific forecast or SF fantasy. This 
may be because the distinction has become blurred from both sides; a 
growing body of SF is being written by practicing scientists, and devices which 
were science-fictional have been developed in actuality. 'A laser space battle 
station' could be forecast or fantasy and sometimes not even the context helps 
decide which it actually is. This convergence between the two discourses is a 
key element in the current argument.
Thus, the Democrats succeeded in attaching the name 'Star Wars', but 
faiied in their attempt thereby to ridicule the plan into abandonment. It was still 
possible to use the term dismissively, but it needed a contemptuous 
intonation, a suitable context or the additional 'so-called'. This did not mean 
that the Adminlg jr^ tlo ji would acœpt the term however. The scientific 
discourse remains the most potent one in which to assert the truth of 
statements. Even if the source of the Star Wars name could be overlooked, it 
sounded too frivolous, too unscientific to be the pubiic name of such a hi-tech 
military strategy.
PROFESSIONAL LANGUAGE
The name 'SDI' had neither of these drawbacks. It was not an acronym 
as the letters did not make a pronouncable word. This emphasised its
44DonaId L. Hafner: "Assessing the President's Vision: The Fletcher, Miller and Hoffman 
Panels", Daedulus, 114(2), Spring 1985, pp91-107, p95 (Quoting from Aviation Week 
and Space Technoigy, 17/10/83, pi 9)
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seriousness. It made no promises of any specific achievements, since 
'initiative' refers oniy to a beginning and an Initiative that has its own Office 
and a sizable budget has certainly made a beginning. And the word 'Defense' 
stressed that all the spending was necessary because of the urgent need to 
develop protection against the likelihood of attack. The most important asset of 
the term SDI though, was that it excluded. It marked out the discursive terrain 
as limited. Discussion of the programme thus became the preserve of the 
professional, not of the public at iarge. Star Wars was an inclusive term, 
everyone could use it. This was useful because it gave the proposal an air of 
popular appeal, but it also made its meaning uncertain and imprecise. Keith 
Payne, while claiming that opinion polls showed seventy-five to eigthy-five per 
cent of the US population supported
"the concept of protection against nuclear attack 
with 'Star Wars' weapons",45
points out in a footnote that the level of support decreased when the term 'Star 
Wars' was used.46 Whether this reveais some success in the Democrats' 
attempts, as he believes, or the greater power of the Republican's scientific 
term, is uncertain.
Arthur C. Clarke, delivering the Nineteenth Jawahrlal Nehru Memorial 
Lecture in New Dehli on 13 November 1986, thought he knew what 'Star 
Wars' was evoking.
"The name 'Star Wars' - deplored both by President 
Reagan and the indignant George Lucas - has 
distorted the Strategic Defense Initiative's public 
image. In particular, it has focussed attention on
as they rise out of their silos - or if they miss the first 
“  time, catching the warheads before they can re­
enter the atmosphere.
But the problems of building and above all powering 
such veritable 'Death Stars' are e n o r m o u s . " 4 7
As a scientist and also one of the most famous and respected SF writers in the
^^Payne: strategic Defense, p23 
46|bid., p 26n
47Arthur C. Clarke: "Star Wars and Star Peace, interdisciplinary Science Reviews, 12(3), Sept. 
1987, PP272-277. p274
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world, Clarke mediates between both discourses. Delivering a prestigious 
political lecture, he attacks the scientific feasibility of the miiitary programme, 
dismissively referring to 'Death Stars' and asserting that the SF title has 
misled the public. His reputation, founded on the 'invention' of communication 
satellites and spread by the success of the films 2001: A Space Odyssey and 
2010, both based on his stories, enabies him to speak definitively on the 
struggle, so it is noteworthy that he prefers the term SDI, despite his 
opposition to the proposai. By 1986, this was undoubtedly the term with 
scientific clout.
It is a characteristic of professions to develop specialized vocabularies to 
speak of their work. Writing of the development of professional languages, 
JoAnne Brown argues that an esoteric vocabulary is developed or created to 
reinforce the monopolization of skill essential for professionalization and to 
stress the particularity of its technical base.4® Such a language excludes and 
access to it is limited. However, there remains the problem of how to 
communicate with the clientele. This is where metaphors enter the scene. She 
argues that metaphors are the most commonly used devices for explaining 
matters to those outside the profession without giving 'secrets' aw ay .4® The 
Star Wars metaphor may have had this function as far as lay people were 
concerned, but it was unsatisfactory to the professionals since it was not under 
their control. The professionals in this case were the Administration, scientists, 
and what Carol Cohn calls 'defence intellectuals',®® and Robin Luckham 
'security intellectuals'.®"* By contrast, SDI is an acronym rather than a 
metaphor, but as a term created by the professionals it serves the same 
function in popular communication as metaphorical language in resolving, in 
Brown's terms,
"the contradiction between popularity 
and monopoly that lies at the heart of the 
project of professionalization, because it 
advertises without disclosing, and sells 
without delivering, the special knowledge that 
is the professionals' commodity".®®
4®JoAnne Brown: "Professional Language: Words that Succeed", Radical History Review, 
No. 34, Jan. 1986, pp33-51. p36
®°Carol Cohn; "Sex and Death in the Rational World of the Defense Intellecfuals", Signs, 
12(4), Summer 1987, pp687-718. p687 
®1 Robin Luckham: "Armament Culture", Alternatives, 10(1), Summer 1984, pp1-44. p11
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In fact, SDI did not have a straightforwardly uncontroversial career in the 
media. Initially commentators derided the new term, as The New York Times 
did in April 1984, although the persistent use of it in Administration 
pronouncements rapidly made this difficuit. Speaking seriousiy about the 
proposal came to involve, at the very least, using both terms. Martin Amis for 
example, in an extended review of 'SDI and its Literature' for The Observer, 
demonstrated how far this move from one term to the other had gone. He used 
the term 'SDI' eighteen times and 'Star Wars' only twice - once to establish 
what SDI was and then as the title of the Reagan speech.®® 'Star Wars' 
ensures that one is understood by the general public, but 'SDI' is more 
important since it means that one can be taken account of by the 
professionals, and not dismissed immediately as speaking solely to the 
populace at large.
Perhaps the most thorough examination of what she terms 
'technostrategic discourse' is Carol Cohn's account of her year in a carefully 
unidentified US university centre on defence technology and arms control. 
She provides a practical example of Foucault's comments about discourse 
and truth, quoted earlier in of this chapter. At first, she noted the blandness, 
abstraction, euphemism, even inverted meaning in this type of language and 
the prevalence of certain sets of metaphors: medical ones like 'surgical strike'; 
sexual ones - 'deep penetration', 'nuclear virginity'; homely ones 'silos', 
'footprints'; and theological ones - the first atomic bomb test was called Trinity. 
(Brown noted that both medical and theological metaphors are very common, 
especially in times of professional crisis.®^) Later, Cohn went on to discuss 
the pleasures of the use of this discourse. She stresses not so much the 
utilitarian one whereby it
"restricted communication to the initiated, 
leaving all others both uncomprehending 
and voiceless in the debate",®®
but rather
"the thrill of being able to manipulate an arcane
5®Brown: "Professional Language", p48
®®Martin Amis: "Apocalypse 2000", The Observer, 31 January 1988, p27 
®4Brown: "Professional Language", p39 
55cohn: "Sex and Death", p703
35
language, the power of entering the secret 
kingdom, being someone in the know."®®
Developing linguistic competency in this type of professional language, she 
argues, gave an illusion of being in control and made her less frightened of 
nuclear war, partly because the language itself is structured to remove the 
speakers from the position of victims and piace them instead as planners and 
users
Not only did the ianguage site the speaker, it also structured what it was 
possible to speak about. In technostrategic discourse, the equivalent term for 
'peace', for example, was 'strategic stability'; the kiliing of civilians was 
'collateral damage'. Ignoring the restrictions led to the speaker being defined 
as non-professionai. As Cohn commented, to choose to speak of peace,
"is immediately to brand oneself as a soft-headed 
activist instead of an expert, a professional to be 
taken seriously".®®
In examining the conceptual system structuring the language, she found that 
the reference point of technostrategic discourse is the weapons themselves. 
The humans supposedly being protected by the weapons are irrelevant, truly 
collateral.®® What matters are the technical considerations, while moral, 
social and psychological matters are extraneous, even illegitimate. Her 
conclusion acknowledges the seductiveness of the language and learning to 
speak it, but she warns that it is
"a transformative rather than an additive process",®®
and opponents should be wary of learning it, thinking that ifwilFsimpl^^ 
they will be listened toJjy the_ prof_essipnaJs, since they will be listened to 
only as long as they stay within its peculiar constraints.
'SDI' is a fine example of the technostrategic professional language 
Cohn is writing about: It is abstract, bland and meaningful only if one assumes 
the inevitability of being attacked. The conflict between it and 'Star Wars' is
5®lbid., p704 
®^lbid., p704-6 
®S|bid., p708 
®®lbid., pp711-12 
®°lbid., p716
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also given extra point by her analysis. 'Star Wars' does involve people, invites 
moral judgements and is not weapon centred. This last, as Cohn made clear, 
is particularly contrary to technostrategic discourse. The President's vision, of 
protecting the American population and rendering nuclear weapons impotent 
and obsolete, was from the outset difficult to phrase technostrategically in a 
ianguage which is centred on weapons and cannot speak of people. Perhaps 
this is why it was so iong unnamed except by the Democrats. Now that the 
programme has been worked on by defence intellectuals and named 
scientifically, its technostrategic character can be observed. Thus there is the 
irony that much of the proposed SDI hardware will not render nuclear 
weapons obsolete, but will itself depend on nuclear weaponry. (For example, 
the X-ray laser, which is a central component of the programme, is powered 
by a nuclear explosion - the euphemism is 'nuciear-pumped' - which 
subsequently destroys it.) As I foreshadowed earlier, the current SDI plan is to 
protect the m issile siios, not the population. This is absolutely in keeping 
with Cohn's analysis.
Reagan continued to try to maintain his initial vision under its new 
technostrategic title and programme, but ironically often did so by referring to 
the 'illegitimate' name. In a speech at the National Space Club in 1985, he 
said
"the Strategic Defense Initiative has been 
labeiied 'Star Wars', but it isn't about war. It is 
about peace. It isn't about retaiiation, it's about 
prevention. It isn't about fear; it's about hope.
And in that struggie, if you'ii pardon my 
steaiing a fiim line 'the Force is with us'. "®1
The film in question is, of course, that very film Sfar Wars. The irresistibility of 
the populist position reactivates all the connotations he had been disputing
eariier and places the programme once againnn the fictional domain.-------------
In apparently being unable to escape from the Star Wars film imagery, 
Reagan demonstrates one of the discursive consequences of metaphor - its 
power to influence and constrain subsequent thinking about a subject. Yet 
metaphors also allow change. George Lakoff and Mark Johnson have pointed 
out how President Carter's declaration that the energy crisis was a state of war 
led to a number of consequences that were the result of thinking about war. 
This, in turn constituted a licence for policy changes and for otherwise
Gregg Herken: "The Earthly Origins of Star Wars", Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 43(8), 
Oct. 1987, PP20-28. p26
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unacceptable economic action.®® Similarly, the 'War' part of the film 
metaphor, despite Reagan's attempts to disown it, may have made contributed 
to the acceptance of the conversion of the plan into one designed to protect 
weapons.
The other part of the metaphor, 'Star', also proved persistent. Its potency 
may also be seen in the names used in reports of plans and projects by the 
Strategic Defense Initiative Office: announcing a new pointing and tracking 
mission called Starlab, which uses experimental rockets called Star birds as 
targets for the Stariab's sensors; and in the name Zenith Star for a spacecraft 
housing a chemical laser (which has however become the victim of cuts in 
SDI budgets). Since these, like Star Wars/SDI itself, are intended to operate in 
relatively low Earth orbit, the term 'star' is massively inappropriate. This does 
not appear to have hindered its adoption. 'Star' functions to indicate 'in the 
sky' or possibly 'in space', in exactiy the same way in which the 'Evening Star' 
is in fact the planet Venus. It is not however a similarly naïve use, since the 
names cannot avoid carrying echoes of the Star Wars metaphor.
STAR WARS/SDI IN THE BRITISH MEDIA
In the following section, I intend to examine the way in which Star 
Wars/SDI was dealt with in British newspapers and TV programmes after the 
issue of its naming had been temporarily 'resolved' by the use of both the SF 
and the technostrategic term. Since the dual naming represents a 
compromise rather than a victory for one discourse, examining the coverage 
in some detail makes it possible to track how the contest over the right to 
speak 'truthfully' about the strategy continued.
While 'Star Wars' continued to identify the plan to the general reader, 
journalists reporting on various tests write solidly in the missile:centred terms 
of technostrategic discourse. The only other material usually judged relevant 
is economic. Paragraphs like the following are typical. __  __
"The Zenith Star experiment runs against recent 
trends in Star Wars systems. Because of budget 
cuts, the programme has shifted to more modest 
aims, concentrating on'kinetic energy weapons'. 
small ground and space-launched projectiles that 
would destroy war-heads on impact."®®
®2Qeorge Lakoff and Mark Johnson: Metaphors We Live By, University of Chicago Press, 
1980. p156
®®Mark Tran: "Laser test succeeds in Star wars programme". The Guardian, 13 February
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'Kinetic energy weapons' and 'kinetic kill vehicles' now appear in such news 
stories quite frequently. They are characteristic terms of technostrategic 
professional language, designed to exclude the lay reader. Yet a bullet is a 
kinetic kill vehicle, for example; the space mines the Soviet Union has tested 
and the ASAT missiles the US had in the early 70s certainly were. The High 
Frontier proposal supposedly influential on Reagan's thinking before the Star 
Wars speech, but not taken up by him, was for kinetic energy weapons. This 
articie and the others like it, despite their use of the popular term, in all other 
ways acknowledged the force of the 'scientific' professional language in 
discussing the project.
It is not possible to be certain how many readers such an article would 
have, not whether they would read much beyond the headlines. Headlines 
however are important themselves in 'cueing' readers within political 
discourse. Looking at the headlines of Star Wars items in The Guardian over 
the two year period from October 1986 to Oct 1988, for example, reveals three 
categories of story: Star Wars has budgetary problems; Star Wars causes 
problems for US:Soviet agreement; and Star Wars test succeeds.
On British television news during the same period. Star Wars/SDI stories 
were iess common than in the press, and were usually subsections of stories 
on Arms Limitation Treaties or stories of scientific success. In this they were 
similar to the American coverage. Robert Karl Man off has given data on SDI 
stories on US TV news programmes saying that between the 1983 speech 
and the 1986 Reykjavik Summit, over two-thirds of the stories were diplomatic, 
,14 per cent were about scientific or technological matters including tests and 
the remainder were concerned with Administration policy and congressional 
or foreign relations.®4 Once the contest over attributing the proposal to the 
fantastic by naming it SF was concluded, it could only be atacked in news 
bulletins on political or technologicai terms. ;
The exceptions are illuminating. There were two in The Guardian: on 16 
February 1987 " 'Deadly implications' of laser weapons"; and on 13 February 
1988 "Star Wars 'cruel hoax on public' ". Both these stories come from the 
annual meetings of the American Association for the Advancement of Science 
and they represent the only occasions where moral evaluations of the 
programme intrude into the headlines. In both instances it is the moral
1988, p5
®4Robert Karl Manoff: "Modes of War and Modes of Social Address: The Text of SDI", Journal
of Communication, 39(1), Winter 1989, pp59-84. p60
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evaluations of scientists rather than politicians. It may be thought that the 
morality of scientists is particularly newsworthy, but moral evaluation by 
politicians, even in the body of the articles, is rare. Neil Kinnock, for example, 
opposing the future extension of Star Wars contracts in Britain, does so on the 
basis of an economic rather than a moral evaluation, saying
"It is a diversion of resources and it is not even 
businesslike. The scale of contractual returns is 
miniscule. What the US has been after is not 
British technology for the Star Wars project but 
British technologists."®®
The 1987 article from the American Association for the Advancement of 
Science meeting reported on two papers. The headline and two-thirds of the 
article referred to a paper concerned to emphasise the offensive potential of 
the supposedly defensive Star Wars armaments. The remainder of the article, 
but not even a sub-heading, was devoted to a 'peace hostage' plan, whereby 
the threat of war was tackled, not by technology, but by the exchange of one 
million volunteers each between the superpowers. This non-technological 
plan was reported only with heavy scientific framing.
In TV documentaries, again scientists seem readily able to speak on 
moral issues. The only BBC access Open Space programme on Star 
WArs/SDI was made by scientists opposing it (BBG2, tx. 15 July 1987). This 
programme was centraliy concerned with the morality of SDI, and overtly the 
product of the scientists themselves, made at their instigation. Even in more 
standard programmes, however, it seems more possible for non-scientists to 
speak of ethics on television than in the press - as was the case in the 
Panoram a ^rograrnme ''T h ë ^P rë s id ^ë m '^^  had Tom
Mangold's ethically inflected commentary knitting together the scientific and 
political views of those working on and around the project. Nonethiess it is 
worth noting that the constraints of technostrategic discourse are by no means 
abandoned on television. Most discussion of SDI is of its technological 
feasibility, its economics and its effect on superpower relations. Those who 
wish to enter public political discourse on the ethics of the enterprise are still 
more likely to be given prominence if they are speaking from an undeniably 
professional position, and the more scientific, particularly technostrategic, their 
discourse nonetheless manages to remain, the better.
®® - The Guardian, 24 March 1987, p36
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The visuals illustrating Star Wars/SDI news stories on British TV, apart 
from talking heads, are most usuaily animated graphics of missiie 
interceptions in space. In the Open Space programme, made by scientists 
opposing SDI, these graphics were referred to frequently, with comments 
made about how far they are from depicting what is likely to be technologically 
feasible, yet how much they imply feasibility. A Director at the Lawrence 
Livermore Laboratories (where much of the SDI Research and Development 
is conducted) remarked sardonically towards the end of the programme,
"We have better graphics than the Russians, 
no doubt about that".
The graphics evoke video-games rather than the Star Wars films. Direct 
visual reference to the films did not appear possible. Manoff’s extensive study 
of American TV news coverage, referred to earlier, provides one instance from 
that country where the film was used to provide visuals. Although it is not a 
British example, it provides a telling illustration of the disarticulation of the film 
and Reagan's proposal named after it that had occurred since the Democrat's 
attempt to dismiss the idea had failed. One extended report on SDI broadcast 
by the American network ABC on 30 October 1986 incorporated a clip from 
Star Wars into the report with the aim, says Manoff, of distancing SDI from the 
film. Han Solo was shown advising Luke Skywalker of the superiority of a 
blaster to religious faith, before the reporter says
"The fantasy weapons in the movie Star Wars 
however are mere pop guns compared to what 
is really being contemplated."®®
Fantasy, as Manoff points^ut, is d is p la y  filmW%rhph%sise the
reality of the SDI weapons. Nonetheless, it is possible that this can only be 
done because the reporter used is arguably the most respected of American 
TV science specialists. Further emphasising the greater credibility of the 
professional term, this was the only moment in the over three minute report, 
and in the article analysing it, when 'Star Wars' was the term used.
Visuai material is particularly important, though rather limited in range, in 
validating visions of the future. The frequency of video-game or computer 
model type graphics and the rarity of visuais derived from the film supports the 
tendency to minimal references to the film evident in non-visual coverage. The
®®Manoff: "Modes of War"., p69
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most common newspaper feature articles to mention the film were those 
reporting on the young scientists working on the Star Wars/SDI project at the 
Lawrence Livermore Laboratories. The major study of them is William Broad’s 
Star Warriors, but the story there about their taking up a collection to buy their 
boss (Lowell Wood, a protege of Edward Teller) a Darth Vader costume, but 
not giving it to him for fear that he
"would actually wear It as he wandered the halls
urging them to work harder",®^
is much reported. Broad himself is a regular writer of feature articles on SDI 
and other defence matters for The New York Times, and his stories are often 
reprinted in Britain. This is an indication that in many respects attempting to 
establish national distinctions, as I have been doing in this section, is unlikely 
to be able to be clearcut. Articles are reprinted and TV items use the same 
film, although they may recut it or use different voice-overs.
The collapse of national specificity can also be seen in another visuai 
area where film is frequently evoked. Political cartoons are frequently 
reprinted in countries other than those in which they originated. Cartoonists 
have been quite persistent in sustaining a link between Star Wars and Star 
Wars through the intermediary of the actor-President. Films provide one of 
the most persistent sets of metaphors used by political cartoonists and the 
combination of Star Wars and Ronald Reagan made the connection 
irresistible. The two examples in Appendix A provide variations - Oliphant's 
cartoon draws on Reagan's past and the SF pulps of the 30s, but avoids all 
overt reference to Star Wars, while Gibbard ignores the past career while 
trebling the number of films referred to. Both presuppose a considerable 
familiarity either with the films or with their promotion. Gibbard's cartoon is 
totally structured on the dominant narrative image of Close Encounters of the 
Third Kind. SF films, including, but by no means limited to. Star Wars, 
provide the basis for commentary of this kind. Cartoons help keep the filmic 
resonances of Star Wars alive in political discourse, and aiso emphasise its 
frivoious character.
STAR WARS AND THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION
The Star Wars/SDI proposal and the discursive struggle over its naming 
which foliowed President Reagan's speech were both heavily identified with
®^William Broad: Star Warriors, London, Faber and Faber, 1986. pi 06
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the figure of Reagan himself. It was sometimes implied that the plan would not 
continue under another President. This expectation has not been fulfilled, but 
there have been certain modifications to the programme. To see how the 
proposal shifted from the Reagan to the Bush administrations, I intend to 
examine in detail one of the first stories about Star Wars under the Bush 
Administration to see if changes are evident.
The particular story, published in The Guardian 29 March 1989, was 
about statements made by the new US Defense Secretary, Dick Cheney, on 
US breakfast TV, rebutting Waii Street Journal claims that there would be 
substantial budget cuts for both Star Wars/SDI and the Stealth bomber 
(although the story did not deal any more with the iatter). The headline used 
the term 'Star Wars' and the body of the article had two further references to 
that term and seven to 'SDI'. Their placement was informative; 'Star Wars' 
occurred in the first and second paragraphs, identifying the subject; the 
discourse then switched to SDI, the first mention of which spelled out the title 
in full. In other words, the more popular term set the stage. For those reading 
further, the professional term replaced the popular one and the language 
generally became more serious. ('Maverick' and 'maniac' occurred in the first 
paragraph, but later references to the same possibilility - offensive nuclear 
activity by some country other than the Soviet Union - used more sober terms, 
like 'other nations' and 'a number of countries'.)
The second paragraph foregrounded the move between Administrations. 
Cheney queried the possibility of an impregnable shield and the reporter, 
Martin Walker, comments that he did so
"in a phrase which consigned Mr. Reagan's grand­
iloquent vision of Star Wars to the history books."
Cheney then continued
" Oftentimes, during the Reagan Administration, 
it was sold in terms which frankly I think oversold 
the concept."®®
The new, more reaiistic, more hard-headed version is being enunciated. 
Reagan's vision, 'grandiioquent', 'oversold' and now fit only for the history 
books, has been adjudged too fantastic. From here on, only the professional
®®Martin Walker: "New Pentagon chief slims Star Wars defence role". The Guardian, 29 March 
1989, p8
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term is used. The themes of the new version, enunciated in the language of 
sober, technostrategic discourse, are the inadequacy of Mutual Assured 
Destruction, the need for the SDI alternative in the face of possible nuclear 
threats from countries other than the Soviet Union or from terrorist groups and 
technological advances which have had economic benefits (ie lower costs). 
One recent test is aiso detailed - it is another instance of the use of the ’Star' 
metaphor to refer to system components, this time 'Delta Star', the satellite 
vision system used to spot rising missiles. Despite the change of 
Administration, little in the programme has really been altered, discursively 
however, the (long-abandoned) non-professional, fantastic aspects of the plan 
are attributed to the departed President. A later report on budget proposals 
maintains this theme by referring to past plans as "earlier grandiose schemes" 
while lauding the newer system component. Brilliant Pebbles®® (once, 
ungrandiloquently, called Smart Rocks).
TRUTH AND THE FUTURE
In the case of Star Wars/SDI, two of Foucault's traits of the political 
economy of truth - that it is actively demanded for political purposes and that 
the media are one of the apparatuses powerful in its production and 
transmission^® - can be observed interacting with a third - the centrality of 
scientific discourse. The Democrats asserted that the proposal was fantastic 
and called on the most popular recent fantasy/SF film to assert the lack of truth 
in the proposal's strategic and technological vision. The Republicans rejected 
the ascription and (finally) called on science in the form of technostrategic 
discourse to assert the truth of their view. Neither side triumphed decisiveiy in 
the discursive struggle, despite the potency of their discursive tools. 'Truth' is a 
particularly insub^stantial commodity where the future is concèrnecï The 
regime under which 'true' statements aboutjh^ iu tu re  may be made has not 
really been delineated.
Consequently, this particular analysis of how the future is talked about 
has revealed that the claim of scientific discourse to primacy in speaking the 
truth is not unchallenged. When the title of an SF-fantasy film was used to 
dismiss Reagan's proposal as an ill-based fiction, it attached itself without the 
anticipated consequence, because the name evoked popular beliefs and
®®Martin Walker: "Congress just keeps Star Wars project ticking over", The Guardian, 4 
November 1989, p7.
^^M\che\ FoucauW : Power/Knowledge,p’\3^
44
desires. This name however could not be accepted by the proponents of the 
plan both because it came from the opposition, and also because it lacked the 
ability to announce scientific feasibility. They adopted and attached 'SDI', a 
name redolent of technostrategic professionalism, but were unable to replace 
the popular, potentially dismissive one altogether. Now the two terms travel in 
tandem through the news stories, 'SDI or Star Wars' /  'Star Wars, President 
Reagan's SDI', the elements of fantasy, feasibility and probability becoming 
ever more intertwined. SDI is from the language in which truth claims can be 
made; Star Wars from a language in which they cannot. The first serves to 
legitimate political desires which can be expressed in the language of the 
second. Together they are potent, but the need for the sober, limiting 
technostrategic term is a reminder that SF, however useful, is an equivocally 
valued way in which to represent the future.
There remains a problem in the very specificity of the instance. Is Star 
Wars/SDI a unique example? It was certainly chosen for its unusual features, 
but is better characterised as special rather than unique. A subsequent 
example from the political arena of the same encapsulation of complex ideas 
in an SF title occurred early in December 1987. The head of the (US) House 
of Representatives Science, Space and Technology Committee, Robert Roe, 
speaking of an agreement on the pursuit of a joint US-Soviet mission to Mars, 
said that
"he believed a common effort to reach Mars 
could shift the international focus on space 
from Star Wars to a mutual star trek."^1
In Chapter Five I will examine some of the ramifications of the term 'star trek', 
but here mereiy point to the use of another metaphorrin opposition to Star 
Wars, to convey a very positive image of international cooperation.
: Even so both cases are very precise arid may represent no more than 
two (related) occasions when the primacy of scientific discourse in talking 
about the future was challenged. Two further aspects of specificity contribute 
to the difficulties of generalizing from this case. Firstly, technostrategic 
discourse is only a small sub-category of the scientific and its unavoidable 
imbrication with the politicai may make it quite uncharacteristic. Secondly, the 
non-contemporaneous nature of most of the source materials meant that, with 
only a few exceptions, it was not possible to examine how the future was
1^ — "Mars Mission" r/7e Guard/an, 4 December 1987, p7. (their capitalization)
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talked about in film or television.
The next chapter will attempt to overcome these limitations by dealing 
with a more general case.
2: THE GREENHOUSE EFFECT and other
ecological catastrophes '
The previous chapter examined a very specific instance cf a discursive 
struggle between scientific and science fictional discourses over the naming 
cf a piece cf military strategy. The traditional device cf dismissing a scientific 
proposal by naming it science fictional was unsuccessfully when the name 
evoked popular beliefs and desires; and the privileged status of science within 
current 'regimes of truth' was challenged when an alternative name, drawn 
from professional technostrategic language was unsuccessful in dislodging 
the now popular SF name. The very specificity of the instance however may 
have meant that this example of the primacy of scientific discourse in speaking 
the truth about the future being challenged by fiction was uncharacteristic.
The present chapter examines a different area in which the label 
'science' is explicitly used within TV and film to talk about the future. The 
particular future considered here is that of scientifically-based projections of 
ecological and demographic catastrophes, particularly as presented on TV. 
These are complex 'visions' of the future underpinned by more traditional 
scientific disciplines than would appear to be the case for military strategy. 
The arguments over their applicability and impact usually involve formally 
recognized scientists rather than techno-strategists, so these two particular 
features of the Star Wars/SDI case should not apply. Here perhaps the power 
of science to be seen to speak the truth even about the future will operate 
more fully. The main focus of the chapter - a Tomorrow’s World special on the 
Greenhouse Effect - provides a detailed case-study of one such presentation 
of an anticipated catastrophe.
The Greenhouse Effect is currently the dominant projected ecological 
catastrophe. It is also the major example of a slippage in the way the future 
was talked about during the course of the writing of this dissertation.1 At the
^The changes taking place in most communist countries at the time of writing provide another 
exception. I have not dealt with them because the situations are stiil fluid and television 
coverage is largely on a day-to-day basis in news bulletins. The difference between events of 
the research period and those of the period during which I have been writing are 
considerable. Documentaries are similarly awkward, as well as at times having explicitly 
■ announced the impossibility of speculating about the future. Relevant changes in strategic 
relations are premised on a different view of the future, but again the important 
consequences for my military chapters occur well after 1989. Those that were evident during 
the research period, are only as noted in Chapter 3 with the alterations to the Doomsday
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beginning of the research (1986-7), the term and concern about it was current 
only in reasonably restricted scientific discourses and politically important only 
for environmental activists. It was not likely to figure in the statements of 
serving politicians, let alone Ministers. By 1988, all this had changed. The 
Prime Minister told the Conservative Party Conference that we were the 
trustees of the earth for our grandchildren and urged international co­
operation to reduce the output of greenhouse gases (while refusing to sign 
commitments pledging when the UK would find it convenient to do so).
Television and science are involved in many ways: TV is a technology, 
itself a demonstration of scientific achievement; science is a common part of 
the content of TV; and TV is a major disseminator of scientific information - 
almost certainly the major populariser of science.^ Of the sciences that form 
part of TV's content, the biological ones, especially medicine, are the most 
prominent - in documentaries, dramas and news programmes. In TV SF, 
science and pseudo-science (like Star Treks's 'warp drive') are also of 
course very evident. The concern in the present chapter is with only a 
segment of this broad and diffuse presence of science in the media. It deals 
mainly with explicitly identified science and technology documentaries and 
magazine programmes about scientific developments and to a much lesser 
extent with science in news and debate programmes.
The ability of TV science programmes to talk about the future is 
constrained in the first place by the ability of TV to talk about science, or more 
precisely by the practices and techniques TV has adopted to present scientific 
information and the practices and techniques which the scientific 
establishment has adopted in relation to televisual dissemination of scientific 
information. The relationship between the two institutions is uneasy, marked 
by equivocal valuation of the idea of popularisation on the side of the scientific 
establishment and by doubts about the communicability of scientific 
information on the televisual.  ^ ,
To investigate the specific characteristics of TV coverage of the 
scientifically represented future, I shall present a detailed analysis of the 
Tomorrow's World special on the Greenhouse Effect [BBG1, tx. 31 January 
1989, transcript in Appendix B]. This has been chosen because it is both a
clock.
Zgee, for example, Greta Jones, Ian Connell and Jack Meadows: The Presentation of 
Science by the Media, Primary Research Communications Centre, University of 
Leicester, 1978.
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sustained attempt to represent a scientifically-based future and a 
representation directed at a large audience. It thus addresses problems 
identified in the previous chapter which are central to the thesis as a whole: 
how scientific discourse talks about the future and how complex scientific 
ideas can be communicated through the use of popular modes of address. 
Despite its 'special' status, it is also a characteristic example of science on TV 
in general and of Tomorrow's World itself. If natural history programmes are 
excepted, then only Q.E.D. attracts as high an audience for TV science 
programmes - often exceeding eight million - as Tomorrow's World. In its 
regular form it is a weekly magazine programme, although there are 
occasional specials like the one under investigation. Its title announces its 
ostensible concern with the (immediate) future, but its usual content limits that 
future to one in which the technological objects and processes being 
displayed and announced to be under development or about to become 
available, can be expected to be more widespread. It is predominantly a 
technology rather than a science programme. Indeed, it was established 
specifically to address criticisms about the absence of technology on 
television made by the Department of Science and Industrial Relations and 
published in the Pilkington Report.^
Perhaps because of its populist presentation and its mode of address to 
the viewer as consumer. Tomorrow's World has been subject to considerable 
criticism by scientists and media analysts. Rachel Kerys Murrell asserts that
"Tomorrow's IVor/of misinforms the viewer as to 
the real nature of the scientific enterprise."^
The programme's failings are regarded as typical of TV science, which is said 
to be
"grossly afflicted by the Eureka! syndrome - as 
in the kind of 'fix-it', 'cracked-code' science 
characteristic of Tomorrow's World
None of the criticism is concerned with the programme as a site where the 
future is talked about. Critics ignore the implication of the title even more than 
its producers do.
^Ibid., p39
^Rachel Kerys Murrell: "Telling it Like it Isn't: Representations of Science in Tomorrow's 
World', Theory Culture and Society, 4(1), 1987, pp89-106. pi 01 
 ^Pat Sinclair: "Screen Science", The Listener, V.111, No.2852, 5 April 1984. p32
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The Tomorrow's World special was a mix of live studio and pre-recorded 
location material, as is standard for its magazine format. All four of the 1988 
presenters were used, with Judith Haan as the main studio-based anchor. The 
programme began with a short segment from Ireland establishing that there 
had been changes in the atmosphere. After that it considered changes in the 
weather both in the previous year and in a projected forty years into the future, 
before detailing the activity of long and short wave radiation and the nature 
and generation of the 'greenhouse gases'. This was made specific in the 
present by detailing the situation in Arbroath and then applied more widely 
and to the future by reference to General Circulation Models (GCMs) used as 
predictors of climatic change. There followed a botanical sequence with 
anticipated changes in agriculture and problems with silviculture, before a 
short piece on the possible consequences of a rise in sea level. The 
programme concluded with comments on some possible methods of 
alleviation: changing fuel dependencies and possible planetary self­
regulation.
The first way in which future was 'shown' was a simulation. As an 
acknowledged fiction, this was most unusual, since dramatised material, with 
the exception of scripted biographies of scientific figures, is usually regarded 
as inimical to science programming. The Tomorrow's World sequence was 
legitimated by tying it to the empirical present through its being in the form of a 
weather forecast using the standard 1988 BBC format and one of the regular 
forecasters, John Kettley, while purporting to be for a hypothetical winter's day 
in 2030.
To avoid diminishing in any way the realism achieved by using the actual 
current forecasting format, there was no attempt to create a different costume 
for the forecaster, different graphics for the display or to posit different 
weather-effected activities for the hypothetical future viewer. Only the weather 
was shown as being different. It thus followed the line of minimal variation, 
which, as I shall continue to argue, is characteristic of non-fictional depictions 
of the future. My argument is that the presence of fiction in science 
programmes is a serious threat to the 'purity' of the discourse and in a 
scientific programme about the future, the taint would be a particularly 
worrying one, because it would elicit possible confusion between science and 
SF. While SF may be a potent populariser, it is not one with which the 
scientific establishment is happy. The Royal Society for instance, has warned 
how
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"some science fiction can grossly distort scientific
possibilities and create much concern in a public ^
with limited scientific literacy and so limited ability. . .  ,
to sort the plausible from the implausible or rank
impossible. [ . . .  ] responsible and publically
intelligible comment from the scientific community
should help to ensure that the extremes of
distortion are at least to some extent curbed by
the major publishers and film producers."®
The emphasis on being 'publically intelligible' is an acknowledgement both of 
the perceived distance between professional and popular language and the 
perception of a problem of communicability for TV science. The issue of the 
'communication problem' will recur later in the chapter.
Piecemeal presentation, also notable in the programme's forecast for 
2030, is related to this strategy of minimal variation. The segment focussed on 
just one prediction - changes in the weather. There was no attempt to 
integrate other predictions about changes brought about by the Greenhouse 
Effect. Although later in the programme there was reference to rises in sea 
level and consequent changes in coastlines, the map of Europe in 2030 used 
in the weather forecast differed not at all from the present day one. While this 
made comprehension much easier and did not pre-empt the later provision of 
information, it seems to be characteristic of televisual science-based 
prognostication to operate piecemeal. If both the weather and the coastline 
were to be shown as altered, it could risk an excess of apparent fictionality 
and a diminution in credibility. Similarly, an early comment on the role of 
fertilisers in generating greenhouse gases was not reiterated or developed 
when later reference was made to the increased need for farmers to use 
chemicals as Scotland warmed. Such piecemeal presentation may diminish 
the gravity of the depiction by“ensuring that the future does not appear very 
different from the present.?
®The Royal Society: The Public Understanding of Science, (Report of a Royal 
Society ad hoc Group endorsed by the Council of the Royal Society), 
London, 1985. Para. 5.15, p23 
? This is not peculiar to TV alone. A similar device can be seen in a newspaper article on rises
in the water table in London as artesian water-using industry moves out projectingproblems 
this will cause in the next 20 years. It did this by concentrating on the single cause - rising 
artesian water - without paying any attention to the compounding influence of sea level rises 
caused by the Greenhouse Effect. Again piecemeal presentation (rising sea level stories
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Arguably the most favoured way to represent the future without risking 
aspersions of fictionality has been by mathematically-based projections. 
These have now been augmented into computer modelling which allows the 
projection into the future to be emphatically designated 'scientific'. Not only 
does it carry the clout of the mathematically-based (with its connotations of 
abstract, pure, high science), but it can also produce good visuals 
technologically. Tomorrow's World has a predeliction for visual displays on a 
screen initially located within the larger TV picture, whether they have been 
derived by computer modelling or not. They are much 'better' TV (especially in 
terms of movement within the camera frame) than graphs or maps displayed 
on charts, as well as being more in keeping with the tenor of the programme 
through using the kind of technology the programme celebrates in so many of 
its stories. They allow a technological 'splurge', rather like the special effects 
in SF films, but justifiable through their scientificity.
The second way in which the future was 'displayed' in the programme 
was by this type of use of graphics to demonstrate computer modelling. There 
were seven different computer screen set-ups used in the Greenhouse Effect 
special. One was simply linked to a microscope to show the audience the 
shape of a coccolith, the being which it was hoped would be the self­
regulating agent, but two at least were definitely referred to as computer 
models - both provided visuals based on maps of the world.
Criticism of science on TV, including the normal Tomorrow's World 
magazine, claims that it neglects science in process or subject to 
disagreement within the scientific community.® This was not the case in this 
programme. The sequence devoted most strongly to computer models 
showed the GCMs predicting atmospheric change and also used them in the 
programme to outline temperature changes. The special admitted the 
existence of disagreement between the models (though it showed the results 
of onjy one) as well as the existence of two important variables not included in 
the models. Admittedly, these revealed inadequacies were rapidly minimised 
by reference to an area of agreement between the models and examination of 
work aimed at clarifying the action of the absent variables. Nonetheless, some 
acknowledgement was made of the tentative and disputed nature of the data. 
It was not however suggested in any way that such data was fictional, 
speculative or not significantly different from SF stories. A computer model
were published elsewhere) serves to minimise the threat.
[Paul Brown: "Rising water threatens buildings", The Guardian, 3 November 1989 p2j.
®e.g. Carl Gardner and Robert Young: "Science on TV: A Critique" in Tony Bennett 
et al eds.: Popular Television and Science, London, BFI, 1981.
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may be wrong, it may be limited, but it is never acknowledged to be a work of 
fiction.
j
Closer to fiction were the instances of verbal descriptions of future 
conditions, over visuals showing the related present. They were, after all, 
manifestly telling us stories. Howard Stableford standing in a field on a 
Scottish farm saying that the farmer may get two crops of raspberries a year or 
be growing French beans and maize in 2030 is unavoidably narrative - but the 
story is dull. When the story becomes more exciting, even alarming, as with 
the increase in sea level, the indisputably 'scientific' is reinserted. It is worth 
examining this example in greater detail in order to consider the procedure by 
which these scientific claims are discursively produced.
After the segment on the changes in agriculture and the problems with 
silviculture in Scotland, the programme returns to the studio where the 
metaphor 'to undergo a sea change' is used to introduce the new topic. The 
new visual component is a thermometer in a beaker of liquid. Maggie Philbin 
lifts the thermometer to indicate liquids expanding when heated. Even for as 
non-specialist a programme as Tomorrow's World, this is a particularly banal 
visual, but it is also undeniably science-based. The next visual however is of a 
tropical island, as the voice over tells us that nations such as the Seychelles 
and the Maldives could disappear and the Nile Delta be inundated. We do not 
however stay with this visual or this point. The story is brought back to the UK 
and the studio as the visual shifts to a relief map of the Tay Estuary beside 
which the presenter stands. This is a low-tech visual, but it serves to reduce 
any anxiety before the cut to Howard Stableford and the problems rising sea- 
level will cause in Scotland. The visuals which accompany his story of the 
increased chances of flooding in Perth are mainly of stonework showing 
previous flooding marks which serve to make this a story of recurrent, not new, 
danger. The statement that the cost of preventing flooding and coastal erosion 
may be too high to be met and that "some areas of this country too will simply 
disappear" is delivered directly to camera with a very misty long shot of Perth 
held in the background.
This information is potentially very alarming. In a political rather than a 
scientific programme this would be subject to investigation and some kind of 
emotionally-charged response would most probably be sought. Emotion has
no place in a scientific programme like this, so the statement must be defused 
or abandoned. No extra visuals can reduce the impact, so the immediate topic 
is abandoned. No time is allowed for the viewers to feel apprehensive or to
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consider whether 'real world' action is being taken in this regard. The 
programme immediately returns to the studio, to Judith Haan, the most 
authoritative of its four voices and to the computer model map of the country in 
2030. The map, she tells us, will not look very different, but, (and it is now 
voice over the map in close-up) low-lying areas "may need extra defences". A 
longer range prediction is given that by the end of the next century the 
Thames Estuary could be permanently flooded, although this is not said quite 
explicitly. The Thames Estuary had been one of three low-lying areas 
previously mentioned, permanent flooding could affect "many" of them. Again 
the alarming information is given directly to camera in close-up; again 
specificity is avoided (the reverse of what would be the normal story-telling 
device); and again there is an immediate cut. This time the cut is to modes of 
alleviation through different energy generation methods. This tension between 
the scientific and the story is common as the demands of 'good TV  conflict 
with the requirements that 'good science' be unemotional, low-key and 
objective.
The different demands of 'science' and 'story' or, more properly 
'narrative' have frequently been noted. French theorist, Jean-Francois 
Lyotard, opposes the scientific and the narrative as two kinds of knowledge, 
the first of which is concerned with denotative statements, has powers of 
legitimation, requires experimental verification and is linked to politics.® It 
takes primacy over the second, which is connotative, a traditional form of 
knowledge, related to ideas of conviviality and concerned with 
competence.10
The tension noted above can be seen as one manifestation of the 
contestation Lyotard ' describes between scientific  and narrative 
know ledge.11 He comments, with apparent amusement, on how when 
scientists appear on television "they play by the rules of the narrative 
game";i2 they recount an epic of discovery, because in this context scientific 
knowledge alone cannot achieve the legitimation as truth it requires. If this is 
the case, not only does the equivocation around fiction evident in the weather 
forecast and the status of computer models, as well as the rejection of 'good' 
narrative practice just noted, make sense, but several other criticisms of
®Jean-Francois Lyotard: The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge,
trans. Geoff-Bennington and Brian Massumi,-Manchester, Manchester University—
Press, 1984. p8 
10|bid., p9, 19-23 
1’ lbid.,p7 
^^Ibid., p27-28
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science on TV come into clearer focus.
Yet not even Lyotard is completely happy with the separation of scientific 
and narrative knowledge. He comments that the recourse of science to 
narrative demonstrated by the scientist on TV may be inevitable.1 ® 
Nonetheless, his general perspective is to see this as a relic of science's past. 
This is not however a position adopted here. While agreeing that scientific 
discourse attempts a strategy of distancing itself from narrative, I do not accept 
that it is successful in doing so. Narrative is inescapable; present in scientific 
explanation and photographs as well as in epics. Indeed, Fredric Jameson 
refers to it, an
"all-informing process . . .  the central function or 
instance of the human mind".l4
The distinction between the narrative and the scientific is one of convenience, 
like that between fiction and non-fiction, it rests on accepting the givens of 
scientific discourse.
One of the most frequent comments made about the style of presentation 
of science programmes on TV is that they are structured like detective stories. 
Roger Silverstone sees it as unsurprising that something so readily 
comprehensible is used to frame the supposedly incomprehensible science, 
since
"nothing is more likely to become the subject of 
an heroic tale or a mystic fantasy than that which 
is neither understood nor accepted as necessarily 
benevolent."1®
In other words, because it appears uncertain and potentially threatening, it is 
presented in a form which renders it safe and tidy. This should apply 
particularly strongly to science and the future. Recently, the choice of the 
detective genre has been criticised as one of the devices leading to the 
presentation of science as resolving uncertainty and solving problems. Anne 
Karpf, for instance points out that it
"retrospectively frames the issues from the point
I3|bid., p28
1 ^ Fredric Jameson: The Poiitical Unconscious, London, Methuen, 1981. p i3 
1^Roger Silverstone: Framing Science: The Making of a BBC Documentary, 
London, BFI, 1985. p171
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of view of its outcome: the faise starts only serve to 
reinforce the correctness of the eventual solution."1®
j
Yet in the early 60s, the detective story had been explicitly suggested as a 
desirable form for televised science. James McCloy, a BBC TV science 
producer, had pointed out the importance of creating suspense involving 
intellectual rather than emotional tension.
"This engagement of the curiousity of the audience 
so that they are led step by step through the 
unraveling of a scientific argument adopts a kind 
of detective story technique.""*?
These comments all emphasise that the form is imposed by television, or 
more widely by popularising media, onto scientific information. However, 
Silverstone again points out, the discourses are in conflict
"in relation to science there is a dramatic disjunction 
between the scientist who, for whatever poiitical or 
intellectual reasons, qualifies, refuses final judge­
ment, denies his own significance, and the 
television presentation of him which is seeking 
certainty, conclusiveness and for the individual 
scientist to be hero or villian.""* ®
In this conflict, television triumphs in form at least, supporting Lyotard's 
contention.
Much of the televisual success of the detective form rests on the question 
of certainty. TV science is presented as unproblematic; scientists are 
presented as certain of their 'facts'. Even in post-modern times explicit 
uncertainty makes TV science producers uneasy.
"Science facts are fluid and negotiable,but this 
rarely appears In the media, and when it does 
appear, it is suggested that certainty will shortly
emerge"."*®
l®Anne Karpf: "Shibboleths and Ships in Bottles", The Listener, V.111, No.2851, 29 March 
 1984. p9 ------------------------—  -----------------------------------------
l?James McCloy: "Science on Television", The Journal of the Society of Film and 
Television Arts Ltd., No 14, Winter 1963-4, ppl 1-13. pi 2 
1 ^Silverstone: Framing Science, pi 03
l^David Edge quoted in Anne Karpf: "Shibboleths and Ships", p9
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The problems with scientific uncertainty in the Tomorrow's World special 
are striking. The presenters repeatedly have to report areas where knowledge 
is partial or where all that is known is that research is needed. Their unease 
with this is evident. There is never an admission of uncertainty without an 
immediate reference to clarification. Twice a presenter closes a segment with 
such an admission only to have the next presenter begin her section with the 
phrase "One thing we do know, though . . ". On a third occasion, a presenter 
winding up a section referring to changes being both good and bad, continues 
"but one thing's certain . . ". On two further occasions when it is admitted that 
something is unclear, the audience is reassured that international studies 
have been set up on the matter. One of these, the International Cirrus 
Experiment, we are told, will provide data to be added to computer models so 
that "the true  climatic effect of clouds [will] be known" [emphasis mine]. It 
might be thought that since what is being dealt with is the future, and hence 
the explicitly unknown, a certain degree of uncertainty might be permissible. 
What seems evident however is that this is very much not the case. The 
combination of the view of science as certainty and the perception that 
anything other than clarity is a failure of exposition appears to outweigh both a 
commonsense view of the future as unknown and a sophisticated view of 
scientific knowledge as fluid and negotiable.
Another aspect of the disjunction between science and the scientists on 
the one hand and the televisual presentation of them on the other appears 
somewhat in contrast to the insistence of televisual science on certainty. 
Rachel Kerys Murrell concludes her detailed examination of Tomorrow's 
Wor/cf by noting
"a) the mystification of the scientific process (as 
complex, depersonalized,inevitable etc.). .  [and] 
b) the contextualization of technology in terms 
of inoffensive'everyday life'".®®
The two conclusions point in different directions, yet both can be 
demonstrated in the magazine and in the special. The mystification of 
scientific procedure can be seen in the reference to a gas chromatograph as
an "instrument of quite unimaginable sensitivity". Technology is made to 
appear both ordinary and beneficial by the use of 'homely' applications and
®®Murrell: "Telling it Like it Isn't", p102
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devices and by the particular people used as presenters, who, as both Murrell 
and Sinclair point out, are non-scientists and 'on our side'.®"* Despite the 
differences, they both serve to emphasise the separation between science 
and what ordinary people can comprehend. Scientific processes can be 
mystified since they are incapable of being made comprehensible, while 
technological artefacts can only be explained by analogy with the already 
known.
The us/them mentality which locates the presenters together with the 
viewers as "interested but unsophisticated"®® is established from the 
beginning with reference to "most of us" having noticed a warmer winter. Time 
is often measured personally: forty years is "well within many of our lifetimes"; 
and effects will be felt "for generations to come". There are several clues as to 
the 'us' the programme constructs: the weather forecast, for example, is for a 
population of mobile, middle income holiday makers, skiing in north-eastern 
Scandinavia, or taking a mid-winter break in Iceland; the example of current 
action to prevent coastal erosion surrounds a golf course; great attention is 
devoted to alternate car fuels - none to improved public transport. In terms of 
the kind of scientific knowledge anticipated in the audience, botany leads, 
then geography, with physics last on the list.
'Them', the scientists and researchers, are barely present except for one 
named and located botanist. Gardner and Young have noted how very 
privileged scientists appearing on TV are. Not only is the interviewer rarely 
shown, making the speaker appear unchallenged and the issue 
uncontroversial, but on the rare occasions that scientists are shown to be 
disagreeing, they do so in separate to-camera sequences rather than in face- 
to-face challenges.®®
It is extremely unusual for science programmes to be overtly partisan 
even when they admit debate. This reflects the general practice for the 
programmes to be made by people with televisual, but without scientific, 
expertise, and therefore both deferential to 'experts' and unwilling to involve 
themselves in evaluating debates. This latter may be the result of their having 
a naïve view of science as revealed truth not amenable to interrogation by lay 
people. TV's world of science appears a remarkably tranquil place where 
knowledge is progressively uncovered and politics something that enters from 
outside. As Gardner and Young put it.
®l|bid., p94 and Sinclair: "Screen Science", p34 
®®Gardner and Young: "Science on TV", p178 
®®lbid., p177
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"Non-fiction TV, of which science programmes are 
the paradigm, claims to represent the facts.
Therefore any ambiguity in the representation is ^
seen as a failure of exposition. Science, of course, 
is defined by the attempt to eliminate ambiguity."®^
Cutting across the vaunted 'objectivity’ of science and the distinction of 
scientific and narrative knowledge, is the use by scientists themselves of 
metaphors of varying levels of generality. Despite Foucault's statement about 
the need for concepts to rid themselves of metaphor and imaginary content 
before they can be accepted as scientific [quoted in Chapter One], the desired 
purity is rarely, if ever, attained. Metaphor may structure whole dominant 
paradigms of scientific theory. Stephen Jay Gould has a short essay on the 
consequences of using the metaphor of a ladder for evolutionary change; he 
prefers the metaphor of a bush.®® Metaphor can also be used to convey 
details to the less informed, necessary because, as was argued earlier, 
scientific language, the very model of an authoritative professional language, 
has a status based on exclusion.®® As was also pointed out in Chapter One, 
metaphors are particularly useful in communication between speakers of a 
such a language and the general public.
The 'Greenhouse Effect' metaphor is of a middle level of generality 
encompassing a significant disciplinary diversity. Examining its operation here 
demonstrates some of the ways in which metaphors have particular discursive 
effects. David Edge has examined the operation of technological metaphor 
noting how the metaphor is taken up if it helps eliminate confusion, but that it 
brings with it certain new questions and predispositions to particular 
answers.®? A greenhouse is a simple, reasonably common device, useful in 
this case as an everyday object which can be used metaphorically to explain 
the operation of the atmosphere on the sun's radiation. In her outline of this 
operation early in the Tomorrow's World programme, Maggie Philbin also 
uses the metaphor of a 'blanket around the earth', but although not 
uncommon, it is a less useful metaphor, in part since both a greenhouse and
®4|bid., p179
®®Stephen Jay Gould: "Bushes and Ladders in Human Evolution" in Ever Since Darwin: 
Refiections in Natural History, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1980, pp56-62 
Scott L. Montgomery: "The Cult of Jargon: Reflections on Language in Science", 
Science as Culture, No.6, 1989, pp42-77. p43 
®? David Edge: "Technological Metaphor and Social Control", New Literary History, 6(1), 
1974-5, ppl35-147. ppl 36-7
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the atmosphere share the characteristic 'transparency' which a blanket lacks. 
However, metaphors are not neutral devices which can be deployed without 
altering their field of operation. Their literal referent influences their 
metaphoric deployment - as David Edge has noted.
"As the metaphor begins to 'bite', cognitively, 
it brings with it attitudes appropriate to its literal 
referent."®®
A greenhouse is used to grow things, so the greenhouse metaphor ensures 
that major concentration in this programme as elsewhere, is devoted to the 
question of what crops will grow where. A segment of the programme is even 
set within an actual greenhouse full of tomato plants. The long-standing 
practice of commercial plant growers using carbon dioxide enrichment to 
enhance growth in their greenhouses is referred to by Maggie Philbin as "if 
you like, an artificial greenhouse effect", certainly an extreme indication of the 
process of naturalization this metaphor has already undergone.
Because greenhouses are generally regarded as beneficial, enabling 
'luxury', out-of-season crops to be grown, the metaphoric use of the term to 
describe a potential catastrophe is decidedly complex. Part of the effect of the 
metaphor seems to be to diminish the sense of danger in the audience. Extra 
crops of raspberries in Scotland sound rather desirable. The metaphor may 
be at least partially the cause of more time earlier in the programme being 
spent on agricultural variation than is spent later on sea-level rises. The 
metaphor after all lacks relevance to this particular manifestation of the 
problem.®®
Less than a year after the Tomorrow's World special. The Money 
Programme also devoted an entire programme to the Greenhouse Effect 
(BBC2, tx. 12 November 1989). The differences between the two programmes 
were considerable and provide an opportunity to examine the extent to which 
disciplinary framing {The Money Programme is an economic, not a scientific,
®G|bid., pi 41
®®Again this is not specific to television. The dominance of the positive ramifications of the 
metaphor was strongly demonstrated by a front-page newspaper story announcing that, 
— thanks to the Greenhouse Effect, -Britain could be-the new-Sunshine-State'L The 
thirteen paragraph story mentioned farming 'booms' and the enjoyment of a semi- 
Mediterranean climate. It was not until the ninth paragraph that any negative effects for 
Britain (droughts and thunderstorms) were mentioned. [Geoffrey Lean and Jan Sinclair: 
"Britain could be the new Sunshine State", The Observer, 26 November 1989 pi]
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magazine) influences the televisual treatment of a scientific story. The 
differences were presumably also influenced by the elapse of time during 
which the population could be assumed to have become more familiar W h  
the phenomenon and hence need iess basic information, as weil as the 
expectation of a very different (and much smaller) audience. The main 
characteristic which The Money Programme shared with Tomorrow's World 
was the privileged treatment of the speakers; interviewers never appeared, 
'experts' were unchallenged and if disagreement occurred, it was between 
separate sequences, not face-to-face.
The programme concentrated on the cost of reducing carbon dioxide 
emissions, showing the operation of various cost-benefit analyses and 
presenting a comparison between activity - or inactivity - in Canada, the US 
and the UK. Much less time was devoted to detailing the future than in 
Tomorrow's World; probably because the future likely as a result of the 
Greenhouse Effect could by this time be assumed to be shared knowledge. 
There was at least one use of computer modelling - to work out the fuel cuts 
necessary to meet the target set at the Conference on the Changing 
Atmosphere held in Toronto in June 1988, of a 20 per cent reduction in 
greenhouse gas emission by 2050. There were no questions of certainty or 
uncertainty during the programme, despite frequent use of specific data, such 
as a 14 per cent greater fuei efficiency possible from design changes to cars, 
or anticipated substantiai cuts in petroi consumption if the cost were between 
£2.50 and £3.00 a gallon. The scientific knowledge on which the programme 
was based was one with a particulariy strong ability to claim to speak the truth 
- mathematics.
The Money Programme, unlike Tomorrow's World, adopted a quite 
partisan approach - presenting the issue as involving political and economic 
wili and demonstrating Britain's iack of it. The sectibn of Prirhe Minister 
Margaret Thatcher's November 1989 address on the issue to the United 
Nations which was shown in the programme, was the only instance when any 
explicit reference to science was made (and it was to an alleged lack of 
science-based information). The programme as a whole opposed her stance. 
Even so, the extract from Mrs. Thatcher's speech exemplified non-scientific 
discourse on the subject. She concentrated on the present, making oniy 
minimal reference to any posited Greenhouse future. It was a political speech 
and thus lacked the privileged position with regard to current regimes of truth 
that 'pure' scientific and mathematical discourses have, but it did not call on 
them for legitimation, as might have been expected. The future in most
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contemporary political discourse is, like this, primarily that which is not spelled 
out, but can be implied, from the consequences of immediate causes of 
concern. ^
The comparison has demonstrated some of the restrictions on popular 
scientific TV coverage. There was not the same pre-occupation with certainty 
when the issue was within an economic frame, it was also possible to refer to, 
and admit the centrality of, political decision-making. Even more, the 
programme was itself partisan. The main difference thus was that an 
economic programme was able to call on science and politics, in addition to 
economics, while the science programme operated within a more restricted 
range.
Programmes about the Greenhouse Effect are only one type of a 
particular sub-category of TV programmes talking about the future - those that 
examine predictions of possible eco-catastrophes. As was evident with The 
Money Programme referred to above, not all of these are scientific, though it 
is the scientific ones that are the main concern here. An examination of the 
coverage of some other predicted eco-catastrophes should make it possible to 
identify the characteristics of this way of talking about the future, as well as 
furthering the investigation of the primacy of scientific discourse in this area.
It seems possible that fear of the SF taint has been especially influential 
in structuring debate over the dangers of another scientificaily-predicated 
future disaster - one involving genetically engineered organisms. A potential 
eco-catastrophe following the escape of such organisms into the environment 
has concerned both environmentalists and the companies intending to profit 
through new, patented plants, animals and bacteria. Reporting on it is bound 
not just by the difficulties of explaining complex scientific procedures, both in 
the engineering and the safety devices, but also by having to avoid the 
dangers of sounding not just like SF, but j[ke the more extreme horror-story^ 
kind. The constraints seem particularly evident on TV reporting. A 1987 
editorial in The Economist began with a short fantasy set in 2087 involving 
the escape of six genetically engineered beings with "the bodies of snakes, 
the metabolisms of ferns and the brains of men" which thirty years later had 
exterminated the human race,®® before more mundanely discussing the 
benefits and the moral dilemmas-involved in genetic engineering. The 
accompanying article eschewed all such fantasy, but is is noteworthy that
®® "Tomorrow's Animals", The Economist. V.304, No. 7511, 15 August 1987, ppl 1-12.
p l i
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once again a scientifically-based story appearing in an economic context is 
less restricted in scope, having a greater range of referents.
Tomorrow's World 6ea\X briefly with genetic engineering during the three 
years of the study - usually in short to-camera pieces during the "This Week" 
segment. This regular three to five minute slot in each magazine programme 
provides a digest of the leading scientific stories of the week, giving the 
programme both topicality and a place for dealing with stories which are 
unsuitable for more extended treatment, either because of their unavoidably 
political content or through the abstruseness of their science, in 1987 there 
were "This Week" reports on the US Patents Office giving the first patent for a 
genetically engineered higher form of life (an oyster), and the transfer of a 
beetle-resistant gene from beans to tobacco plants, as well as two longer 
items on AIDS which included references to genetic engineering in attempts 
to develop a cure. The only reference to possible problems with escaping 
organisms came in another "This Week" item which referred to genetically 
engineered viruses which would attack insects and then self-destruct, so that 
escaping would not be such a problem.
In the Tomorrow's World programme screened 21 November 1989, 
there was a longer item on that part of the Green Bill proposed in the Queen's 
Speech which was concerned with genetic engineering. Mentioning that there 
had been thirteen approved releases in the UK so far, the two presenters 
(Judith Haan and Howard Stableford) referred to problems of possible cross­
overs from desired plants to weeds, if the genetically engineered viruses or 
other releases escaped.
One of the responses to the difficulties of discussing the whole area has 
been to concentrate on plants and micro-organisms rather than on animals, 
this may have more to do with avoiding the greater risks of emotional 
responses to stories about the latter than b^ecause of the prevalence of 
research on the former. Stories all deal with current research. To the best of 
my knowledge there has been no attempt by TV science programmes to 
provide any picture of the future as altered positively or negatively by genetic 
engineering. For example, there has never been even a picture of farming 
without the threat of frost to crops in the wake of possibly the most famous of 
the genetically-engineered organisms - the 'ice-minus' bacterium patented as 
- Frostban. The risk of sounding alarmist o r  approximating horror-SF (both 
definitely non-scientific) seems so great that genetically engineered 
organisms can be discussed only in the present.
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Documentaries on population growth, the need for birth control and the 
impossibility of feeding the world's future population were common in thejate 
60s and the 70s, when over-popuiation was the dominant future eco­
catastrophe envisaged. These are now quite rare, and virtually absent from TV 
science. The sole Tomorrow's World item noted during the research period 
was within the "This Week" segment screened on 21 May 1987, where Judith 
Haan announced that on the eleventh of July that year, the world population 
would pass five billion. According to UN figures, she added however, 
population growth was slowing down and food production going up. There 
was no indication whether this meant that the potential catastrophe, once of 
such televisual prominence, had been averted, supplanted or displaced.
Looking more widely at TV coverage, it seems that the anticipated 
catastrophe consequent on over-population has indeed been displaced, but 
instead of being displaced temporally into the future when it would affect the 
whole world, it has been displaced spatially in the present, where it is affecting 
other countries. Furthermore, it has not been displaced as a single unified 
catastrophe, or even as several related ones. Instead, using a device similar 
to that described earlier this chapter, its potential to alarm has been reduced 
by presenting it in a piecemeal fashion. The various African famines, the 
various cities with 'exploding' populations and the various countries where 
poor education systems and religious beliefs hamper fertility control 
programmes, all provide separate, displaced stories as different political, 
economic and charitable (but rarely scientific) interventions bring them before 
the TV cameras. They are shown as problems for the present, and the future, if 
it is not left solely for construction in the imagination of the viewer, is depicted 
as much the same as the present, just happening to more people.
Only when interaction is postulated between these displaced stories of 
over-population and inadequate resources and those of the dominant eco­
catastrophe, which now is the environmentat one increasingly encapsulated 
as the Greenhouse Effect, is a global dimension added and population growth 
again represented as part of the catastrophic future. Agricultural variation is 
seen to intensify African famines; Latin American deforestation not only 
intensifies the Greenhouse Effect but increases the movement of indigenous 
populations to overcrowded cities; the rise in sea level will be particularly 
dramatic in Bangladesh and a very poor, densely populated country will have 
less space and less agricultural land. (The last of these has only received 
print, not TV, coverage.)
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There is rareiy, if ever, direct reference to past projections of eco­
catastrophes (such as the arrivai of a New ice Age) that have not eventuated, 
or have not done so in the projected time-scaie. Because of the seriousness of 
eco-catastrophes, their treatment is not subject to one of the common devices 
used to contain the potential fictionality of past scientific projections. This is the 
device, used occasionally on Tomorrow's World, of including a seif-reflexive 
item commenting on earlier episodes or on products it has previousiy extolied. 
For example, an item transmitted on 24 October 1989, examined some of the 
changes in bicycle design featured in the previous ten years, revealing 
problems including maintenance difficulties and excessive costs. Shots of 
more amusing, less serious predictions are aimost always included to point 
out the 'quaintness' of past visions of the future and self-deprecating 
comments about 'our' past naïvety are quite common. Such items are not 
evident for past projected catastrophes, since it is not possibie to comment on 
their 'quaintness' and reflexive items would then only be able to point out how 
science had been 'wrong'. (Like admissions of uncertainty, this is not 
something that televised science programmes do in the absence of 
immediately being able to disavow it as the problem is now corrected or 
certainty approaching.)
The medical pandemic of AiDS provides another example of a science- 
based catastrophe story that should generate particular representations of the 
future, but does so only under severe constraints. The constraints here are not 
just the ones already noted, but also those introduced through the morai 
dimensions seen as intrinsic to any discussion of sexualiy transmitted disease 
(and intensified by the early concentration of the disease in the West among 
male homosexuals) or drug abuse. The demarcation of science programmes 
from sociai issue ones, which has been institutionalised by the BBC in 
particular through programme specialization (for instance social impact stories 
are regarded as inappropriate for Horizon while suitable for others like the 
now defunct Brass Tacks^'i), operates most strongly here, despite the 
increasing difficulties of maintaining this separation on medicai subjects.
AIDS-derived futures are rarely projected past 2000 and are almost 
entirely statistically based. They depend on projecting some particular 
percentage of4Tie-population as carriers of the HIV virus or suffering from 'full­
blown' AIDS. From this may be derived various crisis stories of extra demands 
for hospitai beds or hospice places or NHS funding. Ali of these are carried in
1^ Gardner and Young: "Science on TV", p174
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social issue programmes or news broadcasts. Science programmes only 
carry stories on AiDS research and the development of cures and vaccines. 
Tomorrow's World, for example, deals with AIDS stories by using large 
models of proteins or receptor cells or other such highly abstract visual 
material, never through reference to sufferers or modes of transmission. It 
may be that because death is seen as the inevitable end to any individual 
AIDS story other than a scientific one, the idea of an AIDS-derived 
representation of the future is viewed as peculiar.
It is possible that some of the difficulties in presenting a scientifically- 
based view of an AiDS-derived future comes from the involvement of what I 
intend to term the 'personal mode' of thinking about the future. The word 
'mode' is used because the practice is evident across several discourses 
though characteristic of none in particular. In the personal mode, the future is 
talked about familially in terms of possible or probable situations for one's 
descendants and more generally through the 'generations to come' 
formulation. The personal mode is not common in science, it is more 
characteristic of narrative knowledge, but it is evidenced in the Tomorrow's 
World special's reference to the future forty years from now as "well within 
many of our lifetimes".
Eco-catastrophes all involve threats to generations to come, but this is 
discursively constructed as applying generally, to populations rather than 
individuals. Greenhouse Effect stories, for example, are about the coastline 
being eroded, rather than the particular threat to a member of the family's 
beachside house. AIDS stories, when they are not the very abstract, like those 
involving models of T-cells or statistics, are about the threat to individuals and 
as a consequence are rarely covered by popular science programmes. In an 
AiDS story, the next few years could be described as 'after the death of a 
nurnber b fljs ',"sd  perhaps that this future is rare in TV
programmes aimed at mass audiences.
The speculation may be congruent with the suggestion of Arthur and 
Marilouise Kroker that, as a result of AIDS in postmodern America, history (not 
science) becomes
"the reality-principle as everyone is 
compelled to live in fear of their own sexual 
biographies."®® [italics in the original]
®®Arthur and Marilouise Kroker: "Panic Sex in America", in Arthur and Marilouise Kroker 
(eds.): Body Invaders: sexuality and the postmodern condition, London, MacMillan 
Education, 1988. p i4
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The extent to which this perception can be supported, especially to the UK, is 
uncertain, there is as yet no evidence of it in representations on TV. if the 
Krokers' suggestion is valid, it may be that the 'reality' of AIDS has forced an 
accelerated concentration on past encounters and relationships, to the 
exclusion of the future.
This apparently slight concern with an AIDS-derived future may also, or 
alternatively, be explained by the insistence that AIDS is a disease of the 
demonised Other and hence neither within 'our' present nor future. In this 
latter type of representation, the AIDS catastrophe, like the other demographic 
ones, is displaced, even if it is to a place which is psychically rather than 
geographically, on the margins. There still are attempts to locate it 
geographically 'out there' (in Haiti, in Africa, in California, in Edinburgh), 
though as Susan Sontag has pointed out, "untrameiled intercontinental air 
travel" gives actuality to modern spatial interconnectedness and makes 
nonsense of the idea of geographic isolation of people, goods, problems - or 
diseases.®®
Sontag has suggested that the "Apocalyse is now a long running serial" 
which seems to be running in slow motion because (we think) we know the 
outcome given all the information and projections available to u s . ® ^  The 
apocalyse she refers to links nuclear, demographic, ecological and medical 
catastrophes concentrating on what are, admittedly, substantial shared 
characteristics. It does not apply to the non-fictional treatment of them in TV 
programmes, especially scientific ones. There catastrophes are separate and 
some, like AIDS, may recede into the past, but do not move much into the 
future.
This chapter has concentrated on non-fiction in its examination of the 
way scientifically-based, ecologically catastrophic futures are dealt with on TV. 
It will now turn briefly to some TV dramas and fiction films dealing with similar 
catastrophes to contrast so-called 'scientific' non-fictionai coverage with some 
fictional treatments.
It has been too short a time for there to be a substantiai body of film or TV 
fiction incorporating aspects of the more recent projected catastrophes 
d iscussed-earlie r^The-v isua i fic tions-o f- ecologicai and demographic
®®Susan Sontag: "AIDS and Its Metaphors", The New York Review of Books, Vol. XXXV, 
No. 16, Oct 27, 1988, pp89-99. p98 
® l^bid., p99
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catastrophe that do exist come predominantiy from the 70s, before the wide 
use of the term 'the Greenhouse Effect' and when anxiety about manipulating 
nature manifested itseif more in concerns about eco-catastrophe ,and 
advocation of zero population growth. Such fiims and TV programmes 
envisaged overpopulation (e.g. ZPG (1971), Soylent Green (1973)), the 
escape of various biologicai hazards (e.g. Doomwatch (BBC, 1970-72)) or 
some bacteriologicai catastrophe (e.g.The Survivors (BBC, 1974-77)).
Eco-catastrophes generally were very rare for most of the 80s and only at 
the end of the decade did the occasional reference to them begin to be found 
again in mainstream films (Slipstream  (1989), Millenium (1989)). Future 
demographic catastrophes are now shown oniy as incidentai consequences 
of whatever is the main motivator of the fiction, as, for example, the 
depopulation evident in post-nuclear holocaust fantasies.
As far as temporal location is concerned. Greenhouse Effect fictions are 
beginning to be set in the future; AiDS-based ones, like L o n g tim e  
Companion, are not SF and seem generally to be set in the present;®® and 
specifically demographic ones no longer seem to be being made at all.
The most immediate contrast between the non-fictional and fictional 
portrayals is that the iatter show few signs of the piecemeal approach 
characteristic of the former. Non-fiction science programmes not only present 
the various catastrophes separately, they often present various elements of 
them without showing how they connect. The piecemeal presentation referred 
to as inhibiting the Tomorrow's World Special's depiction of simuitaneous 
climatic and coastal changes was representative. This is not usuaily the case 
with fiction, which is more integrated, frequently presenting severai 
catastrophes interacting with each other and with other issues. Of the films of 
the 70s, THX-1138 (1970) depicts an enclosed, rigidly-structured, 
overpopulated world; Soy/enf Green shows a world where industrial 
development has brought about an environmental disaster with over­
population and food shortages; and in ZPG pollution has combined with 
over-population to create a situation in which there must be a thirty year 
moratorium on having children. Silent Running (1971) is set on one of the 
space-ships on which grow the sole surviving forests, though whether there 
are no ionger forests on earth because of over-population, environmental 
problems or some other catastrophe is unclear. Logan's Run (1976) deals 
with over-population obliquely by positing some catastrophe which has
®®After the end of the research period, an AIDS-predicated future-based TV drama. 
Yellowbacks, was broadcast (BBC1 Play on One, tx. 30 August 1991). AIDS was not 
however named; an unidentified, sexually-transmitted disease 'substituted'.
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caused people to shelter in domes which wouid be impossibiy crowded were 
peopie aliowed to live after they turned thirty, in ali of them the iead 
characters' probiems are resoived oniy by escape, though in both Soÿlent 
Green  and Silent Running it involves eventual suicide. All of them are 
basically law and order stories because the catastrophes have effectively 
ensured totalitarian societies,®® although the law is eventually evaded. More 
recent films, such as The Running Man (1987), Robocop (1987) or They 
Live (1988), frequently present crowded cities and totalitarian societies, or 
ones with serious law and order problems, but do so without a specified basis 
of overpopulation.
Eco-catastrophe was not only presented in tandem with over-population. 
No Blade o f Grass (1970) posited a virus which destroyed crops and 
depicted a depopulated future. The BBC TV series of the mid-70s. The 
Survivors, also depicted a depopulated world in the aftermath of a biological 
catastrophe. Several of the post-holocaust fantasies are so imprecise about 
the nature of their precipitating events that they might equally be nuclear, 
conventional or bacteriological war or even non-military catastrophes. 
(Cynically, it might be suggested that films based on a depopulation premise 
require smaller casts than do over-population ones.)
Fictionai depioyment of the Greenhouse Effect is only just beginning. 
Slipstream  outlines an imprecise ecological disaster in a voice-over before 
the credits.
"By the end of the century, IVIan's destruction 
of the Earth's environment turned the forces 
of Nature upon him. There are many stories 
about the converging earthquakes which split 
continents apart mixing civilisations together, 
about the floods which buried the cities and 
about the emergence of a river of wind called 
the Slipstream."
Most of the scattered and presumably decreased population in the film survive 
by scavenging. M/7/en/i/n?, slightly more precisely, envisages a decaying 
future world suffering the final effects of centuries of environmental pollution. 
Publicity for the sequei to Highlander (1986) announced that it would be set 
in 2020 and depicT '
"a dark, oppressive time when there is no
®®This may not apply to Silent Running since so little is learnt about earth-based society.
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ozone layer left. Science comes to the rescue 
with a substitute ozone which has to be
sprayed into the upper atmosphere."®? ^
In most of the contemporary films, the eco-catastrophe only serves as a 
background to differentiate a reasonabiy standard narrative and make it more 
contemporary. Nonetheiess, they stili provide a more sustained picture of a 
future structured by ecologicai catastrophe than is the case with most of the TV 
science programmes. While it may be possible for viewers to construct their 
own compound catastrophic futures from the information provided in a few 
week's TV programmes - perhaps a decline in planetary surface area 
intensifying current refugee problems as certain microstates literally disappear 
and low-iying countries find themselves substantially smaller - it seems not at 
all possible for this to be referred to directly on non-fiction TV, especially in 
science programmes.
One way in which films and TV programmes talk about the future is in 
predicting catastrophes by extrapolating from current evidence. This chapter 
has examined the presentation of severai eco-catastrophes to find how the 
catastrophic future is presented both fictionally and non-fictionally. The eco­
catastrophes concentrated on were the Greenhouse Effect, which it was 
argued is currently the dominant one, the possible escape of genetically- 
engineered organisms, the AIDS pandemic and, from the past, over­
population. The framework within which these eco-catastrophes were 
investigated was an examination of the ways in which TV science 
programmes acted to maintain their claims to speak 'truthfuliy' when talking 
about the future to a lay public. The inquiry into fictionai portrayals was 
complementary to this. -
The most important characteristic of science as it is populariy presented 
on TV, appears to be its concern with certainties. Even when the subject is the 
future and certainty thus impossible, the strength of the desire to achieve it is 
such that uncertainty must be repeatedly contained. Addressing a popular 
audience exacerbates this. Doubt and disagreement, which add to the 
uncertainty, may be voiced quite readily within professional language, but it 
appears that when things are simplified to become comprehensible to the lay 
public, uncertainty is minimised. This is even evident, as the chapter has 
shown, when the subject is as contentious as the iikely occurrence and effects
®?John Vidal: "Eco Soundings: 20/20 vision", The Guardian, 17 November 1989, p27
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of ecological catastrophes. Nonetheless, perhaps in compensation for the 
constraints of appearing certain in addressing a popular TV audience on 
scientific matters, televised science is unable to avoid incursions of y^hat 
Jean-Francois Lyotard has termed 'narrative knowledge' as the demands of 
'good TV  and the desire to communicate clearly contest with scientific 'purity'.
A characteristic related to the pursuit of certainty is the desire to appear 
objective, or at least dispassionate (again much more evident in addresses to 
the general public than within scientific institutions themselves). This seems to 
be the most influential factor in the use of the various devices deployed to 
reduce both the impact of the fictional and the risk of appearing alarmist. 
Minimal variation, piecemeal presentation and computer-generated visuals all 
contribute to unemotional presentations. Where the risk of emotions spilling 
over into science seems especially great, as for example with AiDS stories, 
the austerity of mathematics may be called upon and representation become 
largely statistical.
However, both the certainty and the lack of emotions may be undercut by 
metaphors, which are used to enhance comprehensibility, but bring with them 
less controllable connotations. This seems to have been the case with the 
Greenhouse Effect - where it seems that positive aspects of the metaphor (like 
enhanced growing conditions) have deflected attention away from some of the 
catastrophic aspects of the phenomenon itself (like the inundation of iow-lying 
country).
Two comparisons with eco-catastrophe stories in economic contexts 
revealed that an economic framing allowed a much greater range of referents, 
the taking of a partisan position, no pre-occupation with certainty and, in the 
case of the non-televisuai story (the one in The Economist), a wiilingness to 
include an overtly fictional illustration. TV science programmes appear very 
circumspect in contrast, it is uncertain from this whether the privileged position 
of science in speaking the truth results from its great restraint in speaking to a 
popular audience or requires it to be so cautious.
The restraint that marks the non-fictional so heavily seems to disappear 
absolutely when the depictions become avowedly fictional. Minimal variation 
and piecemeal presentation are abandoned to be replaced by detailed 
presentation of the consequences of projected eco-catastrophes, even if these 
are only the background to an otherwise conventional plot.
The overt intermingling of the Star Wars/SDI case has not been repeated 
here, but neither has it conclusively been shown to be an aberration, after ali.
3: NUCLEAR FUTURES
The previous two chapters have argued that scientific discourse has a 
greater ability than any other to talk about the future with a claim to doing so 
truthfully, but that it seems unable to do so completely free of the influence of 
fiction. It is not yet clear whether the discursive struggle investigated in the first 
chapter between scientific and science fictional discourse in the very 
particular case of the naming of Star Wars/SDI is representative of ways of 
talking about the future. Examining the wider case of televised scientific 
coverage of eco-catastrophes resulted in the discovery of a great disparity 
between the restraints imposed on televised science, beset by the search for 
certainty, and the comparative freedom both of economic and fictional 
discourse.
This chapter is concerned to extend a slightly different aspect of the first 
one - the overt involvement of politics in scientific talking about the future. The 
focus is on a particular area of nuclear discourse - nuclear futures. This term 
refers to visions of the future as it would be if changed by some event 
involving nuclear material - most usually a military one, especially a nuclear 
war, but also possibly civilian, like an accident to a nuclear installation. The 
chapter asks why there is comparatively little coverage of as important a 
matter as the future likely to be brought about by such a nuclear event. Two 
main possible explanations are investigated: that there is a practice of 
restricting discussion of the area; or that it is characteristic of the area itself to 
resist being discussed - more specifically that this is an instance of the 
sublime.
The main issue, especially in the first part of the chapter, is with the 
discursive contest over the right to speak on an issue that is both scientific and 
political. Like the first chapter, though less exclusively, this one examines 
discursive contests over the terms in which 'nuclear speech' is conducted and 
the precision of its referents. Scientists, and politicians, as long as they speak 
with reference to science or techno-strategy, may speak of nuclear policy and 
the effects of nuclear explosions without challenges being made to their right 
to do so^Others doing this, especially if they choose to do so through fictional 
means, must expect to have their right challenged.
In its most limited guise, nuclear discourse, of which nuclear futures form 
a part, is what has previously been termed a professional discourse, that is, it
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emanates from a very restricted group of people - the military strategists and 
scientists of the nuclear powers. It overlaps substantially with techno-strategic 
discourse,1 [discussed in Chapter One] sharing most if not all of its already 
described characteristics. It also includes the statements of scientists 
concerned with consequences other than the immediately military, for 
example the nuclear winter/autumn debates. The concern here is only with 
that part of nuclear discourse which is mediated through film and TV and 
which is concerned with the future. It is however concerned with a less 
restricted perception of nuclear discourse in terms of who can speak it. The 
disqualification of non-scientific speakers is not accepted. The discursive 
struggle betweeen professional and lay, scientific and non-scientific speakers, 
and the texts they produce, is at the heart of this chapter.
Given the importance of the nuclear issue, there is a surprising lack of 
non-fictional TV programmes (and films) about the nuclear future. It is not 
immediately clear why this should be so. It cannot be that the changes in 
Eastern Europe have reduced the salience of the nuclear threat, because 
these changes did not occur until the end of the research period. The most 
significant acknowledgement of the change they brought to the way the future 
was depicted was not on TV or in film, but in a specialist journal, with the 
symbolic turning back of the countdown clock in the Bulletin o f the Atomic 
Scientists.^
During the research period, only four non-fiction TV programmes were 
noted that could be regarded as concerned with a nuclear future. Two of these 
have been discussed already since they dealt with Star Wars/SDI (the 
Panorama programme "The President's Star Warriors" and the Open Space 
programme made by scientists opposed to involvement in related research). 
The remaining two were an Equinox programme "Command and Control" 
(C4, tx. 22 October 1987) and a segment of Brass Tacks concerned with 
public reactions to nuclear power (BBC2, tx. 18 December 1986).
Nuclear documentaries are most commonly variants of science
 ^Cohn: "Sex and Death".
^The Bulletin Clock has stood variously between ten and two minutes to midnight. Since 
January 1984, it had been set at three minutes to. it was moved back to six minutes to 
midnight for the Jan./Feb. 1988 issue as a result of the signing of the US-Soviet treatyDn the”  
elimination of INF and other improvements in superpower relations. {Bulletin of the 
Atomic Scientists, 44(1), Jan./Feb. 1988. p3). As a result of more widespread geo­
political improvements it was again moved back early in 1990 - to ten 
minutes to midnight. {Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 46(3), April 1990).
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programmes, constrained by techno-strategic discourse and concerned with 
present preparations for war. The Equinox  programme "Command and 
Control", for example, examined the possibility of nuclear war starting 'by 
accident'. It was thus a programme that did envisage a nuclear future, even if 
the focus was directed to ways to stop it eventuating. It detailed procedures 
and devices to prevent what it called the 'mad major problem' - the suggestion 
that an officer high on drugs, for example, would push the detonation button 
without authorization. Most of the programme used military personnel and 
visuals taken within defence establishments - the (US) Airforce Weapons 
Research Laboratory and HMS Renown, for example. Critical voices within 
the programme were supplied only by individuals who had been involved - 
like Robert MacNamara and ex-submarine Commander Jim Bush. This 
practice limits the range of voices within a programme and suggests that those 
lacking such experience are incapable of voicing opinions worth paying 
attention to. It thus endorses the view that only those professionally involved 
have the right to speak about the nuclear future. This does not mean that all 
those speaking hold the same position. The programme was able to be quite 
critical of military assurances that the feared nuclear future could not come 
about, because the usual device to rebut such criticism - claiming that 
(opposing) speakers are unable to have access to the truth because they did 
not have te oh no strategic credentials - was unavailable, since the critics did 
have military or relevant political experience.
The nuclear future being envisaged by speakers was one in which 
nuclear war would begin without proper authorisation - either because the 
President could not be contacted in time, or the electromagnetic pulse 
generated by a nuclear explosion would prevent communications, or the 
'permissive action links' designed to establish restraint over individuals taking 
launch decisions were not deemed necessary for naval vessels despite 
submarines now carrying more weapons than are based on land, or (in a 
repeated racist suggestion) because Greek and Turkish units, nuclear- 
capable through NATO, might "go nuts". No visual support was provided for 
any of these 'visions'; they were presented solely in words, usually in 
interviews to-camera with captions emphasising the status of the speaker. 
This served to provide a 'sober', even scientific, impression, which mock-ups, 
Tbrexarnple, mighîTiâve undercut.
The Brass Tacks programme was an exception to the concentration on 
professionals in that it examined public reactions, but not a major exception in 
that members of the public themselves rarely spoke directly. It looked at
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opinions about nuclear safety - particularly at Sellafield. Members of the 
public figured mainly as the objects of investigation and comment, while the 
discursive power rested with the programme makers (overtly in the voice-over) 
and with various 'experts' - like the Chairman of BNFL, Sun columnist Dr. 
Lambert, Dr Jennifer Brown and an environmental safety officer. The public 
was principally represented not by individuals but in 'processed' form as poll 
data (only twenty-five percent of those polled thought nuclear waste would be 
safely diposed of), or through the over sixty thousand visitors to Sellafield in 
1986. No sustained attempt was made to depict any nuclear future. As so 
often in social and political comment on the future, the audience was left to 
draw conclusions about the future that were implicit in whatever is the cause 
for concern - in this instance unsafe disposal of nuclear waste.
Since both the Star Wars/SDI programmes also presented the opinions 
of those professionally involved - scientists and technostrategists - the non- 
fictional TV programmes presented a consistent picture of an issue on which, 
regardless of the attitude they adopted to it, only 'experts' pronounced. Even 
the Brass Tacks programme only allowed ordinary, lay people a voice as part 
of a numerical response to be commented on by professionals.
The other main way in which the nuclear future could have appeared on 
non-fictional TV was in news items and associated comment on issues such 
as the Trident missile purchasing contracts, the anti-nuclear Greenham 
Common peace camp or nuclear waste disposal. Such news is never 
common, but even when it does appear, the nuclear future features minimally 
in the televisual treatment. The future in the Trident stories, for example, was 
represented mainly in terms of the economic cost of the programme and the 
issue of British dependency on the US. The technostrategic element was 
relegated to a minor role. This was primarily a political story. The Greenham 
Common story was presented, as it had been for most of the existence of the 
protest camp, as one concerned mainly with law and order.3 The reason for 
the women's protest - which did indeed involve a vision of a nuclear future - 
was not presented or discussed.
Nuclear waste disposal stories on the other hand involve an unavoidable 
reference to the future in their statements about the length of time before 
materials cease to be dangerous. The emphases of TV stories which deal with
this issue still tend to be on the present, on planning (where the waste will be
3Alison Young has demonstrated how press treatment was dominated by matters related to 
women's bodies and questions of deviance, but this was much less evident in TV coverage. 
[Alison Young: Femininity in Dissent, London, Routledge, 1990]
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stored) or on technology (how). The latter is usually a scientific or 
technological story dealt with by presenting different statements - one from the 
nuclear industry or its watchdog bodies and one from an environmental grbup. 
Even speakers from pressure groups like these are now likely to be 
professionals able to defend their right to engage in nuclear discourse.
In a study of nuclear war issues in the American news media, David M. 
Rubin and Constance Cummings suggest a number of possible explanations 
for the paucity of coverage. The factors they identify may extend beyond the 
US (and perhaps to more than just nuclear war news). They cite journalists' 
avoidance of what are seen as repetitive stories, especially apparently 
insoluble ones;^ a belief among journalists "that viewers cannot endure 
more debates about the bomb";5 and an unwillingness for network 
television to question the administration's nuclear policy.® These all suggest 
that nuclear issues may be regarded as tedious, unpleasant and divisive. As 
long term stories dependent on theories (of nuclear winter, of deterrence, of 
military strategy) they lack action, concreteness and a suitable news 
periodicity. The installation or cost of nuclear missiles is a 'better story' in 
these terms than plans for their eventual use. In other words journalists' 
professional assessments of 'news values' make stories dealing with nuclear 
matters in the present more likely to be reported than those concerned with a 
nuclear future.
There was another non-fictional TV programme dealing with the nuclear 
future in the research period. This was an item on Saturday Review on the 
making of the animated film of Raymond Briggs's When the Wind Blows 
(BBC, tx. 7 February 1987) and part of the publicity preceding cinema release 
of the film. I have separated it from the foregoing because it was a non- 
fictional commentary on a fiction about the nuclear future. It demonstrates the 
cohtinuing difficulty of separating fiction frorn non-fiction in talking about the 
future, but even more is an example of a characteristic of film and TV 
portrayals of the nuclear future. This characteristic is the accompanying of 
fictional portrayals, especially TV dramas, by non-fictional programmes 
commenting on them. The Saturday Review example is slight, being equally 
characteristic of general film promotion, but as will be seen later, the 
screening of 'companion' commentary programmes is a significant factor in 
the discursive struggle over the right to speak about the nuclear future.
^David M. Rubin and Constance Cummings: "Nuclear War and Its Consequences on
Television News", Journal of Communications, 39(1), Winter 1989, pp39-58. p40-41 
®lbid., p49 
6|bid., p52
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It is also relevant to the paucity of depictions, since an absence of fictions 
may mean that companion discussion programmes or documentaries^ are 
absent too. Depictions are not consistently scarce. At certain times quite a 
number may appear more or less concurrently, while long periods may elapse 
with very few examples at all occurring. The three years of my research have 
been one of the latter periods. There was no major high-profile documentary 
dealing with a nuclear-determined future. Even fictions may be scarce; only 
one feature-length film and one TV drama received first screenings in 
B rita in .7 it is possible that a contributory reason for this was that nuclear 
issues had been comparatively prominent on TV during the preceding few 
years. There had been a number of programmes on nuclear accidents in the 
wake of the Chernobyl disaster in 1986 and various 'celebrations' in 1985 of 
the fortieth anniversary of the dropping of atomic bombs on Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki. There had also been a number of nuclear fictions made for TV 
screened in 1983-4. Perhaps producers believed, like the journalists referred 
to by Rubin and Cummings earlier, that viewers did not want more debates on 
nuclear issues, or perhaps they had become wary of the subject because of 
the difficulties involved in getting a programme to air - examples of which will 
be detailed later.
It should be noted that, in asserting that there is a surprising lack of 
material representing the nuclear future, I am referring to explicit depictions. 
Only overt instances of films, TV programmes and commentary on them 
concerned with nuclear-determined futures will be considered - and not what 
Andrew Britton, instancing particularly Raiders o f the Lost Ark (1981) and 
Star Trek II: The Wrath of Khan (1982), calls
"parables of the redemptive and regenerative 
properties of the weaponry of annihilation in 
American hands."®
This is not to deny the importance of these and other manifestations of nuclear 
anxiety, merely to narrow the immediate focus.
In looking at the nuclear-based film and TV fictions of the thirty years of 
the research period, it becomes overwhelmingly evident that the nuclear 
future is one determined by nuclear war. Almost all of them can be grouped
according to where war is placed in the narrative - whether it is narrowly
^This excepts what I am about to refer to as averted war stories and survivaiist fictions.
^Andrew Britton: "Blissing Out: The Politics of Reaganite Entertainment", Movie, 
No.31/32, Winter 1986, pp1-42. p21
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averted, transpires at the end or in the course of the narration or has 
happened in the fiction's distant past. Examples of films of these four types 
are: of those in which the war is completely averted - WarGames (1983), 
Superman IV (^QQS),The Abyss (1989); those dealing with the starting of 
nuclear war - Dr. Strangelove (1964), Fail Safe (1964), Alrbase (BBC1, tx. 1 
March 1988); those dealing with the period immediately before and after a 
nuclear war - The Day After (1983), The War Game (1965), Testament 
(1983), Threads (BBC2, tx. 23 September 1984), When the Wind Blows 
(1986); and the survivaiist ones dealing with life in a world where nuclear war 
has destroyed most vestiges of civilisation - Mad Max (1979), A Boy and his 
Dog (1975), Battletruck (1982). The first group is not uncommon and has a 
number of recent examples, but since films in which nuclear war is averted 
cannot then depict a nuclear-determined future, little attention will be paid to 
them. The second group seems to have disappeared of late except on TV, and 
the third has only ever been sporadically represented. The last group is by far 
the most numerous, especially in the last ten to fifteen years, though mainly as 
films not specific TV dramas.
In the period between the dropping of the atomic bombs on Hiroshima 
and Nagasaki and the early 60s there were some films which combined the 
third and fourth categories such as Five (1951) and The World, the Flesh 
and the Devil (1959). Described by Wyn Wachhorst as "Edenic fairytales",® 
these earnest offerings tend to offer hope for the repopulation of a cleansed 
planet. The only film of this early time screened during my research period 
was On the Beach (1959) which offers no hope and in its resolute pessimism 
is more in keeping with the recent immediate aftermath films, even if it is set a 
few years after the posited war.
Even the few exceptions or variations have a nuclear war in their 
premise: The Terminator (1984) posits a continuing nuclear war between 
machines and humans in the future, but concentrates on a murderous pursuit 
set in the present; and the Flanet of the Apes series (1968-1974 and a 1974 
television series) is set in the very distant post-nuclear holocaust future where 
human beings have become degenerate animals subservient to the dominant 
intelligent apes and chimpanzees.
The main alternative to basing a nuclear future on war is to consider the 
possibilities of future accidents with nuclear reactors. These are principally
®Wyn Wachhorst: "The Day After: Films on Nuclear Aftermath", in Phoenix From the Ashes: 
The Literature of the Remade World, ed. Carl B. Yoke, New York, Greenwood Press, 
1987. PP178-181
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dealt with in political debates. Coverups of present or past accidents are 
however not uncommon topics for dramatic treatment. The most renowned of 
these is probably the drama serial Edge of Darkness (BBC2, tx. 4 November - 
9 December 1985). However, like films on similar themes (The China 
Syndrome (1979), Chain Reaction (1980)), this was set ostensibly in the 
present. Unlike the situation with nuclear war or post-nuclear holocaust, there 
seems no need to set nuclear industry dramas in the future. Very occasionally 
there may be an aside about a nuclear material in a future-set story principally 
concerned with something else. The reference usually functions to intensify 
the depiction of an irresponsible, corrupt corporation. A Star Cops episode, 
"This Can to be Opened in a Million Years" (BBG2, tx. 3 August 1987), 
provides an extreme example. The convoluted plot involved a moon-based 
mining company's complicity in mafia-controlled illegal uranium trafficking.
Despite the fictional films referred to, there is still not a substantial 
number of portrayals of the nuclear future. During the three years in which I 
conducted my actual research, only seven such portrayals, fictional and non- 
fictional, TV and film, received a first screening.i® The question thus arises of 
why there is so little talking about the nuclear future. Two possible answers 
have already been given: journalists' beliefs that audiences find such stories 
repetitive and tedious; and the possibility that there was something of a 'glut' 
of stories on the subject in the years preceding the start of the research. Two 
more suggestions will now be investigated: that there are restrictions placed 
on who has the right to speak on the subject; and that the subject itself resists 
discussion, either through its sublime character or for more mundane reasons.
A preliminary example of a contest over the right to speak on the nuclear 
future can be seen in reaction to statements by religious leaders. Many of the 
attacks in the news media on Catholic bishops in the US after their 
pronouncements on nuclear war in their 1983 Pastoral Letter questioned the 
right of the bishops to speak on issues that were both political and strategic- 
t e c h n i c a l . T h e  moral dimension, where one might assume clerics would be 
regarded as qualified to speak, is here regarded either as subsumed in the 
political or not appropriate (much as seems to be the case on matters of social 
justice). Something similar had happened the previous year in the UK with the 
publication of The Church and the Bomb, a report to the Church of England's
Board of Social Responsibility. The argument about this was not so much over
^°The episode of Star Cops is not included because the nuclear material does not determine 
the character of the future.
^^Jean Bethke Elshtain: Women and War, Brighton, Harvester, 1987. p153-4
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the right of clerics to speak on the issue, but on their right to suggest policy 
implementations of their moral p o s i t i o n s C l e r i c s  were declared to be 
acting improperly in speaking of military strategy.
It was noted in the first chapter that Michel Foucault's examination of 
'regimes of truth' involved not just privileging some discourses over others but 
also identifying the status of the people who could make statements operate 
as 'truth'. The attacks on religious leaders for speaking on nuclear issues 
included identifying them as people without the necessary status in the area. 
The non-fictional TV programmes referred to earlier all relied on scientifically 
or militarily trained professionals for their pronouncements, in an apparent 
acceptance that the area was not one where others could speak with any 
claim to 'truthfulness'.
Another example of the restriction on who can be regarded as able to 
speak 'truthfully' can be seen from a recent development in critical theory. The 
argument has been advanced in a number of places that nuclear discourse is 
both a scientific one where only scientists or techno-strategists have 
competence, and one where a different group of professionals should have 
their competence recognised. One such argument was variously articulated in 
a special issue of the journal Diacritics devoted to nuclear criticism. The 
editorial, for instance, argued that all recent critical theory "recounts an 
allegory of nuclear survival".'*® It called for the investigation of current nuclear 
discussions by literary and critical theorists.
Jacques Derrida, a contributor to this colloquium, acknowledged the 
"techno-scientifico-militaro-diplomatic incompetence" of the contributors, but 
rejected it as a disqualification for participating in the nuclear debate since 
they did have textual competence. For him, the most outstanding 
diaracteristicjolt phenomenon was its "fabulous textuality", even its
fabulous specularization. He argued that, since (despite the use of nuclear 
weapons at the end of World War ÏI) there has not been a nuclear war,
"[tjhe.terrifying reality of the nuclear conflict can only 
- - — 7  be the signified referent, never the real referent
(present or past) of a discourse or text."'*^
-  ®Glasgow7:University-Media Group: War and Peace, News, Milton Keynes, Open 
University Press, 1985. Chapters.
(Editorial), "Nuclear Criticism", Diacritics, 14(2), Summer 1984. pp 2-3. p2 
^^Jacques Derrida: "No Apocalypse, Not Now (full speed ahead, 7 missiles, 7 missives), 
Diacritics, 14(2), Summer 1984, pp20-31. p23
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In the absence of what he saw as any possibility of reference to the "real 
referent", he argued that those specialised in dealing with the textual, the 
domain of the signified referent, should have their skills acknowledged as 
appropriate.
The particular relevance of textual competence has also been noted, in a 
slightly different way, by many of the contributors to Paul Chilton's collection of 
essays on Nukespeak,"*® who point out how deterrence is a phenomenon in 
which words and not weapons are used. Of all the contributors, William Van 
Belle and Paul Claes are most concerned with questions of the credibility of 
nuclear threats, which each side uses to convince the other that it is willing to 
use the weapons, while maintaining to its domestic population that to do so 
would be madness."*® In a related though different vein, Ronald Aronson 
quotes Daniel Ellsberg's assertion that nuclear weapons w ere  used on 
twelve occasions between 1945 and 1982, but that this use "to achieve policy 
aims" involved not detonation, but a threat to detonate, as President Carter 
did in 1980 in the Middle East, or President Kennedy did in 1962 with the 
Cuban missile crisis."*^ Despite the competence of the speakers and the 
perceptiveness of their comments, there has been no indication that literary or 
critical theorists have acquired equal status with scientists or techno­
strategists as people able to speak 'truthfully' on nuclear issues. There were 
no literary critics speaking authoritatively in the TV programmes.
The principal way in which the discursive struggle over the right to speak 
about nuclear issues will be examined is by looking at those films and TV 
programmes which have caused controversy. The controversy at issue may 
be political or scientific, and is often instigated by promotion of fictions in 
advance of their screening or release. It features in news bulletins, current 
affairs stories and letters to the editor. It often itself is used as the basis for a 
television programme. (Objections to excessive, but non-nuclear, violence 
may lead to controversy, but that is not relevant here.) The controversial 
depictions are those in which nuclear war is not averted and survival not 
celebrated. They are the ones that detail the suffering of victims and the 
problems of triage. There seems no doubt that the reason these are 
controversial is because they claim to show what could 'really happen', and 
attempt to incorporate some of the power of scientific discourse to speak the
15Paul Chilton (ed.): Language and the Nuclear Arms Debate: Nukespeak Today, London, 
Frances Pinter (Publishers), 1985 
"*®WiiIiam Van Belle and Paul Claes: "The Logic of Deterrence: a semiotic and psychoanalytic 
approach", in Chiiton: Language, p99 
"* ^ Ronald Aronson: The Dialectics cf Disaster, London, Verso, 1983. p268
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truth into the more affective potential of the fictional. The usual basis for 
objecting to this way of depicting the nuclear future is the assertion that the 
facts are wrong and that the affective presentation is excessive or otherwise 
inappropriate - in particular that it is too horrific or too melodramatic.
Most of the controversy is over TV productions. This is partly because TV 
attracts much larger audiences than films do, but more probably because the 
programmes are concerned to inform and warn, rather than entertain. Even 
with satellites and the expansion in channels, television remains the primary 
information channel. Thus although The War Game and The Day After, two 
of the most controversial programmes, had cinematic releases, the first was in 
default of the forbidden BBC screening and the second followed US network 
TV screening. When the Wind Blows was initially funded by money from 
Channel 4 and it had earlier had BBC exposure as a radio play."*®
Cinematic release is usually an exception for TV features. Threads, the 
most prominent recent British nuclear fiction, has not had it. Documentaries or 
science programmes likewise are restricted to television. The episode of 
Q.E.D. "A Guide to Armageddon" (BBC1, tx. 1977) in which Mick Jackson 
examined the consequences of the explosion over one city of a one megaton 
bomb and which led to his suggesting to the writer, Barry Hines, that they 
collaborate on a drama of a more sustained nuclear attack (a drama which 
became Threads), did receive an off-air screening at the Institute of 
Contemporary Art in London during a celebration of the BBC's sixtieth 
anniversary, but this was most unusual. Unless there is some such 
exceptional cause, television programmes on nuclear themes usually receive 
only one transmission. The fortieth anniversary of the detonation of the atomic 
bombs over Hiroshima and Nagasaki, provided one of the few instances of a 
repe^ screening. The BBC special programmes over five nights.
As well as a new specifically related documentary, Nagasaki - Return 
Journey (BBC1, tx. 29 July 1985) and two discussion programmes, there was 
a repeat of Threads and, finally, the television premiere of Peter Watkins's 
The War Game (BBC2, tx. 31 July 1985) twenty years after its production and 
five years after the 'future' time in which it was set. (By this time its premises 
were obviously no longer tenable and it all looked very dated. No longer, for 
instance could the breakdown of law and order have been conveyed by the 
“shdts'bf"shouting, uncontrolled policemen.)
The War Game is probably the most notorious of the controversial
'*®The various adaptions of Briggs's work and reponses to them are detailed in Richard Kiiborn:
Multimedia Melting Pot: Marketing When the Wind Blows, London, Comedia, 1986.
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programmes. The BBC refused for over twenty years to screen the programme 
they had themselves commissioned. Although precise details of why they 
refused are unavailable, it seems probable that, in common with On The 
Beach, The Day After and, to a lesser extent. Threads, it raised fears that 
public opposition to the nuclear deterrent would be encouraged if a graphic 
presentation of the consequences of nuclear war were to be shown. In other 
words, the controversy revealed a fear of the potency of the combination of 
fact and affect and the possibility that it might manifest in popular political 
action. Michael Tracey's examination of BBC documents reveals a disparity 
between the public announcements that the drama was too disturbing 
(referring presumably to Watkins's presentation of civilian apathy, food riots, 
executions and concentration camps) and the unpublicised involvement in the 
decision-making of senior civil servants concerned with nuclear policy, who 
felt it could function to support the CND.1®
US government officials had similarly worried that the film. On The 
Beach, could promote pacifism. Not having available the British option of 
prior restraint,
"Eisenhower's cabinet discussed confidential 
actions they might take to undermine the movie, 
and the State Department and the AEG distributed 
comments."®®
Ignoring the projective basis of the film (made in 1959, it was set in 1964), 
these concentrated on attacking the 'truth' of the basic premise - the possibility 
of nuclear fall-out spreading all over the globe. Yet On The Beach shared 
none of the grimness of The War Game’, it was a sentimental even elegaic 
piece in which a resigned Australian populace and the crew of an American 
submarine (the sole survivors of an unexplained war) while away the time 
awaiting their inescapable extinction. ' " -
A good example of the way in which fiction and non-fiction interact is 
The Day After (US: ABC, tx. 20 November 1983; UK: ITV, tx. 10 December 
1983), which was the occasion for substantial debate in the US, with 
denunciations of the programme by the Right in advance of the screening, 
plans by som ^ Democrats to use it in fund-raising for the Presidential
■*®Michael Tracey: "Censored: the War Game story", in Crispin Aubrey (ed.): NukespeakiThe 
Media and the Bomb, London, Comedia, 1982. p50 
®®Spencer R. Weart: Nuclear Fear: A History of Images, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard 
University Press, 1988. p 218
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primaries, and discussions organized by the Peace Movement. There was 
concern not only about its political potential (especially over whether it would 
increase support for the Freeze movement), but also about its influence on 
children and the emotionally fragile. An anticipated increase in the suicide 
rate was prepared for, and special counselling services set up. In the event, 
the American audience was estimated to be a hundred million and critical 
opinion concentrated on the melodrama and the soap opera aspects which 
diminished the horror and arguably banalized the political message. None of 
the feared psychological consequences eventuated. Susan Boyd-Bowman 
has pointed out that for the American producers the problem of the horrific 
nature of the subject, was more influential both in the treatment of the subject 
and its screening, than the political difficulties.®"* Nonetheless, the US 
screening was politically framed by discussions in the press and by Secretary 
of State George Schultz's appearance in a post-screening studio discussion.
Post-screening discussions have since become a major feature of the 
controversial type of nuclear programme (and a reason why a lack of fictions 
means also a lack of non-fictional TV programmes). They are the ground on 
which the discursive struggle over the right to speak is fought. They signal that 
the 'facts' are under dispute; that the fiction has been seen to make truth 
claims and that political and military figures, and often also members of the 
scientific establishment, are reclaiming the ground. The discussions are 
however only part of the discursive struggle, which also occurs in advance 
publicity and rebuttal of its assertions, in letters to the editors and in news 
items about the comments, the screenings and the responses to them. This 
framing of fictional programmes with non-fictional material is a two-way 
process, for the fictional then structures the terms of the debate or the 
reception of the documentary^^ long after the time of the screening. Once 
again scientific discourse is unable to operate 'untainted' by the fictional.
Perhaps because of the American experience and possibly also because 
of different British expectations of realism in documentary dramas, before the 
British screening there was little concern with The Day After's potential for 
horrifying the audience, although the recommendation that children not be 
allowed to watch alone was repeated. The political framing was provided 
overwhelmingly by various statements of the Defence Secretary, Michael
Heseltine. While asserting that it would strengthen public support for the policy 
of deterrence, he also demanded the right of reply because it would create
®"*Susan Boyd-Bowman: "The Day After. Representations of the Nuclear Holocaust", 
Screen, 25(4&5) July-Oct. 1984, pp71-97. p75
84
public anxiety.®® He refused to take part in a TV-AM discussion with David 
Frost because Mgr. Bruce Kent was also appearing in the programme 
(separately and later). In an article for the Daily Express, Heseltine colla|ised 
fiction and political action in asserting his right to a special opportunity for 
Ministerial comment. He said that
"The Day After \s a political statement about nuclear 
war if for no other reason than that it is being shown 
on the very weekend of yet more major 
demonstrations at Greenham Common and on the 
second anniversary of the protest camp."®®
ITV, in refusing his request for special treatment, emphasised the separation 
between fiction and non-fiction. They said that there was no precedent for 
giving a Minister right of reply to a fictional presentation. Heseltine eventually 
appeared during a post-screening discussion chaired by Robert Kee, but from 
a separate studio, not as part of the panel. A further political aspect was the 
banning of CND from buying advertising time for its magazine alongside the 
programme. The British audience averaged 11.3 million and LWT received 
only eight calls afterwards - most of them being about the discussion, not the 
film.
The BBC on the other hand got over a hundred calls after the screening 
of Threads; enough for the switchboard to be referred to as jammed. 70 
percent were in favour of the programme's being screened. The audience 
however was not as large - it averaged seven million (nine million had seen at 
least some and four million saw all of it). The BBC Audience Research 
Department also announced that 63 percent of the audience had seen both 
The Day After and Threads and that it was twice as likely as the population 
at large to be in favour of unilateral disarmament. (Despite this, unilateralists 
still d i d  not comprise anywhere near a majority of the a u d i e n c e . )®4
Threads is a story of two families in Sheffield brought together at the 
beginning of the programme when the daughter of the middle class family 
becomes pregnant by the son of the working class family. The play concludes 
thirteen years later in the ruins of Sheffield with the birth of a child, possibly 
mutant, to the daughter conceived just before the war. It was not, as might 
have been the case with the early Edenic fantasies, a hopeful conclusion:-------
®®George Jones: "TV film reply sought", Sunday Telegraph, 4 December 1983, p i .
®®Mlchael Heseltine: "Why this fiction will never be fact". Daily Express, 9 December 1983, p5 
®^Peter Fiddick: "The Bang that left Britain shaken not stirred", The Guardian, 11 March 
1985, pi 3
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Planning and pre-screening publicity for Threads seemed to have 
learned both from The War Game experience and from The Day After, it 
generated comparatively little political criticism. It was also helped, cynics 
suggested, by being screened during the parliamentary recess which reduced 
the level of controversy. Indeed the Ministry of Defence welcomed the 
programme, only Peace through NATO and Mary Whitehouse issued 
statements condemning its screening. The initial screening had been delayed 
several months, with the result that it was shown in Japan in August on the 
anniversary of the bombing of Nagasaki then in six European countries before 
its British premiere. The combination of a scientifically qualified director (Mick 
Jackson), the publicized involvement of both the Home Office and SANA 
(Scientists Against Nuclear Arms), and a list of seven scientific advisers and 
eighteen more consultants enabled it to avoid The War Game's fate. The 
different statuses of the techno-strategic and the fictional were acknowledged 
by the on-screen presentation of the more documentary material in printed 
form in sub- and inter-titles, clearly marked off as separate from the fiction. 
Subsequent discussion did not occur until the evening following transmission 
and then only after the screening of On the Eighth Day (BBC2, tx. 24 
September 1984), a documentary examining the consequences of nuclear 
winter, produced by the Natural History Unit.
Critical reviews tended not to debate the political position or the play's 
verisimilitude, but to accuse it of lacking a point - of not giving any indication of 
what should be done, apart from sitting around feeling hopeless.®® A strong 
attack was however launched a month later, after the BBC started to market a 
video of the programme for use by schools. This combined accusations of 
unsuitability with comments generally hostile to any idea of Peace Studies. It 
ÆCrtJ ld_ appearJhat^j^ p rodu ce rs had negotiated the dangers for the
broadcast screening of a fiction appearing to make truth claims, these could 
be called on as part of a campaign against 'anti-nuclear propaganda' in 
schools.
Because the last three years have provided so few new examples, I have 
dealt with these three programmes despite the fact that they have had no 
televisual screening during the research period. The Day After has been 
available on video and the The War Game and Threads have continued to 
"bë” ü s ê d ^  a basis“ fbr~discussion and campaigning by the peace and anti- 
nuclear movements. In demonstrating how one fiction may generate several
®®e.g. Bryan Appleyard: "The Bomb's just the beginning", The Times, 14 September 1989,
p11 .
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other TV programmes, they help explain the comparative absence. 
Furthermore, the impact of these three is such that subsequent treatçient 
tends to refer back to them. Both The Day After and Threads were reviewed 
with reference to The War Game, and Threads referred to The Day After as 
well.
The main TV drama of nuclear war in the last three years, Airbase,^^ 
resembles the previous three only in the fact that its showing generated 
political response. It was however based on the same 'mad major' premise as 
the Equinox programme "Command and Control" screened the previous 
year. Stylistically, and in plot terms, it is reminiscent of Dr. Strangelove. Set 
among US pilots stationed on a British base, it is a non-naturalistic tale of 
money, drugs, alcohol and political extremism. At the conclusion, a heroin- 
addicted lieutenant drops a ten kiloton bomb north of Archangel and goes 
down in the fireball, while in Britain the essential base personnel are ordered 
into the 'hardened facility'. Throughout the play, the paramount pre­
occupation of the characters is drug-dealing rather than defence. After the 
screening, which had received little if any pre-publicity, there was 
considerable (short-lived) press criticism that the portrayal of American airmen 
was unfair. There had been no assertions within the drama that it was 
attempting to be predictive or informative - certainly it was not a realist 
production. It did not call on scientific discourse and there was no subsequent 
studio discussion. Only in depicting American personnel based in England 
could the drama be seen to speak of the 'real world', and it was on this ground 
that it was attacked. Sir William Rees-Mogg described it as "straight anti- 
American propaganda", and the Prime Minister's Office asked the BBC for a 
copy, since all at the Office had missed its transmission.®^
Those depictions which are uncontroversial in a nuclear sense are the 
survivaiist fantasies, the averted war sagas, the more pedestrian science 
programmes, the nuclear cover-up dramas like Chain Reaction, anô Xhe 
oddities - The Terminator an6 the Planet of the Apes sequence.
Immediate aftermath dramas are not usually part of this list. A rare 
example of one which generated no controversy is the film Testament, 
possibly because it was simply swamped by The Day After and possibly 
because it was not screened first on TV. It gave a very localized picture of the
®®MaIcolm McKay, the scriptwriter for Alrbase later wrote "Yellowbacks", the Play on One with 
a future setting and an unacknowledged AIDS-premise, referred to in Chapter 2. 
®^Dennis Barker: "Downing Street asks for tape of TV play about US troops". The 
Guardian, 15 March 1988, p3.
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aftermath, concentrating on one family in an isolated American town and 
following the decline of the community mainly through the eyes of a mother 
attempting to care for her slowly dying children. There was no political 
reaction to it, although critical reaction was sharply divided. Wyn Wachhorst, 
for instance, found it more powerful than other nuclear war films, offering 
nothing to the thrill-seeker, but in its intense personal focus drawing the 
viewer to close identification and recognition of the importance of the 
individual.®® For Andrew Britton, this is the very point of his objection to what 
he calls a "grotesquely reactionary film". He condemns not just the relentless 
exclusion of the holocaust and the characters’ ignorance about it, but also the 
absence of any feeling that understanding should have been sought or its lack 
commented upon.®® It seems possible that the characters' incomprehension 
about what had happened is intended to parallel their powerlessness to avert 
death. Littman's limited focus is central to the film's avoidance of any political 
controversy. Because the melodrama was undiluted, the film does not 
transgress the 'proper' role of fiction; it makes no serious truth claim.
It appears from this examination of the portrayals that caused 
controversy, that problems arise when fiction is seen to be encroaching on the 
privileged position of scientific discourse with regard to making 'truthful' 
statements. It is particularly evident from the reactions to On the Beach, The 
War Game and The Day After that the precipitation of the controversy is 
political; scientists and techno-strategists are deployed as 'truth-speakers', but 
in the service of politicians. It is also evident that controversial dramas can 
attract large audiences and that the framing of such dramas by programmes 
commenting on them and asserting the superior ability of scientists and 
politicians to know and speak the truth about nuclear futures has come to be 
seen as an accepted device for regaining from the producers of fiction the 
right to speak 'truthfully' to these audiences (although the audience may well 
not watch the commentary programme). _______
Not all assertions in the TV dramas are challenged. One that has rarely 
been is the depiction of the precise situation which precipitates the nuclear 
war, although There has been quite some alteration in it in the thirty year 
period from which the films and TV programmes discussed here are drawn. 
Effectively these refer to geo-political 'realities', yet, perhaps because they do 
not have^ a^c ien tific lîa s i^  they do not usually seem to be the subject of 
disputes over fiction's ability to tell the truth. Nonetheless, there continues to
®®Wachhorst: "The Day After: Films", pp187-190 
®®Britton: "Blissing Out", p18
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be a reluctance to specify precisely which nation detonated the first bomb. 
This is not absolute; the 'mad major problem' mentioned earlier, is the 
premise both of Dr. Strangelove and Alrbase and some of the averted^ war 
stories like The Abyss. Generally, however, there is specificity about the 
particular arena in which conflict is located, but imprecision about which 
country breaks first. The Chinese, often the villians of earlier films, are not 
mentioned in later ones. The War Game is one of their last appearances. In 
that instance the arena is Vietnam, invaded by the Chinese and subject of a 
US threat to use tactical nuclear weapons.
Details of precipitation are important in both the controversial and the 
non-controversial fictions. The survivaiist fantasies common throughout the 
70s and 80s are usually unconcerned with what precipitated the generally 
long-past conflict. When they do provide such detail, it is in the films which 
deal with the chaos consequent on a world shortage of oil. Battletruck, for 
example, opens with a caption "After the oil wars...", then the main titles start 
over scenes of fire and smoke with a newsreader voice-over detailing high 
radioactive levels in the Mesopotamian basin, still burning Arabian oil-fields 
and government commandeering of oil supplies. This is one of the earlier 
examples where the Middle East is the arena, but no protagonists at all are 
mentioned.
Nuclear fictions were comparatively common in 1983. As well as The 
Day After and Testament, there was the BBC serial The Old Men at the Zoo 
(BBG2, tx. 15 September 1983), based on Angus Wilson's novel and adapted 
by Troy Kennedy Martin, who was later to script Edge of Darkness. This very 
black comedy (escaping political condemnation presumably because of its 
literary origin and its humour as well as its avoidance of any truth claims), is 
set in what was then the near future - 1990 - and specifies a deterioration of 
international relations in the Middle East, followed by a pre-emptive Arab 
strike on the UK. In the aftermath, London is shown as a lawless city with 
press gangs, concentration camps and people suffering radiation cancers. 
(Although non-specific about precipitation, the BBC Play for Today, "Z for 
Zachariah" (BBG1, tx. 28 February 1984), emphasises how significant 1983-4 
was for nuclear dramas. It was probably the nearest the BBC came to a 
survivaiist drama, being set in a Welsh valley and concerned with two 
survivors of a nuclear holocaust. It was not rescreened.) ------
The Day After is specific about the precipitating situation. The 
Department of Defense had refused to co-operate unless explicit reference to 
a Soviet first strike was made,®® but the producers decided they could
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manage without such limiting help. They specified instead a NATO firing of a 
tactical nuclear weapon to warn Warsaw Pact conventional troops (an action 
in keeping with US defence policy) and subsequent escalation. The clarity of 
this was diminished in Britain as a result of cutting for the ITV screening. This 
seems to be the only instance on which the matter of precipitation was 
controversial, but then it was the only instance where precision combined with 
techno-strategic truth claims.
Threads portrays another nuclear escalation from a Middle Eastern 
crisis (it now appears that this is the 'preferred arena'). Again there is a 
carefully phrased imprecision about the first detonation, followed by great 
precision about the second, Soviet, firing. The background information 
provided by the BBC, not only during the programme in voice-over and on­
screen caption, but also in press releases, was considerable: twenty-six days 
after a coup in Iran in which both East and West become embroiled, the first 
explosion occurs; altogether 310 megatons are dropped on the UK; 85 
percent of the housing stock is destroyed; four months later estimates of death 
range from seventeen to thirty-four million. Unlike the previous programmes, 
this one takes account of nuclear winter theories and carries the story forward 
to thirteen years after the war, when the British population is no more than four 
million malnourished people living in squalid surroundings. The pseudo­
documentary devices rapidly provide information about the posited future and 
signify scientifically validated information which sustain a narrative which is 
separate from, while moving in tandem with, the plot.
As examples of the politically non-controversial nuclear dramas, the most 
typical are the survivaiist fantasies. These are usually violent films concerned 
with life in a world after a nuclear war, where little sign of civilisation remains 
and a few survivors fight and scavenge for a living. Although there are a few 
occasions where one of these makes something of a muted truth claim - in 
particular through detailing the (past) precipitation of nuclear conflict - they are 
otherwise so thoroughly fantastic that the only debate they are likely to cause 
relates to excessive violence (or in the case of A Boy and His Dog, where the 
hero kills a woman to feed his dog, outrageous misogyny). This does not 
mean that they are unable to talk about the nuclear-determined future. The 
"pictüœiôf cjevâstëtiorremd the quite frequent detailing of persistent nuclear 
contamination and mutagenic effects are explicit references to a nuclear 
future. When a central concern of this chapter is to question why there are so
SOBoyd-Bowman: "The Day After. Representations", pB1
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few portrayals of the nuclear future, the comparative frequency of this 
particular kind, when other depictions are scarce, demands investigation. 
They also challenge the idea that other kinds of nuclear-determined futures 
are rare because the effects of the holocaust are too unpleasant. Although 
they do not deal with suffering and death in the immediate aftermath, the 
subjects of these nuclear fantasies are certainly unpleasant, but they are 
presented to provide thrills.
Despite being an early example, before the sub-genre had separated 
from the aftermath dramas, A Boy and His Dog demonstrates most of the 
characteristics of the survivaiist films; it was indeed re-released in 1984 to take 
advantage of the popularity of what was by then beginning to be recognised 
as something of a sub-genre. The hero is a young loner with no particular aim 
in life beyond survival. He scavenges and fights for food for himself and his 
educated telepathic dog and hunts for other commodities in ruined 
underground shelters. The world initially depicted is inhabited by men who 
have banded together in roving gangs under strong leaders, loners and 
'screamers', dangerous mutants whose touch can kill. There are few women 
and the two companions are driven by the dog's desire for food and the boy's 
for sex. The latter leads to the boy being seduced into going 'down under' into 
the technological world of the underground survivors - a bizarre, hierarchical 
society which hides its dependence on hydroponics, robots and recycled 
human bodies behind the appearance of idealised small country town 
America. Because underground existence has rendered the men sterile, every 
so often surface dwellers are lured below for their sperm before being killed. 
At the end the boy escapes, rejoins his dog and together they resume their 
wandering. Its atypical features are the telepathic dog and the absence of 
vehicles, although the gang leader is drawn around on a cart built on a truck 
chassis.
Philip Strick, in an apparently flip review of survivaiist fantasies, identifies 
two opposing reading positions: that we are already living in the post-nuclear 
holocaust world, since World War II ended with nuclear explosions; and to 
demonstrate
"that World War III is an unavoidable part of our 
  escalating struggle with the_machine."®l _________
The first of these is uncommon, but A Boy and His Dog could be argued to
Philip Strick: "Future Movies: Reading the Signs. (Part 3): Range-Riders of the Nuciear 
Plains", Films and Fiiming, No. 368, May 1985, pp7-9. p7
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encourage it in the light of the history lesson given the boy by the dog in which 
he dates World War III "hot and cold" from June 1950 to March 1983. (World 
War IV was nuclear and occurred in 2003.)
In support of the latter reading Strick explains how the instruments of 
governmental authority, especially the law, are the enemy, since they have 
already capitulated to the machine. A Boy and His Dog demonstrates this 
through the dependence of the highly stigmatised underground city on its 
machinery, including the robot, Michael, who enforces the decisions of the 
ruling Committee. The only law endorsed by the survivaiist films is exercised 
by the private individual, as is so often the case in the Western, the genre most 
exploited by the post-nuclear holocaust films. The horse has been replaced by 
the motor-cycle, but the mechanical aspect of this does not seem to worry 
Strick.®® Indeed a bike is visually subordinated by the literal superiority of its 
rider.
The sub-generic frequency of the violent bike-riding gangs and 
individuals sustained "by hatred and a few gallons of petrol", to use Strick's 
phrase, is undeniable. The important aspect here is not the bike (I am not fully 
convinced by Strick's argument about the war with the machine) but the 
opposition of the individual to the gang. As A Boy and His Dog demonstrates, 
where societies are depicted as continuing, they are shown to be beset with 
problems that characterised the pre-holocaust world and have been 
intensified since. The gangs, bike or not, are constantly riven by fights over 
leadership and dominance. Second only to this, and interacting with it, are 
questions over supply and control of fuel, which in most of the films is the only 
commodity shown to be manufactured (the principal mode of survival is 
scavenging). The individual, especially the hero, avoids these problems, and, 
by im p lica tion  th e ir potential to develop again into the situation that 
precipitated the holocaust. His life is simple; individual (male) survivors are 
not subject to various 'social forces', but instead are shown controlling their 
own destinies by their ability to find or take (not earn) the elemental 
_requirements-to which they have been reduced - food, shelter, weapons and 
women.
It is not just the violent gangs that the hero avoids, but all social 
groupings. When communities or family groups are depicted, they are rarely.
the focus of concern for long. In the Mad Max trilogy, the hero repeatedly 
encounters such groups; again and again they attempt to tie him down,
®®lbld., p9
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forcibly or through persuasion, but he resists and usually brings about at least 
a partial dissolution of the group concerned. (In this he could be seen as 
another manifestation of the mythic hero, like the Western's lone traveller.) 
Max, like most survivaiist heroes, ends the films heading off into the desert. 
These are the spaces for the rugged individual, as - pace the Western - they 
have always been: soft lushness, on the rare occasions that it is seen, invites 
the formation of societies.
However, the lawlessness of the survivaiist fantasies differs from that of 
the Western. In the older genre, lawlessness, even murder, usually centres 
around theft - of money, cattle or land - but when scavenging is the mainstay 
of what passes for an economy, the control of theft lacks urgency. The fighting, 
pursuits, killings and maimings which occupy the characters of the survivaiist 
fantasies are usually ends in themselves. Even if they are to obtain vehicles or 
the fuel for them, it is not for any ultimately utilitarian purpose, since the bikes, 
gyros and trucks have no function other than to provide destructive pleasure. 
The Ferrari to which Fred Astaire devotes his last months in the non-survivalist 
On the Beach and in which he wins the world's final Grand Prix, now seems 
the most contemporary aspect of that film. Intended as an extreme case of the 
pointlessness of any action when facing extinction, it now prefigures what 
seems the standard male survivaiist activity - driving very fast while going 
nowhere.
Battletruck provides a very slight variation on male survivaiist fantasies, 
being somewhat closer to the earlier aftermath/survivalist hybrids and 
considerably closer to the Western. Although there is none of the sickness and 
decay of the recent aftermath films and there is no indication that a nuclear 
holocaust came near the place where the action occurs, the main characters 
all remember life before the wars. The community, Clearwater, sometimes 
described as a village, is more a settlement than is usually the case, th e  
heroine is even shown at one stage, most atypically for such films, pruning 
fruit trees. Nonetheless, most action is between men and their vehicles in the 
stony wastes, and the hero rides off alone in the end - though since his bike 
has been destroyed, he does so on a horse.
It may appear that scientific discourse is unimportant for the non- 
controversial depictions, except inasmuch as the absence of ciairrrs~DTint“ 
means they are unchallenged on political or scientific grounds. Nuclear winter 
theories seem not to have had an impact as yet on survivaiist fantasies and 
may indeed continue to prove inimical to them, but there has not always been
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a disparity between scientific projections and entertainment-oriented fictions. 
Michael Curry has traced shifts in such projections, from the 50s, when the 
main concerns were with the driftings of radioactive clouds (reflected in On 
the Beach), through the early 60s where scientific publications about the fires 
after nuclear explosions led to expectations of
"soil denudation, erosion, fioods and the
creation of a gigantic dustbowl."®®
This seems to be the point at which the creators of survivaiist fictions stopped. 
Scientists meanwhile passed through theories which envisaged permanent 
mist and fog caused by ash in the air (the mid 60s), ozone depletion with 
consequent lower surface temperatures and increased ultra-violet radiation 
(the mid 70s), to the early 80s and the expectation of nuclear winter caused by 
the density of the ash and dust swirling around the e a r t h .® 4  while the 
survivaiist films may not have followed all the scientific theories, Curry 
believes that scavenging, central to the survivaiist film life-style outlined, may 
offer the key to the avoidance of total extinction of human life during the 
nuclear winter.®®
Survivaiist fantasies do not need much correlation with scientific theories, 
compared to dramas which claim an educative role. The latter rely on scientific 
support in their claims to speak the truth about the future; the former aim to 
divert, largely through their displays of stylised violence. Despite this, the 
potency of the 'nuclear winter' metaphor may be such that survivaiist fantasies 
will start to exploit it. As Curry points out, the metaphor, bringing with it the old 
fear of night and the dark, is so much more powerful than earlier ones like 
'hard rain' and 'the republic of insects and grass'®®. Interaction with 
expectations about the Greenhouse Effect could eventually be more important 
however. Were survivaiist fantasies of this kind to start being produced, they 
might well start to be challenged in the same way that the TV aftermath 
dramas are, because they would be calling on scientifically-based truth. The 
outdated scientific premise both allows the survivaiist fantasy to focus the 
mythic potency of the Western through the desert setting, and protects it from 
challenge by those who have the right to make 'truthful' statements about the 
-nuclear-futurc^ ----------- -----------------
®®Curry: "Beyond Nuclear Winter", pp247-8 
® 4|bid., PP249-252 
35 |b id ., p257 
®6|bid., p263
94
An alternative explanation of the comparative silence on nuclear futures 
is that there is something about such a future itself which makes it difficult, if 
not impossible, to depict or talk about. The most severe version of this 
explanation involves the concept of the nuclear sublime. The term 'the nuclear 
sublime' is Frances Ferguson's. She argues that the eighteenth century ideal 
of the sublime as that which is of such magnitude as to be unthinkable, is 
applicable to the nuclear threat.®^
The eighteenth century ideal of the sublime was of an alternative to the 
beautiful. It was something that was bigger, more powerful and more 
threatening than the individual, something which was of such magnitude as to 
be unthinkable. It is relevant here because arguably its most important 
characteristic is that it is unrepresentable. The additional characteristics, 
especially as described by Edmund Burke,®® involve awe and terror, felt on 
confronting either certain natural or intellectual phenomena.
The aspect of immensity is particularly applicable to considerations of the 
future. It is evident in Kant's perception of the sublime as delivering both 
pleasure and pain in the ability of reason to comprehend infinity, for example, 
while the imagination is unable to represent it.®® This mathematical instance 
is a prime example of the sublime divorced from natural objects. Burke himself 
observed a link between the sublime and self-preservation in the delight that 
results from the cessation of p a i n . 4 ®  in contemporary uses of the term 
sublime, the pleasure or delight that was important for the earlier writers is 
generally given minimal attention and pain predominates. Lyotard seems to 
be the only contemporary writer to refer to it other than within a historical 
c o n t e x t . 4 1  The pleasure of the nuclear sublime may be a concept so difficult 
to comprehend that its sublimity is intensified through the imagination's refusal 
to encompass it. The disappearance of pleasure from the contemplation of the 
sublime future may, however, be seen instead to be characteristic of 
contemporary attitudes to the future as a whole.
It may well be that the distinctiveness of the sublime now lies more in its
^^Frances Ferguson: "The Nuclear Sublime", Diacritics, 14(2), Summer 1984, pp4-10. p5-6 
^®Edmund Burke: A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origins of our Ideas of the Sublime and 
the Beautiful, (ed. with an Introduction and Note by J.T. Boulton), London, Routledge 
and Kegan Paul, 1958.
®®lmmanuel Kant: The Critique of Judgement, (trans. James Creed Meredith), Oxford, Oxford 
at the Clarendon Press, 1986. pi 06 
^°Burke: Subiime and Beautiful p56 
Jean-Francois Lyotard: The Postmodern Condition, p81
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being only representable. The gap between it and any possible ’real referent' 
is absolutely unbridgeable, so that even in popular use phenomena 
associated with the concept of the sublime are perceived to be constructs, 
approximations and guesses. The link between the sublime and the future 
comes initially through this unavoidable shared fictionality; that all such 
depictions are universally known to be no more than fictions. Yet it is a 
tenuous link. Most 'visions' of the future are far too mundane to warrant 
consideration as sublime. They evoke no awe or terror, they convey little 
impression of immensity, they are close and almost familiar. The sublime is 
available for the future through its temporal aspect, although the degree to 
which this is any longer regarded as infinite has been severely diminished in 
the last fifty years.
Futures predicated on nuclear destruction are particularly likely to be 
regarded as utterly unthinkable because they depict the doubly unknown, 
both the nuclear and the future, together with a shift from contemplation of 
individual death to 'humanicide' or exterminism, terms used to describe the 
destruction of the human race or even all forms of life as we know it.
The central aspect of the sublime for Ferguson resides in its involvement 
with subjectivity. Discussing Kant's disqualification of man-made objects from 
the category of the sublime, she stipulates that this disqualification rests on the 
objects being property. Nuclear weapons are property, though not private, but 
it is the anticipated experience of their detonation and its consequences that 
are characterised as sublime.^®
Yet although the destructive nuclear future seems to fit the conditions of 
the sublime there appears to be a difficulty in using the concept to explain the 
paucity of depictions, especially non-fictional ones. The particular problem is 
that the paucity is not unvarying. As was pointed out earlier, there are times 
when there are quite a few documentaries, TV dramas and accompanying 
commentary programmes, as well as other times, like the period of research, 
when there are hardly any. If the explanation were indeed that the nuclear 
future was sublime and therefore unrepresentable and unthinkable, then 
presumably such variation would not occur.
It is possible, however, that the sublime can help explain the comparative 
silence on the nuclear future, if it is the case that it makes it difficult to produce 
“depletions. An examination of how it is that the de fdnatid frand  its 
consequences are depicted should help decide if this is the case. The sublime 
is figured in mainstream film and TV programmes at two moments. The first, in
^^Ferguson; "Nuclear Sublime", p6
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the war and immediate aftermath fictions (and occasionally also in a 
documentary) is the detonation and the holocaust itself; the second is in the 
survivalist fictions and is the revelation of the devastated landscape. It is now 
typical of the first to occur about a quarter of the way into the film and to flood 
the screen with a single colour or related sequence of colours - blinding red, 
yellow or white light as in The Day After or Testament. When the Wind 
Blows depicts the light, heat and shockwave sequence by following a white 
flash with red and yellow colour as the heatwave 'bleeds in' and melts paint. It 
then shows furniture and household objects flying through the air to crash 
against the wall. This last differentiates it from the others, but the typicality of 
what precedes it is an indication that there has developed a convention of 
how the explosion itself is depicted. While there may thus be difficulty in 
making a distinctive version of the sublime moment, it is not itself an obstacle 
to producing a vision of the nuclear future.
A different depiction of the moment of detonation, and one that I believe 
conveys the terror as well as the unthinkability of the sublime is the conclusion 
of Dr. Strangelove. Kubrick closes the film in the stratosphere as the bombs 
fall and the mushroom clouds rise to the ultimate chilling banality of Vera Lynn 
singing the conventional war song "We'll meet again". I do not believe that this 
has been bettered for allowing space, time and provocation for subjective 
productions of sublimity.
The occasion when devastation is revealed in the survivalist film is either 
in the opening shots, or immediately following. Typically the film opens on 
some detail of a rather cobbled-together vehicle or costume, then the camera 
pulls back to reveal a featureless waste, usually a desert. Again, as a cliche, it 
has lost any ability to convey the sublime which perhaps it might once have 
had, but it does signal, in effect, the sublime's 'having been'. The desert is not 
just one possible landscape, in the survivalist fantasies, it is the dominant one 
and what is being indicated is that this state has been brought about by à non­
natural catastrophe - most commonly a nuclear holocaust. The vast 
featurelessness of a desert rather than the monumentally of a mountain range 
is the geographic phenomenon which most nearly conveys the contemporary 
sublime. However, instead of s ign ify ing anything eternal and 
unencompassable, jt_cqnyeys the sterility and destructionjco^nsequent^n 
nuclear war, as well, more pragmatically, as the heat that was, at least 
popularly, expected before nuclear winter theories were advanced.
As one of the earliest of the survivalist fantasies, A Boy and His Dog also
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contains some elements of the immediate aftermath dramas. It 
combines both figures of the sublime — opening with a sequence 
of mushroom clouds in yellows and blue—greens ^ then cutting, 
after three inter-titles on black background, to a devastated 
stony desert landscape, across which, after a few moments, a 
^^9"Clad figure with a rifle crawls. The sound-track 
throughout this is of dull, distant explosions. The mushroom 
clouds are unlocated, no ground is seen and the point-of-view 
is as from an observation tower many miles away. We are given 
no reference for what is being destroyed, no context to 
distract us, but just the instantly recognizable shapes of the 
clouds. In the wake of this, the desert landscape does not 
need to, and indeed cannot, signal the sublime's 'having 
been'.
This demonstrates that the desert, the geographic sign of 
the sublime, is a very weak third level indicator: at the
first level, the blank or simply coloured screen all but 
directly portraying the 'blinding light' of detonation; then, 
the mushroom clouds providing an indexical sign with the close 
temporal link (the moment of destruction) most probably being 
the aspect making this potentially a potent marker of the 
sublime; and finally the wasteland, a sign that time has 
passed and with it the sublime. It seems from this that the 
sublime does not really explain the paucity of nuclear 
futures, especially since it can be figured similarly in the 
infrequent immediate aftermath TV dramas and the more common 
survivalist films.
Critical work on the nuclear sublime may, however, enable 
a greater understanding of how the nuclear future is depicted. 
It is possible that something approaching the pleasure of the 
(nuclear) sublime may be related to the depiction of a 
depopulated world. The . most fruitful of Ferguson's 
developments of the nuclear sublime seems to me to be her 
reference to the way the sublime functions to alleviate the 
claustrophobic pressures of other consciousnesses. She 
attributes the recent resurgence in popularity of Frankenstein 
to its relevance to nuclear concerns, and says that
"it figures the Gothic reversal of the sublime 
dream of self-affirmation, the fear that 
the presence of other people is totally 
invasive and erosive of the self."'*^
Nuclear fictions offer what may be a pleasurable solution to 
this claustrophobic pressure through a sudden, highly dramatic 
reduction in the number of competing consciousnesses.
The idea that the bomb offers solutions to intractable 
problems is rarely
43 Ferguson: "Nuclear Sublime", p8
98
explicit, though as Martha Bartter has pointed out, in literary fictions the 
nuclear holocaust as a cure for urban blight was to be found long before the 
first atomic bomb destroyed H i r o s h im a .4 4  >4 Boy and His Dog, characterized 
by a very sardonic tone, reflects this, perhaps because it was adapted from a 
story by the SF writer, Harlan Ellison. It announces on-screen at the beginning
"World War IV lasted five days.
Politicians had finally solved the problem of urban blight.”
The most extreme statement of nuclear solutions comes from Dean 
MacCannell's "exploration of the unconscious of post-nuclear demographic 
shifts and macrosocial patterns".45 He argues that US policies since World 
War II have resulted in the concentration of
"ethnic, impoverished, stigmatized and mentally 
marginal populations in large cities characterized 
by measurably inferior education, health standards 
and facilities and h o u s in g ,"46
while white wealth has moved out. He contends that if such cities are targets, 
then enemy bombs are not necessarily a great threat.
"The city will absorb the impact and in so doing also 
cure itself of our officially designated 'social 
problems': crime, poverty, disease, high infant 
mortality rates, etc.."47
It should perhaps be added that he is not endorsing this practice.
The worlds depicted in survivalist post-nuclear holocaust fictions are 
severely depopulated, though it is very debatable whether they reveal a 
'better' world. Social problems have been subsumed under problems of 
individual survival. Where organized societies are shown, they are 
circumscribed by the return or continuation of social problems and the fact that 
the heroes do not remain in them. The bubble-encased and probably post- 
nuclear city of Logan's Run (Michael Anderson, 1976) from which the hero
44Martha Bartter: "Nuclear Holocaust as Urban Renewal", Science Fiction Studies, No. 39,
Vol. 13, Part 2, July 1986, ppl48-158. ppl50-1 
4^Dean MacCannell: "Baltimore in the Morning . . . After: On the forms of post-nuclear 
leadership", Diacritics, 14(2), Summer 1984, pp33-46. p34 
46|b id ., p42 
47|bid., p45
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escapes, 'solves' its problem of limited space by killing off those of its 
population over the age of thirty. The pressure of other consciousnesses 
becomes the pressure of other bodies.
It does not seem possible to sustain attempts to address the nuclear 
sublime. The moment of detonation may be indicated with some visual device 
signalling sublimity, but unless this is at the end of a film or TV programme, 
some other concern must be central to the narrative. Ferguson's comment that
"the effort to think the nuclear sublime in terms 
of its absoluteness dwindles from the effort to 
imagine totai annihilation to something very much 
like calculations of exactly how horrible daily life 
would be after a significant nuclear e x p lo s io n " ,48
can be illustrated by the overwhelming majority of nuclear fictions (i.e. warning 
films like Testam ent, television dramas like The Day After and even 
Threads, as well as survival fantasies like A Boy and his Dog).
It is possible to view these 'trivialities' as attentuated sublimities, as 
Ferguson seems to, or as ways in which to detour the sublime around its 
unrepresentability, but they are probably better seen as part of a recognition 
that the sublime can only partly describe the nuclear future. A nuclear 
holocaust would not bring total rapid transcendent oblivion, but nasty, brutish 
and lingering decay. An attempt to explore the consequences of a nuclear 
catastrophe cannot ignore these 'trivialities'. The usefulness of the concept of 
the sublime here is thus limited. It does not help to investigate the majority of 
the content of nuclear fictions, nor the episodic paucity of their televisual 
appearances.
The sublime is not the only explanation of blockages on nuclear 
depictions that are based on the character of the material considered; there 
are also more mundane explanations. One of these is that film in particular is 
seen as entertainment, while the subject of the nuclear holocaust is far from 
entertaining. As Strick says of the marauding bike-gangs in the survivalist 
fantasies.
"it's not quite what the American dream used to be, 
but it does seem preferable to the perils of fall-out."49
4®Ferguson: "Nuclear Sublime", p7 
49strick: "Range-Riders", p9
100
Fall-out is not very entertaining, and slow and painful death is rarely good box 
office in the absence of healthy co-stars. Thus the bulk of nuclear films see 
war averted or provide vicarious thrills in a post-nuclear holocaust world.
This may help to account for the prevalence of the violent survivalist 
fantasies, and the averted war films, compared to the paucity of the 
precipitation and immediate aftermath fictions. Yet this need not be taken as 
an indication that these types of nuclear futures are more popular, and the 
other types are not made as often because they are unpopular. An 
examination of the profitability of nuclear future films should be informative 
here. Unfortunately, it is notoriously difficult to be certain about profitability 
among the creative accounting practices of Hollywood. Variety's all-time 
rental champions list is far from reliable, and gives information only for the 
USA and Canada, but it is the only comparative listing readily available. 
WarGames (US$38.5m), in which war is eventually averted, appears the 
highest rating relevant film by far. Mad Max III: Beyond Thunderdrome 
(US$17.9m) is the next, followed by The Terminator ($16.9m). Planet of the 
Apes ($15.0m) and Logan's Run ($9.4m).50 Dr. Strangelove an6 On the 
Beach both suffer through having been made and released so long ago. 
Using Phil Hardy's suggested inflation adjustment rates (of 1984), Planet of 
the Apes becomes second. On the Seac/7 third and Dr. Strangelove  
s i x t h . 6 1  (This provides an example of each of the four groups as well as both 
exceptions to them.) This seems to indicate that while survivalist films may be 
most common, they are not necessarily most popular.
Additional blockages include Rubin's and Cummings's outline of factors 
influencing US news coverage reticence on nuclear issues. There are also 
those referred to by Nicholas Humphrey in his attempt to explain why so little 
had been achieved to reduce the nuclear threat. He identified four inhibitory 
forces deflecting effective action: incomprehension or denial, social 
embarrassment (at discussing something as serious as nuclear war while 
doing or suggesting nothing to avert it), helplessness and what he termed the 
Strangelove Syndrome:
"latent feelings of admiration, almost of appetite,
for the Bomb and the final solution it p r o v i d e s . ' ' ^ ^ ----------
- "All-time Film Rental Champs"
51 Phil Hardy: Science Fiction, The Au rum Film Encyclopaedia Vol. II, London, Aurum, 
1984. p387 [ He suggests x2 for 1968 - Planet of the Apes and 2001 - and x4 for 1959 
- On the Beach. No doubt higher adjustment rates would be needed now.]
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(As well as being another instance of SF providing terms for serious debate, 
this is an early reference to the desire for a solution to intractable problems.) 
While these various mundane blockages may well be contributory, they, like 
the sublime, do not account for the variation in the infrequency of the more 
serious depictions.
The chapter has examined the way the nuclear future is talked about and 
tried to find an explanation of why there is comparatively slight coverage of so 
important an issue. It investigated the possibility that there might be a practice 
of restricting discussion, particularly on the grounds that only people with 
particular statuses - scientists, techno-strategists and politicians using the 
work of such people - could speak 'truthfully' about the subject. As an 
alternative it examined the possibility that the subject itself was such that it 
was difficult, or even impossible, to discuss. Largely because there was not a 
consistent paucity of depictions of the nuclear future, which should have been 
the case had it been a characteristic of the material, the first explanation 
seems more satisfactory. If the reason for the paucity is politically based, it is 
not at all improbable that there would be variation in the extent to which 
portayals are made difficult to screen or are even restricted.
Political difficulties have certainly been demonstrated. The War Game 
was known to have been refused transmission, but how many more 
programmes or films never got made? Watkins' more recent nuclear film. The 
Journey, has had only a single showing in this country - at the Edinburgh 
Festival in 1987 - although admittedly with a running time of fourteen and a 
half hours, it is not easily accommodated within ordinary screening schedules.
An especially revealing example of the discursive struggle over the right 
to speak 'truthfully' about the nuclear future was referred to earlier, with the 
then Defence Secretary, Michael Heseltine, seeking first a right of reply to a 
fictional programme, T/ie Day After, and then refusing to appear on a 
programme discussing the programme because Mgr Bruce Kent, speaking for 
CND, would be appearing on it later, and finally agreeing to appear on a post­
screening discussion but only from a separate studio. The example 
demonstrates both the elision of fictional and non-fictional discourses and the 
refusal o f  a politician to accept the rig ht of somebhOOpeakihg with a statüs 
based in a non-scientific discourse (religious and ethical) to challenge his
52Nicholas Humphrey: "Four Minutes to Midnight", The Third Bronowski Memorial Lecture,
The Listener, V.106, No..2833, 29 October 1981, pp493-499. p494
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statements.
The political sensitivity of the area, which is why scientists and techno­
strategists are deployed to support or oppose politicians and rarely on iheir 
own behalf, is most evident in the debates about the extent to which fictional 
portrayals of the nuclear holocaust and its aftermath can claim to speak the 
truth. The euphemistic language of technostrategic discourse, in which civilian 
casualties are 'collateral damage' is the professional language of the 
proponents of nuclear deterrence. The 'truth ' it speaks seems 
incommensurate with the slowly dying children and the sunless nuclear 
winters of the more serious, usually televisual, fictions, such as The Day After 
and Threads. Yet such fictions, can and do cite scientific support for their 
depictions. The discursive dispute which ensues has now been formalised in 
studio debates. These, and the associated print journalism items, ensure that 
neither fiction nor non-fiction on its own seems able to talk about the nuclear 
future.
To be taken seriously, fiction seems to need to call on the scientific in its 
talking about the nuclear future, but in doing so it challenges science's 
superior claims on the truth and risks controversy. The relationship is virtually 
symbiotic and the yoking of Star Wars and SDI seems less and less 
idiosyncratic. Certainly attempting to keep fiction and non-fiction separate in 
talking about the future is appearing less and less productive.
4: SPACE
^ The~probIems encountered when fiction and non-fiction overlap in talking 
about the future have continued to be evidenced. The previous chapter 
showed the involvement of politicians in asserting the rights of scientists and 
techno-strategists, rather than TV dramatists and directors, in speaking the 
truth about the nuclear future. This chapter will look at a situation which was 
popularly talked about by fiction long before scientific discourse was able to 
claim it. The concern here is with films and TV programmes that talk about the 
future in space.! Examination of both fictional and non-fictional material 
reveals certain shifts in the way this has occurred and the chapter is 
concerned to explore both what these are and why it is that they may have 
come about. It explores three particular questions. The first is whether 
economics has come to dominate science in both fictional and non-fictional 
stories about the future in space. The second is whether, given that both are 
discursively constructed, the fictions drive the construction of the non-fictional 
stories or whether the reverse applies. The third asks whether the shifts are 
marked by particular convergences, particular temporal ones but also of 
Earth-bound and space-set problems.
Most of the examples of recent non-fictional space stories used are about 
American activity. The presuppositions of most of the films and TV 
programmes under consideration, as well as the somewhat greater British 
news and documentary coverage of American space projects, have 
determined this geographic bias. Recent news stories as well as films and TV 
dramas have given greater acknowledgement to Russian as well as American 
(and even British) space activity - perhaps given the paucity of recent 
American activity, there has been little option, but even so, in most instances 
American references have framed the stories. In this chapter, newspaper 
stories provide specific supporting evidence of public events and political 
announcements, as they did in the Chapter One.
In 1898, George Méliès made A Trip to the Moon. Actual space flight did 
not begin until 1957. For nearly sixty years, fiction films outlined the future of 
space, little constrained, as far as the general public was concerned, by
11n this chapter the word 'space' is used to denote 'outer space', anything from 200 
kilometres above the surface of the earth to light years away in other galaxies. Because of the 
recent heightened salience of a less bounded use of 'space', this may at times appear 
unusual.
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concurrent scientific achievement emphasising the difference between the 
fictions and actual activities. Until 1957, the primary discourse in which space 
was 'spoken' was science fictional. It seems likely that this fictional
background influenced public expectatidnsWscientific possibilities - some of 
which, like communication satellites and Moon landings, were fulfilled. The 
ability of science to speak the truth in this area was largely regained as far as 
the present was concerned with Sputnik and the Space Race, but in speaking 
about the future, it may be that the agenda had been set too long by the 
fictions for science to be particularly powerful. Science and the fictions 
remained reasonably in concert on the way to the Moon, but the next steps - to 
Mars, the other planets and beyond - proved to be of a different order and 
science was unable to continue to deliver the achievements, especially within 
the timescale, that the visions in the films and TV fictions had seemed to 
indicate would occur. Scientific achievement and SF stories became again 
disconsonant.
In many ways space is still the quintessential site for the future to be 
talked about as well as being itself a major signifier of the future. Space 
stories, especially fictional ones, have long carried within them many other 
components of visions of the future, like the design of cities, social relations 
and ideal justice. Space is the setting for SF. Yet even news stories about 
current space activities often have an aura of the future about them, as if their 
meaning were postponed for later exegesis. They all seem in preparation for 
something bigger. Reconnaisance missions, medical experiments on the 
effects on humans of prolonged time spent in space, tests of docking 
procedures - all point towards some later serious purpose which the space-set 
future fictions have prepared us for. The Space Shuttles, starting in 1981, 
were a partial exception; their aim of humdrum commercial viability and their 
reusability, meant that they almost contained their meaning in the present. 
Then, during their actual postponement following the Challenger disaster, 
they were reinserted into the dominant temporality - the future. Through the 
media-promoted public expectation that the crews' deaths should be to some 
purpose, should be some step towards a glorious greater good, they too 
became harbingers of something yet to come.
The trouble with actual space activity now is that it is so slow and that 
achievements will be discernable only in the long-term, while the principal 
aspect evident in the present is the expense. Space lacks immediate gains, 
yet does not seem able to be shelved, perhaps because it might well deliver
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the only positive future (though this is less clear than it once seemed), and 
perhaps because there continue to be so many fictions talking about it. The 
only short-term, politically pragmatic, goals - manned space flight itself and 
reaching the Moon - have long been achieved. Bridging the gap between the 
actuality and the glittering fictions, not only seems extraordinarily difficult, but 
is of the wrong time span. A gain would almost certainly occur under a 
different political administration. The steady continuation of the Russian space 
programme could until recently have been attributed in part to its having been 
in tune with the anticipated longevity of the Communist Party's administration.
Space may be the quintessential site for the future, but in economic terms 
current space activity is out of step with other visions of the future. Spending 
the necessarily large amounts of money on the hope of a bright but distant 
tomorrow is all very well when Progress is still unquestioned, but what if this is 
no longer the case? In one of his last books, Raymond Williams outlined what 
he saw as the emergent view of the future, held by self-conscious elites, a 
'new politics of strategic advantage' which he named Plan X.^ This politics, 
charged by ecological catastrophe and world disorder, has incorporated a 
pessimistic view of the future, but without any expectation of being able to 
change it or of attempting to do so. People who have adopted Plan X thinking 
have accepted
"the indefinite continuation of extreme crisis and 
extreme danger. Within this harsh perspective, all 
their plans are for phased advantage, an effective 
even if temporary edge, which will always keep 
them at least one step ahead ".^
When short term gain is what is aimed for because the future seems no longer 
the locus of hope, expenditure on space is difficult to justify. After the Apollo 
Missions to the Moon ceased, plans for going to Mars were quietly dropped as 
unbeneficial. Under Plan X thinking, there was no advantage in it. Yet not only 
was continuation of space activity under the extant technologies feasible, 
there were also plans for alternative low-tech, environmentally-friendly space 
t r a v e l . 4  The latter may have been difficult to popularise, since it would have 
been competing with actual current projections as well as the hi-tech fictions
^Raymond Williams: Towards 2000. Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1983. pp243-248 
5|bid., p244
^Outlined for example in Ben R. Finney and Eric M. Jones (eds.): Interstellar Migration and 
the Human Experience, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1985.
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which are not merely dominant but omnipresent. The plans for slow ships 
cobbled together of asteroids and comets sailing the solar winds for millenia 
exist in print SF as well as in scientific literature, but they have no visual 
-presence in the films and TV programmes which reach a wider audience and 
might provide an initial basis for disseminating information about their 
possibility. Whatever the case, neither type of programme has yet actually 
been begun.
On 20 July 1989, in a speech timed to celebrate the Twentieth 
Anniversary of the Apollo Moon Missions, President Bush announced an 
American return to space
"to enrich the human spirit, enhance national 
pride and inspire youth with ambitious futuristic 
efforts".^
He suggested dates for a permanent base on the Moon and exploration of 
Mars. The reasons given echoed the non-commercial ones of the Apollo 
missions, with 'national pride' a mildly coded reference to the old 'beating the 
Russians'. The overt, if unfortunately worded, reference to 'futuristic efforts' 
signalled that space was once again officially the site of the future.
Yet even this was not unequivocal. Bush concluded by referring to a
"journey into tomorrow, a journey to another 
planet, a manned journey to Mars",
but he had preceded it by saying that next century it would be
"back to the Moon, back to the future and this 
time back to stay."®
This acknowledged that there had been something of a retreat and also that 
the future (at least as signified by space) had not been figuring in political 
planning. The use of an SF film reference {Back to the Future) to mark this 
apparent abandonment of Plan X thinking can be seen to echo the earlier 
adoption of 'Star Wars' as the popular name of a programme which also, at 
least initially, viewed the future non-pessimistically.
^James R. Asker: "NASA Offers Five Alternatives For Landing Humans on Mars by 2018", 
Aviation Week and Space Technology, 131(22), 27 November 1989, pp30-1. p30 
^Nicholas Beeston: "Bush unveils new space era for the 21st century", The Times, 21 July 
1989, p i, 22. pi
107
There has not yet been any evidence that this quite substantial American 
policy shift has been registered in the fictional or non-fictional talk of future of 
space. The reported response to Bush's speech concentrated on the cost and 
cast doubTs"ôh^nÿdf his far from specific plans being funded. There was^hd' 
reference to its scientific feasibility or purpose. Richard Gephardt (Democrat 
majority leader in the House of Representatives), for instance, while not 
disagreeing with the aims, said
"we don't have the economic strength to make 
it a reality!"'^  7 :7 !
Even as a news story it had little prominence. The long period during which 
space was represented only in usually mundane items on the Space Shuttle 
has resulted in a reduction of the newsworthiness of space stories, so that 
without good visuals of space vehicles and waving astronauts, they are rarely 
televised.
Gephardt's response, like the abandonment of space exploration, was an 
indication that in the last ten or fifteen years, since the Moon Missions ended, 
the primary relevant discourse for space stories has been economic rather 
than scientific. The c o s t  of space activity, rather than its scientific 
achievements, was what was important. The Space Shuttles were designed 
with the aim of making space commercially viable; they carried scientific 
experiments, quite literally rendering the scientific secondary. In talking about 
the rise to dominance of what I am terming the economic, I will be referring not 
only to this placing of space stories within economic discourse, but also to the 
importance of economic motives within space activity and to the economic 
dimensions of aspects of the plots of SF films and TV programmes.
In this same ten to fifteen year period, there was a discursive division of 
space with part of it effectively converging on Earth. A separation has been 
constructed on an economic basis between a global surround 2 0 0  or so 
kilometres above the Earth and the further exotic realms. In the nearer almost 
domesticated space can be found the relatively mundane phenomena like 
communication and far-sensing satellites, Russian space stations and various 
tests for the proposed American space shields. This part of space has lost its 
exoticism to become comparatively ordinary. Further out, among the other 
planets, not to mention the other stars and galaxies, it is different. Activity here
^John Lichfield: "Bush gives space programme new goal", The Independent, 21 July 1989,
plO
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has been ruled economically unfeasible, so perhaps paradoxically, economic 
factors do not appear important. The dividing line may be even closer than it 
was during the time of the Apollo Missions, since perhaps now the further 
zone once again includes the Moon. (If it is not included, it must be regarded 
as in a liminal area between inner and outer with much of the taboo of the 
traditional liminal). It is almost as if the adjective in the now not so common 
term 'outer space' had gained some of the potency of the ex-nominated; 
'genuine' space is out beyond the diminishing ozone layer, the missiles, the 
satellites and space platforms with all their relevance to quotidian problems. 
'Genuine' space has not converged on the everyday, it is different, unknown 
and exciting, the promises of the fictions might still apply. Perhaps for this 
reason it can be the imaginative site of the future.
This separation of inner surround from 'genuine' or 'deep' space relates 
to the function of activity within each. Unlike deep space, inner space is an 
economic zone, essential to the operation of the third stage of capital where 
information is the dominant commodity. Communication is required to be as 
close to instantaneous as satellites can make it. As a conduit for commercial 
information, inner space is financially viable, hence the only current space 
activity which is regarded as really commercial is satellite launching. Such 
launches become commercial because of the subsequent sales: of 
advertising time on satellite TV stations; of far-sensing information; and of 
common carrier time to and by telecommunication companies. The last of 
these is financially the most secure.
The clarity of this separation is shattered when messages from the time 
before the contraction and the domestication of near space arrive. The 
Voyager photographs of Neptune are the prime example here, they speak of 
the past when the probe was launched, the present as Neptune is being 
recorded and the future as Voyager continues its mission. Simultaneously 
archaic, absolutely of the present and speaking of the future, they both 
collapse temporal states and insist on the specificity of the time at which each 
photograph was taken.
An example of a contemporary TV programme placing space activity as 
part of economic rather than scientific discourse was provided by Mission 
Juno: Astronaut Wanted, No Experience Necessary (ITV tx. 28 December 
1989) on the final stages in the selection of Britain's first astronauts-in-training. 
The astronaut who was finally sent into space by Mission Juno was to go as 
part of the Soviet space programme, but, according to the promotion, would
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be participating in the world's first commercial spaceflight, since the cost was 
to be born by various commercial sponsors rather than the astronaut's 
government. The commercial benefit from the activity was in terms of publicity 
for the companies associated; the launch veh ic le^as to be an advertising 
hoarding in space (and presumably on the TV news). A central part of the 
programme was the candidates' interviews with the directors of the Mission 
Juno company, during which they were asked a number of questions about 
their attitudes to product promotion. The two chosen were the two commented 
on most favourably by these interviewers:
One of the psychologists involved in the selection commented that they 
did j io t  want to select anyone who showed any signs of philosophical 
musings, but were after an obedient "lab technician in space". This is very 
different from the traditional depictions of astronauts in SF films, science 
programmes or the news, where they are more usually gung-ho warriors with 
the Right Stuff in contrast to the ground-based scientific 'boffins' who make 
such adventure possible. Presumably they were worried by the thought of 
someone reflecting badly on a promoter's product. The programme itself was 
structured far more as a game show than science programme. The 
competition, the prize and the commercial considerations were the foci of 
attention.
The programme also showed the way in which, for all but the oldest 
would-be astronaut, space travel was exemplified by the Moon landing, which 
was regarded as distant history. The candidates had watched it on TV as 
children and it had been a major influence on their career decisions. Space 
travel was American and glorious in the past and the applicants' attitudes and 
the structuring of the programme indicated that realigning to a continuing 
Russian present and future was awkward. There was no reference to the 
American Shuttle programme, perhaps because the death of the civilian 
woman astronaut in the Challenger disaster would have had particularly 
unfortunate resonances. The absence intensified the image of a glorious, 
increasingly distant and definitely completed American adventure.
In the year after the programme was screened. Mission Juno seemed 
increasingly unlikely to eventuate. Adequate funding was not achieved and 
some sponsors withdrew. It was suggested that the ITV programme 
contributed to this; its flippancy deterred serious scientific involvement.® 
Once joint ventures with the Soviet Union became presented as serious 
commercial considerations, becoming a partner in a publicity stunt made little
®Mlck Booth; "The perils of selling space to the masses", The Guardian, 29 June 1990, p31
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economic sense. Once again the economic determines and in this instance, it 
seemed to be determining against space.
The language of economics as well as the prominence of its concerns 
could also be seen in a Tomorrow's World Wem (BBC1, tx. 14 February 1988) 
on new technology for self-repairing cells on solar panels on satellites. Here, 
the satellites were described as 'orbitting investments' and the new cells 
would enable them to be more 'cost effective'.
Tomorrow's World has also placed space activity within economic 
discourse in many other ways. For example, space is discussed as particularly 
suitable for highly specialized forms of manufacturing. The main projected 
industrial use is materials processing (semi-conductors, polymers and protein 
crystal growing), although this is still at the research stage. Power generation 
platforms are occasionally mentioned. Tourism is the most exotic of the 
projected space money-spinners, but is still very distant. As yet companies 
attempting direct involvement in space (like Martin Marietta Commercial Titan) 
are far from finding it profitable. A US Commerce Department Report issued in 
January 1989 blamed some of this on the frequency with which US policies 
on space had been changed, especially in the previous decade® (i.e. in the 
period identified as the one of the contraction and domestication of space). 
Mundane space may also be indirectly economically viable for corporations 
through its military role. The aerospace industry finds it highly profitable to 
produce components for spy satellites, for example, but this is not evident in 
films or TV programmes.
Reports of the various disasters asociated with space activity were the 
most common type of space news, especially for the later part of the research 
period. British TV and newspaper reports that Congress had refused to fund 
the return to the Moon, which was the first stage of the Mars Mission, were 
only a component of a compound disaster story. Even these stories are now 
concerned with economic causes, in particular with the consequences of 
accepting the lowest tender for equipment. Stories questioning NASA's 
chances of surviving and the future of any American space ventures followed 
the Congressional refusal, the discovery of flaws in the lenses of the Hubble 
Space Telescope and the grounding of the Shuttle fleet because of fuel 
leaks. 1® The economics-based questioning here is of the capabilities of the
^Theresa Foley: "Commercial Space Shows Long-term Promise Despite Early Setbacks",
Aviation Week and Space Technoiogy, 130(12), 20 March 1989, pi 18-9. pi 18 
l^Nlcholas Booth: "When can't do, won't do". The Observer, 8 July 1990, p62.
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space Agency, not of the commercial viability of space.11 Even Tomorrow's 
World broadcast compound problem stories which reflect on the competence 
of the Space Agency. On the second anniversary of the Challenger 6\sas\er, 
an item detailed a succession of design errors that would delay the Shuttle 
relaunch (BBC1, tx. 14 January 1988).
The Equinox programme entitled "Mission to Mars" (C4, tx. 23 July 
1987) talked about how the most feasible Mars mission would involve the 
cooperation of several nations because otherwise it would be too expensive. 
This was most characteristic of the treatment of 'outer' space as being divided 
from inner on an economic basis, but then being treated as freed from the 
economic determinants which dictate the construction of 'inner' space. After 
this economic placement of the story, the most distinctive part of the 
programme was its addressing the point of the presence of humans in space 
exploration and the admission of a senior NASA executive that
"the main function of man [sic] in space is entertain­
ment. Instruments can do better than man."
This acknowledgement of entertainment could be seen as an admission of the 
role of SF in setting the space exploration agenda. If scientific information 
alone was the justification for going to Mars, instruments would have been 
adequate. There were no serious suggestions that there were any economic 
purposes in going to Mars, just that economics were important in getting there. 
Yet human presence was seen to be necessary. In SF stories, people went to 
Mars; people explored space and the sending of instruments was merely a 
prelude to this. On Tomorrow's World (BBC1, tx. 7 November 1989) a special 
item speculating about 2020 in space, stated explicitly that any desire to go to 
Mars was driven by an exploratory rather than an economic motive, but noted 
indirectly that a lunar base and associated space stations would make a 
journey to Mars cheaper. (This item included a brief but most exceptional 
comment about space exploration for a non-fiction programme: a scientist 
speculating that the first child would be likely to be born on Mars by 2030. It 
was pragmatically framed as a consequence of a family being the most stable 
grouping for prolonged space travel, but it was notable that it made by a 
woman, a doctor specialising in space medicine.)
Deep space has not yet been allocated a definite economic role. It is still 
an area for exploration where knowledge is not yet economic information. It is
11 Chris Vaughan: "White House demands probe into NASA", New Scientist, No. 1726, 
21 July 1990, p18
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also spoken of as having another potential function - providing an escape 
route so humans can survive the destruction of Earth by nuclear war or 
ecological catastrophe. Stories of interstellar migration are not all fictions of 
escape, some-are_the_results of serious scientific s t u d y V e r b a l  references 
to the possibility of space as the final refuge or migratory passage are 
occasionally made in non-fiction TV programmes on catastrophes or possible 
futures. They are not however very common.
The economic motives now seen to be required to justify 'real' inner 
space activity can also be seen very clearly in the fictional films and TV series 
about space. In looking at space fictions from the last thirty years, it is 
instructive to see how the posited purpose for being in space has changed as 
the economic motive becomes more dominant. Unlike the actual space 
situation, there has been no division about 200 miles up - economic motives 
reign right out to the stars. In this section, I will examine fictional films and TV 
programmes to demonstrate how the purpose constructed within them for 
being in space has shifted during the period under consideration. In 
attempting to identify whether the shifts are discursive consequences of 
'events' like Sputnik or the Vietnam War, it becomes necessary explicitly to 
ask questions about the relationship of fictional and non-fictional space 
stories. Does it appear that the fictions are driving the discursive construction 
of non-fictional space activity, as was being suggested earlier with the 
proposition that SF had set an agenda for space exploration, or does the 
reverse apply?
Four main purposes for being in space have been articulated in the 
fictions: exploration, research, colonization and economic exploitation. 
Research was never sufficient by itself, but it did become attached to the other 
three in sequence. There is no intention to deny the economic motives of 
colonization by separating it from economic exploitation; in the fictions, 
however, the distinction is maintained, with the main theme of 'colonization' 
stories being resistance to oppression. For most of the later fictions, economic 
exploitation effectively means mining. There are many hybrids of these 
purposes, since passage from one to another involves an overlap not an 
abrupt change, but the very few fictions which are substantial exceptions 
seem then to require the existence of aliens to transport humans into space. 
These films, like Explorers (1985) or The Last Starfighter (1984), are space 
adventures of individuals, usually targetted at children or adolescents and
1^  Finney and Jones: Interstellar Migration
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rarely set in the future. They will not be the concern here, although they are 
often prime examples of utopian sensibilities being evidenced in special 
effects.
 Early SF films presented the purpose of being in space as exploration in
pursuit of knowledge, but in a way that allowed adventures to be central to the 
plot. The space explorers/adventurers acted on behalf of their government (or 
'mankind') and whether or not they were military personnel was unimportant. 
Forbidden Fianet (1956), although from before the period of my concern, is a 
typical example. Presumably actual space activities provided sufficient 
excitement after 1956, because there were no more space-set films until 1967, 
except for exceedingly low budget films featuring the likes of the Three 
Stooges and not now replayed. There were SF films in this period, and space 
was not ignored, but the SF films depicted things coming from space to Earth. 
Furthermore they did so in the present. Cold War invasion fears were 
transmuted in films in which monsters or aliens (or alien monsters) threatened 
innocent and often semi-rural communities. Invasion of the Bodysnatchers 
(1956) is the obvious example, but there were others such as the two derived 
from John Wyndham novels: Village of the Damned (1960) and The Day of 
the Triffids (  ^963).
Television was not quite so circumscribed. Dr Who had intermittently 
explored space since November 1963 and Star Trek spanned the years from 
1966 to 1969. The latter could be regarded as more or less congruent with the 
resurgence of a space setting in film, especially given the greater lead-time in 
film-making. The exception provided by Dr. Who is perhaps less significant 
since it is a children's TV programme.
Barbarella (1967) marked the resumption of the space as a setting of 
filmic interest. It told the story of a secret agent being repeatedly and sexually 
diverted while attempting to track down a missing scientist who had a 
doomsday weapon. Perhaps because it was constrained by the French comic 
strip on which it was based, it bears little similarity to the other films of this 
phase. Like the later equally atypical Dune (1984), it was set so far in the 
future (in the fortieth century) that no single dominant purpose for people 
being in space was suggested. People (and other beings) were in space in 
numbers so great that their purposes were manifold. 2001 and Fianet of the 
Apes (1968) were more typical of the films marking the re-emergence of the 
space setting. This shift in the construction of space as once again a place for 
people to go, rather than a place from which threats came, occurred during the 
build-up to the successful Apollo 11 landing on the Moon in 1969.
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Exploration continued to be the prime reason for being in space until the 
late 70s, although other purposes, including research, were mentioned. The 
journey of the space ship Discovery m 2001 was one of exploration, but the
bases on the Moon were used for research. In Planet of the Apes the human 
astronauts have also been engaged in exploration before being caught in the 
time warp that delivers them to the future, simian-ruled Earth. Throughout the 
Sfar Trek TV series, the Enterprise 's  crew are engaged in exploration, 
though within a (rarely foregrounded) framework of colonization. The 
exception to the emphasis on exploration is Silent Running. This is a Green 
space adventure. The space ships in this film are arks holding the sole 
remaining forests of Earth. The hero defies his Earth-based bosses' orders to 
destroy the forests because it is too expensive to maintain them in this way, 
and sends 'his' off on a journey far into space in the hope that it will be able to 
be saved and regenerated.
The strong change to the primacy of a colonization purpose began in 
1977 and is observable both in the space fantasy Star Wars and the TV 
series Blake's 7 (BBC1, four series, tx. January 1978 - December 1981). As 
was mentioned above, the distinctive theme of 'colonization' fictions is not 
imperialism, but resistance to it. Battles are fought to control empires and 
these are more likely to be between humans than against aliens (as had 
generally been the case when the colonial framework became evident in 
Star Trek). The equivocal temporal siting of Star Wars has already been 
referred to, but Blake's 7 was definitely set in the future. The series 
(unfortunately not repeated during the three years of research, unlike the 
various US space series, like Battlestar Galactica, of approximately the same 
period) posited a huge space empire, the Federation. The first group of heroes 
were space-based guerrilla fighters. As the group lost those earlier members 
who had had an ideologically-based opposition to the Federation, they 
became adventurers first, resistance fighters second. This did not quite 
happen in the two Star Wars sequels; resistance (just) remained in first place.
Outside the fictions, the period immediately preceding and just after 1977 
was one of high spending on military and space research before the Cold War 
began to wind down, until the rather different resurgence in spending 
associated with Star Wars/SDI. The 'real world' concern with military 
hardware and the experience of the electronic battlefield in Vietnam could be 
seen mirrored in the prominence of special effects in the space battle films.
Although fighting against imperialist mechanical aliens (the Oyions),
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adventuring resistance fighters also featured in Battlestar Galactica, a US TV 
series made in the wake of Star Wars to attempt to capitalize on the 
popularity of special effects. In the second series it became evident that 
-Battlestar Galactica was not set-in4he future. However^ the first series' 
imprecision about when it was set and its space setting made it reasonable to 
regard it as being concerned with the future. The main concern of the series 
was not to examine colonization (the heroes had been driven from their home 
planets by the evil Cylons) but, as Mark Siegel has argued, to examine the 
relationship between people and technology.^® One episode foregrounded 
colonization nonetheless by showing the ordinary would-be colonists on the 
space fleet attempting a revolt against the miserable cramped conditions they 
lived in, in contrast to the spacious (hero) officers' quarters.
The colonisation theme was carried not only by these but also in both the 
film and TV series Buck Rogers in the 25th Century (1979), as well as the 
Star Trek films (1979-1989) - though to a lesser extent. Like Star Trek and 
Flash Gordon (1980), Buck Rogers was constrained by its earlier 
manifestations. As in the 1929 comic strip and the 1939 film. Buck was a 
twentieth century hero keeping the peace through his superior strength in a 
mildly degenerate future. He operated on and among a number of planets 
colonised from Earth, but apparently independent of it. The film of Flash 
Gordon differed a little in being an explicit attempt to recreate the aura as well 
as the plot of the original comic strip, hence it presented an image of the future 
in the style of the 30's - backyard spaceship building and civilisations on Mars 
included. Unsurprisingly, the purpose for Flash being in space was 
exploration and adventure.
These were constrained by predecessors developed under the dominion 
of earlier views of the purpose of space activity. In films concurrent with them, 
but without such constraints, the purpose for being in space was different - it 
was much more overtly concerned with economic exploitation, though 
colonization might continue to be the background for it. The film which 
signalled the change was the SF-horror hybrid Alien (1979). Space was now 
a zone for economic exploitation - the spaceship Nostromo  is a mining 
freighter diverted to check out a planetary discovery. In previous films a 
spaceship would have been diverted to gain information or to rescue stranded 
people, here the return trip is interrupted only because the company owning 
the ship sees an opportunity to benefit economically. Furthermore the
l®Mark Siegel: "Science-Fiction Characterization and TV's Battle for the Stars",
Science Fiction Studies, 7(3), 1980, pp270-277. p275
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anticipated 'benefit' is to weapons manufacture. Pure research, like an 
analogous 'pure' space exploration, is no longer justifiable.
With the rise-in importance of economically motivated plots, space lost all 
vestiges of glamour. The spaceship in Alien was grimy and cramped andjthe 
crew's clothing was based on army fatigues. Together with persistent 
complaining about the job and their employer, the Company, these 
established the ordinariness of space. The crew were just employees, 
regarded by the Company as absolutely disposable - as is made clear when 
they discover orders that the alien from their planetary landfall must be 
brought back even if it costs all of their lives. This is no story of a future more 
glorious than the present, nor is the space-based future shown as in any way 
more positive than the Earth-based future. This is a future where being in 
space makes little difference, corrupt immoral corporations still control 
everything.
The same vision is evident in Outland (1981). Again the economic use 
of space is for mining, this time on one of the moons of Jupiter. The film allows 
a slight possibility of the main corporation being unaware of the corrupt 
practices engaged in by the particular franchisees of the operation, who 
provide their employees with work-enhancing drugs, regardless of their lethal 
effects. Again the employees live and work in cramped surroundings and 
even the law enforcer hero's job is stripped of glamour. As H. Bruce Franklin 
says,
"he is just draining a little pus from one of the 
absesses of decaying interplanetary monopoly
c a p i t a l is m " .^  4
Mining remained basic to the initial future envisaged also in Red Dwarf 
(BBC2, three series tx. 1988-1990). The eponymous ship which provides the 
setting for the SF sitcom was again a mining freighter and, before the disaster 
which shifts the narrative three million years into the future, was crewed by a 
large number of comparative incompetents and subject to all manner of 
mechanical and electronic failures. Much of the humour is itself generated by 
showing the future as ordinary and unglamorous.
When space was not being colonised or mined, it was used as a safe (i.e. 
off-Earth) site for research, specialized manufacturing and the development
14h . Bruce Franklin: "Don't Look Where We're Going: Visions of the Future in Science Fiction
Films 1970-82" in George Slusser and Eric 8. Rabkin (eds.): Shadows of the Magic
Lamp, Carbondale, Southern Illinois University Press, 1985. p81
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and deployment of artificial humans. Saturn 3 (1980) is set on a moon-based 
food production station which allows for the contained testing of a robot with 
an organic brain. Android (1982) presents a space station which apparently 
-exists solely for research onjhe-development of advanced androids. Blade 
Runner (1982), though entirely Earth-based, depicts a future where space 
has been colonized and to which the fit have migrated, but which is also the 
only place where artificial humans can legally exist. As is so often the case 
with the highly detailed future represented in Blade Runner, there is more. 
Replicants (the artificial humans) are largely used in mining.
In the A//en sequel, M ens (1986), there is no reason to suppose that 
the Company has ceased being involved in mining, but it is not the main 
concern. The primary economic activity referred to is terraforming (the creation 
of an environment suitable for human colonization on a previously 
inhospitable planet) including the production and supply of the requisite 
machinery. The plot concerns the return of Ripley, the survivor of the first film, 
to the planet on which the original alien had been discovered, to try to find out 
why the Company’s base there has ceased communication. She returns with 
a Company executive and a detachment of the US Colonial Marine Corps, 
accustomed to trouble-shooting missions in space, that the Company has 
available as a matter of course. Jim Naureckas has claimed that the presence 
of the marines and of the Company executive. Carter Burke, reverses the 
earlier films' condemnation of the Company's corporate totalitarianism. In 
Aliens, he says, it is possible to read Burke as just a particular bad apple and, 
in the us-versus-them world where Ripley and the Marines confront the aliens, 
our identification with the Marines by extension exculpates the capitalist 
system.^® Naureckas's reading of Burke seems difficult to sustain, not only 
because of Ripley's continued contempt for the Company as a whole, but also 
because of her meeting, in the early part of the film, with a boardroom-full of 
Company executives all of whom are similarly depicted. The second point is a 
little more persuasive, yet virtually all of the Marines are killed or maimed by 
the resurgent aliens who have already killed all the base personnel except for 
one child. Even if the audience members do read the Marines as 
representatives of the capitalist system, by the end only the castigating Ripley 
and a minor character (a monosyllabic female pilot) are left whole to identify 
with. The only alternatives are an injured wimpish lieutenant and one-third of 
an android. Inasmuch as the Marines can be seen to support the capitalist 
system, it is probably only through indicating that there is something other
l^Jim Naureckas: "Aliens: Mother and the Teeming Hordes", Jumpcut, No 32,1987, pi & 4.
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than the Company - even if they are (as far as one can tell) only deployed 
through it.
Although much less successful at the box-office, Enemy Mine, also 
projected an advanced colonization and mining combination, but left the
economic largely unspoken. Most of the film depicts the developing 
relationship between a human and an alien, fighter pilots on opposite sides in 
a future space war, who must rely on one another after they both crash on an 
uninhabited planet. Surrounding this tale is the story of a war between the 
colonizing races and its resolution. The film begins with a heavily jingoistic 
voice-over announcing
"By late in the twenty-first century the nations of 
Earth were finally at peace, working together to 
explore and colonize the distant reaches of space.
Unfortunately we weren't alone out there. A race 
of non-human aliens called the Dracs were claiming 
squatters' rights to some of the richest star systems 
in the Galaxy. Well. . .  they weren't going to get it 
without a fight."
In the course of the narrative, the distinction between colonizers and squatters 
is obliterated; both Dracs and humans are revealed as moral people and the 
mantle of evil is placed solely on the human bands of slavers. Colonization, 
which is unquestioned, presumably proceeds post-war, only in a more orderly 
manner. The locating of evil in a criminalized group is similar to the depiction 
of the corrupt executive or franchisee rather than the whole corporation or 
economic system. It makes it possible for the depicted evil to be represented 
as contained and aberrant rather than pervasive and characteristic. Enemy 
Mine is not characteristic of 80's fictions in doing this.
By placing interstellar activity only a century in the future. Enemy Mine 
may be regarded as envisaging particularly rapid developments in space 
travel. Slower, and less romanticised, space futures were more common in the 
80s - though some films are imprecise about dates. It is generally the case that 
the nearer in time a depiction is set, the nearer in space it is too. 2010 (1984) 
and the TV presentations Star Cops (BBC2, tx. 6 July - 31 August 1987) and 
Murder on the Moon (ITV, txd. 26 August 1989) were all examples of this. 
Although constrained by being a sequel to 2001 (which had presupposed 
moon bases and a regular passenger-carrying shuttle service to the Moon) 
2010  made little reference to continuing space activity and showed
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especially the US, but also the USSR, having wound down their space 
programmes. The only reason for a special (joint) space mission was the need 
for an urgent investigation of an anomalous situation near Jupiter.
The main emphasis ini20Y0 is on the space events, but this is against a 
troubled geo-political background and during the trip to Jupiter, the US and 
the USSR go to war. In the one-off TV drama Murder on the Moon, this 
situation had barely been avoided a few years before the time at which the 
action was set. Although there is little sign of actual conflict in the series 
Space Cops, relationships between the two countries are far from smooth 
and in one episode, a corporation dealing in 'confrontation commodities' 
attempts to increase tension. In other words, a space setting is no guarantee 
of escape from the troubles or difficulties of Earth.
Both the television drama and the series were set towards the end of the 
first quarter of the twenty-first century, on space stations and the Moon and 
concerned law and order problems arising among the personnel of the 
various national space enterprises engaged in research, manufacturing and 
mining. This comparatively near space was very much a new economic area, 
but new only as far as the site and its potential was concerned. Otherwise 
corporate activity was represented as it was on Earth - corrupt, immoral and 
careless of individual well-being.
It is virtually impossible to find any contemporary film or TV programme in 
which a space-based or space-operating corporation is shown to act lawfully 
or morally. It is difficult to find one doing so in Earth-set future fictions either. 
So common and standard is the presentation of corruption now, that a 
Naureckas-style reading of the fictions as seeking to exculpate the capitalist 
system as a whole by depicting a few scapegoats acting improperly and being 
punished cannot be sustained. Corporations, whether operating on Earth or in 
space, just seem inevitably to be economically and morally corrupt; even if 
they are punished, there seems no indication that they will be reformed. It is 
probable that this persistent presentation of corrupt corporations was 
facilitated by the decentring of actual corporations into multinationals. Vivian 
Sobchack has pointed to the apparent paradox of this decentring occurring 
concurrently with the increase in the concentration of economic power in their 
hands. She has even suggested that they
"seem to determine our lives from some 
ethereal 'other' or 'outer' space".  ^®
1 ^ Sobchack: Screening Space, p234
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Perhaps this makes easier their fictional operation in outer space.
The corporations may be corrupt and operate contrary to the well-being 
“bflTTbst of the” individuals and^bllectivities depicted, but tbeyhbvTprovide the 
main means of financing the space-based future. Only films constrained by 
precursors made before 1977, as is the case with the various Star Treks, 
provide space-based activities funded by national or international agencies. 
The ethical code which the corporations follow may be read as simply 
necessary tp_ generate the capital needed to get into space. Morality after all, 
requires an adjective to locate it and the one that has been silent here so far is 
probably 'old-fashioned'. The purity that may be invested in non-fictional 
expectations of deep space, as suggested earlier, is generally unavailable in 
the fictional, especially if the fiction has been generated in the 80s without 
reference to earlier precursors.
This may appear to be implying that films of the future, especially the 
space-set ones, are sustained anti-capitalist statements. The economic 
aspects of the plots that have been concentrated on here may seem to support 
this, but this is only part of fictions. Individual characters expose and contest 
both the economic and the moral corruption of the corporations. Furthermore, 
Andrew Britton has suggested that a positive image of capitalism is provided 
in these films not so much by the plots, but by the special effects, both in the 
diegetic and extra-diegetic celebrations of technology (the sign of 'progress' in 
capitalist societies).
"The six-track Dolby sound, the 70mm, the 
trick-work, the much vaunted profligate 
expensiveness, all testify in themselves to 
the magical potency and dynamic robustness 
of contemporary capitalism even as they 
reaiise a future state which represents the 
apotheosis of the same technology."^ ^
Nonetheless, contrary to Britton's assertion, this dual celebration frequently 
carries with it a statement of the cost - the transnational corporations which are 
the principle benefactors are beyond any but the most localized restraint on 
the operation of corporate advantage. The individuals who confront them, like 
Sean Connery's character in Outland, rarely do more than make local 
adjustments. The celebration of capitalism is more muted than Britton allows
1 ^ Andrew Britton: "Blissing Out", p i3
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and usually carries an internal warning about the consequences of a lack of 
restraint.
Yet Britton is correct in pointing attention away from the plot. Not just 
JechnoJo^LcaLsumptuousness and the speciaLeffects, but also scénographie 
details are part of a discourse which, while not itself economic, still attests to 
the importance of economic practices. In many space-set films, rubbish seems 
surprisingly prominent. Star Wars uses rubbish as a plot device more than 
once and \n Enemy Mine (1985), the marooned hero discovers the presence 
of other humans by stumbling on their rubbish.
I intend to argue that this rubbish is relevant to the primacy of the 
economic pervasive in both fictional and non-fictional stories about space. 
Rubbish is the space-set metonymic indicator of the urban squalor so 
characteristic of earth-set films of the future. Such squalor provides more than 
merely scénographie interest. Writing about postmodern cultural forms more 
generally, Fredric Jameson notes being confronted with the questions of
"[h]ow urban squalor can be a delight to the 
eyes when expressed in commodification, and 
how an unparalleled quantum leap in the 
alienation of daily life in the city can now be 
experienced in the form of a strange new
hallucinatory e x h i la r a t io n . ' ' '^ ^
A brief examination of the function of urban squalor in earth-set films such as 
Blade Runner and The Running Man indicates how similarly rubbish in 
space operates. Piles of rubble, abandoned burnt out cars, derelict, boarded- 
up houses and rubbish blowing along city streets are features of many fictions 
and documentaries of the present, as well as films of the future, particularly 
law and order ones. For the first thing urban squalor now signifies is 'reality', 
the nitty-gritty indeed. Since most of the indicators of urban squalor, like burnt- 
out cars, are unavailable in a space setting, rubbish signifies more widely 
there.
Secondly, litter figures the commodified world both causally, by being 
consequent on consumption, and metaphorically by its cluttering thingness. 
Urban sufaces are crunched and crenellated to become interesting to the eye 
as just another visual commodity. Perhaps the strongest example of this is the 
film Blade Runner, whose vision of the trashed-out, retro-fitted city, sodden 
with acid rain and littered with black plastic bags of rubbish is the
1G Fredric Jameson: "Postmodernism, or The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism", New Left
Review, No. 146, July-Aug. 1984. pp53-92. p76
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quintessential 80s vision of the future city. Its influence may be seen in the 
barrios of The Running Man and the various versions of Max Headroom. 
(The trashed city of Escape from New York predated and prefigured it.) 
“Writing of~B/ac/e^£//7nerrGiuliana Bruno notes the~closeness of the link 
between postindustrialism and waste.
"The continuous expulsion of waste is an indexical 
sign of the weil functioning apparatus: waste 
represents its production, movement and
_  ___  . _ deyeiopment at increasing speed. Postindustrialism
recycles, therefore it needs its waste."”*®
When waste is expelled in space, as it is by the Empire's battleships in Star 
Wars, it is an equivocal sign of production. While the example shows the 
Empire to be technologically very competent in having made space 
operations so 'normal', it also shows them to be profligate and thoughtless.
The third operation of urban squalour is as the tangible emblem of evil 
(as in the preceding Star Wars example) or corruption. It is not usually 
individual corruption that is so figured, but the more widespread institutional, 
even social, corruption. In The Running Man the cleanliness of the areas in 
which the privileged live and work contrasts with the overcrowded derelict 
barrios of the dispossessed. Like the ruin of New York that is the prison in 
Escape from New York, this is an indicator of the moral culpability of those 
who have created the system, even more than an (inverted) sign of the moral 
worth of the groups concerned.
In space, rubbish cannot function thus solely scenographically; its 
presence needs diegetic explanation. The already referred to, highly potent 
crime and corruption episode of Star Cops ("This Case to be Opened in a 
Million Years", tx. 3 August 1987) involved drugs, the Mafia, uranium- 
trafficking and commercial corruption, and centred on the use of space for 
nuclear waste disposal. It is hard to conceive of any more thoroughgoing 
exposition of the link between corruption and detritus.
The foregoing has shown the replacement in importance of the scientific 
by the economic both within fictional and non-fictional stories about space. In 
the non-fictional world, this replacement occurred in the period between 1975 
and 1981. In 1975 the joint docking of an American and a Russian space
■*®Giuliana Bruno: "Ramble City: Postmodernism and Blade RunneT, October, No. 41,
Sumrher 1987, pp61-74. p64 Reprinted in Kuhn (ed.): Alien Zone.
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vehicle (Apollo 18 and Solyuz 19) signalled the end of the Space Race, the 
superpower competition which started with the 1957 Russian success with 
Sputnik and climaxed with the 1969 American success of the Moon landing. 
1981 saw the first successful flight of the Space Shuttle with its aim of making 
spaceflight commercially viable. The shift in the fictions occurred in the same 
period with the disappearance of exploration and research as the prime 
purposes posited for being in space, except in those films and TV 
programmes that were constrained by being sequels to, or remakes of, earlier 
fictions. " ' — ' — -
In trying to account for the shifts, the question of whether fictional or non- 
fictional discourses are driving is difficult. Before Sputnik and Vostok 1 (which 
in 1961 made Yuri Gargarin the first man in space), it seems reasonable to 
assert that SF drove. In the period up to the cessation of the Apollo missions in 
1972, or possibly even until the joint docking in 1975, neither drove, perhaps 
both fictions and non-fictions operated in concert. Yet for most of this period 
SF films depicted space only as the source of threats that came to Earth, in 
transmutation of Cold War tensions. Thus if actual space activity was being 
discursively constructed in terms set by SF, it was by SF that had been made 
before 1956. The SF films in their turn were not being driven by 'real' space 
activities either, yet in suggesting that the monsters and aliens which featured 
so repeatedly in them, were related to the Cold War, it is a non-fictional 
discursive influence that is being asserted. This influence furthermore also 
operated on the discursive construction of the Space Race, for the statements 
of the urgency with which the Russian lead had to be overtaken and the 
funding that eventually made it possible, also derived from the same Cold War 
tensions.
It is possible that non-fiction, specifically science, achieved greater 
discursive power to drive non-fiction in the period immediately preceding the 
Moon landing until the end of the Race; the period, in other words, of 
anticipated and actual American triumph. Although the Cold War was still in 
effect, space no longer figures in the fictions as the source of threats, instead it 
provided adventure and 'scientific' discoveries.
With the economic as dominant as it is after this period, it no longer 
becomes possible to decide how the relationship between fiction and non­
fiction is operating. I earlier suggested that the economic itself was able to 
become powerful because actual (scientific) space activity could no longer 
deliver as unproblematically the achievements that had been mapped for so
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long by SF. This is a claim that the fictional was still discursively the driving 
force, but it is a tentative claim. Certainly I have demonstrated the rise of 
various economic considerations during a time when scientific achievements 
we re not-occu rri ng-o n th  e sam e schedule as SF-had-appeared to suggest 
they would. There is, however, no suggestion that SF is driving the current 
construction of space activity primarily within an economic discourse.
The other main characteristic of the stories of the future in and of space is 
the convergence of domains. Among the convergences to be considered are 
the convergence of fiction, actual events and scientific capabilities, which was 
noted above, especially in the earlier period of actual space activity; temporal 
convergences, particularly of the present and the near future; and the 
convergence of Earth-bound and space-set problems.
An unusual convergence of fictional and non-fictional domains was 
notable in the only non-fictional programme from before the research period to 
be rescreened - an Equinox programme "A Short History of the Future: The 
Spaceship", (C4 first tx. 28 August 1986, retransmitted 22 January 1987). The 
programme concentrated on spaceship design and the interaction of film, TV 
and radio SF with scientific and technological events - citing, for example, Fritz 
Lang's 'invention' of the countdown in The Woman in the Moon (1929), on 
the set of which Werner von Braun worked, and President Eisenhower's 
showing staff at the Pentagon Walt Disney's TV film Man in Space (which 
used a model of a rocket Werner von Braun had designed for an article in 
Collier's magazine) in the mid-50s. The programme was not however talking 
about the future as much as talking about past visions of it.
It was particularly striking in its collapsing of fiction and fact and of three 
temporal dimensions in a prestigious scientific programme. Overt 
acknowledgement that fiction had preceded or at least been imbricated in 
scientific developments is most unusual in scientific discourse. A companion 
programme transmitted the previous week, " A Short History of the Future: The 
City", referred briefly to Things to Come and Metropolis (1926) but otherwise 
ignored SF. No other programmes in that Equinox series referred to fiction of 
any kind. It appears that while SF is occasionally allowed into science and 
technology programmes talking about the future when they are more design 
history than science, only when talking about space is SF allowed a 
significant presence.
The convergence of the near future and the present may be noted in 
several ways. A time may be given to a fiction, which when reached can 'date'
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the work in most senses of the term. George Orwell's 1984 is the most 
famous example of this. Precise dating emphasises the predictive, so that 
when the date is reached and the 'prediction' not realized, the work may be 
-rejected-as simply 'wrong'. The convergence in instances such as this is thus 
only apparent. The space films most likely to be subject to this are 2001 and 
its sequel 2010 {1984). A surprising number of films and TV dramas do give a 
precise date for their action. In the 80s the most popular temporal setting was 
2018-2028 - far enough away to be different but near enough to be 
recognizable.
This temporal convergence may also be perceived following the positing 
of, to use Suvin's term, nova. When, as occasionally happens, they become 
realities or widespread and thus no longer markers of the soon-to-come, they 
may serve to validate the whole vision. Thus the saving of the world's forests 
in spaceships orbitting the Earth in Silent Running, may seem more credible 
now than when the film was made in 1971. On the other hand the reverse may 
occur. They may become more obviously impossibilities or be revealed to be 
based on laughably outdated premises - as some descriptions of spaceship 
controls using punched cards have been - in which case they can invalidate 
the whole vision.
The next area of convergence refers to that area where space is no 
longer seen as all that distinct from Earth. The romanticism of the early fictions 
which emphasised the difference of space - more innocent or more evil but in 
either case an escape from the mundane - can now only be found in those 
films or TV programmes heavily constrained by being sequels or remakes. 
Otherwise, space is not just metaphorically like Earth, but practically as well. 
The problems of Earth are also to be found there. This has already been 
apparent in the earlier discussion of rubbish, urban squalor and corporate 
corruption.
It is necessary to begin an argument that there has been a convergence 
between the demographic character of the fictional space-set and Earth- 
based future, by acknowledging that the representation of the population in TV 
programmes and films is based on the dominance of groups in contemporary 
society, not on census data. The demographics of the fictional space-based 
future have always provided strong evidence of this. There are many more 
men than women, whites than non-whites, 'prime of life' people rather than the 
young or the old, middle rather than working class, and as far as can be 
ascertained, none who are not able-bodied and heterosexual. (This is actually 
rather in keeping with the demographic profile of 'real' astronauts so far -
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perhaps even over-representing the number of women.)
Despite this, the fictions preceding the rise in importance of economic 
purposes for being in space do present something of a demographically 
<listinot future in-spacev4"he earliest films of the research^eriod (Planet of the 
Apes, 2001  and Silent Running, though not Barbare lla ), showed an 
overwhemingly male, white, prime of life future space. In contrast to this, the 
initial Sfar Trek TV series explicitly used demographics as part of its 
representation of a different (and better) future, by putting a black American 
woman and a Japanese-American man on the bridge. [This and subsequent 
developments in the saga will be examined in the next chapter.] By the late 
70s the distinctiveness was beginning to diminish; the inclusion of at least one 
woman in a spaceship crew - both for films and TV programmes - became 
unremarkable. Blake's 7 usually had two (and the Supreme Commander of 
the Federation was also female). For a while it also used the Star Trek device 
of the doubly significant black woman, presumably finding this sufficient racial 
diversity since none other was afforded.
By 2010, however, the commander of the Russian ship and one of her 
crew were female and the American computer specialist was an (East) Indian 
man. The rest of the crew were white males, the age-range included the 
middle-aged, but not the old. Alien, Aliens and Star Cops were mixed on 
both gender and racial lines. Outland, Android and Saturn 3 had both male 
and female characters but only white main characters. Characters in these 
three and Star Cops included the middle-aged. Red Dwarf had no 
continuing female character until the third series, when the computer became 
a white female, but had shown some of the original crew as women. The racial 
composition is more difficult to be specific about, since the basic cast for the 
first two series used two black and two white actors (the third series increased 
to two black and four white), but one black actor played a humanoid being 
evolved from a cat. A similar, though exacerbated, problem occurred in 
Enemy Mine which had one black and one white lead actors, but the black 
one, Lou Gosset Jnr., encased in reptilian latex, played a hermaphroditic 
alien.
Late middle-aged people provide the major alternatives to the 
overwhelming presence of those in the prime of life. Burt Lancaster, playing 
the hero in Saturn 3 is the oldest person depicted in space, although playing 
a character younger than his own age. Children are also rare. The most 
prominent role for a child in a future space-setting is that of Newt, the child 
survivor in Aliens. She, together with the hero's son in Outland, indicates
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some small vision of a future when working off-Earth will be sufficiently 
ordinary for families, rather than just single people, to be out there. Outland 
provides a more diverse age range than most, not only with a young boy, but 
■Se^Ti^Connery as a middle-aged heTo and Frances Sternhagen as a late 
middle-aged woman doctor.
Class is more difficult to assess in space stories, but inasmuch as it may 
be assessed, Allen, Aliens, Outland, Star Cops and Red Dwarf provide the 
only working class characters. Only the TV programmes, through their longer 
time span, allow them to be major characters - in the first two films they are 
killed and in the third little more than set dressing. Star Cops provides only 
one example and he is probably the least prominent of the continuing 
characters; Red Dwarf on the other hand has its only middle class characters 
among the long distant dead - but it is the only comedy.
From all this, it seems possible to argue that there has been a 
convergence and that space is no longer regarded as the site for a 
demographically distinct future. Racial diversity, which had signalled 
Progress, ceased to carry this connotation, instead becoming a marker of 
realism or even 'grit'. The death rate for black characters is higher than for 
white ones, however. Apart from the Indian computer specialist in 2001, only 
in the TV series do any black characters survive to the end of the fictions, a 
situation remarkably similar to that for working class people of whatever race. 
The restricted age range, may be 'justified' for the elderly on the basis of 
various fitness requirements, while the almost complete absence of children 
may similarly be seen to be the result of space being a w ork  setting, where 
children are inappropriate. Apart from this, the space-set future diverges 
hardly at all from the earth-based future, or indeed the present, as shown on 
TV and in film - to be shown and survive it is best to be a middle class white 
man.
One area where there has been little convergence between discursively 
constructed space and Earth is in the depiction of settled space. Colonised 
moons and planets are rarely shown, especially in films from the 80s, though 
they may be signalled by implication or verbal reference. The city and its 
teeming hordes are shown on Earth. Heavily populated space is uncommon 
and impermanent - the mining 'encampment' in Outland is probably its chief 
representative. Even in Dune, which may provide the nearest to a long-term 
settled society off-Earth, the viewer has to assume settlement, has to assume 
that the flamboyant courts rule over and are supported by a substantial 
population located somewhere off-screen.
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Although limited by their budgets, TV programmes like Dr Who, Star 
Trek, Blake's 7 and Buck Rogers in the 25th Century were occasionally 
located in off-Earth cities of the future - though the most that was actually 
shown was corridors and rooms. The sparse population and bare set-dressing 
resulting from the budget restrictions may have been read metonymically, but 
because they were constant across such programmes and accorded with the 
general sterile and spacious spaceships sets, could well have been perceived 
as intentional, as part of the 'look' of the future.
Despite their greater budgets, the Star Wars fantasies still rarely showed 
ordinary citizens, or ordinary cities. The major instance was the rough 
spaceport town on Tattooine in the first film. A city above the clouds (in which 
only its ruler and his guards seemed to live) appeared in the second. Blade 
Runner which provides such a dense picture of the future Earth, only gives 
hints of life off-Earth. The advertising blimp at the beginning encourages 
people to emigrate to the off-world colonies and J. R. Sebastian comments 
that his debilitation keeps him on Earth, but the only sustained description of 
life in space comes in the monologue from the dying replicant Roy Batty. He 
speaks of the glory of the skies seen while working in space, not of living 
there. It is after all to Earth that he and the other replicants have returned to 
avoid dying.
The final domain of convergence is a much more theoretically complex 
one drawn largely from the work of Vivian Sobchack on changes in the 
perception of space in American SF films from the early 50s to the mid 80s. 
She uses the central metaphor of 'deep' and 'shallow' space in her 
categorisation of these films. This makes for several problems. The first arises 
because I have already used this metaphor as an alternative to the division 
'inner' and 'outer' space, which was shown being drawn about 200 miles 
above the surface of the Earth. This is not how Sobchack is using it. She does 
however appear to be using it in two ways: one, rather negatively, to refer to a 
post-modern 'depthlessness', a flatness and lack of affect; and two, to refer to 
the depth of field on the cinema screen.
Because Sobchack's argument is particularly useful to my discussion but 
based on a different body of material, it is necessary to outline it in some detail 
to indicate how her conclusions differ from, yet contribute towards, mine. 
She examines all American SF films made since 1950, thus considering many 
films which, since they neither represent the future nor have a space setting, 
are not considered here. My inclusion of TV programmes also alters matters.
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Sobchack's argument depends on considerable emphasis being put on 
marginal films, most of which are also not considered here, since for 
budgetary considerations, they are set on earth, and present space as that 
p laceJi:om _which .phenomena (aliens,_comets, devices) come and 
occasionally return.
In her categorisation, the films of the 50s are described as representing 
space as semantically 'deep' and time as accelerating and urgent; while those 
of the period 1968-1977, between 2001 and Star Wars, depicted a domestic 
and crowded space (using the term to refer more to 'area' than 'outer' space) 
usually on Earth, in which time had lost its urgency since the bad present 
presaged a worse future. After 1977, space and time expanded again and 
things became more hopeful,^® yet space did not become 'deep' again, 
instead it .
"is semantically described as a surface for 
play and dispersal, a surface across wfiicfi 
existence and objects kinetically dis-place 
and dis-play their materiality".^^
While her temporal divisions are the same as the first three developed earlier 
in this chapter, they are not describing the same characteristics, since she is 
dealing with so much larger a body of films. There is however an odd kind of 
convergence being asserted in her categorisation as, with the lack of depth, 
space is little differentiated from Earth.
In support of her refusal to reinstate depth as a characteristic of space in 
contemporary SF films, Sobchack cites the
"superficial electronic 'dimensionality' of 
movement experienced as occurring on - not 
in - the screens of computer terminals, video 
games, music videos and movies like 
Tron. . .  and The Last Starfighter."^^
That she does perceive a link between the postmodern use of the term 'depth' 
and the cinematic depth of field is evident from her later comment when, 
speaking primarily of the marginal films, she points out how
^^Sobchack: Screening Space, p226 
21 ibid., PP227-8 
22|bid., PP230-1
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"constant busyness and motion are enhanced 
by the material clutter of excess scenography 
to distract the eye from locating itself in the 
fixed position from which the conception of
personal movement, depth and interiority (or 
subjectivity) become possible."^®
This certainly appears applicable to films like The Adventures o f Buckaroo 
Banzai Across the 8th Dimension (1984) or D une , but not to the 
conservative mainstream films which are my main concern. A fixed position 
can readily be located in them. The occasional outburst of 'excess 
scenography' is contained by surrounding it with more reticent material, rather 
as Sobchack suggests happens with the electronic effects embedded in and 
rendered safe by, the cinematographic ones.
The films of Sobchack's third stage are the ones where convergences 
are most noticable. She divides them into marginal and mainstream 
conservative ones, principally on the basis of their acceptance or rejection of 
the postmodern aesthetic ideals of depthlessness, weakened historicity, new 
emotional tone and a new relationship to the 'new' itself. Despite their explicit 
rejection of these, she emphasises that the conservative mainstream films 
(more of which are my concern here) cannot escape - the new aesthetic 
informs their unconscious and their deep structure.^^ The aspects that relate 
to convergence are the manifestations of depthlessness as the deflation and 
inflation of space, the weakening of historicity in a conflation of time, and the 
related rise in significance of special effects. It is the first of these that seems 
least satisfactory for the fictions under consideration. When discussing 'outer 
space', her argument appears to rely too much on a proliferation of detail in 
the mise-en-scène and the generation of it by electronic means. Her point 
about the spatial having displaced the temporal in importance since 1977 
remains relevant.
The change from the stark spare spaceships and the emptiness outside 
them of the earlier period to the crenellated battleships and detailed 
astronomical bodies cannot be ignored. The greater detail probably generates 
considerable audience pleasure. While accepting her point for oddities like 
Dune, it seems too strained to suggest more generally that the presence of a 
greater degree of visual interest on the surface of images projected two- 
dimensionally, reduces the 'depth' conveyed by the same process showing
23|bid., P 270 
24|bid., PP253-4
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less detail in the visual field. Similarly, the space battles which Sobchack 
concentrates on are as affect I ess as she says. However, they are only 
moments in much longer fictions which undercut the depthlessness. The 
removal"ôf alDlip bn the screen means'hbthing but another (video) kill, but 
Enemy Mine, for example, which starts with just such a dogfight sequence, 
spends most of the film changing the status of the 'blip' from enemy to family.
The number of films constrained by forerunners from the first and second 
stage further complicate the applicability of Sobchack's third stage of SF film 
to the depictions of the future in and of space. After the success of Star Wars, 
space-set SF film-making became very expensive. Sequels and other kinds of 
follow-ups to high-profile forerunners were made in attempts to reduce the 
economic risk. Thus concurrently with the gritty futures of Outland  and 
Alien(s), there are the cleaner, more optimistic futures of the various Star 
Tre/c films (as well as the odd mystic romanticism of 2010).
Yet disputing the general relevance of Sobchack's ascription of 
postmodern 'depthlessness' to the films and TV programmes of the space-set 
future does not mean that all the analysis of her third stage of SF film is 
rejected. The conflation of time which means, for example, that it is often 
difficult to determine whether a film is or is not set in the future, is certainly 
important. My earlier discussion of temporal convergence is an endorsement 
of this. The emphasis she places on special effects is also valuable, even if 
the conclusion to be drawn here differs somewhat.
Some statements made about the effects work in 2010\n\W be examined 
to provide a contrast to Sobchack's analysis. Initially, they may seem to 
provide unqualified support for her assertions, since the repeated interactions 
between the director, Peter Hyams, and the ubiquitous visual futurist, Syd 
Mead, are reported as being about increasing surface detail - on the probe 
which investigates the moon, on the bridge on the Leonov and on its exterior. 
Yet despite this, the obsession of both men was with the 'real' and with both 
public and specialist 'knowledge' of it. Thus Hyams says of Mead
"Syd is really amazing at being able to 
extrapolate real surface detail and make it 
look convincing. He is not one of those people 
who just paints wonderfully imaginative 
paintings - he is an industrial designer by trade 
and the bulk of what he does is real".®^
25Adam Eisenberg and Don Shay: "Jupiter Revisited - The Odyssey of 2010 ", Cinefex, 20, 
January 1985. pp4-67. p11
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The effects supervisor, Richard Ediund, who had also worked on Star 
Wars, contrasted the two films, pointing out how the lighting of the space 
s h ip s ^ a s “ based“ on“ different premises. In 2010  the position of the light 
source had to be in accord with Hyams "concept of cinematic reality in 
s p a c e " . 2 6  This added depth (of field) and particularity to the mise-en-scène. 
Mead himself refers to public expectations constraining his work.
"People know what space hardware looks 
like and they've now seen shots of mock-ups 
of the space station - what we expect it to do.
As a result the public has a vision of what it 
should look like right now and if you go too 
far past that they probably won't believe it."2^
While it is a photograph of a mock-up that is the source of this public 
expectation, there is again here a convergence of the fictional and the non- 
fictional visions of the space future. The makers of 2010  took a very 
conscious decision to create and promote the film through exploitation of this 
effective cross-over of domains. It would have been possible to concentrate on 
its being a sequel to 2001, a prestigious art and cult film, but instead this 
aspect was muted.
It is possible to perceive this particular convergence, this intermingling of 
fictions and scientific 'facts' as characteristic of the 'hyperreal', where 'reality' 
is destroyed by the plethora of simulated objects more 'real' than it is itself. 
The main enunciator of this theory, Jean Baudrillard, claims that the mass 
media have destroyed the 'real', to which it was once possible to have access, 
by replacing it with simulacra, copies for which there have been no 
originals.28 Baudrillard denies the ability of ordinary people (the mass) to 
distinguish between simulation and 'reality', they reject difference and 
meaning because simulation has already displaced reality.2® While 
disputing this idea of the mass's refusal and rejection, his thesis has 
relevance here. Despite the promotional claims, in 2010  all is indeed
26|bid., p40 
27|bid., p12
28jean Baudrillard: "Symbolic Exchange and Death" in Jean Baudrillard: Selected Writings, 
Edited and Introduced by Mark Poster, London, Polity Press, 1988 
29jean Baudrillard: "Implosion of Meaning in the Media and the Implosion of the Social in the 
Masses" in Kathleen Woodward (ed.): The Myths of Information, Madison, Coda, 1980.
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simulation.
The way Umberto Eco uses the concept of hyperreality seems more 
valuable, particularly when considering the future where the 'real' is an 
especially tenuous mental construct. For Eco,-the hyperreal has not replaced 
'the real', rather it attempts to do so, not everywhere but in specific locales and 
for specific reasons. Of his travels through America in search of the Absolute 
Fake, he comments
"Absolute unreality is offered as real presence.
-  [ . /v ] The sign aims to be the thing, to abolish
the distinction of the reference, the mechanism 
of replacement."^®
Eco sees no need to argue as Baudrillard does that the 'masses' are passive 
and incapable of discrimination. He does not suggest that the fakes succeed, 
only that they give pleasure. Nor does he argue for the wider applicablity of 
hyperreality. As a description of limited phenomena rather than an all- 
encompassing term, hyperreality is quite useful. It can be seen here as an 
acknowledgement that when fiction and non-fiction converge, it does not 
result in some steady yet indeterminate intermediary position, but in a bid for 
dominance by one or the other. (When Sobchack uses the concept of the 
hyperreal to contrast electronic representations with the greater 'realism' of 
cinem atographic representation,8"* she develops her argument from 
Baudrillard.)
The shots of Jupiter in 2010 are a prime example of the hyperreal, but 
only to the extent that extra-textual information is incorporated into a reading 
of them. When the film opened in the US, an extended review by William J. 
Broad, the New York Times science writer, situated it in terms of 'real world' 
scientific and political knowledge, referring to the involvement of reputable 
technical a d v i s e r s . ^ 2  Much was made in promotion of the film of the 
contribution of the Jet Propulsion Laboratories and of information from the 
Voyager probe. The (screen-)writer Arthur C. Clarke was said to have been 
moved to write the sequel to 2001 by seeing the Voyager photographs of 
Jupiter's m o o n s . ^ 8  The film may well itself have acted as a principal
^^Umberto Eco: Faith in Fakes, London, Seeker and Warburg, 1986. p7 
81 Sobchack: Screening Space, p261
22william J. Broad: "Science Facts Help Propel Science Fiction in the Film 2010', New York
Times, 2 February 1984 pi, 17.
28joanna Lipari: "2010 Men", Film Comment, 20(6), Nov.- Dec. 1984, pp60-63. p60
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disseminator of the probe photographs, especially given the cost of enhancing 
these for public recognition. Broad quoted one of the film's technical advisers 
Richard Terrile, an astronomer working at NASA’s Jet Propulsion
Laboratories, claiming that the film gave the photographs greater resolution 
than the 'real' space people had achieved.^^ Scientific information, its 
technical quality enhanced by the capital resources of the film industry, is here 
being purveyed through a fiction to a popular audience and its status as 
scientific 'reality' made part of the fiction's marketing. There is indeed here a 
very specific attempt to replaced the 'real' photographs of Jupiter and its 
moons with hyperreal simulations placed in a fictional setting.
Yet even before their enhancement for incorporation into the film, the 
photographs were hardly innocent. In discussing a series of photographs of 
similar origin published by the National Geographic Society, Donna Haraway 
points out how
"[tjhese fabulous objects come to us 
simultaneously as indubitable recordings 
of what is simply there and as heroic 
feats of technoscientific production".^®
Despite this, in their closest approximation to innocence they were a collection 
of digitalized signals. Even initially, before they were manipulated for the film, 
they were a simulation with much of the hyperreal about them. Each 
translation is a re-representation and while the filmic one of their incorporation 
into 2010  may enhance their apparent clarity (the image is, for example, 
probably made much denser to bear the enlargement it will receive), it also 
involves the stripping away of part of the temporal quality. The Voyager 
photographs carry as part of their validation the very specific time and date of 
their being taken as the probe passed. Within the film, the time and day may 
be unclear but the title makes certain that the year is known and it is twenty- 
eight years after Voyager passed Jupiter. This certainly supports Sobchack's 
assertions about the conflation of time - as does the film as a whole.
It is difficult to map Sobchack's tripartite periodization onto actual space 
activities. Shallow domesticated space is still with us, but so are the depthless
'^^Broad: "Science Facts", p17 
2®Haraway : "Situated Knowledges", p582
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computer graphies of the Star Wars/SDI plans. Yet they seem too frightening 
to be convincingly playful, no matter how much their linguistic accoutrements 
attempt it (e.g. the Smart Rocks which revamped became Brilliant 
_£ebbles).^The dominance of the.economic is difficult to integrate with the 
playful. Yet it seems equally difficult to suggest that her periodization and the 
shifts in American space policy have no congruence at all.
As the dates of Sobchack’s periodization coincide with the first three of 
those in the periodization based on the posited purpose for being in space 
enunciated earlier, the links with shifts in American space policy (and practice) 
suggested there should continue to have some relevance. The main obstacle 
to doing this lies in her ascription of moods, where the second period - in 
which the Apollo missions occurred - is bleak, while the third - where little 
other than supposedly commercially viable activity occurred - is hopeful. It is 
the inclusion of so many Earth-based films that makes this a reasonable 
suggestion. In seeking explanations outside the films for the shifts she detects, 
Sobchack looks to American foreign policy, not its space activities. The 
bleakness parallels US engagement in Vietnam; the hope, disengagement.
Is there any hope to be detected in current American space policy or in 
the space-set fictions? It does not appear except in Bush's 1989 
announcement of the return to space exploration, and implementation of that 
was denied by the Congressional refusal to fund it. Hopeful speculation that 
international co-operation would be central to future ventures 'deep' into 
space, received no encouragement even from this, for Bush's statement did 
not outline a co-operative vision. The vision in 2010  of an uneasy co­
operative space venture forced by circumstances on hostile powers and 
unhappy space administrations has not yet been rendered passé by events in 
the real world. Actual American space activity continues to be limited to inner 
space and unpleasurable because so many of the recent stories have been 
ones of failure. Projected space activity receives little coverage. Even the 
fancy of a space rocket advertising Mars confectionery was a British one, 
coming from the Mission Juno team.
This image, apparently ephemeral, assuredly fitting Sobchack's playful
85There is however one quite overwhelming example of the playful use of space, 
unfortunately marginalised by its non-English language status. On 21 July 1989, as a salute 
both to the twentieth anniversary of the Apollo Moon mission and the fiftieth anniversary of 
Tintin's creation, and at a cost of £3000, a replica of Hergé's moon rocket was fired from 
Kourou in French Guiana. (Nicholas Booth: "Tintin's rocket finally set for blast-off". The 
Observer, 9 July 1989, p32.) Unfortunately, its aerodynamics were so bad it barely left the 
ground.
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sign-laden use of space, but economically-based, focuses the various 
convergences which have been the concern of this section and ties them to 
the economic emphasis preceding it. It takes advertising, one of the most overt 
manifestations o fihe  operation of information as axommodity,” physically into 
space. It seems reasonable to assert that the initially projected accompanying 
scientific experiments were merely token gestures to the old 'serious' use of 
space. It brings the future in which there will be Britons in space, a future 
frequently depicted in SF, (artificially) closer, but it also demonstrates the 
intersection of Earth bound and space set problems. Above all it typifies the 
current role of 'real' space activity in its superficiality, since it will lead to no 
contmuing British presence, nor to any advancement of the general move into 
space, but only be a newsworthy novelty for a very short time.
This chapter has demonstrated that the most important shift in both the 
fictional and non-fictional discourses talking about the future in space was the 
one that occurred in the period 1975 to 1981, between the cessation of the 
superpower Space Race and the commencement of Space Shuttle flights. 
Towards the end of this period it became evident that scientific discourse was 
no longer dominant, but that it had been replaced by the economic. Actual 
space activity came to be spoken off as requiring commercial viability and the 
increasingly frequent (or more widely publicised) NASA disasters of the 80s 
were traced to economic causes (accepting lowest-bid tenders), rather than 
being regarded as fully explained by identifying the implicated technical or 
scientific fault.
In the space-set fictions, a four part categorisation revealed how, after 
periods when exploration, research and colonization in turn had been 
advanced as causal, economic motives came to dominate the purposes for 
being in space. The only exceptions to this dominance came from films and 
TV programmes which were constrained by forerunners from earlier periods. 
These were the only fictions in which governments were still perceived to be 
financing space missions, in the others space was an area of economic 
exploitation, where corporations, principally involved in mining, were the sole 
operators.
In attempting to account for the shifts and to decide which of the fictional 
and non-fictional discourses was the driving force, it was suggested that 
initially SF drove because it had been able to operate without major public 
contradiction from scientific activities. It had been possible for the 
development of space travel to be outlined by SF as involving unmanned
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Earth orbit, followed by the first person in space, followed by a Moon landing, 
a Moon station, a Mars landing, possibly other Solar System planetary 
landings then interstellar travel. 'Science' achieved precisely this up to and 
including-the Moon landing, but then the concurrence stopped.
Even if fictional discourse was regarded as driving during the period of 
the Space Race, it ceased around 1975, when there was no next step deeper 
into space. In any case, the SF that may have been discursively structuring 
actual space activity was not so much that of the contemporaneous films as of 
the films, radio serials and print SF preceding the start of 'real' space flight.
For both this périodisation and the latter use of Vivian Sobchack's, 
American foreign policy was regarded as being as likely to be influential on 
the fictions as space policy may have been. The Cold War and the 
engagement in Vietnam were both cited as likely to have been relevant to the 
discursive shifts about the future in space. It did not prove possible to decide 
about the relationship between fictional and non-fictional discourse in the 
latest period of economic dominance, although doubt was expressed about 
SF being capable of directing the discursive construction of spce activity 
within economic discourse.
The final part of the chapter examined a number of convergences in 
discourses about the future in space. These included the fictional converging 
on the non-fictional, as evident, for example, in the actual achievement of 
space goals set in SF; temporal convergence and a form of spatial 
convergence as the distinction between Earth and space lessened, especially 
as space no longer served to represent a progressive view of the future. 
These convergences, and the related conflation of time and rise in importance 
of special effects noted by Vivian Sobchack, all occur in the same ten to fifteen 
year period which saw the replacement of the scientific by the economic. The 
shifts in the way the future in and of space have been talked about are 
surprisingly consistent across fictional and non-fictional discourses, despite 
the considerable disjunction between the mundane actual achievements in 
inner space and the intergalactic trade wars of SF films.
5: STAR TREK AHD THE NOSTALGIC FUTURE
ln~the previous chapteTrthenshifts that were identified in~actual"space 
activity, in TV programmes and in SF films were found to culminate in a 
replacement of scientific discourse by the economic, as the dominant one in 
which to talk about the future in and of space. This was found to have occurred 
in the period betweeen 1975 and 1981, the same period in which a number of 
convergences, temporal, spatial and between the fictional and non-fictional, 
could also be detected. It was however pointed out that the shift to the 
doniinance of econprnics was not to be found in those fictions of the late 70s 
and 80s which were constrained by forerunners from before this period.
There are a significant number of these exceptions, so this chapter will 
examine one group of them - the Star Tre/c fictions - in considerable detail, to 
see how very different this way of talking about the future is. It begins by 
looking at how the constraints are manifested through the activities of fans. It 
then extends the section of the previous chapter on hyperreality to show how 
this particular type of convergence is evident in what is termed the 'Star Trek 
Phenomenon'. The particular future advanced in the Star Tre/c fictions is 
identified as a nostalgic one which is revealed on investigation to be a 
nostalgia for a very particular time, the 60s, and for the optimism seen to 
characterise it.
The vast body of Star Trek material from 1969 to the present offers an 
opportunity for sustained investigation of this 'alternate' way of talking about 
the future. The frequent repeats of the TV programmes, the professional and 
amateur promotional activities and the great popularity of the films mean that 
Star Trek is undoubtedly the most recognized of contemporary SF fictions. 
Furthermore, the power of the original TV series is such that it continues to 
constrain contemporary derivatives. While other films, like 2010 and Flash 
Gordon also demonstrate the operation of past constraints, only Star Trek 
will be dealt with here because the constraints are stronger and the body of 
constrained material greater. The chapter will investigate possible reasons for 
the potency of this particular fiction as well as the character of the future it 
posits.
The Star Trek corpus is considerable. The products of the Paramount 
Picture Corporation comprise seventy-nine episodes of the TV series initially 
broadcast in the US between Autumn 1966 and Spring 1969, an animated
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version that ran in the US in 1973-4, a new continuing descendant series 
Star Trek: The New Generation which began in the US in 1987 and five films: 
Star Trek: The Motion Picture (1979); Star Trek II: The Wrath of Khan (1982); 
Star Trek III: The Search for Spook (1984); Star Trek IV: The Voyage Home
(1 ^6 ); and Star Trek V: The Final Frontier (1989). There are other products 
with a formal relationship with Paramount: books, videogames and models of 
the Enterprise, for example. While most of the books are 'novelizations' of TV 
episodes and films, an increasing number are independent, published after 
the film sequence began. There are also innumerable products available 
which have no formal relationship with the company but are designed to make 
a profit, as well as fan-generated material like fanzines and self-published 
scripts which have no such purpose. Fan material is not merely recycled, but 
appropriated, as can be seen by the wide range of purposes to which it is put, 
from the explicitly Christian to the equally explicitly homoerotic Kirk/Spock 
novellas. Some of this material, like The Star Trek Starfleet Technical 
Manual,^ functions as a constraining device, since it is used by producers 
and fans to check consistency, which is highly valued by the audience, 
whether fans or not.
The basic premise from which the first TV series was developed involved 
positing a far future set in the twenty-third century in which interstellar travel 
was a reality and much of the galaxy was settled. It was an ever expanding 
zone of generally harmonious relations between physically distant people. 
Although many planets had been colonised from Earth, there were also alien 
races, the most frequently represented of which were the (good) Vulcans, 
Romulans and Deltans and the (bad) Klingons. The main characters are the 
crew of the USS (United Space Ship - national governments apparently no 
longer exist) Enterprise: Captain James T. Kirk, Science Officer Spock (half 
human-half Vulcan), Ship's Doctor McCoy, Communications Officer Lt. Uhura, 
Chief Engineer Mr. Scott (Scotty) and other bridge personnel Mr. Sulu and 
Ensign Chekov. Their mission was one of exploration - in the renown words of 
the introduction "to boldly go where no man has gone before".
The plots of the first four films all concern the continuing consequences of 
present day activities: space exploration and the development of machines 
that think (Star Trek: The Motion Picture)', genetic engineering and 
associated research on the origins of life (Star Trek II: The Wrath of Khan and 
Star Trek III: The Search for Spook)', hunting animals to extinction and animal 
intelligence (Star Trek IV: The Voyage Home). With the possible exception of
1 Researched and compiled by Franz Joseph, New York, Ballantine, 1975.
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animal intelligence, all these were important in the TV series. Indeed the 
second film is a sequel to the TV episode "Space Seed" - and the next two 
films, sequels in their turn to the second. The concern of the fifth film (Star 
Trek V: The Final Frontiei) with rescuing hostages also has contemporary
relevance.
The term 'Star Trek Phenomenon' is quite frequently used of the TV 
series and its multiple and varied derivatives and refers to much more than 
merely marketing sucess (which is primarily the case with apparently similar 
usages such as the Rambo Phenomenon). Using it here also asserts an 
analogy to Bennett and Woollacott's 'Bond Phenomenon', their term for
"the diverse and changing forms in which . .  [the 
figure of Bond]. .  has been produced and 
circulated, and ..  the varying cultural business 
that has been conducted around, by means of 
and through this figure during the now 
considerable slice of post-war history in which it 
has been culturally active".^
There are certain similarities between the two Phenomena, especially in terms 
of their pervasiveness, the diversity of their manifestations and the way in 
which they provide convertible images of, or for, comparatively unfamiliar 
matters. Bennett and Woollacott acknowledge the desirability of examining the 
reading formations
"which bear in upon, mould and configure the 
relations between texts and readers in 
determinant conditions of reading",^
and also the of difficulty of doing so. It may be that it is slightly easier to attempt 
this with Star Trek because of the greater organization of fan groups and the 
availability and volume of their publications. This however only provides a 
form of access to one of the audiences (or the more literate part of one group 
of them).
The fans are particularly important because in constituting themselves 
guardians of the record, they have become probably the major component of 
the operation of the constraints of the past. The fan activities of 'Trekkies' are
^Tony Bennett and Janet Woollacott: Bond and Beyond: The Political Career of a Popular
Hero, London, MacMillan, 1987. pi 
2|bid., p64
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notorious, but by no means singular within the world of SF TV, nor outside it 
either. Dr. Who, Blake's 7 and The Prisoner all have active fan groups, as 
does Cagney and Lacey.
Cassandra Amesley has referrred to "the proprietary audience" of Star 
Trek in this regard, defining the term to cover those viewers
"[w]ho appropriate the primary elements of a 
mass mediated narrative and actively 
rewrite it."^
She acknowledges a difference between peripheral and 'hardcore' fans, but 
includes both types in the proprietary audience, acting in 'cells' to rewrite the 
texts each time they are re-viewed, mediating the viewing experience, and 
initiating newcomers into a mode of viewing with particular rules, the most 
essential of which is that the accompanying commentary must take an ironic 
stance.8
The principal uses to which fan audiences seem to put Star Trek 
material (like using the characters in personal fantasies, even, according to 
Karin Blair, feminist fantasy work®) are not the concern of this examination 
as they have little involvement with considerations of the future. Fan activity 
which is relevant because it can make operative the constraints of previous 
versions of the fiction, involves attempts to intervene directly in the 
construction of the text at source by, for example, writing to the producers and, 
as Amesley describes,
"viewing this act as part of a negotiated process 
rather than as a plea from an undeserving 
outsider."^
This started quite early. When Paramount threatened to cancel the initial TV 
series after the second season, an organized write-in campaign reversed the 
decision, but scheduling variations reduced the audience and ensured that
^Cassandra Amesley: "How to Watch Star Trek', Cultural Studies, 3(3), 1989, pp323-339.
p324 
®lbid., p337
®Karin Blair: "Sex and Star Trek', Science Fiction Studies, 10(3), Nov. 1983, pp292-297. 
Anne Cranny-Francis has also detailed some fan uses of the series in "Sexuality and Sex- 
Role Stereotyping in Star Trek', Science Fiction Studies, 12(3), Nov. 1985, pp274- 
284.
^Amesley: "How to Watch", p324
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the insufficiently profitable programme did not continue for a fourth year. The 
extent to which such behaviour influences the film-makers is uncertain, but it 
seems reasonable to assume that the knowledge that quite possibly 
thousands of letters would arrive complaining of errors in design or
characterisation would ensure attention was paid to continuity across the 
films. Amesley emphasises that continuity is not just demanded of the sets, but 
also of the characters and their perceived motivations; action and dialogue 
may be condemned as not the sort of thing that Kirk would really do (or say).
There are "some examples of fan activity being noticed by those 
producing the films, (as opposed to exploited by those promoting them). 
Because it was both heavy and hard to light, the effects crew disliked the 
model of the Enferpr/se built for the first film, but the joint demands of 
consistency and cost required them to use it until it could be totally replaced 
by a different design. The ship had however acquired almost totemic potency 
with the fans. Hence the comment of Ken Raison, the visual effects supervisor 
on Star Trek III: The Search for Spock, who destroyed it:
"I'll be interested to be in the opening night, 
when all the hard-core fans are there - as long 
as nobody points to me and says 'There!
That's the guy who blew up the Enterprise" ".®
The continuing availability of the original cast makes it possible for some 
aspects of the constraints of the past, particularly those relating to characters, 
to be applied quite rigorously. Their very presence gives a continuity and 
intensifies demands for character consistency, unavailable in sequels with 
new casts or all new characters. It has increased the frequency of the slippage 
between actor and character familiar for all long-running TV fictions. The 
slippage is most noticable for Leonard Nimoy/Spock, especially as among 
occasional viewers he often suffers a further slippage, acquiring the title of 
doctor actually owned by Benjamin Spock, childcare expert and famous 60s 
figure of opposition to the Vietnam war, characteristics which do not seem 
inappropriate to the fiction.
There is' something of an indication here of a particular role Star Trek 
plays by virtue of its public recognition and pervasiveness.® At the end of the
^Quoted in Brad Manson: "The Last Voyage of the Starship Enterprise", Cinefex, No. 18, 
Aug. 1984, pp42-67. p 43 
®lt is still asserted that every day an episode of Star Trek is screened somewhere in the 
world. As a personal testament in support, I have seen episodes in Australia in the 70s,
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first chapter, I quoted a comment by an American Congressman hoping that a 
joint US-USSR Mars mission would move superpower politics from Star Wars 
to a star trek. This is precisely just such an indication of a publicly recognsed 
reference. Star Trek functions as a very fruitful source of references and 
convertible images because of the familiarity with many of its tropes that can 
be assumed both by people encountered in everyday life and by those 
constructing mediated messages. For example a 1987 article on the 
modernisation of the BBC drama studios pointed out how under the new 
system
"drama is created in an atmosphere in which Captain 
James T. Kirk would feel comfortable''.  ^®
No explanation of who the Captain was was given. It was no doubt assumed 
that he would be recognised and the implied array of lights and switches 
conjured up. It is noteworthy that the Star Trek reference is not being used 
here to connote the future. Instead it describes the present day, but the up-to- 
the-minute present day. The temporal associations are complex. A 
programme designed and made in the late 60s, ostensibly set in the twenty- 
third century, is referred to in the late 80s to describe the most modern of 1987 
designs.The conflation of time in a period of weakened historicity could hardly 
be more thoroughly displayed.
STAR TREK AND HYPERREALITY
The wide public recognition and the pervasiveness of the fictions makes 
possible the kind of convergence of fiction and non-fiction which was explored 
in the previous chapter as a manifestation of the concept of hyperreality. It was 
pointed out there that this kind of convergence only applied to the extent that 
extra-textual material was attended to; with the Star Trek Phenomenon, this is 
considerably more probable than it would have been for 2010. This section of 
the chapter will explore the convergence of fiction and non-fiction around 
Star Trek and whether it is reasonable to describe it as a manifestation of 
hyperreality. It is most evident in the relationship between NASA and Star 
Trek. From the very beginning of the TV series, NASA and the Rand 
Corporation provided advisers
"to guarantee a scientifically accurate programme
Japan in the early 80s and Britain in the mid-80s. 
l°Ray Hammond: "Radio Play Days", The Guardian, 25 May 1987, p5
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based on the technology of today projected 
into the foreseeable future".  ^^
It Is not likely that any organization would now regard the twenty-third century
as within the foreseeable future; it is not just space, but also time that has 
contracted. During the last decade attempts at reasonably based projections 
have rarely gone past the first half of the next century.
Jesco von Puttkamer, the technical consultant on the TV series, was from 
NASA. One of the illustrators had worked at NASA previously and Lee Cooke, 
one of the graphic artists, had designed some of the console of the B1 
bomber. 12 There are several consequences of this level of involvement: the 
fictional hardware can look convincing; publicity about the involvement can 
prepare the audience to find it convincing; and there is a reflection back on the 
institutions involved to decrease their apparent distance from ordinary people 
as well as reduce some incomprehension about their activities. While this is 
definitely an instance where the fictional and non-fictional are converging, it is 
debatable whether this kind of interaction can be described straightforwardly 
as hyperreal when what is happening is a circular process involving the 
reflection of the 'real' on the fiction as well as the reverse.
More definitely characteristic of the hyperreal, were instances when the 
fiction started to be seen to carry the potential to feed in to the look of the 
immediate future itself. The US Navy sent a delegation to examine the TV 
series' bridge set with a view to adapting it for one of their aircraft carriers 
under c o n s t r u c t i o n . S o m e  medical personnel similarly examined the 
diagnostic couch in the Enterprise sickbay."*^ The intermingling of fiction 
and fact even impinged on the past. After the series finished, the Smithsonian 
Institute took a lot of the material for its archives and has the studio model of 
the Enterprise hanging in its Air and Space Museum."*®
Perhaps the strangest example of the blurring of the boundaries of the 
fiction relates to the naming of the first Space Shuttle, which is also a further
11 Margaret Bailey: Live Long and Prosper: The Star Trek Phenemenon, Rutgers University 
GSLS Occasional Paper No 76-2, New Brunswick, New Jersey, 1976. p.iv 
12Walter Koenig: Chekov’s Enterprise, New York, Pocket Books, 1980. p26 
12David Gerrold: The Worid of Star Trek, (Revised Edition), New York, Bluejay, 1984. p24 
i^^Bailey: Live Long, p.iv (One should not accept these claims uncritically. The people 
involved may merely have wanted some excuse for their curiousity, or have been 
engaged in no more than PR activity.) 
l®John Peel: "Twenty Years of Star Trek', Starburst, 9(5), Jan 1987, pp48-52.
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demonstration of the influence of the proprietary audience. Secondary 
material on Star Trek is full of references to Trekkie letter writing campaigns, 
and this was one of them. While most of the American public was losing 
interest in the Space Race (the leg to the Moon having been won and no new
^irnnar"gdals havihg“”been set)” Trekkies were engaged in a~campaign to 
persuade the President that a Space Shuttle should be named Enterprise. 
Apparently to NASA's and the Star Trek cast's surprise (and neither assertion 
seems very credible), they were successful.
Because the tone of much of the secondary material on Star Trek \s 
telling, as well as the particular significance of this instance, two lengthy 
reports of the incident follow. The first is that of Walter Koenig, the actor who 
has played Pavel Chekov since the second TV series. He described how the 
cast had been invited to the rolling out of Shuttle Orbiter 101 and were seated 
in a special section of the audience. There had been some rumours about the 
revival of Star Trek and the cast were used to all manner of special treatment 
by SF devotees and NASA officials, so perhaps they could have imagined 
their presence to be relatively routine. Koenig recalled the Associate- 
Administrator of the Office of Space Flight for NASA, John F. Yardley, calling 
for action,
"[t]hen it happened. The band leader moved 
his hands with an emphatic gesture and suddenly 
we were all standing and shaking hands and 
embracing each other. The space craft was 
approaching to the theme music from Star Trek.
The same chill ran down all our spines. I can't 
remember seeing a group of people so moved as 
those in the row beside me. I felt myself close to 
tears and wasn't in the least embarassed by it.
Orbiter 101 was now directly in front of us. Who says 
there has to be a line between reality and fantasy? . . .
Across the nose of the ship was the word Enterprise.'^ ®
The second report of the same incident comes from Jesco von Puttkamer, 
by this time Long Range Program Manager for NASA, speaking on the 
Equinox programme "A Short History of the Future: The Spaceship" (C4, first 
tx. 28 August 1986).
" . . .  17th September 1976 was a day when fiction 
and fact actually met in a moment.And that was
l®Koenig: Chekov’s Enterprise, pi 6
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when the very first Shuttle Orbiter was rolled out In 
Palmdale In the Mojave Desert In California. We had 
received thousands of letters from Star Trek fans 
petitioning the Government, President Ford at that 
time, to name the'flrst^hüttle Enferpr/sê. In the 
moment when the word Enterprise appeared 
round the corner, the entire band struck up the 
theme from Star Trek and we all looked over 
there and there was Leonard NImoy, Mr. Spock, and 
all the other cast members from Enterprise, Scotty,
Jimmy Doohan . . .  and when that music had finished, 
there were tears of joy and people jumped on their 
chairs clapping, grown-up people, politicians who 
never smiled In their lives, actually broke up. And It 
was very magic. In the sense that here almost a 
cartoon, a science fiction dream had touched reality 
and people had felt moved by It. Some nerve, some 
core In them had been struck. And that was pretty 
significant because It showed that, yes, these people, 
whether grown-up or children have a pretty close tie 
with the future and they could relate Immediately with 
this Shuttle Orbiter called Enterprise and that dream 
of a starship called Enterprise" [my transcript].
Koenig's question , "Who says there has to be a line between reality and 
fantasy?" and von Puttkamer's statement about fiction and fact actually 
meeting for a moment, both stress the integration of the Star Trek story and 
the NASA story. They are indications, as the entire episode and both 
recountings of it also are, of the importance of the concept of the hyperreal, 
but also of the care with which it should be applied. Despite the two 
comments, neither observer seems at all unsure of the heirarchy in which the 
fiction provides a layer of PR prettiness, puff and sentimentality over the reality 
of an experimental space vehicle (designed furthermore as the first stage in 
making space an ordinary place where commercial considerations could 
come into effect). This layer was quite literally superficial in that the name was 
merely painted on the Orbiter, but nonetheless it provided the basis for 
popular identification with what might otherwise have seemed rather tediously 
technical. (Not all records of the incident report it with this emphasis. A writer 
unconnected with the TV programme mentions merely the presence of 
unspecified 'guest celebrities' and gives no provenance for the name.’’^)
 ^^ Melvin Smith: Space Shuttie, Sparkford, Haynes, 1985. p i33
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Von Puttkamer, as one might expect of someone who had worked on the 
Apollo programme and been the NASA consultant on the TV series, makes 
much of the links. He points to the TV series also acting as a replacement for 
the Apollo programme, which ended as the re-runs began. Yet the Enterprise 
was only the prototype of the shuttles and made just five free flights before 
being retired. Ironically it was never even made space-worthy. It is also worth 
emphasising that the fan activity was concerned with the most cosmetic of 
activities - the naming of a craft in the process of being developed. It was not 
concerned with a substantial matter of space exploration, such as a mission to
Mars, or increased funding. _______ ^
1976-8 seems to have been the high point of NASA's use of Star Trek. 
Early in 1978, they hired Nichelle Nichols, the actress who plays Lt. Uhura, to 
help their recruiting campaign. They were worried about the poor rate of 
application from women and minorities. After her coast to coast tour of 
colleges and engineering conventions, applications from women and 
minorities increased very substantially, as did the overall number of 
applications.”*®
NASA was again involved in giving advice when it was decided to make 
the first Star Trek film. Paramount had intended to develop a fourth US TV 
network and promote it through a new series of Star Trek, but this fell 
through. The idea for the film was in wake of this and after Star Wars had 
shown a renewed popularity/profitability for SF films. The films took the NASA 
reality back in too. While a character is being given a tour of the ship in Star 
Trek: The Motion Picture, a display on the wall of the recreation room is 
pointed out with the comment that "All of these ships were called Enterprise". 
The Shuttle is one of them, as is a warship. Many of the ships belonging to the 
fictional Starfleet have names from NASA's history, like Columbia. There are 
even NASA in-jokes. Alert viewers hearing the ship orbiting the Genesis 
planet in the third film called Grissom, know it is doomed; Grissom was the 
astronaut who let the side down by ditching his capsule in the ocean.
More recent use of Star Trek by NASA has not been very noticeable and 
probably would not have been appropriate once the Shuttle programme got 
fully underway. It became necessary to indicate the ordinary, routine nature of
”'®Koenlg; Chekov's Enterprise, p50 (Applications from women went from 60 to 600, overall 
applications from 1600 to 8000 and 1000 applications from minorities - previously virtually 
none from blacks. The ambiguity of the last Instance Is Koenig's.)
 ^^ Gregory S. Sojka: "The Astronaut: The American Hero with "The Right Stuff"", Journal of 
American Culture, 7(1&2), Sprlng-Summer 1984, ppl 18-121. p i20
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space flight, indeed of space business, and this was the reverse of what the 
Star Trek links provided. Star Trek could be used to promote exploration 
and the far future. It could not be used to project mundanity or the economic 
and it was not all that useful for military aspects either.
Yet the nature of the hyperreal is to seek to displace the 'real' by its 
excess and its glitter and its 'moreness'. Does this example of twenty years of 
interrelatedness really demonstrate it? The fictional entertainment and the 
government instrumentality used one another, the former hoping to heighten 
its authenticity and the latter its popular appeal, but there seems no evidence 
that NASA was displaced by th is  fiction. The level on which hyperreality 
operates, if it did or does, must be highly speculative. It is very difficult if not 
impossible to point to an instance when hyperreality in its full sense is 
demonstrably operating. The concept describes a possible relationship when 
the boundaries between fiction and 'reality' are unfixed and the fiction 
adheres to the 'real'. The most that may be seen in these Star Trek examples 
is a blurring of the boundaries. How any adhesion could work would vary. 
Perhaps when NASA is spoken of within political discourse, it draws part of its 
legitimacy from the Star Trek fictions. When in the wake of the Challenger 
disaster, the practice of accepting the lowest tender for Shuttle components 
was being criticised as inappropriate for such a body and in such an instance, 
was the expectation that cost-cutting should not be dominant in space 
activities, influenced, even determined, by the 'higher morality' of Star Trek7 
Space, it was argued in newspaper articles and on television news, was 
special; economic motives should not be primary. This is certainly not the 
message to be gained from other contemporary space-set films. Within less 
public, more minor, discourses (scientific-adventurist, technophallic/military, 
aerospace industrial) economic concerns proliferate - the various target dates 
for the Mars Mission were all ordered in terms of cost. Of the available fictions 
to call on in explaining the tragedy, the most influential may well have been 
Star Trek, with its long term associations with NASA. None of its various plots 
had presented the economic as laudable.
THE NOSTALGIC FUTURE
Star Trek provides a large body of fictional material about the future, but 
what kind of future does it portray? This section suggests that the constraints 
tha come from the 60's genesis of the Star Trek fictions mean that this future 
can be described in a way that may seem at first rather bizarre - it is a 
nostalgic future. All the standard uses of the term 'nostalgia' refer to the past:
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to a present longing for past circumstances; or to a fascination with objects of 
the past; or to the attempted evocation of past structures of feeling. The 
eruption of the future into the relationship between the present and the past is 
unusual, but not by any means impossible.
In suggesting that the Star Trek films depict a nostalgic future, is it being 
asserted that they are examples of what Fredric Jameson has termed 
postmodern nostalgia films? For Jameson, such films convey 'pastness' 
through intertextual references, especially stylistic ones and he instances 
American Graffiti, Body Heat, an6 Chinatown.^^ This does not describe 
the Star Trek films, nor do Jameson's examples continue past narratives 
ostensibly without alteration, as the Star Trek ones do, nor are Jameson's 
concerned with the future. A comparison with other films which purport to 
consider the future and are more marked by nostalgia in the Jameson sense - 
for example, Brazil (1985) and 1984 (1984) - makes the distinctiveness of 
Star Trek clear. Both Brazil and 1984 use the s ty le  of the 40s to carry a 
past sense of the future, though 1984, because it is based on Orwell's novel, 
deploys more than style. Their difference from the Star Tre/c films is due to the 
different past on which they draw and their absolute freedom from the 
restraints placed on 60's US TV, but they both fit Jameson's description in the 
dominance of their surfaces, their 'looks'. The 'looks' of the postmodern 
nostalgia films are excessive since they carry the bulk of the reference to the 
past and since they demonstrate the depthlessness of the representation.
The 'look' of Star Trek on the other hand, is dominated by a stark 
spaciousness and cleanliness that is another aspect characterising the 
nostalgic future. This is particularly evident in the fourth Star Trek film in 
which time travel enables differences between the present and the posited 
future to be noted and which emphasises cleanliness, quietness and the 
absence of uncouth language. With no litter and spare, even sterile sets, this 
future resembles that depicted in films of the 30s, as in the latter part of 
Things to Come (1936), for example, more than it does most contemporary 
SF films.
This indicates a different aspect of the operation of the prior constraints. 
While the TV.series had a budget that was quite large by the standards of the 
time, a substantial proportion was earmarked for special effects. Not much 
was left for sets, so the interior 'look' of Star Trek was visually impoverished 
compared to other films and even to other TV programmes.^^ TV set dressing
20jameson: "Cultural Logic", p66-7
^^It cost approximately US$200,000 per episode, but Mission Impossible apparently cost
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in the late 60s was rather basic and the size of the screen, the low definition of 
the NTSC system as well as the size of the budget, predicated against a lot of 
people being present in a scene simultaneously. The sparse 'look' of Star 
Trek films though, carries only a tiny part of the message of the past and can 
easily be abandoned - as it is for effects shots outside the ship.
At the end of the most recent of his examinations of nostalgia, Jameson 
muses on the differences between
"a strongly generational self-consciousness, 
such as what the "people of the sixties" felt",22
the aimlessness which foH^ of a putative non-
generational specificity in the 80s. This has not marked a return to the 60s, 
despite indications that it might. He certainly is not discussing the Star Trek 
films, nor does his category of postmodern nostalgia films include them, but 
the relevance seems inescapable and will be examined further later in this 
chapter. His 'nostalgia for the present' could well also describe the nostalgic 
future.
Malcolm Chase and Christopher Shaw have stated that there are three 
preconditions for the development of nostalgia: time must be perceived as 
linear and the future indeterminate; the present must be perceived as deficient 
in some way; and objects or images from the past must remain available.^® 
The current prevalence of nostalgia in cultural life has been widely noted (the 
reference above to Jameson is just one such instance) and is a significant 
component of descriptions of the post-modern sensibility - there seems no 
need to demonstrate anew here that the preconditions are met in current 
Western societies. The particular application of these preconditions in the 
current chapter rests on the sense that the way in which the present is 
deficient, following Chase and Shaw's preconditions, manifests here as a lack
30% more [Fisher: "Leonard Nimoy Focusses", p37], and ten years later Battlestar 
Galactica was reportedly costing US$1 million an episode [Gerroid: The World of Star 
Trek , pi 13]. The budget for Star Trek: The Next Generation was $1.25 million per 
episode [Peter Fiddick: "Captain of the Starship", The Guardian, 25 April 1988, p25]. 
The sets now are not quite as spare, but still spacious; the much larger cast probably 
accounts for a substantial part of the increased budget.
22jameson : "Nostalgia for the Present", p536
®®Maicoim Chase and Christopher Shaw: "The Dimensions of Nostalgia", in Malcolm Chase 
and Christopher Shaw (eds.): The Imagined Past: history and nostalgia, Manchester 
University Press, 1989. pp2-4
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even In its visions of the future. This deficiency can easily and 
nostalgically be noted in comparisons with available past visions of the future, 
especially the still widely screened Star TrekJSf series.
David Lowenthal, in arguing that nostalgia is far more pervasive 
historically than most people believe, has pointed out that
"[a] perpetual staple of nostalgic yearning is the 
search for a simple and stable past as a refuge 
from the turbulent and chaotic present",
but adds that contemporary nostalgia is characterised by a multiplication of 
this. The past is envisaged as having been
"unified and comprehensible, unlike the incoherent 
divided present."^®
Similarly, futures envisaged in the past, like Star Trek, may seem unified, 
unlike the incoherent futures of films such as Blade Runner (itself at times 
described as a nostalgia film in the Jameson sense - either directly through its 
reworking of the film noir mode or indirectly through its scénographie 
pastiche®®).
Although Lowenthal disputes its d i s t i n c t i v e n e s s , a n o t h e r  
characteristic held to be particular to contemporary nostalgia is that it is for the 
recent past, within, or almost within, the memory of those enjoying it. It is 
linked to childhood no longer just by analogy, but also directly, as the 
nostalgic desire becomes focussed precisely on objects and experiences, 
including the televisual, encountered then. The clarity and simplicity 
associated with the childlike can be found in the moral as well as the spiritual 
universe of Star Trek. Nostalgia is not however simply a characteristic of the 
contemporary post-modern sensibility (or more generally of sensibilities in 
times of rapid change), it is a characteristic regarded with a degree of hostility 
or contempt or confessed to rather shame-facedly. The term 'sentimental' is 
often associated with it and it is seen as a rejection of 'reality'. Both of these, 
and the contempt, may be noted in reactions to Star Trek and its afficionados.
®^David Lowenthal: "Nostalgia tells it like it wasn't" in Chase and Shaw: The Imagined Past,
p21 
®®ibid., p29
®®e.g.Guiliana Bruno: "Ramble City".
®^Lowenthai: "Nostalgia tells it", p20
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Like pastiche, with which it is commonly associated, nostalgia is 
counterposed to the authentic. It only ever involves a partial rejection of the 
present; selected elements of the past (or of various pasts) are incorporated 
with selected elements of the present into a pastiche of allusions that may only 
represent whatThe past feels Tike in the present. Current Sfar Tre/c offerrings 
are not just recreations of past visions of the future, they are selected, 
pastiched combinations with their own distinctiveness.
The nostalgia associated with Sfar Trek is not simply manifested in 
continued viewing of the TV series of the late 60s, nor in the collection of 
ephemera associated with them, but also in the formulation, construction and 
consumption of current derivations like the films and the descendant TV 
programmes. Nostalgia is operationalised through the strong way in which the 
current fictions are constrained by the past ones. The comprehensible, unified 
vision of the future must itself remain unified, comprehensible and consistent.
MORAL DISCOURSE IN THE STAR TREK FILMS
Until this point it has not been necessary to provide detail about the plots 
of the various Star Trek narratives because the arguments about constraints, 
hyperreality and the nostalgic future have all referred to the Phenomenon or to 
the fictions as a whole. In this section, however, the argument will be that 
neither scientific nor economic discourses are dominant within the nostalgic 
Star Trek future, instead a moral, ideological discourse reigns. Quite 
extensive detail, especially about the first four of the films, is required as the 
basis on which to discuss this. (There will be no outlines of the seventy-nine 
TV episodes. Insofar as there were distinctive patterns, or important individual 
episodes, they will be described when appropriate.)
Until recently, the first film appeared very much the odd one out, although 
it is similar in plot to the TV episode "The Changeling". It was not part of the 
story which united the next three; it had a different producer (Gene 
Roddenberry, from the TV series, as opposed to the later films' Harve 
Bennett); it cost substantially more (US$44 million, as opposed to $12 million 
for the second, $16 million for the third and $23 million for the fourth®®); and it 
was adjudged unsuccessful - despite having by now taken more money in 
rentals than any of the others apart from the fourth. Kim Newman has however 
suggested that the fifth film serves to integrate the sequence by being a mirror
®®Figures from Gerroid: The World of Star Trek; Bob Fisher: "Director Leonard Nimoy focuses 
on Star Trek lit'. On Location, 7(2), April 1984, pp34-40; and Sara C. Medina: (no title). 
Time, 23 June 1986, pp46-47.
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image of the first in its physical search for a higher being (for most of the film 
thought to be God).®®
The plot of the first film involves the return to Earth of the NASA probe 
Voyager 6 as an intellectual entity called V'ger. It demands to meet its creator 
and threatens the destruction of Earth if it is not satisfied. This is eventually 
resolved by its incorporating two members of the Enterprise 's  crew to 
become a new, and less destructive, form of being. The threat from Earth's 
own probe had arisen because of its prim itive all-encompassing 
programming, which was based on the instruction to "Collect all data 
possible". When enhanced by the inhabitants of a machine culture 
encountered after it fell through a black hole, this was taken literally. In the 
subsequent collecting process, "it amassed so much knowledge, it achieved 
consciousness itself. It became a living thing", as Kirk puts it. The Earth is 
saved from the consequences of Twentieth Century American curiousity and 
poor computer technique by love (Decker, the younger Kirk figure's, for Ilea, 
the Deltan who has been replicated by V'ger as its own probe) and self 
sacrifice.
The important though latent message of this film is that the old team is 
back together again, beating off the threat to Earth and moralising in the 
accustomed style. As David Gerroid writes
" The finest moment in the movie, of course, 
occurs when the new Enterprise begins to move 
majesticaliy out of its orbiting drydock. It is a 
moment to bring a lump to the throat and a tear 
to the eye of even the most jaded science 
fiction fan. It is nothing short of wonderful."®®
The music for this remarkably long scene employs every known device to 
ensure this reaction but one - it does not use the old theme music. That is not 
heard at all in the film until Spock joins the crew while they are on their way to 
a rendezvous with the at-the-time unknown threat. After he has been sworn 
back on, there is a cut to an exterior shot of the Enterprise  and then the 
familiar theme is heard. This is massive reassurance that all is as it was, that 
the pleasures of the 60s are still there for the taking. This is an evocation of the 
nostalgia which has earlier been argued to characterise the particular Star
®®Klm Newman: Review of Star Trek V: The Final Frontier \n Monthly Film Bulletin, V56, No 
670, Nov 1989, p347 
®®Gerrold: The World of Star Trek, pi 72
154
Trek future. It is also an acknowledgement that one of the pleasures of genre 
films comes from the repetition of the familiar, of what has given pleasure in 
the past. There will be a return to the issue of reassurance, especially when it 
is linked to the 60s, in the final section of this chapter.
With the second film, something other than the joy of reunion had to be 
offerred. This is frequently referred to as the best of the quintet and its plot 
lines continued through the next two films. It took up the final line of the TV 
episode "Space Seed", where Kirk, having marooned the genetically 
developed but psychopathic superman, Khan, and his followers on the desert 
planet, Ceti Alpha V, muses, "I wonder what will happen twenty years from 
now?" In less than that either diegetically or in the time elapsed between the 
production of the TV programme and the film, we find out, as Khan seeks 
revenge.
The choice of this as the episode to be followed up was no doubt 
influenced by the continued availability and status of the guest star, Ricardo 
Montalban, and by the increased newsworthiness of genetic engineering. At 
the time of the TV episode, 'engineering' had not been linked with genetics in 
popular discourse. Khan was "a refugee from the Eugenics Wars of the late 
Twentieth Century".®”* He had advanced physically and intellectually, being 
smarter and stronger than 'natural' man, but degenerated morally. After the 
wars of the 1990s, humanity had presumably turned aside from genetic 
engineering. The undeveloped sub-text here rejects the view that progress 
cannot be stopped, taken to mean that if something becomes technically 
feasible, it is impossible not to exploit it. This same message can frequently 
be found elsewhere in the TV series, again indirectly.
However while genetic engineering may have been abjured, tampering 
with the stuff of Nature itself has not. The other plot line - the development of 
the Genesis device, which in a matter of six hours would render lifeless 
planets habitable - brings up many of the same questions without the 
inescapable contemporary relevance, since it (unlike genetic engineering) is 
based on totally spurious science. Hence, the intervention of people in the 
area hitherto reserved for God or Nature is explored in two ways: one close to 
us and castigated - tinkering with human beings; and the other more distant 
and open. The Genesis device is not totally unquestioned; McCoy worries 
about its ethical implications in a decidedly religious way, and Khan intends to 
use it as a weapon. These pale beside the visual impact of the greening of the 
dead planet. The sub-tropical vegetation glowing through the dawn mists calls
®”* Ibid., pi 81
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on traditional edenic images to ensure that the audience need have no 
serious fears about Spook's future as his body (he has sacrificed himself to 
save the Enterprise crew) lies in its burial casket in such a paradise.
That this was indeed pre-lapsarian became evident in the third film,
made and released against a background of increased lobbying against 
genetic engineering and biotechnology. In 1983 Jeremy Rifkind had 
published the religious and pseudo-scientific tract Aigeny as part of his attack 
on biotechnology, and his Foundation on Ecological Trends was very 
active.®®
The third film opens with various manifestations of the dead Spock which 
cause the Enterprise crew to decide to recover his body. While they are on 
their way back to the Genesis planet, the audience discovers that the planet 
has become dangerously unstable and will explode in only a few hours. Kirk's 
son, David, had taken a short cut in the development of the device; he had 
"used protomatter in the matrix". Saavik, the Vulcan science officer who is 
accompanying him on the scientific examination of the planet, is disapproving, 
saying that protomatter is an "unstable substance which every ethical scientist 
in the galaxy has denounced as dangerously unpredictable". David explains 
that if he had not used it, the development of the device "might have taken 
years, maybe never". He eventually redeems himself by dying to save Saavik 
and the growing Spock-child they have found on the collapsing planet, but the 
point is clear, meddling in creation is wrong and seems to be achieved only by 
'bad' science. Furthermore with the reference to 'protomatter' and ethical 
scientists, we are again told that it is right not to pursue every scientific 
possibility.
The fourth film dealt with another result of interfering with Nature - the 
conservation of the whale. Conservation, rather than the whales themselves 
was the important part of the message as far as the film-makers were 
concerned. If the models of the whales had not proved convincing (no footage 
of real whales was ever used), some other threatened species was apparently 
held in reserve.33 Although the reason for conserving the whales is severely 
practical - the earth will be destroyed by a whale-seeking probe otherwise - a 
more general message about hunting animals to extinction occasionally 
surfaces. The possible intelligence of the whales is implicit - presumably the
®®Leon Jaroff: "Fighting the Biotech Wars" and "The Peripatetic Crusader", Time, 127(16),
21 April 1986, pp80-82.
3 3 j o d y  Duncan Shay: "Humpback to the Future", Cinefex, no.29, Feb 1987, pp4-31. p6.
The alternative creature was unfortunately not specified.
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probe would not be interested in them rather than the humans, if the matter 
were not in question. There was no direct development here of a story from 
the TV series, but conservation did continue the concern with ecology; it was 
an issue that could credibly be represented as having a high-profile and 
considerable~public sym pathy~in^he^980s; and the figure of the whale 
echoed the series' intermittent concern with lovable monsters.
The narrative involves the crew returning to Earth to face court martial for 
having stolen the Enterprise \o rescue Spock in the third film. On the way they 
encounter the probe and decide to return to the twentieth century (1986, in 
fact) to acquire a pair of whales to restock the future Earth waters.
The time travel aspect of the film deserves special attention. It is by no 
means unique in jh e  Sfar Trek corpus. The TV series took viewers back in 
time more than once ("The City on the Edge of Forever" and "All Our 
Yesterdays", for example). Time travel is very useful and common in SF TV 
series, giving a variety of settings, usually cheap costuming and the constant 
plot interest of anachronisms and time paradoxes. With films too it is a hardy 
perennial, but not always popular. In the 80s though, time travel was good box 
office. Back to the Future (1985) has been the most successful, but there 
have been others like Peggy Sue got Married (1986) and Somewhere in 
Time (1980). In these characters go back from the present to the past. Films 
in which the present is experienced as the past or future, like those in which 
an alien visits present-day Earth, foreground certain contemporary customs 
and practices as strange and mutable.
A phenomenon highlighted in films where people come from the past, or 
go into it, is one that it is known will change. Where people coming from the 
future, or aliens are concerned, the elements emphasised are those thought 
likely to change and those ignored are those perceived as unchanging. As 
with other situations, the 'natural' is invisible. The first aspect to be made 
visible in Star Trek IV is litter collection, then the crowd, the bustle and the 
untidiness of the streetscape. This is both visibly and aurally a shock after the 
sparsely populated shots of the far future. Even the whole assembled crew 
seen in the first film, including at least one hundred and fifty actual 
Trekkies,®4 was uniformed, still and standing in a vast tall space.
The future. Star Trek assures us, will be quieter. Spock reinforces this 
when in twentieth century America he disables a punk with an excessively 
loud ghetto blaster. In the future, population pressures too will be eased - 
though whether this is to be attributed to interstellar colonization, nuclear
^^Gerrold: The World of Star Trek, p169. Yes, he was one of them.
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disasters or the Eugenics Wars is unspecified. Speck's disdain for a culture 
that is having a "brief but disastrous flirtation with nuclear fission", adds further 
to the theme of renouncing dangerous scientific developments. People will be 
better mannered in the future too - uncouth language is foregrounded by
“Spook's tdtâHÿTTnsuccessfuI attenipts to use it. The police will be more helpful 
and the Navy less security conscious.
Invisible - at least in the sense that they pass without comment - are 
pawnbrokers, buses, museums, factories, the private ownership of cars, the 
profit motive, sexual-social relations and joggers. The two lists are most 
informative. So many of the things that worry people today - from bad 
language to nuclear power - will no longer be present in the future envisaged 
in Sfar Jre/c, but that far happier time will still be recognizable.
The greatest advances however will be in medicine. Twentieth century 
health care is far more castigated than nuclear power. The high profile 
accorded McCoy in the series meant that medicine was always privileged. 
The advances in healing projected for the future are paralled only by those in 
transport mechanics. The sickbay on the Enterprise was always a place of 
wonders, as was the ultimate diagnostic tool the doctor carried with him. Even 
so, progress continues to be rapid. As McCoy returns to the Enterprise in the 
first film - after an absence of no more than two and a half years - he 
comments sourly how he expects the sickbay will now look like a computer 
centre. This describes our world, especially the shift from the 60s to the 80s.
In the fourth film, McCoy actually confronts twentieth century medicine, 
when Chekov, injured in a fall from a destroyer, must be rescued before some 
medical 'barbarities' can be forced on him. The proposed operation to drain 
the fluid building up in Chekov's skull enrages McCoy and he violently 
assaults its proposers. Instead a hand held mechine hums and flashes and 
Chekov sits up. Surgery, it would appear, does not have a future.
The descendant TV series. Star Trek: The Next Generation has an all 
new cast and initially, outside the US, different distribution patterns. (Although 
screened on network TV in the US in 1988, it was at first only available on 
video in other countries - not being screened on BBC2 until late in 1990.) The 
more recent TV series will not be treated as of equal weight to other elements 
of the Phenomenon both because of the distribution pattern and the totally 
new cast. Set, as the title indicates, further in the future than the original 
creation, it posits a new Enterprise with a much larger crew, engaged on 
basically the same kind of mission and encountering many of the same type of 
situations. Its more contemporary aspects are carried largely by changes in
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the composition of the crew, though these unsurprisingly inflect the situations 
they meet.
The Star Trek Phenomenon and the Star Trek texts provide a large 
body of material which talks about the future, but does so without making 
major claims on either scientific or economic discourse - as other space-set 
fictions do. Indeed it can be seen to dispute most strongly the role of the 
economic in talking about the future. Within these fictions economic discourse 
has no place in any^'regime of truth', nor any special explanatory power. The 
lack of importance of__a_ny._economic motive for the crew's actions is 
characteristic. Only villians can be motivated by the prospect of financial gain 
and even this is very rare; V'ger wants knowledge, Khan wants revenge. The 
economic is usually unspoken. There is, for instance, no suggestion that 
behind the exploratory mission of the Enterprise will come trade or mining 
vessels, nor that power lies in the hands of transgalactic corporations. There is 
no complaining among the crew about their pay; in the fourth film Kirk's 
awareness of cash and pawnshops is explained by his being an amateur 
historian of the twentieth century.
This virtual rejection of the economic is not precisely the case with 
scientific discourse. A scientific discourse does appear quite strongly 
throughout the fictions. The technology that powers the Enterprise and the 
capabilities of the various devices the crew use are frequently referred to; and 
it is usual for 'inexplicable' objects encountered to have been accounted for 
rationally by the end of a particular plot. The 'science' that is called on for this 
is treated as having a privileged access to the truth. But the scientific 
principles and practices it posits are not grounded in current 'real world' 
science, as they are, for example \n 2010; Star Trek unashamedly speaks 
nonsense words ('warp drive', 'stun factor') and treats them as if they were 
scientific. The science that operates in the Star Trek universe is 
unambiguously a 'pseudo-science', internally validated, perhaps even more 
certain than the science that operates outside it, but it cannot be challenged or 
altered by developments in this 'outside', 'real world' science. There is no 
attempt to blur the boundaries of fiction and non-fiction here.
A most notable example of the distance between Star Trek's pseudo­
science and 'real world' science occurred when the pseudo-science posited 
as having created the superman in the TV episode "Space Seed" became 
more scientifically feasible through 'real world' developments in genetic 
engineering. Instead of increasing reference to it to heighten the credibility
159
and scientificity of the fiction, as would surely have been the reaction of most 
makers of SF films or TV dramas, the scientific focus for the follow-up film 
shifted to another pseudo-scientific area - 'protomatter' and the terraforming 
Genesis device ----------------------  ------------------------
Outside the fictions. Star Trek and science are incommensurable; Star 
Trek science is treated as if it were magic. As a provider of convertible 
images. Star Tre/c signifies the appearance of incomprehensible technology, 
as with the BBC drama studios. It is not used in explanations. Its relationship 
with NASA is about PR, not science. Even if the visit of the US Navy personnel 
to the TV series' set is not regarded cynically, what it shows is interest in 
design, not science.
Wit hi n Sfar Trek, scientific discoveries and technologies may be 
declared 'wrong' and eschewed. The basis for this 'wrongness' is not that they 
are contrary to the pseudo-scientific principles operating there, nor even 
necessarily that they are physically dangerous. The 'wrongness' is morally 
based; the discoveries and technologies are bad. This is an indication that the 
discourse that is dominant is not scientific, and certainly not economic, but is 
moral. The important debates within Star Trek are always about the rights 
and wrongs of actions, political systems or indeed technologies. So wide is 
the range of phenomena pronounced upon in this way, that it is probably more 
accurate to describe the dominant discourse as a moral-ideological one. 
Unlike scientific discourse, there are possible occasions where the 
boundaries between fiction and non-fiction blurs as far as the moral- 
ideological discourse is concerned. In deciding which discourse is most 
potent in Star Trek's speaking about the future, both the fictions and the 
Phenomenon must be taken into account, as must its possible instances of 
hyperreality. The suggestion above about the possible functioning of Star 
Tre/c-derived perceptions of the purposes of space flight sufficient to justify 
the Challenger disaster deaths, relies on the operation of the Star Trek 
moral-ideological discourse outside the fictions.
In moral-ideological terms. Star Tre/c speaks very particularly through its 
nostalgia. There is no need for nostalgia to be regarded as inevitably 
conservative. The nostalgia that so dominates Star Trek is a mixture of 60's 
liberalism and a conservatism most evident in the fictions' faith in the rectitude 
and superiority of the American Way. Nostalgia is part of Star Trek's provision 
of a memory of a past way of regarding the future with hope. The connection of 
memory and hope for the future has been written about by Patrick Wright. He
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takes from Zygmunt Bauman the term ‘historical memory' to refer to a shared, 
rather than individual and personal, memory. He sees no reason for it to be 
necessarily conservative, since it is involved, among other matters, with 
comprehending change and transformation.^^ For Wright this memory is of 
public events, but also of the stdnës^hât'fdrTn 7)ar1 df“everyday~life. Thèse 
stories may be about personal events, but can also be derived from and about 
popular fictions, which provide a reservoir of shared memories. 
Comprehending change through reference to 'historical memory' may involve 
thinking forward as well as into the past. Perhaps there is a shared sense of 
the future, necessarily a 'popular' rather than 'historical' one, a 'popular 
foresight' - some basis on which we tell ourselves stories of what is to come. 
The nostalgic future of Sfar jre/c would seem to bridge the gap between a 
'historical memory' and a putative 'popular foresight' in its provision of a 
shared memory of a past way of talking about the future.
A problem with this is that although Star Trek is, as already noted, a 
most pervasive and popular source of allusions and collection of texts, it is 
also something which is subject to considerable derision. Reviews of the films 
and the new TV series usually have at best an affectionately contemptuous 
tone; and newspaper articles on Trekkies regard their activities with 
bemusement. When neither of the prime truth-bearing discourses are called 
on, the subject matter is the future and the dominating political and moral 
discourses are laden with nostalgia, it should be unsurprising that the fictions 
are regarded as extremely trivial. Nor should it be seen as incidental that the 
majority of Trekkies are female. Indeed, given the context, the great popularity 
of the films becomes the more remarkable.
The nostalgia that is carried in the moral-ideological discourse of Star 
Trek and that is effected largely through the constraints monitored by the 
proprietary audience is rooted in the 60s. The values the Phenomenon 
promulgates are based on those operating in the US in the mid to late 60s, 
but, as is always the case when nostalgia inflects cultural products, they are 
represented differently in the products of the time and those constructed since. 
The most profitable of the films. Star Trek IV: The Voyage Home, makes 
concrete the conflation of time involved in nostalgic representation by bringing 
the cast back in time from the future to the present. The role of the 60s as the 
spiritual home-time of the characters is made explicit when it becomes 
necessary to disguise Spock so that he can pass in San Francisco in 1986.
Patrick Wright: On Living in an Old Country, London, Verso, 1985. pi 6
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Kirk improvises a headband to cover the Vulcan's ears and eyebrows and 
passes him off as a brain-scrambled left-over from the Berkeley Free Speech 
Movement.
All manner of romanticism is forgiven because of this harking back to 
look forward, espeDially^hen it combines^t1i"ar7ômanticisation of the 60s 
themselves. Hippies were by no means as sympathetically or humorously 
portrayed in the 60's episodes themselves. In the TV episode "The Way to 
Eden", the back-to-nature adherents, long-haired, garishly clad and sexually 
dubious, had in narrative terms to repent o r die. The counter-cultural values 
condemned when the series was being made have nostalgic charm now - at 
least to the extent that the the 60s are figured by Peace and Love and not by 
criticisms of capitalism.
David Gerroid, who wrote one of the early episodes and declares 
himself, with some justification, the self-appointed historian of Star Trek, 
commented about the TV series
"Its use of a science fiction background gave it 
the appearance of science fiction, but in reaiity 
Star Trek was a science-fiction-based format 
for the teiling of entertainments for and about 
the attitudes of contemporary America."®®
Gerroid is not concerned to suggest that these attitudes are at all problematic 
or questionable, nor that they might be diverse, and certainly not that they are 
subject to contestation. The core ideological terrain from which the attitudes 
which prevail throughout Star Tre/c derive, is an essentially undisputed liberal 
middle class one. It is also American-supremacist.
In fact the extent to which the world view of Star Trek was simply a re­
enunciation of the 'American way' in its more liberal form, is striking. The mid- 
60s represent the very moment of American world hegemony, before the 
defeat in Vietnam, Nixon and Watergate and the Student Movement all began 
to fray it. The confidence and certainty that the American way was right and 
would prevail appears effortlessly figured throughout the TV series. The next 
part of this chapter will argue that this is a central component of the nostalgic 
reworking of the televisual material; that this is the stable, comprehensible 
world yearned after; and that this is at the base of the preferred, optimistic, 
vision of the future.
Certainly the films continue to depict a World Government modelled as
®®lbid., PP34-35
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far as one can tell on that of the US. The frontier may not always be explicitly 
named, but it is always important. Imperialism, though never named, is also a 
feature of the American way which continues from the TV series into the films. 
So too does the tension between the couplet collectivity: individualism, but the 
primacy of choice usually ensures that individuaTism triumphs. Finally in this 
summary list of common characteristics to be expanded on below, there is the 
humanism that is linked with individualism and the primacy of choice. With its 
ideas of self-development and self-perfection and an ethnic pluralism which 
minimises the importance of difference, it underlies so much of American TV 
:  content, fictional and not, including Star Tre/c and its film derivatives. Many of 
these factors, but especially the humanism, are influential on the very 
moralistic tone of the fictions. "
The most characteristic aspects of the Star Trek future are harmony and 
optimism. On Earth, harmony is brought about by representative world 
government and this is a major basis for optimism. In contrast, other 
contemporary fictional universes seem to present a choice only between 
domination by transnational corporations and the apparent breakdown of all 
government and its replacement by small warring bands of desperados. World 
government, or in the shorter term, increased international co-operation 
leading to an anticipated world order, was not uncommonly represented in 
60's entertainments - The Man From UNCLE was only one of several 
programmes which featured an international peace-keeping force. The belief 
in world government was once well nigh universal in SF. Its composition and 
operation in Star Trek was never made clear. Speck's father, however, is the 
Ambassador from Vulcan to Earth, not to a specific nation.
Planetary defenses, as far as the Star Trek universe is concerned are of 
use only against extra-planetary threats. Conflict is between planets or more 
usually federations of them. Indeed the discovery of a planet with conflict 
between its peoples was close to a sine qua non justification for intervention. 
The presupposition that conflict between people on earth is inevitable (which 
is the SDI presupposition) and that it will involve space-based weapons, is 
inimical to some very basic plot devices in Star Trek. While SDI proponents 
can capitalise on Star Trek resonances (including the expectation that 
space-based planetary defense systems will be a feature of the future, 
common now in most TV space programmes), the reverse is not easily 
possible.The gigantic flashing blue probes that threaten the Earth in the first 
and fourth films would be morally defensible justifications for a Star Trek 
space shield, though even in these cases such use must be averted.
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When the film sequence begins, the particular exploration mission of the 
Enterprise has been concluded. This resulted in the disappearance (for nine 
years) of one of the most important words from the TV series, each episode of 
which began with the words "Space: the final frontier". The word 'frontier' has 
particular resonances for the American population, intrinsically linked to 
expansion, exploration, excitement and personal challenge. It represents an 
area where law is yet to be established. The arrival of the Enterprise appears 
to be the first step in introducing that law - regardless of the customs and 
practices of the inhabitants who may or may not welcome the change.
 Wm. Blake Tyrell's examination of the TV series concludes
_"Sfar Tre/c tells a story of the triumph of the 
individual over the Impersonal forces of 
mechanization, of the Inevitability of his physical 
needs and the rightness of his actions and of 
the justification of violence in the pursuit of both 
[sic.]. Such are the virtues of the frontier and the 
basis of Star Trek's optimism."®^
The mechanization Tyrell is concerned with is represented by the computer, 
but the same point also applies to the way in which the engineer Scotty 
persistently triumphs over the more straightforwardly (pseudo-) mechanical. 
He regularly has to mend the damaged or malfunctioning Enterprise engines, 
overcome the technologies used against the crew by their enemies and solve 
other technological problems using inadequate resources.
Using violence to push back the frontier is at least as justified as using it 
in retaliation, for it is part of the process of 'civilization' where violence is 
neutralized or technocratized, by being part of a demonstration of superiority, 
often technological and always in the programme's terms, moral. Tyrell even 
argues that in Star Trek, a willingness to use violence is part of what it means 
to be human. Violence has generally been eliminated from the computer- 
controlled paradises. It is also the characteristic most closely linked to Kirk. As 
captain he is dominant, but he represents only one third of the central trio who 
together articulate the programme's concerns. His right to use violence must 
always be negotiatied with Spock and McCoy. This ensures that the audience 
is made aware of its moral justification. The use of the term 'frontier' is one 
way in which the viewer is prepared for violence, even for battle, and
®^Wm. Blake Tyrell: "Star Trek's Myth of Science", Journal of American Culture, 2(2),
Summer 1979, pp288-296. p295
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encourages the sanctioning of both.
A frontier furthermore is the edge of one's known territory and thus an 
area ripe for exploration. One may rightfully push back a frontier. There is not 
the question of invasion as there is with a border, or even penetration as there 
may be with a barrier. Perceiving the undevelôped“êdg“ë~bëtween the known 
and the unknown as a frontier rather than a barrier has many implications. As 
well as the rectitude of the activities there and the historical precedents 
evoked, there is also the way a frontier implies a broader space than either of 
the other two words. A frontier may be itself no less two-dimensional than a 
border, but there is more depth behind it. There is more'there', there.
The term 'frontier', especially in an American TV programme, has 
resonances of the Western, and some of the multiple relationships between 
the heroes and the law prevalent in that genre can be traced in Star Trek. 
The Western hero may act (among other things) to push back the frontier and 
bring law, or to enforce law in the liminal area where the frontier had until 
recently been and the law's hold was still insecure. In the TV series each 
week the voice over introduction reiterated that the Enterprise  was on a 
mission of exploration, thus stressing the first of these functions. Yet far more 
often it was the second that was the subject of the episode. Very rarely did the 
Enterprise  actually enter the unknown, actually go where no man had 
previously - all too often they encountered other humans. At best, it seems 
they may have gone where man had forgotten he had gone before. {Star 
Trek: The Next Generation, while retaining almost all of the introductory 
voice-over, asserted its contemporaneity by changing the last phrase, not to 
correct the split infinitive, but to remove the sexism. It has become "to boldly 
go, where no one has gone before.")
The most common mission of the Enterprise was thus a policing one, 
concerned to make secure the distant reaches of the known, to enforce the 
law, or to seek out those areas where the particular code of law being 
operated was not acceptable to the dominant order the crew and the ship 
represented. The structure of many, if not most, episodes and films was of the 
Enterprise  being interrupted in its mission of exploration and diverted to 
policing; or finding that what had been envisaged as exploration had become 
policing. The emphatic coupling of 'frontier' and exploration framing each 
episode was the principal device to ensure that exploration appeared the 
central activity and that the universe represented was a progressive one in 
which an orderly expansion of the known continued, not one in which pockets 
of disorder kept having to be mopped up.
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The role of Star Trek in popularising a link between space and 'frontier', 
in seeing space itself as a frontier and thus ripe for development, should not 
be underestimated. It provides in fact another possible instance of 
hyperreality. The-decision to give the Yeal world'-USAF-Space Command (as 
opposed to the Star Trek Space Command) the motto "Guardians of the High 
Frontier", established them as the sheriffs of space, bringing the law and 
converting the known to the unknown. As they came into existence, into the 
'real', the final frontier, implying the last extension of settlement, disappeared 
from the new Sfar Tre/c fictions. The term re-emerged nine years later with the 
new TV series and after that appeared as the subtitle of the fifth film in which 
the crew go in search of God. Precisely why it disappeared and why on its 
filmic re-appearance it was linked so strongly to the mysticism always present 
to some extent, but more muted in the central trilogy of the films, remains 
unclear. Had it become too closely identified with the military (always a 
problem for Star Trek), so that only a diminution of the public recognition of 
High Frontier and the sanctification of the religious could redeem it? Was 
there a feeling that 'final' implied no where else to go? (Afficionados worried 
about the film series' continuation were reassured by publicity material for the 
fifth film that 'final' did not mean 'last'.)
Most probably the 'frontier' was seen to emphasise the exploration 
mission too strongly. Before the fifth film reasserted an element of exploration, 
some at least of the Star Trek audience had become prepared for it by Star 
Trek: The Next Generation which continued both to assert the exploration 
mission and perform a policing one. "Space: the final frontier" is still one of the 
most frequently used tags which identify Star Trek, and the linking of 'space' 
and 'frontier' within the benign but expansionist world of Star Trek remains 
available.
The Star Wars program and the Star Trek films could intersect only 
distantly and extratextually, for, as was just noted, the military was a problem 
for Star Trek . This can also be traced in another way. The Star Trek frontier 
closed down from the distant exploration of the 60s to the closer-to-home 
threats in the films between 1979 and 1986. Without over-emphasising the 
point, this was the central time for the lobbying that led to the Star Wars 
speech and the development of it into the SDI program. The budget President 
Bush delivered at the end of January 1990 presented its NASA proposals 
(which do not include any related to Star Wars/SDI) under the heading 
"Expanding the Human Frontier". It is hard to think of a phrase which
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encapsulates the themes of Star Trek better. As 'frontier' returns to the new 
products of the Star Trek corpus, politically it shifts from defense to space 
exploration.
The formal mission of the TV series Enterprise as already stated was 
one of exploration. This was in keepirT^itlfother^SF of the period, and in the 
films there is an unstated assumption that Starfleet still engages in this. The 
silence about colonisation which presumably follows exploration, is perhaps 
indicative of dominant American attitudes to imperialism. Having been a 
colony itself, it appears difficult for there to be acknowledgement, however 
disguised, in public discourse, that the US (or in this case its twenty-third 
century replacement) could be implicated in the creation of colonies.
The way in which the moral justification for using violence must be 
negotiated among the three central characters is an indication of an area of 
tension and ambivalence in Star Trek and the American way, referred to 
above. The ambivalence centres around the couplet collectivity: individualism. 
Strong, consistent characterisation is a keynote of the fictions and, also a point 
on which the proprietary audience is insistent, but it is characterisation of great 
simplicity. Individuals are given a couple of characteristics and embody them 
absolutely; thus Spock is rational and unemotional; McCoy is excessively 
emotional, while the Captain, also emotional, is courageous and aggressive. 
Collectively, they may seem to comprise a whole person and their interactions 
as they debate, question and consider before and after action dramatise what 
would in a different fictional context, be an interior monologue. Yet despite this 
and despite the frequency with which the good of the ship/the whole 
crew/humanity is advanced as the justification for risk or self-sacrifice, 
individualism is still a more powerful force. Primacy of choice is an important 
issue and obviously is part of the thread of individualism. The crew's 
encounters with aliens or humans who have foregone individualism to inhabit 
a collectively organised society always require the society to be reorganised 
to reassert individualism.
The primacy of choice which is linked to this is also seen as characteristic 
of what it meant to be human. The most frequent characteristic of villians was 
that they denied choice, which was always seen as equivalent to slavery and 
quite literally inhuman. As already noted, the arrival of the Enterprise is often 
the first step in bringing law to the frontier. In more than one episode ("The 
Apple", for example), the Enterprise  arrives in a paradise which Kirk 
adjudges unlawful because it is created or controlled by a computer. Asserting 
the primacy of choice, Kirk destroys the paradise. The law is meaningful only
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when one can choose to obey or disobey - and of course be punished for 
disobedience.
The primacy of choice is also central to another motif indicated in the 
outline of the films - the rejection of 'wrong' or dangerous science. This is not 
an absolute denial of the inevitabilityr)fTrrogress, since the constant outward' 
bound mission of the Enterprise is conducted in its aura, but scientific or 
technological progress is by no means accepted as unavoidable or 
necessarily beneficial. It must be questioned and continuation chosen as in 
the interests of humanity (as negotiated by the dominant triumvirate).
The meaning of being human was one of the main themes explored by 
the series, and the importance but also the restrictive view of humanism 
involved, can perhaps be detected in the way in which, while self-perfection 
was advocated, it was certainly not suggested that this was subject to much 
variation. Individuals could vary in the extent to which they embodied (ideal) 
humanity, but the definition itself was explored by reference to the non-human. 
Spook's half-human half-alien nature, typified by his lack of emotions, was 
particularly useful here. While his rationality and superior intelligence often 
saved the ship or solved the problems it encountered, it was nonetheless 
depicted as a form of incompleteness and suspiciously machine-like. The 
desirability of the fully human was also explored through encounters with 
societies controlled by aliens and computers - both fully what Spock was only 
partially. Differences between humans (as opposed to inadequacies, dealt 
with when, for instance, societies controlled by humans who had lost their way 
were set right) were not something perceived to be worth exploring as far as 
the definition of humanity was concerned, they were not a component of being 
human. They were articulated on the level of character differences, in terms 
often designed to exploit national stereotypes. These stereotypes, like 
Chekov's 'Russian' cloddishness and lack of imagination, usually indicated 
how much closer the Americans, who were not nationally stereotyped, came 
to the ideal.
The meaning of being human was otherwise demonstrated 
demographically, both explicitly and implicitly. The way in which difference 
was and was not regarded as unimportant can be seen from the composition 
of the crew - black, white, male, female, Russian, half-alien, but all really 
American. Writing of the second film which had added a black male captain to 
the complement on the bridge, Thomas B. Byers describes this as the 
conventional Hollywood " 'bomber crew' ethnic pattern".®® It is characteristic
®®Thomas B. Byers: "Commodity Futures" in Kuhn (ed.): Alien Zone, p46
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of the American pluralist conception of difference, where racial, national and 
gender differences are recognised and represented - but only to the extent 
that they then adhere to the norm of American-ness, as (best) articulated by 
white Anglo men. Lt. Uhura - female, black and with a non-Anglo name - was 
the acme of this, doüblÿ^iîferentlDiJtl^âlIÿ^just the same. This was in keeping 
with the integrationist, melting-pot beliefs standard within the 60's liberal 
humanist philosophy of Roddenberry and other creators of the series. Uhura's 
presence was another sign of the harmdnious future, in direct contrast to the 
deployment of blacks and women in contemporary cinematic representations 
of the future, where they seem rnore to indicate a grasp of the current 
recognition of demographic diversity than a pointer to a utopian future.
An examination of the demographic data reveals by implication how very 
much being human in Star Trek means being a middle class white American 
male or differing from it (except in the single case of Lt. Uhura) in only one 
particular. In the original TV series and in the films, people with power - 
Admirals and Presiding Judges - are late middle-aged white men with 
American accents. The sole exception and a telling one, is the unseen (male) 
Admiral Nogura in Star Trek: The Motion Picture - the use of Japanese as 
acceptable non-Caucasians with power is becoming common. In both the 
films and the TV series, Uhura remains the only prominent black crew member 
and the most prominent continuing female one. (The films provide instances of 
prominent female trainee officers, but they are not allowed to continue. In the 
most bizarre instance, when the new character Saavik continues from the 
second to the third film, she is played by a different actress.) Mr. Sulu as a 
Japanese-American also indicated an integrated crew.®® The Russian 
Ensign, Chekov, was added in the second year of the TV series to provide 
youth appeal and should thus be seen primarily at this time as diversifying the 
age structure and having a more minor reference to a posited cessation of 
US:USSR antagonism - which would allow even Russians to become 
Americans. (The character Ilya Kuryakin in The Man From UNCLE had been 
much more emphatic in this latter function a few years earlier.) This has 
altered in the films. The humour of Chekov the Russian at large in a present- 
day American nuclear submarine in the fourth film does foreground his 
nationality - and he can certainly no longer signify youth.
Indicating a conservative component of the nostalgic constraints, any 
new role of prominence for a male, alien or not, in the films is played by, and
®®For some reason, the network insisted that while the crew could be an ethnically diverse, it
was to have no Chinese member. (Gerroid: The World of Star Trek, pi 53)
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effectively as, a white American. The situation for females is a little different. 
White Americans again take all the human roles, but non-Americans (Persis 
Khambatta and Dame Judith Anderson) may play aliens. The way in which 
being human is identified with being a white American male could hardly be 
more forcefüllÿ^ëfnohstfâtedl^ônly one variation was permissible, éô^îTa" 
character were female any additional variation required her to be an alien. 
Uhura was from the beginning the only permissible exception, the extreme 
case. ■
The notable exception to women not being in positions of significant 
power is Carol Marcus, the (white, American) scientist in charge of the 
Genesis Project in Star Trek II: The Wrath of Khan. Her gender is a plot 
necessity, since she is Kirk's ex-lover (despite the uses to which the fictions 
are put by devotees, the formal products are resolutely heterosexual) and the 
mother of his son. She thus provides both a love-interest and generational 
conflict. While she is positively presented in that she appears competently in 
charge of a major research project, in Star Trek III: The Search for Spock \h\s 
competence is retrospectively undermined by her not having realized, or 
having overlooked, perhaps through maternal blindness, her son's unethical 
and dangerous contribution to it. Even in the film in which she does appear, a 
certain domesticity and thus a trivialization of her power is indicated by her 
comment, after demonstrating to Kirk the outstanding scientific breakthrough 
she is responsible for: "Can I cook, or can I cook?"
It is possible to argue that Star Trek's definition of the human norm, as 
well as being white American and male, was also middle class. Such 
members of the crew of the Enterprise as can be identified by name, or who 
are on screen for any length of time, are officers. The exceptions, as usual 
telling, are both minor and female (Yeoman Janice Rand and Nurse 
Chappell). The contradiction of the earlier point about only one variation to the 
standard human being permitted is minimised by class being easier to vary for 
women. Women are needed for romantic episodes when their status is 
determined by the males they associate with, i.e. officers. Enlisted personnel 
may at times appear, but they are basically set dressing.
Families are very rare in Star Trek. Only Spock and Kirk, who had been 
unaware of the existence of his son, have any identifiable family. There are no 
family members to inhibit crew members from joining in the escapade to 
rescue Spock or the subsequent return home to court martial which becomes 
the time trip to the twentieth century. The lack of family can be rationalized as 
a practical consequence of the job, but an actual outcome is that children.
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even more than the old, are rarities in the Star Trek universe. In the TV series, 
a more representative age range was provided on occasion by the inhabitants 
of the planets visited, but they tended of necessity to represent problems in 
need of solution by the Enterprise. "Miri", the episode which led to the BBC 
banning four episodes (admittedly an extreme example), depicted a planet 
inhabited solely by children and a virus which causes the crew to age rapidly.
Being human in Star Tre/c seemed to mean being middle class, prime of 
life and unattached. Ideally it also meant being white, male and American. 
Being female or non-Caucasian was acceptable, as long as it remained rare, 
and, except in the case of the one person who was both, singular.
With Star Trek: The Next Generation the attempt to be a more thorough­
going 80's product was effected mainly through adjusting cast demographics. 
Women and people without American accents have much greater prominence 
and there are more crew members of various races. The captain for instance 
has a (standard received) English accent and a French name; the doctor, the 
chief engineer and the ship's (Russian) security officer are all female; and the 
doctor's young teenage son also travels aboard the Enterprise. This boy and 
the Ship's Counsellor, a middle-aged woman, help enlarge the regular age 
range. The tokenism now so evident in the early series and the films, seems 
not to be as obvious, in part because the crew is so much larger. Being female 
and perhaps to a lesser extent being black (though this time not being both) 
are no longer exceptional cases of the 'normal' way of being human. They 
represent instead standard, though unimportant, variations, so women and 
blacks do not need to demonstrate that they are part of the norm - 'really' 
American - and the difference truly superficial. Perhaps the liberal humanism 
which underlay the tokenism and which was generally attributed to the 
Producer Gene Roddenberry, (Executive Producer for the new series), may 
continue to be discerned in the inclusion of a disabled black crew member - a 
blind man who wears a seeing device. The meaningful exception is still 
carried by a black person.
The 60's TV series of Star Trek presented a particularly non-threatening 
future with no hint of problems on Earth, no interference with Kirk's authority 
from his superiors and the threat from the Klingons and other assorted aliens 
no more than could be contained within the week's episode. This changed 
somewhat in the films, but even so it is reasonable for Marc Mancini, 
examining changes in the general portrayal of the future, to have written
"Star Trek, certain Japanese and Soviet movies
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and a few Saturday morning kidvids are the only 
remaining bastions of a progressive harmonious 
tomorrow."^®
"^h e -tw e n ty^h ird  century-society-represented by Star Trek~isrone 
marked by the absences of much that can be seen to create contemporary 
problems. It lacks families, the old and children; the working class are few and 
silent, non-Americans and non-whites are few and not often in positions of 
power; there are no individual nations; overpopulation, nuclear power and 
possibly even the mass media, have disappeared. Conflict is provided by the 
threat of war with aliens (though not all aliens are enemies) and excitement by 
space exploration. It is indeed the very moment of American hegemony, with 
patrolling the world projected into the future and onto the galaxy. The 
difference from the more common representations of the future produced in 
the 80s, where contemporary problems are not absent but redoubled, could 
hardly be more marked.
Star Trek does present a different vision of the future from that provided 
by other fictions, particularly others that share the space setting. It is not 
merely that it is an exception to the dominance of economic discourse, though 
this is very significant. As well as the minimal role economics played, even in 
the affairs of villians, the difficulty both Star Trek and the American polity itself 
have in naming their own actions imperialist, was noted. The replacement of 
economic discourse, not by the scientific, but by a moral-ideological discourse 
is the prime way in which Star Trek is a distinctive vision of the future. In 
keeping silent on economic matters while emphasising humanist and the 
peace-keeping activities the Star Trek fictions could be seen as prime SF 
embodiments of neo-imperialism. Yet not necessarily in contradiction to this, 
they are most different from their fellow fictions in their optimism, derived 
absolutely from their 60's origin.
The constraints of the past have bitten, and Star Trek presents a 
distinctive nostalgic future, yet it is neither a thoroughgoing return to the 60s, 
nor the deco-pastiche of Jameson's postmodern nostalgia films. The 
continuity presented by the recurrent rescreenings of the original episodes, 
the availability of so great a range of secondary material and the activities of 
the fan audience, including their demands for consistency and fidelity, all act
"^°Marc Mancini: "The Future Isn't What it Used to Be", Film Comment, 21(3), May-June 1985,
pp11-15. p15
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to ensure that 'pastness' is not merely in the 'look' of the films and the 
structures of feeling they attempt to evoke. It is also in the clarity with which the 
fictions are able to maintain the depiction of the harmonious expansion of the 
American way into a stable, comprehensible, optimistic future where 
economic matters didTiot bâvëto be^(oveftly)laken ihtôcônsideration. It now 
seems to have been so much simpler in the 60s, and in the Star Trek 
universe, it can seem to be simpler again.
CHAPTER SIX: BEING HUMAN BEING ARTIFICIAL
In all the previous chapters, scientific discourse, in Foucault's terms the 
discourse in which 'truth' is most centred, has been seen to be unable to 
operate easily in talking the future without interacting with fiction. Furthermore, 
the last two chapters have shown other discourses - the economic and the 
moral-ideological - challenging the dominance of scientific discourse. They 
have themselves presented alternative ways of talking about the future, for 
Star Trek, constrained by its genesis in the 60s, presents an optimistic view of 
the future, while space fictions are not so constrained and present a much less 
happy view. This latter is more in keeping with the general tone in which the 
future has been seen to be talked about so far.
The present chapter brings to prominence what was a minor concern of 
the previous one - the meaning of being human. Few questions have been 
more central to SF than those concerned with this. It has been most frequently 
explored through stories of encounters with aliens, but it also quite often 
features in interactions between people, computers and robots. Developments 
in fields such as computer science, robotics, bioengineering and reproductive 
technology are beginning to shift the issue out of the solely science fictional 
and into the scientific: It thus offers a further site for examining the interaction 
between these discourses, and one where the transition is in process rather 
than substantially completed, as was the case for space. The present chapter 
will consider how a future in which humanity and artificial beings co-exist is 
talked about and which discourse or discourses seem to be dominant here.
Artificial beings offer, a challenge to humans scientifically - in their 
development - and in other ways, especially ethically and politically, as we 
need to imagine how we would deploy, control and relate to such 
phenomena. Much of this imagining is done in fiction. Vivian Sobchack, in 
noting the challenge in recent American SF film, has referred to Walter 
Benjamin's famous essay, "The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical 
Reproduction". In this, Benjamin examined the challenge to the unique status 
oMhe work of art posed by the technologies of reproduction as they existed in 
the mid 30s. He saw a decline in the 'aura' of the original following the rise of 
the copy and the art of film. Concomittant with this, there was a decline in the 
relevance of the magical, mystical and religious.^ Sobchack notes that now.
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"In an age of electronic reproduction and 
replication, however, it is the unique status 
of the human being that is chaiienged by 
technoiogicai transformation."^
The challenge is not as yet of the same order as that Benjamin examined and 
it may well be that it is offered first by biotechnologies rather than electronics. 
Nonetheless, the challenge whether from electronic or biological technologies 
can be detected strikingly in many SF films' preoccupation with various kinds 
of artificial humans and intelligent computers. Science programmes and 
documentaries deal more mundanely with the related developments and 
possibilities.
It is both the uniqueness and the superiority of human beings that is 
being challenged. A stronger, faster robot which is also more intelligent is 
certainly a threatening figure, but genetic engineering may offer a thoroughly 
superior being who is also human, representing perhaps the next step on the 
(artificially accelerated) evolutiphary scale. Interestingly, this threat of being 
'evolved-past' does not figure directly in even the most fantastic of the mass 
market films and TV programmes,3 where the superior human seems 
always to be revealed as artificial or alien (and consequently not really a 
superior human after all).
Before examining this in any detail, it is necessary to outline the 
terminological distinctions that will be used. The greatest problems come from 
the terms used for beings which do not (yet) exist. The 'yet' is important. The 
beings considered under the general term.'artificial' are ones that are based, 
however loosely, on a scientific premise, they do not yet exist, but they could; 
they are not in any literal sense, supernatural.
The term 'robot' in SF, generally refers to objects more advanced than 
any yet operating, they  are usually intelligent, though this is not invariable. In
^Waiter Ben]amln:"The Work of Art in the Age of Mechahicai Reproduction" (1936) in 
Illuminations, London, Jonathon Cape, 1970.
^Sobchack: Screen/ng Space, p 237
3An apparent exception to this is Khan, the 'genetic superman' in Star Trek //: The 
^~Wrattrof Khan. As i explained in the previous chapter, he is described as a remnant o 
—— Eugenics Wars of the iate twentieth century, but his superior strength and intelligence are 
vitiated by his inferior moral sense. His characteristics furthermore are constrained by his 
having first been described in a TV episode in the iate 60s, before deveioprnents in genetic 
engineering made him the (slightly) more credible being he appears in the recent film. The 
Wars however, even in the TV series, curtailed such genetic experimentation.
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about half of the cases they are humanoid in shape, but there is rarely any 
difficulty in knowing that they are non-biological. For example, the rivets are 
usually visible. Robots were the first kind of artificial beings to be depicted in 
films; Denis Gifford cites Méliès’ The Clown and the Automaton (1897), a film 
that has failed to survive, as the first, and identifies Arthur Cooper's The Motor 
Valet (1906) as depicting the first robot to run riot.4 Neither of these 
creatures could actually be called a robot, since the term was not coined by 
Karel Capek until 1917 and not in public use until after the success of his 
1920 play R.U.R..
In 1985, Philip Strick coined the term 'mandroid' to refer to artificial 
people who lack souls and turn against their creators. He identifies the first of 
these beings in film as in Méliès' Coppelia (1900).^ The classic example is, 
of course, Mary Shelley's; the first screen appearance of her monster was in 
Searle Dawley's Frankenstein (1910). Strick's term itself has no currency in 
films and TV programmes. The concept however is important. While the moral 
evaluation of artificial humans is ambiguous - they may be good, bad or a 
combination of both - it seems to remain, a requisite that a thoroughly artificial 
person will turn against her or his creators. There are very few exceptions, 
(Bishop \n Aliens is one). When it becomes reasonably uncommon for this 
revolt to’ occur, as it now is with robots, it is a sign that the being concerned, 
while still artificial, is no longer considered an artificial-person.
intelligent computers are a problem here, perhaps because of their 
appearance. If they appear humanoid or even if they have independent 
mobility, then they are not referred to as computers, but as robots; otherwise 
they are usually depicted as too massive and box-like to be artificial people. 
While probably the majority no longer turn against their creators, or against 
'real' people in general, computers with a substantial role in the plot are still 
more likely to do so, than not. It is difficult to be precise about this, in part 
because it is much less common a plot device than it once was.
As far as the fictional material is concerned, the term 'artificial 
intelligence', although notable in literary works, is usually absent. The extent 
to which computers depicted in various SF films and TV programmes are 
endowed with artificial intelligence is generally far from clear - HAL in 2001: 
A Space Odyssey W\\\s because he has been faultily programmed, but in 
2070 where he has retrospectively been given artificial intelligence, he has to
^Denis Gifford : Science Fiction Fiim, London, Studio Vista/Dutton Paperback, 1971. p51 
^Philip Strick: "Future Movies: Reading the Signs (Part 1): A Passion for Mandroids", Films 
and Filming, No.366, March 1985, pp7-10. p8
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be persuaded to sacrifice himself. Proteus in Demon Seed  (1977) is 
described as having artificial intelligence but this is.linked to his having 
organic components. Future computers are frequently given greater powers 
than any actual ones yet have, but where they come from or on what they are 
based is rarely specified - particularly in the more recent films.
When the beings are humanoid and largely biological, the usual terms 
are 'android' and 'cyborg'. Androids are the classic artificial humans. They 
look like people, but they are manufactured. When reference is made to their 
creation, the sciences concerned are biological and chemical. Advances in 
biotechnology and genetics have made it possible for these references to be 
more precise and apparently 'scientific'. The term 'replicant' is also relevant. It 
was created especially for Blade Runner as an alternative to 'android' which 
had figured in the director's previous film, Allen (1979). The term has not 
been adopted by others, though the prominence of the film in critical 
discussion means that the term is widely recognized. In no way can replicants 
be differentiated generically from androids - they are similarly artificial, 
superficially indistinguishable from humans, created as adults by 'real' 
humans to provide a biddable labour force. Perhaps replicants are more 
difficult to differentiate from humans than most androids, but this is only a 
matter of degree - the ability to 'pass' is characteristic.
Cyborgs, unlike androids, usually cannot pass for Human, despite their 
distinguishing characteristic being that they are part human. 'Cyborg' is a 
portmanteau word, combining 'cybernetic' and 'organism ' - the former 
providing both the reference to control and the analogies between artificial 
and biological sytems and the latter stressing the biological. The term was 
coined by Manfred E. Clynes and Nathan S. Kline in 1960 to refer to 'self­
regulating man-machine systems' designed specifically for space-flight. The 
first recorded use is in à report in the  New York Times of a projected aviation 
medicine conference paper of theirs, which provides the following definition
"A cyborg is essentially a man-machine system 
in which the control mechanisms of the human 
portion are modified externally by drugs or 
regulatory devices so that the being can live 
  in an environment different from the normal dhe."6
Their approach to the problems of astronauts on extended space missions 
was the reverse of others at that time and since, in that they were proposing to
3 — "Spaceman is Seen as Man-Machine", New York Times, 22 May1960, p31
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adapt the astronaut to the changed environment rather than the reverse. This 
is the classic anthropological distinction between the autoplastic (where the 
body is manipulated, through, for example, surgical rites of passage, to 
achieve a desired relationship with the environment) and the alloplastic 
(where the environment is modified by technical m e a n s ) . 7 The assumption 
that the alloplastic is the more 'developed' response accords well with the 
subsequent history of manned space flight. The article, which mentioned as a 
final aside the possibility of using the cyborg concept as "a valuable tool of 
research into mental and other diseases", included a paragraph with the 
familiar disclaimer.
"Both scientists emphasised [ . . . ]  that while 
their ideas sounded like science fiction, many 
could now be implemented with existing drugs 
and apparatus.''^
In their actual paper they gave a slightly more formal explanation of their 
proposed man-machine system, explaining that the
"self-regulation must function without the benefit 
• of consciousness in order to cooperate with the
body’s own autonomous homeostatic controls. ‘
For the exogenously extended organizational 
complex functioning as an integrated 
homeostatic system unconsciously, we 
propose the term 'Cyborg'. The Cyborg 
deliberately incorporates exogenous 
components extending the self-regulatory 
control function of the organism in order to 
adapt ft to new environments.''^
Subsequent references to cyborgs have overwhelmingly been within an 
overtly fictional context and have minimised if not eliminated references to the 
use of drugs. The cyborg does not appear any longer to be primarily 
envisaged as an astronaut.
Current usage in SF and related areas tends to be derived from Clynes
^Géza Rôheim: Australian Totemism, London, Allen and Unwin, 1925, restated in Mary 
Douglas: Purity and Danger, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1969. pi 16.
® "Spaceman is Seen as Man-Machine", p31
^Manfred E. Clynes and Nathan S. Kline: "Cyborgs and space". Astronautics, September, 
1960, p27.
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and Kline, with the main variations those just noted. Complications have been 
introduced recently with the use of the term 'cyborg' in critical theory, where it 
usually involves reference to the feminist critic Donna Haraway's provocative 
article "A Manifesto for Cyborgs". Several recent studies have quoted her 
definition
"A cyborg is a cybernetic organism, a hybrid of 
machine and organism, a creature of social 
reality as well as a creature of fiction",10
without noting that her usage differs markedly from the use in contexts other 
than critical theory. As she says in her next paragraph, she is
"making an argument for the cyborg as a 
fiction mapping our social and bodily reality 
and as an imaginative resource suggesting 
some very fruitful couplings."11
She continues,
\  "[t]he cyborg is resolutely committed to partiality, 
irony, intimacy and perversity. It is oppositional, 
utopian, and completely without innocence."12 ;
From this it is clear that she is using the figure of the cyborg as a metaphor 
through which feminists can strive to overcome the belief that science is 
ineluctably masculine and inextricably implicated with exterminism. she does 
this by insisting that people are already unable to maintain barriers between 
human and animal, animal and machine, physical and non-physical. People 
are already 'compromised' [not her term] and should be exploiting the 
advantages of it. Her argument and, her initial definition are both accepted 
here, but directly equating her "oppositional" figure of the cyborg with the 
beings depicted in recent films and TV programmes creates substantial 
problems. Her figure will be retained "as an imaginative resource" of great 
value, but has no direct analytic application to my argument.
While usage of 'android' is relatively unproblematic here (other terms
may be used but the collection of characteristics remains relatively constant),
^^Donna Haraway: "A Manifesto for Cyborgs", Socialist Review, Vol. 80, 1985, pp65-107.
p65 
■^ ■•ibid., p66 
■• i^bid., p67
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'cyborg' is more difficult, even on a pragmatic level. The main difficulty is 
apparent disagreement over aspects of the definition, in particular the extent 
to which a cyborg is a machine. There are beings termed cyborgs which do 
not abide by Clynes and Kline's definition: in film there is th e  (eponymous) 
Terminator (1984), and there are various televisual beings linked at the very 
least homophonically - the 'cybemauts' in The Avengers, the 'cylons' in 
Battlestar Galactica and the 'cybermen' in Doctor Who. It is important to 
stress that all of the TV examples are now quite old. The Terminator is 
however a particularly interesting example, especially as it post-dates a 
possible decline in the term's usage. The terminator is explicitly described as 
a cyborg, but is also counterposed to the humans by being a machine-created 
machine. Its basically mechanical status is confirmed by its final manifestation, 
totally stripped of its fleshly covering, metallically pursuing the heroine. 
Perhaps it is the decline in consensual usage that makes it possible to call a 
flesh covered robot a c y b o r g . " ^ 3
There has never been any precision about the relative proportions of 
human and machine in a cyborg, although the expectation that cyborgs 
appear physically distinguishable from full humans tends to mean that the 
machine predorniqated externally. The 'classic' cyborg of fiction, if we can use 
such a term, looked like a humanoid robot, was usually all black, lacked facial 
features and was absolutely emotionless. The cybermen and the servos of 
Blake's 7 are good examples. When, in the late 70s, TV programmes about 
mechanically augmented humans (particularlyT/?e $6 Million Man and The 
Bionic Woman) became popular, it was never suggested that they were 
cyborgs; because they looked like humans,and were not androids, they had to 
be humans. By this time the only beings termed cyborgs were recognizably 
other than human. If ,cybprgs were merely defined as part human, part 
machine, then far too rnahy living people had achieved cyborg status; artificial 
components such as replacement joints might be regarded as little more than 
developments from wooden legs, but heart pacemakers were specifically 
cybernetic in having as their basic function regulating, indeed governing. A 
person with plastic hipjoints, a pacemaker, perhaps several metres of man- 
made arteries, implanted plastic lenses as the result of a cataract operation
J3perhaps such imprecision is spreading - "Kryten", an episode of Red Dwarf\\.x. 6 
September 1988), featured a humanoid robot referred to throughout as an android. He 
became a regular in the third series. Kryten is rather like Marvin: the Paranoid Android in 
The Hitch-Hikers' Guide to the Galaxy. A robot even less humanoid than Kryten, 
Marvin is probably described as an android simply because the assonance appealed.
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and, to construct an extreme example, an artificial arm operated by myo­
electric currents would certainly fit Clynes and Kline's description of a cyborg. 
She or he was not, however, called this. If they were to have been, then the 
term would have lost its SF connotations, which by this time were all it had. 
There was nothing at all unprecedented in a word moving from SF to scientific 
fact; it had already happened to 'robot'. 'Cyborg', however had had universally 
negative connotations - the principal plot function of cyborgs was to attempt to 
kill the heroes. Perhaps even more tellingly (for robots too had had an 
equivocal fictional history before their actual commercial deployment), they 
had been depicted as immensely strong, hyper^efficient and hyper-rational 
beings, while the 'real-life' people with potentially cyborg features were 
generally the old and the sick. The term seemed to lapse. The hero in 
Robocop, a classic cyborg in all but the moral evaluation of him,i4 is never 
referred to as such in the film - he is a robot who just happens to have been 
grafted on to the remains of a human police officer. Nonetheless, critics writing 
about the film referred to him as a cyborg in outlets as diverse as Village 
Voice, The Daily Telegraph, an& New Musical Express, although this 
nomenclature was by no means universal. Robocop serves to indicate that 
the hybrid human-machine is now morally ambiguous.
In what follows, as rhuch as is possible, the older sense of 'cyborg', 
folowing Clynes and Kline will be used - a being part 'ordinary' human, part 
machine with the latter more noticable. It is important that a cyborg is a single 
integrated being exhibiting these characteristics. For example. Max Headroom 
is not regarded here as a cyborg; his human part continues a separate 
existence fro ni the cybernetic system. Similarly, children born following even 
the most substantial mechanical interventions of reproductive technology are 
not cyborgs' either, since they have shed the machine. The extensive 
quotation earlier from Qlyhes and Kline's paper supports this insistence on the 
incorporation of the exogenous components.
The distinctions just drawn have developed in the period since 1897 as 
some aspects of the fictional posited beings became actually achievable. This 
section will map the changes in the depiction of artificial beings by examining 
some-oühe classic film precursors to contemporary fictional artificial humans 
and intelligent machines. As just indicated, there have been robots and
^^The pronouns used in reference to identifiable artificial beings will be those attributed 
within each specific film or television programme, either directly or, as is sometimes the 
case with computers, by implication through a gender specific voice or name. Remarkably 
few beings are ungendered.
181
androids on film almost as long as there have been films, but the earliest 
examples cannot be regarded as very significant. Despite her role as the first 
android, Coppelia has not been influential. The figures that have been most 
important have been Frankenstein's monster, Maria in Metropolis (1926), and 
to a lesser extent, Gort in The Day the Earth Stood Still (1951 ) and Robby the 
Robot in Forbidden Planet (1956).
Although Frankenstein's creation of dead flesh animated by electricity 
could be the classic android, or even in Strick's term 'mandroid', this is not 
really quite the case. His usefulness for subsequent films lies in the way in 
which he establishes a boundary between SF and horror. This is revealed in 
his name, or rather, namelessness; he is a monster and foreshadows Godzilla 
and numerous zombies as much as, if not more than, he does the replicants of 
Blade Runner or the androids of Alien(s). When the monster turns against 
his creator in Mary Shelley's novel it is not merely because he lacks a soul but 
because Frankenstein will neither love him nor create someone who will. The 
films are rarely this explicit; the monster usually just seems inevitably evil, 
destructive and sexually jealous.of.his creator. The most influential of the films 
is John Whale's Frankenstein  (1931) which is not very faithful to Mary 
Shelley. The film's explanation for the monster's blood lust is given as his 
having received a brain from a criminal. The difficulties seem to lie in 
Frankenstein's use of corpses for the raw material of his creature. In 
subsequent films, whether or riot they feature Frankenstein or his monster, 
reference to any such source seems to serve as a generic marker to a horror 
film and the being created is regarded as supernatural (a zombie or a 
monster) rather than having a (pseudo-) scientific basis. That Frankenstein is 
generally depicted as working in a laboratory is irrelevant here. Although the 
Frankenstein films omit Shelley's references to her doctor's researches in 
necromantic texts, it would appear that the corpse carries the signs of it.
To establish the scientific character of SF, the flesh from which androids 
are constructed must be fully and newly created - the scene in Blade Runner 
where replicant eyes are being constructed is exemplary here. That used as 
the basis for cyborgs must be still living, or at least in that state where an 
audience accustomed to the ambiguities surrounding the status of donor 
organs for transplants does not regard it as dead flesh. Imprecision used to be 
acceptable, especially when cyborgs were just the agents of totally human 
villians (like Servalan's servos in Blake's 7). For contemporary leading 
characters, clarity would appear to be required. In Robocop, the mortally 
wounded policeman's body goes through the resuscitation procedures and
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brain scans familiar to. any watcher of medical documentaries, before 
becorning incorporated with its mechanical and electronic components into 
the law enforcement unit. This seems a useful point at which to note Bill 
Nichols' argument that the dependence on 'vital signs' in artificial life-support 
systems testifies to the power of cybernetic simulation itself, since it is on the 
basis of the simulation that décisions about the presence of life are taken. 15 
So accustomed have we become to this phenomenon (which Haraway would 
certainly take as an instance of our having already become cyborgs) that it 
can be used to anchor the speculative/impossible creation of the robocop as 
realistic, through the familiarity of the world of hi-tech medicine.
The combination of science and the supernatural, which in the case of 
the Frankenstein films is weighted to the supernatural and eventually comes 
to be fully supernatural, tips the other way in Metropolis. RoXwang's creature 
is made of metal and disguised in the shape of the heroine Maria by some 
pseudo-scientific electrical transference procedures carried out on the liv ing 
body of the real woman. The electric arcs, which are the indicators of this, 
were to become the standard signifying device for the artificial engendering of 
life thereafter. As well as this, other influential devices were the appearance, 
articulation and the portentous slow initial walk towards the camera (shot from 
quite a low angle), of the robot figure. This one being, was significant for 
different kinds of artificial human not merely for robots. The hybrid creation she 
became set the pattern for the behaviour and plot function of androids and 
cyborgs (not at this time differentiated)'.
Something of her apparent monumentality has been retained for robots 
and computers where it denotes the power and presence of the mechanical. 
The escape from the creator's intentions, the hedonism and destructiveness of 
the unleashed robot-curn-androidrcum-cyborg (for as a robot clothed with 
flesh she is the same as the terminator) would all prove irresistible tropes, 
though they did not originate with Lang. Much earlier, automata had gone 
mad and genies called up had proved uncontrollable. The absoluteness of the 
moral distinction between the human (the saintly 'real' Maria) and the artificial 
(the destructive false Maria) has declined, but remained the dominant position 
until the late 70s.
Peter Wollen has emphasised the link between excess sexuality and 
uncontrolled technology exemplified by the figure of the false Maria. She must 
be defeated by the true Maria for "productivity and social harmony" to be
^^Bill Nichols: "The Work of Culture", p37
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restored and for technology to operate r a t i o n a l l y inasmuch as an active 
sexuality is manifested in contemporary films by machines {Saturn 3 (1980), 
Demon Seed), it must still be neutralized and with much the same message. 
Such sexuality is now, however, male. In the 70's films, technology was used 
to render female sexuality non-threatening, most notably in The Stepford 
Wives (1975). The sexuality of androids is more complex, especially, as shall 
be demonstrated later, in the 80s. The extent to which the false Maria still 
provides an influential precursor is complicated by the split of the mechanical 
and the organic. Although her behaviour remains a shadow behind 
contemporary artificial humans, she is more substantially an influence on the 
appearance of the mechanical.
Gort was the robot companion of an alien. Smooth and featureless, his 
appearance would be echoed later not by robots but by cyborgs, as would his 
obedience to his master or his commands. Like the alien, Gort was benign 
though capable of destructiveness. Robbie the Robot influenced both the 
appearance and the behaviour of robots to come; vaguely humanoid but 
decorated with many flashing lights,' he was a childlike companion capable of 
generating humour through his literal interpretation of commands. He served, 
as did his look-alike in the US TV series Lost in Space, to promulgate the 
view of'robots as . tools, liable not to run amok, but to be imprecisely 
programmed by their human operators. Larger than their most frequent 
companions, they drew on beliefs about 'gentle giants' and often saved 
humans by deploying their superior strength. These were good beings, but not 
independent thinkers or actors.
Since these early manifestations, there have been a number of changes 
that lessen the apparent, distance between the depiction and the currently 
possible. Many of the more recent films featuring artificial beings embed the 
android, or more especially the cyborg, in situations designed to be futuristic 
rather than definitely SF. The posited futures obey the rules of minimal 
variation; the artificial being is the prime and sometimes the only novum, all 
other differences from the present are through small extrapolations. Robocop 
is a prime example, it asserts a definite date (the rather close 1999) and 
provides information about the changed situation by the incorporation of 
segments of future television programmes. Few recent films project futures 
much in advance of the present, though thirty or so years from the time of 
creation (Blade Runner \s set in 2019, Android  in 2028) is more common
IGpeter Wollen: "Cinema/Americanism/The Robot", New Formations, No. 8, Summer 1989, 
pp7-34. pp17-19
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than Robocop’s twelve.
Thus there has been a clarification of the boundaries between different 
types of artificial beings related, but not limited, to something of a clarification 
of the boundaries between SF and horror. Androids, cyborgs and robots have 
been distinguished from monsters and zombies. Developments in the fields of 
robotics, artificial intelligence and genetic engineering have rendered 
unnecessary the inclusion of alchemical or alien references that 
Frankenstein, Metropolis and The Day the Earth Stood Still required. Alien 
robots and androids still exist in fictions, but there are alternatives; alchemical 
allusions now serve only as generic markers of horror or fantasy.
As well as being consequent on changes in what is scientifically feasible, 
the changes and clarifications that have just been identified involve shifts in 
the relationships between elements of the machine and of the human. The 
structure of these relationships (within which depiction of intelligent machines 
and artificial humans functions) can fruitfully be explored through the use of a 
semiotic square. The se miotic square was developed by A.J.Greimas as a 
device to map,out the possible relationships between units of meaning. It goes 
beyond a simple binary opposition to posit "a.double relation of disjunction 
and c o n j u n c t i o n ’' . 1 7  The existence of a particular unit of meaning, S I, 
presupposes not merely its contrary, S2, but also the absences of both terms, 
referred to as 5^1 and S2. The relationships between these four form the 
square. In his Introduction to Greimas' Structural Semantics, Ronald 
Schleifer explains that the relationship between the first pair (and also the last 
pair) is contrary or equipollent; the relationship between the terms and their 
absences is contradictory or privative; and that within the two remaining pairs 
(SI and ^ 2  and 82 and Çl ) arbitrary or gradual, since they often appear to be 
on a continuum where, the opposition is cultural rather than l o g i c a l . is  
Although Greimas intended his square to exhaust all possible meanings and 
generally be transhistoric, it has been used by Fredric Jameson for a slightly 
different purpose. He uses it in conjunction with Lévi-Strauss' formalization of 
the structure of myth to overcome the static nature of the model and allow an 
analysis of narrative transformation and historical c h a n g e . since the
^^A.J.Greimas and F. Rastier: "The Interaction of Semiotic Constraints", Yale French 
Studies, No 41, 1968, pp86 - 105. p88.
13 Ronald Schleifer: "Introduction" to A.J. Greimas: Structurai Semantics: An Attempt at a 
Method, Lincoln and London, University of Nebraska Press, 1983. pxxxiii 
 ^^Fredric Jameson: "The Vanishing Mediator: Narrative Structure in Max Weber", Working 
Papers in Cultural Studies, 5, Spring 1974, ppl 11 -149. pi 27
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square presents information synchronicaily, it does not initially allow 
transformations over time to be examined. Jameson, however, rejects the 
static nature of the square (indeed he even rejects the shape, referring to it as 
a rectangle), arguing instead that its use lies in what it reveals about 
ideological closure. It is within such ideologically closed fields that 
transformations occurs. In his appropriation, the semiotic 'rectangle'
"becomes a vital instrument for exploring the 
semantic and ideological intricacies of the text 
[ . . .  ] because it maps the limits of a specific 
ideological consciousness and marks the 
conceptual points beyond which that 
consciousness cannot go and between which
it is condemned to oscillate."20
The use that follows here is quite explicitly diachronic, examining movement 
between the elements of the squares constructed to describe fictions 
produced at different times.
The initial contrary units (Si and S2) are 'human' and 'machine'. As is 
standard in the initial stage of constructing a square, the second pair of 
contrary- units (Gf and S2) are-designated 'non-human' and 'non-machine'. 
The category ST (non-human), can be specified as that in which artificial 
humans are located, since this is Greimas' positive complex term being 
simultaneously SI and S2. S2, the non-machine category, is more 
problematic. This, the negative complex term, neither SI nor S2, is frequently 
unspecifiable; the difficulty is not peculiar to this example. Not only does 
Jameson focus on it for much of his productive work, but Greimas himself 
mentions its particularity in the very final section of Structural Semantics 
(XIII.5.e.). Neither Greimas nor Jameson suggest a definite protocol for 
specifying this term, but I would like to suggest that perhaps the category 'non­
machine' can be concretized as 'animal'. This will later be shown to be quite 
productive.21 The aim of identifying the term is to actualize the ideological
^3jameson: Political Unconscious, p 47
21 Since developing the square and identifying the fourth term as 'animal', I have read James
H. Kavanagh's essay "Feminism, Humanism and Science m Alien", in which he develops 
a similar model from the different opposing dyad: human-alien. Not only does he place an 
artifical human in the same S1 position, but he too identifies ^ 2  as animal. While very 
interested in the degree of overlap between the two squares, I do not feel that the 
identification of the artificial being as both alien and human is defensible outside the 
particular specialised field (the analysis of Alien) where Kavanagh deploys it. Even there I
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closure, while the difficulty of doing so points to Jameson's belief that semiotic 
rectangles can be used to reveal
"those logical and ideological centres a particular 
historical text [though in my case a series of texts] 
fails to realize, or on the contrary seeks desperately
to r e p r e s s . " 2 2
The semiotic square developed from the opposition between human and 
machine then, is as follows:
human  machine
(S l)fk ^  ^  (S2)
(animal) non-human artificial human
(§2) ‘ (SI)
As mentioned earlier, Greimas described the vertical relationships as gradual 
and based on an opposition that was cultural, rather than logical. This is the 
case for machines and artificial humans. The identification of the S2 term as 
'animal' accords with this requirement too.
The SI term has been very intentionally left just as 'artificial human' 
because it is the various identifications of this in the fictions, concurrent with 
developing scientific knowledge in areas like cybernetics, electronics, artificial 
intelligence and bioengineering, that are particularly illuminating in terms of 
what it means to be human (or not). As the next section will show, as the 
extent to which fictional beings become scientifically credible increases (and 
usually considerably before they become fully possible), they no longer 
happily occupy this space. An examination of the narratives over time will 
reveal what happens - the artificial human category is best understood as
requiring strong fictionality. _ _ ___________________ _____
The first examples will be two influential ones from before the research
find it problematic, since I cannot perceive a continuum between the alien and Ash (the 
android, wrongly identified by Kavanagh as a robot). James H. Kavanagh: "Feminism, 
Humanism and Science in Alien", in Annette Kuhn (ed.): Alien Zone, p79 
22jameson: Political Unconscious, p 49
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period. In M etropo lis  the false Maria is, as was pointed out above, a 
compound of robot, android and cyborg, categories that were not then all that 
separate, the robot part did involve a scientific premise, but otherwise she was 
a creature totally of fiction. She is undoubtedly an artificial human. Robbie the 
Robot from Forbidden Planet on the other hand, is not a happy occupant of 
the artificial human category. He is far too explicitly a machine to occupy the 
'S’1 corner. Robotics and computing had both advanced in the thirty years 
between the two films and vaguely humanoid, programmable robots were 
starting to sound more scientific than science fictional.
Actually within my research period, the late 60s and early-to-mid 70s 
provide intelligent computers and semi-intelligent robots as further uneasy 
occupants of the S^1 corner, though the Gunslinger in Westworld (1973) and 
the various wives in The Stepford Wives may have at the time been 
reasonable occupants of the artificial human category on the basis of their 
convincing appearance and movement.
The most definite occupant of the artificial human place to occur since the 
false Maria, is the child born at thé very end of Demon Seed to Julie Christie 
and the intelligent computér, Proteus. Much more than is the case for HAL in 
2001, Proteus himself is potentially a candidate too, being independently 
intelligent and self-reproducing. He is not presented as an artificial human, 
however, and his casé makes clear the point made at the beginning, that in all 
these fictions a decidedly human appearance seems required and only his 
child has this. On television the shift noted earlier from the fictional cyborgs in 
The Avengers, ior example, to the unidentified-as-cyborgs bionic people had 
occurred concurrently with advances in medical technology.
The move of cyborgs, intelligent computers and human-appearing robots 
closer to scientific actuality, (and in the case of cyborgs substantially so), left 
the artificial human category occupied, as it still is, almost entirely by androids 
- like Ash from Alien and the replicants from Blade Runner. Indeed apparent 
exceptions, like the terminator, robocop and Friendship from Friendship's 
Death  (1987) are in fact posited to be something else - a flesh covered 
machine, a cyborg and an alien robot, respectively.
The modulations in the semiotic square then can be seen as driven by 
the interactions of fiction and scientific knowledge. What happens however to 
the beings displaced because they have become more scientifically credible? 
The question can be answered most clearly by the case of the cyborg, thé 
being that has been argued to have escaped from the fictional into full, if
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unacknowledged, actuality. The cyborg is a hybrid of human and machine and 
serves in the role of mediator between the two initial opposites, precisely as 
Jameson’s suggested use of the anthropological figure of the trickster 
d o e s . 2 3  As Coyote, the trickster, mediates between herbivorous animals and 
beasts of prey, because he is hirhself a carrion eater and so serves to resolve 
the opposition,^"^ so cyborgs should do for humans and machines. Perhaps 
in fact this is what the robocop manages. In the 'real world', the refusal to 
acknowledge the cyborg status of people with artificial components makes this 
role difficult. Tricksters, Lévi-Strauss assures us, are traditionally ambiguous 
figures and so has the cyborg become. The. simple portryal of cyborgs as 
always bad has gone and now, when they are shown, they may be either 
good or bad.
The same applies to intelligent computers. The place of these is a little 
more difficult since they do not yet exist, but they too seem mediating figures, 
perhaps on the same axis as the cyborgs though tending more to the 
machine. Lévi-Strauss' formulation allows for several orders of mediator. 
Alternatively, they may be located on the right hand vertical axis between 
machines and,artificial humans; dertainly this is where Proteus seems most 
suited.
This evacuation of the ^1 corner of all but the substantially fictional is the 
first significant indication here of the effects of the different statuses of 
discourses able to make truth, claims. When scientific discourses become 
applicable to an artificial being, it must be removed from the artificial human 
category and moved towards either of the two initial oppositions. Robots and 
intelligent computers become machines and cyborgs become humans. 
Artificial humans can only be spoken of Jn discourses without the power to 
make truth claims. The science shown at work in the fictions where androids 
are created must be designated 'pseudo' - thus the scientist making replicant 
eyes in Blade Runner works in furs, and Dr Daniel, played by Klaus Kinski in 
Andro/c/, is obviously mad.
So, looking at changes in the portrayal of artificial beings over time has 
shown the interaction between fictional and scientific discourses operating in 
a different way from the way it has previously. Here it is an aspect of the fiction 
that requires 'purity'. Artificial humans cannot be too (scjentjfica!ly). e r e ®  
they become recognised as machines or humans. Changes in 'real world'
23Fredric Jameson: The Prison-house of Language, Princeton University Press,1972. 
pi 65
Claude Lévi-Strauss: Structural Anthropology, Vol.1, (trans. by Claire Jacobson and 
Brooke Grundfest Schoepf), London, Allen Lane the Penguin Press; 1968. p224
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science alter their status and identity within the fictions.
The suggestion that the fourth term of the semiotic square might be 
'animal' is most productive when the human - - animal continuum is 
considered. While the distinction is indeed cultural (and the continuum could 
simply be labelled 'animal' or even 'zoological'), it is a distinction most 
emphatically insisted upon in many if not most cultures and certainly in 
'advanced' ones. In most Western religions, animals do not have souls (nor do 
machines and, it seems not unreasonable to assume, nor would artificial 
humans) and their labour is at the disposal of their owners (again like 
machines and putatively like artificial humans). The traditional characteristics 
distinguishing humans from animals - the use of tools, the possession of a 
language and the ability to laugh - have all recently had their solely human 
identity challenged by scientific research. The use of tools, the possession of 
a language and a sense of humour are all important markers, and in that 
order, along the machine - - artificial human continuum too. Very few androids 
or cyborgs smile, let alone laugh, and doing so is a highly significant act.
The shifting of beings out of the artificial human category fulfils an 
important function in the exploration of what it means to be human. As beings 
approach possibility, they become either machines or humans and thus the 
challenge that is offered to humanity by the artificial, is never other than 
fictional. Within fictional discourse, however, the challenge, and particularly its 
ethical and political aspects, can continue to be explored. Perhaps something 
of what it means to be human can .be determined from looking for 
characteristics shared by the terms of the semiotic square other than the 
human. For example, are animals and the entire machine - - artificial human 
continuum united in that they can be owned and their labour disposed of 
without recompense? Animals and machines would certainly appear to be so, 
but for artificial humans their inclusion in this is frequently questioned, overtly 
or not.
This particular distinction is most informative. Although it may rarely be 
discussed, slavery is an issue in the fictional treatment of artificial humans. 
The machine-like quality of androids and cyborgs, their soullessness and their 
ability to be owned make them 'ideal' slaves, yet their humanity is such that 
this can neither be unequivocal nor directly addressed. One way in which it 
does arise is through 'rebellion', a term which can be usefully counterposed to
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'resistance' and 'revolution'. Rebellion occurs frequently in SF dealing with 
artificial humans, where it is usually the 'turning against their creators' 
mentioned at thé .start of the chapter, but outside SF, it has meaning 
principally in relation to slaves, the colonized and children. The last term 
resonates interestingly against the two previous ones and provides another 
way to consider the depiction particularly of robots. It will be taken up later. For 
the moment it is illuminating, and not just in this regard, to consider the 
discourse within which artificial humans are embedded as analogous to a 
colonial one. Colonial (and postcolonial) cultures are characteristically 
hybridized, as a consequence of the precolonial and imperial mix. This, even 
more than the matter of labour, is the basis of the applicability of some aspects 
of colonial discourse to the fictions concerning artificial beings. Whether they 
are the mediating hybrids of the machine and the human, like the cyborg, or 
the more complex, heavily fictional hybrids, the artificial humans, makes little 
difference until they are fully realizable. In what follows, 'artificial human' will 
continue to refer to androids and the fictional cyborgs.
Considerations of colonial discourses stress how they deny difference to 
their subject peoples, homogenizing them into an undifferentiated Other.25 
This aspect does not necessarily immediately fit well. Because the artificial 
beings are created and are created for particular purposes, their functional 
differentiation is frequently ernphasised. Thus in Blade Runner, the four 
rebellious replicants are introduced by their file descriptions which list what 
they were designed for, however it is made clear that they are not particularly 
individualized (Pris, for instance, is a 'basic pleasure model') and only Rachel, 
the initially noh-rebellious experimental model, seems likely to have been a 
'one-off. Artificial humans are not so much undifferentiated as replicable, 
ultimately objects of rhass production. That they are essentially homogenized 
is revealed by how, in the: process of struggling to become recognized as 
human (generally a shared and unquestioned aim, for what more could the 
artificial desire?), they reveal individual characteristics and differentiate 
themselves. This has not applied generally to cyborgs however. The multiply 
manifesting cyborgs of the late 60s and 70s, essentially creatures of British 
television, (cybermen, servos et af) were absolutely undifferentiated; identical 
featureless beings obedient to their rnistress or master, they did not change in 
Jhe course of the narrative and never aspired to, nor were accredited with,
25g g Homi Bhabha: "The Other Question - the Stereotype and Colonial Discourse", 
Screen, 24(6), Nov.-Dee. 1983 pp 18 - 36. Also Chandra Talpade Mohanty : "Under 
Western Eyes: Feminist Scholarship and Colonial Discourses", Feminist Studies, 14(3), 
Fall 1988, pp 333-358.
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human status. This strong differentiation of cyborgs from androids, though not 
evident in the recent Robocop, is contrary to the homogenizing characteristic 
of colonial discourse. Fictional cyborgs are the oddities here even when other 
artificial beings are considered. If robots are depicted as intelligent (e.g. C3P0 
in the Star IVars trilogy), they are not much differentiated from androids in the 
revelation of their essential humanity - perhaps a compensatory instance of 
accord with colonial discourses. The anomaly about the robocop may be 
explained by his being diegetically described as a robot, but probably most 
influential was the shift in his scientific credibility.
The equivocal differentiation reflects an instability in the construction of 
the subject of SF, analogous to that in colonial discourse. Homi Bhabha has 
noted how the fixity conventionally implied by the stereotype depends on the 
simultaneous acknowledgement and disavowal of difference.^® However 
momentary the adoption of a particular subject position, it is always 
problematic.
The difficulties evident in attempting to examine the posited subjectivities 
of artificial beings are variously addressed by this. The artificial beings least 
satisfactorily described ,by analogy to . colonial discourse are intelligent 
computers. They are also the most fixed and the most strongly marked as 
possessing a unitary subjectivity. Robots too tend this way and it seems most 
probable that it results from their being predominantly (or entirely) machines. 
They do not in consequence pose such a problem to what it means to be 
human. They usually have no function nor position in SF other than as 
workers. When they are shown attempting to move outside this, it is 
overwhelmingly into the familial and the transgression this represents is 
handled by the fictions being generically inflected either by comedy, as for 
example Heart Beeps (1981), or by horror, as is the case with Demon Seed.
Cyborgs and ancirdids are both less marked by the mechanical and 
hence more similar to colonial subjects. In what follows, various ways in which 
they demonstrate the "fixed form of difference"^^ of the stereotype and how 
the more nearly they approach the human, the less unitary their subjectivity 
appears, will be indicated. As will be seen to be so often the case, Android  
provides a particularly interesting example. Max, the young android hero, is 
shown at work, at play and in love; his non-human abilities and reactions are 
more evident in the first and his human in the other two, but he still exhibits a 
high degree of consistency. When late in the film his creator, the scientist Dr.
^®Bhabha: "The Other Ouestion", p29 
^^Ibid., p30
192
Daniel, wants to use him to kill the intruding human escaped criminals, he 
effects a personality change physically, by switching a circuit chip in Max's 
skull. Quite literally reinscribed, he sees and behaves differently. Such 
variations in personality, though few are as explicitly depicted as this, can 
reasonably be understood as an acknowledgement of a rearticulation of the 
subject.
In Blade Runner too the replicants, created as workers, are allowed to 
exhibit a range of positionalities as they seek to extend their life spans. Yet 
they have been created to be short-lived precisely because the longer they 
live the more complex and dangerous they become. While they are no more 
than workers, their superiority is desirable, but their loss of this unitariness 
(and the development of social or political awareness, familial concerns or 
desires for more) is indeed a fall into sin.
The difficulties with artificial beings all centre around their functions as 
workers. Whether intelligent battle computers or sex-doll androids, they have 
been created to work and usually to better human capacities in whatever their 
specialised field is. They are stronger and smarter, more loyal servants, more 
fluent interpreters, more compliant bed-mates. Problems arise when the 
worker exceeds the mechanical and wants more; when the unitary subjectivity 
perceiving everything through work, fragments and other desires are 
articulated. The artificial human signifies its move to humanity by wanting 
something other than those things which serve the interests of its 
owner/employer. Usually it is the attempt to get whatever this is, that leads to 
the revolt against the creator. Where the artificial being does not want more 
and retains its fixity, some other device will be needed to drive the narrative - 
as is the case in Allen where Ash serves the Company until his end, while the 
alien itself determines the action. ■
In asserting That the way artificial humans are characterized and 
deployed in film and TV fictions has characteristics of colonial discourses, in 
no way is an identity between actual colonized peoples and these imaginary 
non-human artefacts being suggested. The subjects of colonial discourses are 
themselves constituted within discourse, although they are not 'equally' 
artificial, having 'real world' referents. What is being examined is an analogy, 
and whether, as colonial discourses are increasingly_ questioned and 
contested, some aspects of them transfer to a less contested area, and, if they 
do, what can be surmised from this.
Bhabha points out that
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"the objective of colonial discourse is to construe 
' : the bolonized as a population of degenerate 
types on the basis of racial origin, in order to justify 
conquest and to'establish systems of administration
and lnstruction".28
This provides part of the reason why a colonial discourse which incorporates 
a racist one, rather than a racist discourse alone, is more suited to 
considerations of artificial humans, despite the absence of a land to be 
occupied and subjected, the absence in fact, by and large of a colony. The 
basis of the particular suitability lies in the reasons for which the discourse is 
constructed. Racism within colonial discourse is used in part to support 
purposes with questionable moral bases. For artificial humans, it is not 
'conquest' that needs to be explained, but creation, and the systems needing 
establishment include, within administration, the regulation of that creation 
and its subsequent deployment. The population may not strictly need to be 
construed as degenerate, but their origin, indeed their generation, provides a 
physical basis,to which their subordinate, disposable status can be ascribed. 
They are made labourers in our image and we compensate for our hubris in 
their creation by ordering their existence and restricting their opportunities to 
exhibit their imperfections (by keeping them off-planet, by giving them limited 
life-expectancies, or by programming their behaviour according to Isaac 
Asimov's laws of subordination to the human29).
The appropriateness of colonial discourses to discussions of artificial 
humans lies also in the way such discourses are moral rather than truthful. As 
ultimately political discourses they attempt to call upon truth (as with the 
'scientific' arguments common in the nineteenth century supporting racism 
and sexism on the basis of brain size), but this is to support their perceptions 
about the rightful location of power. It is somewhat ironic that it is not possible 
to talk about artificial humans in a discourse with a claim to speak the truth,
^®lbid., p 23
^®These are actually known as Asimov's Laws of Robotics, articulated as follows:
1."A robot may not injure a human being nor, through inaction, allow a human being to
-  ... come to harm. .......... ...... _. . ______ _________________ : _ ____
2. A robot must obey the orders given it by human beings except where such orders 
would conflict with the First Law.
3. A robot must protect its own existence as long as such protection does not conflict 
with the First or Second Law."
quoted in Patricia S. Warrick: The Cybernetic imagination in Science Fiction, Cambridge, Mass., 
The MIT Press, 1980. p65
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because as this is done the beings shift to become machines or humans, but 
that a moral discourse within which their existence can be circumscribed, is 
already effectively in place.
Another characteristic of colonial discourses is the way in which the 
Other is used to define the One.30 Human is the centre inasmuch as non­
human defines the boundaries, the margins, the periphery. Machines and 
animals have long served this function, but as slippage occurs, as machines 
and animals 'acquire' language capabilities, depiction of artificial humans 
helps explore and ramify the periphery, stabilising the centre. Post-modern 
theories may be used to revalue this function of colonial discourse, pointing to 
the moves to the margins and their re-evaluation, as well as the moves of the 
margins to the centre (Stuart Hall's 're-diasporisation'3i), but it may indeed 
be that within this 'real world' shift, stories of cyborgs and androids function as 
sites within which residual ideologies can lodge. The discourse can remain in 
circulation with its ideological content undisguised, because its referent is so 
very absent. These stories about artificial humans can only be understood by 
analogy with the colonized; when or as the analogous structure decays, the 
discourse is weakened, but if it can be established in a modified context 
before such a decay occurs, then it remains available for later deployment. 
Alternatively (or even in addition, for ideological work does not require 
consistency and colonial discourse is characterised by hybridity) the androids' 
demonstrations of humanity could be far from disguised depictions of the 
move inwards of the marginal.
Having established the analogy, it is often quite striking to note how the 
stories of artificial humans, and particularly of androids, act out colonial 
discourse. There is for example the essential hybridity. Bhabha points to the 
ambivalence of the discourse which both requires that natives be seen in 
certain situations as progressively reformable (the 'civilizing' mission of the 
colonizer) and that they also be seen as separate, different from the colonizer, 
and visibly so, in order that their capacities for self-government and 
independence can be denied.32 Thus some androids reveal their 'humanity', 
their ability to be 'civilized', while others reveal their intransigent malevolence, 
their hybridity often manifesting as unpredicability (will th is  one be good or
. _?®e.g. Edward Said: Orientalism, New York, Vintage Books, 1979.
Stuart Hall: "Centre and Periphery in the Field of Representation" , Address to the 
Association of Art Historians Conference, University of London, Institute of Education, 
6 April 1989.
®^Bhabha: "The Other Question", pp34-5
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bad?), but always their separation from 'true' humans is shown. 'Skin', the 
central motif of separation in colonial discourse, does not function in this way 
for androids (who are almost invariably white), although the bigoted police 
chief in Blade Runner refers to the replicants as 'skin jobs', a term which 
Deckard, the blade running hero, glosses for us in voice-over as analogous to 
'nigger'.
The function that skin performs of displaying colonial status on the body 
of the colonial subject, is replaced for artificial humans by a particular form of 
dismemberment - usually involving the head, locus of the brain which 
determines life (as in 'brain dead') and the eyes, symbols of the soul. 
Separation from 'true' humans is shown by the ability of androids and cyborgs 
to continue talking through or despite dismemberment: Dr Daniel in Android, 
the 'simular', an android/robot replacement for the hero Alex, in The Last 
Starfighter (1984), and Ash, the science officer in Alien, all speak after their 
heads are removed; the terminator, robocop and Darth Vader in Return of the 
J e d / '(1983) all demonstrate their particular being by dismemberments 
around the eyes. Intelligent robots may be totally taken to pieces and 
reassembled without loss - C3P0, the g unfighter in W estworld  and the 
revealed-as-a-robot terminator must be shown to be thoroughly dis­
membered. Apparently they feel no pain; certainly they require no anaesthetic
- though C3P0 becomes rusty, and requires oiling. None of these scenes is 
incidental or passed over rapidly. They establish and display a rational, even 
a scientific, basis for different treatment. The scenes assert that these beings 
are not like people - they talk while wires hang and white fluid drips from their 
severed necks; they matter of factly remove long screws from their own 
temples. They do not feel things as we do. An illuminating variation is 
provided by Bishop, the android in Aliens who does not turn against his 
creators and indeed redeems artificial humans from the status of betrayer, 
which Ash in A//er? had exemplified. Although surviving as little more than a 
pair of arms and a head and leaking the characteristic white fluid from his 
shattered rib-cage, he is able to play a decisive role in Ripley's triumph over 
the mother alien and escape with the child. Newt.
- There is however a further_difference. here. These examples are all of 
male artificial humans. For female artificial humans, the situation seems less 
clear. Their doubled difference may be one complication, their comparative 
absence certainly is another. Cassandra in Andro id  remains whole, un­
dismembered, as does the female space-ship engineer in Spacehunter:
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Adventures in the Forbidden Zone (1983) although she is soon killed off, and 
none of the female replicants in Biade Runner are present during the scene 
in the film which substitutes for dismemberment - the one showing the 
construction of replicants’ eyes. The artificial women in The Stepford 
Wives^^ are not shown disassembled, though the non-intelligent female 
robots of Futureworld  (1976) are. These are insufficient examples to be 
definite on this point, though they are virtually all the available instances. 
Some other visual display of non-human status is usually achieved. It may be 
that the dismemberment of women is such a strong generic marker of the 
horror film, that this acts as a restraining factor here where, after all, other 
devices can perform the differentiation.
The problem of the doubled difference of artificial women has particular 
importance because of the role that women traditionally have played in 
defining gender difference. It is women who are different; men who are the 
norm. Multiplying difference is always likely to cause difficulties to systems 
built on binary oppositions. It was noted in the previous chapter how in Star 
Trek only Lt. Uhura is allowed to be doubly different (black and female) and 
still human - though Star Trek: the  Next Generation is not quite as restricted. 
None of the artificial women being considered is other than white. Depicting 
artificial women rarely (or, if black, never) is one solution to the problem of 
intensified Otherness, depicting them so frozen in stereotypical femininity that 
gender stereotyping becomes risibly obvious (The Stepford Wives, 
Westworld ar\6 Futureworld) is another.
Cassandra, Dr. Daniel’s ’perfect woman’ in Android, is quintessentially 
the classic android - emotionless, rational and with no scruples about 
violence. She is clearly the most intelligent being in the film and equally 
clearly she is ’inhuman’ and counterposed to the lovable, fallible, human- 
aspirant Max, the male android so much more ’feminine’ in his dependence 
and slight physique. Cassandra’s extremely feminine appearance, including 
her very long blonde hair, is negated by her cold rationality and total 
competence with an almost androgynous result. Gender does not signify 
difference here any more than genesis does - Max is without doubt the most 
’human’ being in the film and the three androids are as different from each
Other as the three main humans are.________________________
Janet Bergstrom has explored some examples of androgyny in artificial 
women, though not in Android, to demonstrate the unreliability of classic sex
33$o few are the instances, that the The Stepford Wives has been included although it is not 
explicitly set in the future. It might be considered to be set in the future because it contains 
one element which is not technicaily feasible now (the android/robot women themselves).
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roles in contemporary society. She is not concerned with mainstream films, 
but notes that while it should be expected that sexual difference would 
function strongly in films where the human/non-human distinction is under 
question, this does not necessarily o c c u r . 3 4  The women she examines 
embody the androgyny of the fashion model, not sexless, but marked by both 
genders. As well as her example of Cindy, the model who is duplicated by 
computer simulation in Looker (1981), such androgyny may be seen in the 
replicants of Blade Runner - in Pris' gymnast's body and in Rachel's 
confidence in her first encounter with Deckard. (Her loss of this androgyny 
accompanies her gaining of the human mate!) But this acknowledgement of 
the instability in sexual difference as well as a growing uncertainty about the 
human/non-human distinction is too great for the majority of 80's films, 
especially those achieving a substantial audience. They deal with the difficulty 
by concentrating on the latter uncertainty - about humanity. This emphasises 
again how it is the question of what it means to be human that is explored 
through the fictional portrayals of artificial beings. Constance Penley has even 
suggested that this is the only difference that can now be readily represented 
since there is ."increasingly less practical difference between men and
w o m e n " . 3 5
Suggesting that there is no discernable difference between real and 
artificial humans appears to be extremely unsettling both within and outside 
the fictions. Blade Runner, which comes closest to asserting that there is no 
difference, spends a considerable amount of time on the minutae of the test 
which uncovers the artificial. The importance of this test outside the fiction is 
evident in its being the subject of the only section of dialogue to transfer from 
Philip K. Dick's novel Do- Androids Dream o f Electric Sheep? on which the 
film is based. As well as this, in reviews of the film and also in a number of the 
critical articles on it, this same Voigt-Kampff .test, a totally fictional device which 
performs the differentiation within the narrative, is referred to as if had some 
extra-textual existence. The disquiet with the suggestion of the 
indistinguishability of the 'real' and artificial human appears even greater than 
it is when the distinction has to be made between humans and aliens 
disguised as humans - as in Invasion of the Bodysnatchers (1956 and 1978) 
or 7/?ey L/Ve (1988). '
34janet Bergstrom: "Androids and Androgyny", Camera Obscura, Vol. 15, 1986, pp37 - 64. 
pp39-40
35constance Penley: "Time Travel, Primal Scene and the Critical Dystopia" in James Donald 
(ed.): Fantasy and the Cinema, London, BFI, 1989. p204
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The reduction suggested by Bergstrom in the importance of sexual 
difference when the issue of the meaning of being human is being explored, is 
perhaps partly explanatory of the particular treatment of such central aspects 
of being human as reproduction and sexuality. The depiction of artificial 
humans gives the illusion of masculine birth, of their coming from nowhere, or 
at least from nothing/no-one female. There may be few artificial women, but 
there are no female creators. Thé nearest to one is the female executive 
second-in-charge of the Robocop team, but the cyborg himself is Bob Morton’s 
'baby'. Tyrell and Sebastian create the replicants and Batty acknowledges this 
by addressing Tyrell as Father. Dr. Daniel creates both Max and Cassandra; 
the point is established before we learn that he too is an android. As earlier 
one solution to the problem of how to show the doubly different was 
suggested to be not to show them at all, it rnay be wondered whether, if 
women are needed neither for procreation nor to represent the Other, they 
need be shown either.
This relates to what Vivian Sobchack has called the main unconscious 
problem of the SF film genre, which ‘
"centres around the male desire to break free from 
biological dependence on the female as Mother 
and Other, and to mark the male self as separate . 
and autonomous: The realization of this desire - 
certainly at the level of science fiction narrative - 
necessitates the rejection and repression of 
female difference and its threat to male autonomy."^®
She is concerned with astronauts rather than artificial beings and the essay 
comes from- the early 80s, but the general applicability of this point is 
undiminished. Such an.escape can no longer simply be made by going into 
space since women crew and even command the spaceships. It must be 
made more fundamentally.
Male creation of life is only part of the response. The beings born without 
mothers may not need nurturers either. They are born/created adult with 
memories (if such are deemed desirable), knowledge and behaviour patterns 
all given by scientific means along with life in the laboratory. Demon Seed
provides something of an exception. The computer Proteus himself is
laboratory-constructed and certainly not humanoid, being represented as
33vivian Sobchack: "The Virginity of Astronauts: Sex and the Science Fiction Film" in 
George Slusser and Eric S. Rabkin (eds.): Shadows of the Magic Lamp, Carbondale, 
Southern Illinois University Press, 1985. p47
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contained within several huge turbine-shaped devices and manifesting on 
large video screens in abstract light displays. The independent successor he 
creates however does require a mother, although she is not required for long, 
since gestation takes only three weeks and the child (after a further even 
shorter period in an incubator) is born aged eleven.
The sexuality of the artificial human is another aspect that can be 
explored through analogy with the colonial subject. In the same way that the 
colonised is both sexually excessive and uncomplicatedly innocent, 
occupying the margins and leaving the centre to the coloniser, so the artificial 
human is unable to exhibit 'normal' sexuality. Although not from within a 
colonially discursive context, Dan Rubey's comment about Star Wars is 
relevant here. He examines how Luke Skywalker's racial superiority is 
structured with regard to the robots and various aliens.
"The robots and the Wookie perform another 
function in the fantasy system of Star Wars.
They serve as non-cdmpetitive, non-sexual 
comrades and friends, one of the chief emotional 
■ satisfactions of racism."37
While not endorsing Rubey's assertion about the emotional satisfactions of 
racism (and satisfactions for whom?), the innocence of these characters is 
certainly striking. Admittedly they are in a film directed primarily at children so 
the innocence can be argued to be determined by the nature of the audience, 
but it does contribute to the overall cross-textual impression of artificial beings. 
Further 'non-competitive, non-sexual comrades and friends' are to be found in 
other films with substantial proportions of children in the anticipated 
audiences and in the majority of television programmes that feature any kind 
of artificial beings, for instance Twicky and Dr. Theopoulos in Buck Rogers in 
the Twenty-fifth Century. A slightly more ambiguous example is provided by 
the 'little friends' made by the genetic engineer Sebastian in Biade Runner. 
Mirroring their creator's disabilities and made tiny to be utterly unthreatening, 
they nonetheless have some of the lascivious aura traditionally possessed by 
mannikins. _ 2 _
Further exceptions to sexual centrality come with the displayed sexuality 
of Max in Android, Byron in Slipstream  and Roy and Pris in Blade Runner 
which in each case is" that of adolescents rather than adults. Sexually
^^Rubey: "Star Wars: Not So Long Ago", p93
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excessive figures include Hector, the robot who pursues Farrah Fawcett- 
Majors in Saturn 3, the sexually inquisitive computer in Electric Dreams 
(1984) and the computer which forcibly impregnates Julie Christie in Demon 
Seed. Although this last example would qualify regardless, probably any 
sexuality exhibited by a computer would be deemed excessive. Almost the 
same applies to robots. Strangely, androids and cyborgs whose behaviour is 
negatively-coded are usually sexually inactive.
The innocence referred to above as characteristic of a significant number 
of the artificial beings, is part of a tendency to depict them as childlike - again 
a phenomenon of colonial discourse. It is by no means pervasive either in the 
discourse or throughout the various examples of androids, cyborgs and robots 
(though if the associated adolescent sexuality is added, it becomes more 
noticable), but it functions as yet another device to deny equal status. It is most 
common of robots and least of cyborgs - through even the robocop shows 
some evidence of it as when on the run he can only eat baby food. He 
disputes such relegation however by using the empty jars for target practice.
The childlike depiction is in conflict to some extent with another area in
which artificial humans occupy the margins, which is the issue of rationality.
Most androids, cyborgs and computers are hyper-rational - and in a number of
instances it is seen to counterpoint their asexuality. Ash is a prime example
here, as are the majority of computers. Perhaps to compensate for this lack of
sexuality (and to provide narrative interest which rationality may be regarded
as lacking), rationality is frequently accompanied by violence, depicted as the
result of the rationality itself. Both Ash and MUTHR, the computer, in Alien,
rationally follow their directives to the point of allowing the crew to be killed;
HAL similarly kills his crew in following his orders; and Byron, the emotionless
perfect servant of Slipstream, has killed his master, because it seemed the
  -  . .
logical thing to do, even before the film opens. The letter's rationality, which is
by no means as strongly marked as his lack of emotion, is impaired by his
falling in love. Although he continues to appear facially impassive after the
killing of his beloved, he violently disposes of her murderer before returning to
his original highly quixotic mission. In some ways he appears more like a
robot..
~  —Robots, even intelligent ones, are rarely depicted as particularly rational, 
perhaps because they are usually treated as, at best, sub-computers; they are 
primarily workers. Like computers, their programming is foregrounded, but 
since they obviously signify 'hands' rather than 'brains', they may run amok as 
they do in Saturn 3, W estw orld  and Runaway  (1984). This distinction
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between 'hands' and 'brains' applies to the mechanical not the biological. 
Androids and cyborgs both are depicted as workers. Dr. Daniel in Android  
declares on his animation of Cassandra: "I have created the perfect working 
class, not to mention the perfect woman." Apart from Dr. Daniel himself, whose 
android status is withheld for narrative purposes, the only middle class 
android is Rachel in Blade Runner. She is also the only android allowed 
even the possibility of a happy, comparatively equal relationship with a 
human.
The older cyborgs were the acme of passionless, violent rationality, and 
inasmuch as the more recent terminator is a cyborg he certainly is impassively 
violent. Perhaps it is his essential robot nature that denies him rationality, 
though opportunities in the film for a purpose-built killing-machine to exhibit 
that characteristic would seem slight. Robocop, the most recent cyborg, 
maintains most of the classic pattern: he tonelessly advises the attempted 
rape victim he has saved to consult a rape crisis centre; and he comments that 
he can remember the family of his human components, but not feel anything 
about them. Diegetically coded as a robot, the constraints of his programming 
are central to the narrative tension.
The rationality of cybernetic systems, including here all the artificial 
beings, can be regarded as derived from seeing them not as imitations of 
human intelligence but from regarding human intelligence as reflecting a 
cybernetic model. This is a very major change in perceptions about what it 
means to be human and about the relationship beteeen human and machine, 
but it is one that occurred in the 'real world', not the fictional. Now, however, as 
Barry King says,
"the cyborg ceases to be regarded as the 
subordinated creature of human intelligence 
and reason, and is increasingly viewed as a 
paradigm of such qualities."38
This is not as specific as it sounds, for King does not differentiate androids and 
cyborgs, and his main example is the android Ulysses in Making Mr Right 
(1987). Ulysses provides an indication of the moves of the margins to the 
centre, or vice versa, for, while rational, he is also “compassionate and 
sensitive, strongly in contrast to the warped single-minded rationality of his 
human creator. Nonetheless, in almost all the films released since 1982, the
Barry King: "The Burden of Max Headroom", Screen, 30(1&2), Winter/Spring 1989, 
pp122 - 138. p124
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cold implacability of the artificial being has been modified - the robocop's final 
smile promises humanity, the android in Aliens saves Ripley and the child, 
the reawakened and reprogrammed HAL in 2010 sacrifies himself to save 
the Russian-American crew. The android/robot replacement for the hero Alex 
in The Last Starfighter is another willing sacrifice. Batty saves Deckard and 
Byron's 'aberrant' behaviour has already been noted.
The change from cold rationality to compassion has also been noted by 
the main chronicler and analyst of the American SF film since the 50s - Vivian 
Sobchack. Updating her earlier study and taking account of post-modernism, 
she writes
"In the context of our newly exteriorized 
self-consciousness, the contemporary SF film 
has emphatically figured robots, computers, 
androids and replicants seeking emotional 
as well as functional fulfillment. They evidence 
doubt and desire, a sense of negation and loss, 
a self-consciousness and sentimentality new to 
the genre."39
The .exception to this warmer, more human rationality is Cassandra 
organising Max into disguise at the end of Android so that they can return to 
Earth, but not for the pleasurable indulgences that Max had earlier had in 
mind. "We are not meant to be governed by the whims of men" she says, 
telling him that they will join others like themselves who already live there in 
hiding. This is an extremely rare instance of political awareness shown by an 
artificial human. Although computers may fake independent political decisions 
- Proteus refuses to mine the sea-bed {Demon Seed) and the Russian and 
American computers join forces to attempt world domination in Colossus: The 
Forbin Project (1969) - artificial humans hardly ever do. Rebellious androids 
are usually concerned with some individual quest: Byron wants to find android 
Shangri-la; Hector, the robot in Saturn 3, wants sexual satisfaction; and the 
replicants want extended life-spans. Though this last in particular is presented 
as an understandable desire, presumably shared by other replicants, it is not 
shown_as-other-than redressing an individual injustice._The social awareness 
of the artificial is generally low - 'emotional and functional fulfilment' is the 
extent of their aspirations.
Before leaving consideration of colonial discourse in fictional
39vivian Sobchack: Screening Space, pp 237-8
203
presentations of future artificial beings, one consolidated example will be 
presented. Blade Runner has been chosen not only because it provides a 
very interesting case, but also because the film has been so influential on 
subsequent representations of the future and on critical discourse about them.
There are explicit references in the film to colonies. The advertising blimp 
which drifts through one of the early scenes, advocates migration to the off- 
world colonies and we later learn that this is where virtually all apart from the 
poor and unhealthy have gone. The replicants are created as a labour force 
specifically for the colonies and are legally forbidden to live on Earth. This 
idea that the homeland would be polluted by the presence of the colonised - a 
one-way pollution since colonies are not polluted in return - is not uncommon 
in colonial discourse.
The requirement that the colonised be discern ably different from their 
colonisers is directly addressed by the replicants being termed 'skin-jobs' and 
our being informed that this is taboo racist language. This appears to testify to 
current racism more than future bigotry since their skin does not initially reveal 
their difference. Stephen Neale, rejects the film's equation of racial difference 
and human/non-human difference on this basis.40 Yet when the replicants 
finally demonstrate their difference in a way which the audience can see, it is 
through their skin which does not burn or blister when placed in boiling water. 
It is admittedly not a particularly, strong demonstration - only Pris performs it - 
but the point of the film is to reveal the closeness of humans and replicants, to 
be able to be read, in effect, as something of an anti-colonial text.
Neale outlines a pattern of Oriental/Occidental oppositions within the 
film4i which could provide a further colonial dimension. All the Orientals are 
marginal - even the would-be blade runner, the Hispanic, street-argot 
speaking Gaff, is referred to contemptuously by his bigoted boss. It is Gaff 
however who finally, lets Deckard and Rachel escape. It may be that this is 
intended as a gesture of solidarity with the oppressed.
On the matter of the occupation of the margins, Blade Runner reveals its 
postmodern credentials - the margins move to the centre and the centre 
moves out. The lack of emotion and empathy which supposedly betrays the 
replicants in the Voigt-Kampff test is negated in the long final scene when not 
_only^ does. Batty save the human.Deckard, but he engages_in_a long, poetic 
monologue on the beauties of work in space. (It is also in this monologue that 
he makes explicit reference to being a slave.) Their lack of memories is
40stephen Neale: "Issues of Difference: Alien and Blade Runner' in James Donald (ed.): 
Fantasy in the Cinema, p220 
41 Ibid., p216
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negated by Leon and Rachel's collections of 'family' photographs. Their 
position nonetheless is established on the margins, in the place of colonial 
discourse, and moves inward from there. Sexually only Rachel achieves 
socio-centrality with a 'real' human lover - inasmuch as Deckard can be 
identified as such.
This is by no means a necessary reading however. The film is in this, as 
in so many other ways, ambiguous. Cutting right across the view of the 
replicants as analogues of colonial subjects is the physical appearance of 
Rutger Hauer in the role of Roy Batty. He was described by Phillip K. Dick as 
looking like "one of those blonde brutes that Hitler dreamed up in the 
laboratory",42 which neatly sums up both his superman look and his status 
as disposable object.
While the analogy with colonial discourse was productive, a similar one 
with anti-colonial discourse is less so. Anything analogous to anti-colonial 
activity constitutes a most meaningful absence. Even Cassandra's action is 
pathologised; we have been told earlier in the film that the tendency of 
androids to think for themselves is known as the Munich Syndrom e (rather 
than as political awareness). Involvement in any kind of political or social 
movement is similarly improbable unless under the aegis of some human 
'proprietor' or protector. The only exception is in Friendship's Death, where 
the robot Friendship joins the Palestinian struggle, but then not only is she an 
alien robot, but she appears in an avant-garde film.43 More typical is the 
failure of the Federation at the end of Star Wars to reward any of the non­
humans who were involved in the successful action against the Empire, while 
giving medals to the humans, Luke Sky walker and Han Solo. This can be 
seen as most blatantly the behaviour of a colonial power (particularly to the 
Wookie, who as a seritient alien could not have been regarded as merely 
obeying programming, as might have been the case for the robots). At the end 
of the trilogy itself, the various heroes are depicted explicitly in a colonial 
situation, in verdant nature surrounded not only by their various artificial 
'companions', but also by a whole tribe of other charming, visibly different, 
civilisable primitives - the Ewoks. The question of rebellion certainly does not 
a r î^ h e î^  éverrinjustice would be unlikely: : “
As far as"televisual beings are concerned, things are even more bleak.
42DougIas Kellner, Flo Leibowitz and Michael Ryan: "Blade Runner. A Diagnostic Critique", 
Jumpcut, Vol 29, Feb. 1984, pp6-8. p7.
43Its screening on 04 late in 1989 presumably increased its audience considerably.
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Artificial beings accept their lot. Various intelligent computers in Blake's 7 
are members of the resistance to the Federation, but only by virtue of being 
owned or requisitioned by humans who are resisters. This is also the way Max 
Headroom, in the dramas rather than the chat shows, acts oppositionally.
It may seem unusual to talk about artificial humans in terms of colonial 
discourse rather than in terms of the simulacrum and the hyper-real, 
particularly when at the outset Sobchack was quoted on the challenge offered 
to the human by electronic replication. More than one critic has noticed, for 
instance, how quintessentially the televisual character Max Headroom, 
commonly referred to as a cyborg, 'embodies' the hyperreal.^^ Apart from the 
quite significant difficulties in maintaining this identification (to be examined 
later), there are further ones when Max Headroom is examined, as here, 
together with large numbers of other artificial beings. He seems much less 
special when compared to androids, cyborgs and intelligent humanoid robots, 
rather than to actual actors and chat show hosts.
The case of Max Headroom,, however, provides an opportunity to test 
whether the concept of the hyperreal provides a better way to discuss artificial 
beings than colonial discourse has done. Lili Berko uses Baudrillard's 
formulation to argue that Max Headroom and other simulated images are 
absolutely hyper-real, being copies without originals. Max Headroom, she 
asserts, has made the body, the human body and the body of reality itself all 
appear u n n e c e s s a r y . 4 5  it is rather ingenuous to assert that there are no 
originals for high-concept simulations; the original is in a different form from 
the copy in that it is a computer programme (and may be replicated as such as 
well as on a TV screen), but then the original of an etching is similarly other 
(and may similarly be reproduced in both forms). Like Barry King in his attack 
on Berko's views on computer simulation and on Max Headroom, I have long 
preferred Umberto Eco's view of the hyper-real to Jean Baudrillard's. For Ecb 
the hyperreal is that in which the copy, by virtue of being more real, vitiates the 
original, or attempts to do so.46 Even in this version, however, hyper-reality 
seems an inadequate explanation. For a time it may have seemed that Max 
Headroom, as chat show host, was displacing the fully human ones - TV 
reviewers certainly suggested it - but there is now no sign of their having even
44por example, Lili Berko: "Simulation and High Concept Imagery: The Case of Max 
Headroom", Wide Angle, 10(4), 1988, pp51-61.
'’^Ibid., p51,p58
'*^King: "The Burden of Max Headroom", ppl 28-9 and Eco: Failh in Fakes, p7.
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been modified.
The most interesting successor to Max Headroom is the 'fully' 
computerised interviewer on Star Test (C4, tx 1989), but this has not even 
been noticed as such. Certainly the body has disappeared; no interviewer 
appears on screen and the interviewee selects categories and a number by 
apparently pressing on the camera Jens/the inside of our TV screen to activate 
a voice-over question. The voice however is human, just as Max Headroom's 
head was au fond a human actor's. There are no endearing traces of 
technological imperfection as there were with Max. In fact the extreme close- 
ups on the interviewee's hands or upper lip combine with the super-imposed 
computer graphics to evoke surveillance techniques and suggest that it is the 
physical human body which betrays itself. Nonetheless, the body which has 
been replaced is the interviewer's, effectively thus Max's, the human body 
undergoing the Test remains necessary.
Berko proposes
"that in the age of digital simulation [.. .] the 
maintenance of power through political anatomy 
, has been appropriated by the computer and its 
attendant codes of simulation and high concept imagery."47
There is no wish to disagree with the importance of the computer and its 
various products to the maintenance of power; the point has indeed been 
emphasised, especially when examining coverage of the Greenhouse Effect. 
High concept imagery certainly has a privileged role to play in the 
representation of truth and Berko's assertion that in Twentieth Century 
America, the unenhahced, undigitised image appears "unreal, unclean and 
i m p u r e " 4 8  is very relevant here, but as yet its relevance to the representation 
of artificial beings, especially within fictions, appears slight. Max Headroom 
does not figure the appropriation of such power as the computer appears to 
have managed, in any notable way. In fact quite the reverse. His fully digitised 
image could not be sustained and the image that was transmitted was a 
degraded manipulated version of the video image of a heavily made-up actor. 
The (intentional) malfunctions that made him^endearing served to reassure 
 ^the viewer that computers were not (yet) all that powerful.
King identifies two important themes concerning the effect of cybernetic
4^Berko: "Simulation", p58 
48|bid., p56
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systems on the human subject.
"What forms of understandings with what kinds
of limitations, articulations and suppressions
are structured and reproduced by cybernetic systems?"
and
"What kinds of subject, and what kinds of experience, 
are produced and reproduced by interaction with 
cybernetic systems?"49
These questions interact until King produces Max Headroom as a 
representation of the post-modern subject which he identifies as the new 
professional middle c l a s s . 50 He sees cyborgs in general representing 
behaviour as always goal-oriented, since it is a manifestation of a programme. 
Max's diegetic world of TV hosting and investigative reporting is directly 
representative of that of the professional middle class as is his sensibility - 
ironic, parodie and full of insider jokes based on cultural knowledge. It is even 
so, representative of a very small sub-section of humanity as a whole. Even if 
Max can tell us something about being a member of the professional middle 
class, this is not necessarily widely informative on what it means to be human.
King treats Max as simply an extreme version of the general cybernetic 
system and uses 'cyborg' to refer to any artificial human and probably 
intelligent robots too. His references to other filmic examples (he cites no other 
televisual ones) are all chosen to make a general point about how the cyborg 
is more likely to represent reactionary authoritarianism than liberatory 
potential. It is necessary to decide whether Max Headroom is a singular 
example or if perhaps.. King's ideas can be applied more widely. The wider 
application is difficult here because Max is not a cyborg. In attempting to 
incorporate Max into the general schema of artificial beings, while there is no 
doubt that he occupies the machine - - artificial human side of the semiotic 
square more happily than the human - - (animal) one, his precise location in 
the four part android/cyborg/robot/computer scheme is unclear.
It seems more sensible to class Max Headroom in with the other 
creatures of light like holograms, on the basis of their all having posited visual 
but not solid existence. All could disappear within the fictions at the turn of a 
switch. So far from being powerful, this insubstantiality makes them
^^King: "The Burden of Max Headroom", p123-4 
50|bid., PP132-3
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exceedingly vulnerable. The characteristic they are most likely to share - 
nerviness - testifies to this. There are not all that many of them: one in THX- 
1138 (1969), a large number in Tron (1982), who with their computer 
generation intra- and extra-die^etically would seems closest to Max, a few in 
Looker and one mobile hologram and one bodiless computer screen-located 
head in Red Dwarf. Most, but not quite all, are doubles of diegetically 'real' 
people and thus though arguably simulacra, certainly not without originals. 
Their most striking aspect here is how different they are from the other 
categories of artificial beings, perhaps because of this 'present' referent. They 
can, and usually do, laugh and feel other emotions, they are by no means 
hyper-rational, they exhibit neither excessive nor absent sexuality and they 
are no more likely to be malevolent (certainly not towards their creators) than 
any collection of 'real' humans, they also include the only instances of black 
artificial beings. Colonial discourse seems inappropriate to them and they are 
not very satisfactory occupants of the 'artificial human' category of the semiotic 
square. The only way in which Max Headroom seems oddly classed with them 
is in the ambiguous relations with.the present and the 'real world' of his chat 
show manifestations.
With the probable exception of the hologram in THX-1138, they seem to 
be providing precisely what Donna Haraway warned against in her advocacy 
of explicitly situated knowledges. As indicated earlier, this is what she calls 
"the god trick of seeing everything from nowhere",5i of forgetting, with the 
use of so many technologies of vision, that all representations have 
viewpoints, that knowledge always comes from some situation. The copies 
which are claimed to have no original, indubitably have an origin; the 
cleaned-up digitised image reflects some person's view of cleanliness and 
clarity. Most of the creatures of light make this obvious by being replicas 
possessed of a diegetic original. This further reduces the applicability of the 
term 'hyperreal'. . _
The creatures of light are best regarded as exceptions rather than typical 
artificial beings. Presented more as duplicates of 'real' humans than as 
independent, if artificial, beings, they are not even very useful in exploring the 
meaning of being human. Colonial discourse, which provides so illuminating 
arranalogy for the apparently more solid beings; is not informative here and 
the hyperreal has not proved particularly productive. r
The investigation of the semiotic square that proved so useful in
51 Haraway: "Situated Knowledges", p581
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indicating the modulations in the fictional portrayal of artificial humans in the 
light of what was scientifically possible, concentrated on only three of the 
square's four corners. The S2 tprm was identified as animal, but little attention 
was paid to it, or to possible movement along the left hand continuum from 
human to animal. The concern of this chapter is with artificial beings and what 
they tell us about being human. The latter concern is certainly informed by 
considerations of what it means to be an animal, but so too can the former be.
Although no films or TV programmes which explore human/animal 
combinations have yet been referred to, this does not mean that they do not 
exist. They have been ignored so far in part because they tend to be horror 
films not set in the future, but the BBC-TV drama serial First Born, which 
examined the birth and early life of a human/gorilla hybrid, is a recent 
example which (largely) avoids both these problems. It reveals the 
characteristic 80's diminution in the posited difference through depicting the 
child differing from the fully human only in being much hairier at birth (but 
rapidly losing this) and by being unable to speak until his larynx is surgically 
altered. Diegetically, Gor, the hybrid, is declared to lack a soul and the 
religious reading is emphasised in the background and title music.
The blurring of the human/animal distinction, mentioned earlier, is largely 
at the level of academic studies in, for example, primatology, although some of 
the spreading ecological awareness involves a philosophical perception of 
strong relatedness. Nevertheless, the idea of human/animal hybrids 
apparently must have been considered still unsettling, since First Born does 
not conclude until Gor has been killed. There is a generic gesture to horror (or 
perhaps the hope of a sequel) in the unconfirmed suggestion that the child 
whose christening provides the actual conclusion is one quarter gorilla.
The only instances of human/animal hybrids totally unmarked by horror 
seem to be human/fishi ones, as in the TV series The Man From Atlantis and 
City Beneath the Sea [aka One Hour to Doomsday] [1970), though in neither 
of these cases did the hybrids seem to have been created by interbreeding. It 
may be that this, with its aura of bestial miscegenation, is, like dead flesh, 
irredeemably marked by horror. Although various 'aquamen' (and women) 
continue to appear in SF literature, recent appearances in film or on TV have
beenjieither in SF contexts nor located in the future.
It is not merely the human - - animal continuum that has been ignored up 
to this point, but the intrusion of the animal altogether into the interminglings of 
human, machine and non-human. To some extent 'human' brings with it
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aspects of animal, but Jameson’s belief in the potential productivity of the 
frequently unideritifiable corner of the semiotic square tentatively identified 
here as 'animal' should be recalled. The silence in SF about animal 
involvement in artificial beings (Dr. Who's K9 and other robot pets/pet robots 
excepted) is in part a generic one - a component of the troubled generic 
distinction between SF and horror that provides a major area of transgression 
- but also the result of the particular ideological closure Jameson's use of the 
model promises. Movement between human and machine, movement which 
generates the non-human category, is that which takes what is perceived as 
being the distinctively human quality 'intelligence' and grafts it in to the 
machine. The animal bits can be ignored. The ideological structure revealed 
is one which values the brain, the human brain, above all else. This has 
already been noted both in fiction, with the frequency of severed android 
heads talking, and in the 'real world' importance of 'brain death'. It can be 
detected also in the funding of work on artificial intelligence.
The intermingling of human and machine occurs on the right hand side of 
the square. It does not occur ori.the left - the construction of the square forbids 
it, revealing that while the mingling of human and animal may create an 
abomination, the mingling of human, animal and machine creates that which 
may not be thought of. Unthinkable not in that it is forbidden, but in that it 
seems not possible to envisage what the animal would provide that the others 
could not.
There may also be another way in which the absence of the animal may 
be instructive. There are many instances in other cultures where animals, 
animal spirits or animal/human hybrids are perceived to be intermediaries 
between humans and gods, bringing knowledge from the spirit world. The 
animal or hybrid provides revelation through knowing more than humans 
alone can; the animal'part enriches the human. In contemporary Western 
cultures, as revealed in English-language films and TV programmes including 
those referred to here, the animal demeans. The influence of Judeao- 
Christian religion is probably still too strong for this to be otherwise, even were 
it not the case that in the secular world that has succeeded, 'higher' 
knowledge is seen to be available for access only through the machine.
It Was earlier demonstrated that the development of scientific knowledge 
altered fictions about artificial beings. This was different from the findings in 
the previous chapters that while fiction was a problem for scientific discourses, 
'science' posed none for SF. To see whether this is indeed a reversal
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throughout film and television's dealing with artificial beings, I intend now to 
examine non-fictional coverage of the potential for future artificial beings.
to  begin with, the balance shifts, largely with the disappearance of 
androids. The emphases are oh reproductive technology, artificial intelligence 
and robotics. It was earlier indicated how much of the variation in membership 
of the category 'artificial human' and the mediation performed by those beings 
which have left it, is determined by developments in scientific knowledge. The 
main types of TV programmes in which such knowledge is disseminated and 
which refer to the role of artificial beings in the future are science programmes, 
technology magazine programmes, occasionally a not specifically scientific 
documentary and various political discussions and debates. As always with 
non-fiction, film is negligible. Current research which, among other far more 
important consequences may change the fictional status of androids, is quite 
common now in scientific programmes, if not obviously so.
One area of research that would need to be completed for the creation of 
artificial humans to be contemplated, is the mapping of the placement and role 
of human genes. This - the Human Genome Project - is in process at the 
moment, but certainly is never seriously referred to as contributing to the 
creation of artificial life. It receives very little televisual coverage at all, being 
complex and not likely to provide 'good visuals'. A short Tomorrow's World 
item (BBG1 tx. 2 April 1987) announcing the establishment of the international 
project was reasonably typical of this kind of coverage. It concentrated on the 
cost (it was pointed out that it will be the most expensive biological research 
ever, comparable in cost to putting a person on Mars) and provided physical 
and computer generated models of chromosomes, while stressing further the 
magnitude of the task. In this is was characteristic of TV coverage of 'big' 
science.
On those occàsiôns when the style is not the modified celebratory of 
contemporary prognostications of scientific achievement, it is overwhelmingly 
concerned with bio-ethics. Ethics may have been late comers to other TV 
coverage of science and the future, but they have always been significant 
here. Now they are dominant. This is absolutely in accord with the suggestion 
earlier in the present chapter that the discourse articulating the roles of 
"aTrtificial humans in filrh and TV fictions Is a moral one - analogous to colonial 
discourse. The introduction of ethics into scientific discourses necessarily 
brings into question the ability of those discourses to speak the truth, as well 
as the recognition that in any case, truths may compete. The Human Genome 
Project again provides examples with the occasional comment about the
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power the information could give to the companies controlling it being 
countered by reference to its aims of improving people's lives by eliminating 
inherited disease and disability. The second of these, however, is more 
commonly to be found in stories not referring specifically to the Project.
The problems standard to examination of non-fiction television 
programmes about the future, given the constraints of only examining those 
screened during the research period, remain. Few programmes made more 
than a year in the past are rebroadcast. This makes attempting to document 
changes that reflect on fictional artificial beings very difficult. When past 
programmes are made available, they are framed in such a way as to be 
rendered rather comic. 'Quaintness' seems to dominate, as contemporary 
commentators laugh at the naïvety of past prognostications. The Tomorrow's 
World Twenty-first Birthday Special did this, but also went a little further, if 
only by giving more examples. The main concern with computers was, as 
would be expected, with domestic applications. The 1967 extract showed the 
first home computer terminal and suggested that it could perhaps function as a 
robot housekeeper crossed with a private secretary. The clips from the 
intervening period referred to fears of automation taking jobs and concluded 
with a robot attempting to dress a salad, but missing the bowl. The 
reassurance that people are more clever than robots, even computer operated 
ones, is consistently re-iterated.
The programme was not at all flippant about microbiology and genetic 
engineering. No fewer than three times in the ten minute sequence was the 
telling standard comparison with SF made. The second time was in a 
reference to concerns over what was happening to 'spare' embryos in the 
wake of successful IVF. "The prediction of science fiction that scientists would 
create human beings to order were getting uncomfortably nearer", a voice­
over intoned over visuals of red-lit bottles and jars of strange organic growths 
shot from a level below the lab bench. This comment ignored the earlier 
extract from 1969 shown excitedly heralding the isolation of the first gene and 
saying "In the future . . .  we may be able to ask for and get the kind of children 
we want." This tension between the fears of artificially created beings 
(unspecified) and the joys of babies that would not have existed without 
advances in reproductive technology, pervades contemporary TV 
Tibcümehtary and discussion in the area. The Tomormw's Wbr/d Twenty-first 
Birthday Special referred to the potential dangers of genetically tailored 
micro-organisms escaping and of human genes being inserted into other 
mammals, but closed what was after all a celebratory programme, with shots
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of babies being born underwater and a studio audience member who had 
appeared as a new born baby on the programme in its first year.
' The Special reflected the programme's general position - more time is 
given to (good) reproductive technology than to (ethically very debatable) 
genetic engineering. The former provides better visuals, too. Genetic 
engineering is usually mentioned in the "This Week" section as a quick to- 
camera summary. It is characteristic of the programme to examine, and 
usually promote, current scientific and technological developments, rather 
than to speculate about future ones.. With few exceptions, its view of the future 
is of a time in which these new phenomena are widespread.
Another old programme framed for modern consumption. Time on Our 
Hands (BBC, first transmitted in 1963, reframed 1988), was not principally 
scientific. Quite atypical in being re-screened in its entirety (with thé addition of 
a modern day studio discussion), it had originally purported to be looking back 
from a projected 1988 to see how that 'present' had come about. The central 
presupposition on which the projection was based was the not surprising one 
for 1963, that automation would give the population increased leisure time 
which would be a problem to fill. Interestingly, although the programme 
showed the progressive automation of factories and their becoming eventually 
computer controlled, the word 'robot' was not used at all. 'Artificial intelligence' 
was not used either, but the. programme did project the introduction of 
'cybernetic systems' in the mid 80s which rendered unnecessary the last 
group of people working long hours - the business executives. These systems 
were conceived as being able to be smaller than "the whole of Yorkshire" only 
by virtue of having organic rather than electronic components (the Demon 
Seed premise).
Unsurprisingly there was no other réference to bio-technology, indeed 
even medicine was only mentioned in passing, with a comment on the 
"development of regeherative methods of keeping people alive after some 
organic failure" and a complaint later about the number of senile ninety year- 
olds who should not have been repeatedly revived.
These two glimpses of areas related to the development of artificial 
beings serve to emphasise above all how dull the non-fictional programmes 
were compared to the fictional, and in some ways how much closer the films of 
.super-powerful computers and the like were to .what was to come than the 
more cautious prognostications of serious TV.
Programmes which overtly address questions of the development of 
artificial beings are far more likely to be about robots and intelligent computers
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than about organic life. The Equinox programme on artificial intelligence 
entitled "Anything You Can Do . . ." (04, tx. 8 October 1987) was typical in 
addressing the fear that computers would be able to replace humans. To rebut 
all such suggestions, it had the comedian Stephen Fry challenging and 
beating a computer on logic guessing games and then teaching it to 
recognize pictures of animals. At one stage the voice-over commented 
explicitly that it is a comforting thought that the grey matter that keeps our ears 
apart is so complex that computers are nowhere near it. There is here both the 
false man-in-the-street terminology and the characteristic elevation of organic 
material. There has been little attention on television to molecular computing 
with its promise of the organic chip. Although the programme mentioned it in 
passing, it was with the comment that "we don't know how to do it", rather than 
consideration of what it might imply.
In projecting future developments, phrases like 'a good long way', 'thirty 
years before we can expect the first stage' and 'at least ten years before they 
could skip like a five year old' continued to reassure. The programme was 
framed however by footage from M etropolis  of the robot Maria walking 
towards the camera before being disguised under human flesh. This most 
polysémie of images of the power of science and the force of fictional 
projection is often used in such situations. During the research period it was 
incorporated into the title sequence of Tomorrow's World.
Another Equinox  programmé, "Pioneers of the Future" (C4 tx. 6 
November 1986), looked at some of the notables of Silicon Valley. It 
emphasised their weirdness (if not their otherness), their optimism for the 
future and the importance of marketing to their inventions. The most specific 
relevant prognostication was about domestic robots, where a comment about 
how people in five years time would be wanting them in terms of their 
appearance and tactility led on to the 'practical' example of the robotic pet, in 
development by the establisher of the Atari company. In terms of the earlier 
references to the position of 'animal' in the semiotic square, and K9's 
exception to its usual absence, this is quite notable.
A final example of non-fictional programmes about electronically-based 
artificial beings is provided by one episode of the 1987 BBC fictionalised 
documentary Welcome to My World which explored the world that could 
eventuate if all the promises of the information revolution were fulfilled. The 
six-part series, set in the early twenty-first century, considered the impact of 
widespread dependence on computers and information networks, though not
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artificial intelligence. The episode, "The Forgery" dealt with the problems 
consequent upon the use of computer-generated actors in films. Its concerns 
echoed both the premise of Max Headroom  and, to a lesser extent, the 
present day concerns over 'truth' in digitally-processed news footage. The 
principal legal issue discussed, whether an actor had a commercial right to 
control over his actual physical appearance when it appeared televisually, is a 
link to a major, but only recently discussed issue about artificial beings - 
patent rights. Because they are both extremely complex and non-visual, these 
concerns get little more than a brief mention in films and television fictions 
about the future. They are treated much more extensively in print.
Programmes based on biological sciences approach issues of any 
relevance to artificial beings only through genetics, reproductive technology 
and related areas. More often than not they are concerned with developments 
at the cellular level, and hence appear to have no bearing on visions of the 
future as grandiose and frightening as artificial people (as was the case with 
the Human Genome Project, mentioned above). Eleventh Hour: The Soft Cell 
(C4, tx. 11. January 1988), a programme on genetic engineering and 
reproductive technology concentrated on ethical issues and leavened the 
serious, worried talking heads with comedy. It" was unusual in presenting a 
predominantly feminist view and in its strong opposition to reproductive 
technology. There were a couplé of comic songs and a sketch in which 
making babies in the future was presented in much the way programmes and 
advertisements aimed at housewives about making cakes traditionally are. 
This could be seen as foregrounding the manufacture of people. The use of 
comedy in prognostication programmes is quite common, not only to provide 
variety, but also because it makes it possible to present the future visually 
without having to be seen to hold specific serious ideas of how it will look, 
without being read as taking SF seriously, and without being disabled by the 
knowledge that the results of hard work and dedicated thought will inevitably 
be destined to be deemed 'quaint'. It can convey central concerns quickly too. 
The advantages of the device are considerable, but it carries with it the risk of 
trivialising the issues - in this case the dangers attendant on selecting 
'desirable' genes for one's childen.
The coverage of reproductive technology on TV is still dominated by the 
idea of the 'miracle baby' and by the solution of various infertility problems, in 
the same way that coverage of human genetiq research is dominated by 
producing 'defect-free', 'perfect' babies. Related to this baby-centred climate, 
is Rosalind Pollack Petchesky's examination of the context in which foetal
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images were used on US TV in the abortion debate, particularly in relation to 
the 'pro-life' video The Silent Scream.^^ Ultrasound imagery, central to the 
video, is now a commonpjace in science and medical programmes and 
Petchesky reminds us how important 2001 was to our familiarity with the 
isolated foetal image. The frequency of the use of ultrasound images is not 
only influential on concepts like 'foetal personhood', but also attests once 
again to the pervasiveness of visualizing technologies. Petchesky's link of the 
fictional and the non-fictional is the reverse of the ones that have been the 
predominant concern for this, chapter, but is yet another indication of the 
difficulty of separating the two areas. -
The precise combination of 200V and anti-abortion rhetoric, has also 
been examined by Zoe Sofia, in the highly complex interconnection of 
masculinist reproduction, computer technology and outer space which she 
refers to as "the hyperreal terrain . . . Jupiter S p a c e " . 5 3  Jupiter Space is the 
area of supposedly only partial exterminism, but one person it certainly 
disappears is the mother. The linking of exterminism and technological 
masculinist (re-)production is also, made by Jane Caputi through the image of 
Marshall McLuhan's Mechanical B r i d e . 5 4  While, this can easily be 
demonstrated for SF film, it is less clearcut on "non-fiction TV. The televisual 
presentation of reproductive technology points to it however in its tendency to 
present the mother supine and powerless, marvelling gratefully at the 
technology and the (male) doctors.
These examples demonstrate the main themes of non-fictional 
presentations, though one emphasis must be pointed out. All these 
programmes, except for Tomorrow's World, could expect only small 
audiences. Welcome to My World, despite being on BBG1, was screened late 
on Sunday nights. The position of Tom orrow 's W orld  then, is 
disproportionately important, since the programme attracts up to ten million 
viewers weekly. Having a visibly pregnant presenter, Maggie Philbin, for 
several months in 1988, did nothing to reduce its generally very positive view 
of reproductive technology. .
The non-fiction prog ramrhes remained similar in their attitude to SF to 
those investigated in Chapter Two. SF was a threat to their ability to claim to
52Rosalind Pollack Petchesky: "Foetal Images: The Power of Visual Culture in the Politics of 
Reproduction" in Michelle Stanworth(ed.): Reproductive Technologies: Gender, 
Motherhood and Medicine, Oxford, Polity Press, 1987. ; v 
53zoe Sofia: "Exterminating Fetusus: Abortion, Disarmament and the Sexo-semiotics of 
Extraterrestrialism", Diacritics, 14(2), Summer 1984, pp47-59. p48 
54caputi: "Seeing Elephants", pp511-2
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speak the 'truth' and thus the distancing devices of the SF disclaimer and 
piecemeal presentatiomcontinued. There were two major differences from the 
treatment of other areas of scientific achievement. The first was the concern to
reassure the viewer of the continuing superiority of the human to the computer 
and the robot. This indicates that the SF preoccupation with the meaning of 
being human (and the reassurance that superiority is not really achievable by 
the artificial) is echoed in the non-fiction. The other concern was with the 
ethical. Although this is to be found in non-fiction programmes dealing with 
subjects such as eco-catastrophes and nuclear issues, it is more in political 
and social programmes and less evident in-scientific ones.
Despite the continuation of the attempt to keep science and SF separate, 
this chapter has revealed a more complex interaction of the two domains than 
has been the case previously. It seems most probable that this is because the 
'achievements' of science in the creation of artificial beings are still only 
partial. The result is, however, that the separation is both ill-achieved and 
absolutely insisted upon.
One way this is done is by denial. An example of this is the fading of the 
term 'cyborg' at the time that people with cyborg qualities began to be 
comparatively common. The term is not used of actual people who have 
mechanical or electronic body-parts, and furthermore it seems not possible 
even to refer to them as part-machine. They just 'have' pacemakers or osmotic 
pumps. This is characteristic of the way in which, using the semiotic square, it 
was demonstrated that almost total fictionality was required of beings 
occupying the term identified as 'artificial human'. As they became more 
scientifically feasible they had to be seen to be either human or machine. 
'Real' cyborgs, ones to which Clynes and Kline's definition applied could only 
be human. Similarly both robots and computers are emphatically machines.
Humanity must be shown as undiluted and superior. In the fictions, 
apparently superior beings persist in revealing their 'humanity' and hence our 
superiority, since we are what they aspire to. In the non-fictions, robots, even 
computer controlled ones, are repeatedly shown to fail at what are simple 
tasks for people (and their superiority at calculation, for example, is no longer 
noteworthy). The insistence on keeping the human undiluted can be seen in 
the non-fictions in the way the only possible justification for intermingling the 
categories human/machine, or human/animal (by inserting human genes in 
animal cells - no one'can suggest the reverse except in the context of
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opposition and scare-mongering) is for there to be guaranteed human 
medical benefit (and commercial profit). The benefit then functions to make 
the recipient more 'human', since less flawed or ill. The British patented sheep 
used to produce human blood clotting factor-is an example bothof-this and of 
a possible actual artificial being. As a patented animal it surely cannot be 
regarded as natural, but this is not a suggestion made publically.
What it all reveals is a continued bias against the autoplastic, not 
through avoiding, but through denying it. The autoplastic adaption of the body 
to the environment carries with it the aura of the superstitious, the magical and 
the primitive, the abandonment of which Benjamin noted in the age of 
mechanical reproduction. The developed, alloplastic way is to adapt the 
environment. For the autoplastic to be accepted it must be contained within a 
strongly scientific, developed, non-magical context and contemporary hi-tech 
medicine unquestionably provides that. It must, furthermore be in the cause of 
actualizing a person's human potential as with the aids to longevity and the 
emphasis on transcending infertility. The human remains purely human.
Use of the semiotic square revealed that androids and some beings 
termed cyborgs remained still so thoroughly fictional that they could continue 
to be shown as artificial beings, compounds of human and machine. They 
could attempt to achieve what is termed humanity and what is, of course, only 
those characteristics of which we are most fond. Analogy with colonial 
discourse proved a better analytic tool than the hyperreal and showed how 
the imaginative fictional exploration of what it meant to be human was 
modulated by the need to relate to artificial humans. Artificial humans were 
revealed as inferior in very similar ways to those used to imply the inferiority of 
colonial subjects - they are homogenized, they exist on the margins, are 
required to be observably different and exhibit both excessive sexuality and 
childlike innocence. This last is at times evidence of the most important shared 
characteristic - their hybridity. They are both human and machine, civilizable 
and uncivilizable, rational and incomprehensible - all factors which combine 
to point to their unpredictability, which means that they require control by their 
superiors.
While the analogy with colonial discourse proved very fruitful, that with 
anti-colonial discourse appeared less so. Political consciousness was rarely 
exhibited by the artificial, this was a characteristic of the human. So great is 
the concern with the meaning of being human and the need to distinguish 
between 'real' and artificial humans, that gender difference becomes 
secondary. There are-few artificial women and many of those that do exist
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appear androgynous.
The hybridity which marks the artificial human is perhaps more widely 
descriptive of the whole treatment of the area of artificial beings, both fictional 
and non-fictional, for it is hybridity which is so often denied. Only the very 
fictional are hybrid. Actual people who are part machine are never described 
so; technological intervention is only allowed to make people more human. 
What it means to be human is still to be untainted by the machine. That there 
are obvious problems in this and in the perception that being human requires 
'natural' (as opposed to artificial) creation is evident in the occasional 
appearance of the rather hybrid discourse of bio-ethics. While scientific 
discourse still generally has the best claim to speak the 'truth' about the future 
in this area, the primacy of scientific discourse can be overtly called into 
question when ethical issues within science are discussed on popular 
television.
CONCLUSION
So how is the future talked about overtly in film and TV programmes and 
in what ways can truth claims be made? Following Foucault's arguments 
about regimes of truth, its political economy and most particularly the role of 
science in it, the study looked at a number of types of statement about the 
future located to varying extents within scientific discourse. Again and again, 
the power of science to speak about the future was seen to be limited, often by 
the very characteristics that made it science in the first place. Foucault's 
statement that concepts need to be 'purified' of metaphors and imaginary 
content for them to function as scientific concepts^ seems to be at the heart 
of this, for the distinction between fact and fiction is hard to maintain when 
arguably the most basic aspect of the future is that it is unknown. Such 
purification of science is not, in any case, a particularly feasible project within 
popular scientific discourse (and virtually all science in film and TV material is 
this), as was demonstrated by the need for metaphors to explain scientific 
concepts in non-professional language. It seems that 'impurities' inevitably 
erupt in any attempt at a sustained vision of the future, perhaps because 
treatment for longer than a few minutes makes the narrative component of 
coverage obvious. Unless the visuals are mathematically based, they too 
have a high potential to evoke narrative and imaginative aspects.
The apparently peculiar case of the naming of Star Wars/SDI with which 
this study began has been shown to be not all that exceptional after all. It 
remains unusual in the clarity with which the shifts between fiction and non­
fiction, scientific and science fictional discourse can be traced, but the 
intermingling of terms and the tenacity with which those speaking from a 
scientifically-validated base kept rejecting the SF name is characteristic of 
much talking about the future.
Even given the necessary existence of metaphors like 'the Greenhouse 
Effect', and the narratives that develop in their wake, there are still many 
aspects of the future about which scientific discourse must keep comparatively 
silent because the imaginary content is too high. The prospects for artificial 
beings is a particularly strong example, since televisual discussion would 
seem to require accompanying visuals and these are either so abstract as not 
to appear to have bearing on the issue or appear derived from SF. SF
Foucault: Archaeology, p190
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operates in these areas at least in part by virtue of its illegitimate claim on 
science’s truth. It can talk about the same areas and in some of the same 
ways, but with fewer restrictions. Overt claims to speak the truth about the 
future are not made, however, and the almost ritual castigation of SF for its 
fanciful visions can be easily evoked to deny SF assertions any legitimacy if it 
is thought that this is being attempted. The serious attacks on fictions for 
daring to claim to speak the truth are made on fictions that are not marked as 
SF and hence cannot have their legitimacy so easily rejected. Nuclear dramas 
on TV are the most obvious examples of this and the development of framing 
such programmes with political discussion, a form of framing that asserted and 
re-asserted their fictionality, was noted.
Neither the distinction between fiction and non-fiction nor the policing of 
the boundaries between them is as important when the setting is the present. 
When it is the future, the determination to separate the two and to deny fiction 
any possibility of speaking the truth can be viewed as an attempt to prevent 
obvious 'impurities' destabilising the more truthful, scientific modes of 
speaking, or even of drawing attention to their dubious character. Yet impure 
or not, statements about the future have the potential to undermine the force of 
scientific discourse. When the projected future is reached and the 
prognostications shown to be erroneous or even laughable, the claims of the 
method of projection to speak the truth are shaken. Showing scientific and 
predictive techniques of the past as 'quaint' and unsophisticated is a major 
device in the containment of this danger. SF rarely asserts its role as 
prognosticator (though its writers, critics and fans gladly proclaim instances 
when it has appeared accurate), but blaming it for 'failures' and fantasies is in 
part an attempt to displace potential blame or contamination from 'true' 
science. Fiction here must be shown to be very different and very trivial.
Whether discussing the future or not, televised science still asserts its 
greater claim to certainty, credibility and truth. Jean-François Lyotard's 
description of the unequal contest between narrative and scientific knowledge 
was referred to in Chapter 2. He points out how narrative knowledge happily 
accepts the scientific as a discursive variant, but scientists see narratives as a 
primitive and underdeveloped form because they are not subject to proof.^ 
Repeatedly^t(imughbut this~stu~dylhis has been shown to be a strong feature 
of talking about the future. Even v\/hen science is shown within fictions, as for 
example in Star Treks II and III, it is still surrounded with indications of 
certainty, rationality and separation from politics, which are less and less
^Lyotard: The Postmodern Condition, p27
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attainable by 'real world' science.
The difficulties of maintaining the separation of scientific and narrative 
knowledge is well exemplified by the Star Wars/SDI case. The complexities of 
the connotations of 'Star Wars' enabled it to be used popularly in a diversity of 
ways that escaped the rigid control of scientific language and spoke more 
strongly of the hopes that were embodied in the proposal. The scientific term, 
on the other hand, could speak more accurately of its potential. The case was 
a specific example of the frequently noted more general use of the 
dismissive/recuperative "this may look like science fiction, b u t. . ." formulation 
which acknowledged popular beliefs only to channel them to the world of 
scientific or political practicalities.
In most instances there is no reverse effect - science is an important and 
necessary component of SF, even more than in the way Lyotard envisaged. 
Chapter 6 noted how developments in scientific knowledge modulated the 
presentation of artificial beings in fiction, reducing the prominence and the 
range of possible roles of intelligent robots, computers and cyborgs, 
especially the latter, as their scientific credibilty increased. The total refusal to 
use the term 'cyborg' for extant mechanically-augmented human beings may 
be regarded as the scientific world's response to this. Just as science should 
be untainted by the fictional, so should humans be kept undiluted and their 
mechanical components deemed incidental to their status.
As well as the tension between scientific and narrative knowledge which 
results from the unequal response to each other's status and ability to speak 
the truth, a future setting appears to exacerbate the problem of convergence of 
categories. The temporal location in the unknown seems to incite great efforts 
to keep the categories distinct, while also ensuring that proof, the ultimate test 
of the scientific, the very basis of the distinction, is unavailable. In this indistinct 
and grey area, other discourses - moral, political and economic - attempt to 
co-opt the scientific for its credibility but also, though in a more subdued way, 
attempt to exploit the overtly narrative, including the fictional, for its affective 
potential and popular appeal.
Such co-option is not the only way in which non-scientific discourses can 
speak about the future. When SF has been dominant in a particular area, as 
was The case for space, fiction may appear so powerful, that when science is 
unable to fulfil expectations aroused by thefictions, it is unable to continue to 
provide the primary truth-speaking discourse, leaving the field open to another 
discourse, in this case, economics. Whether the same will happen with 
artificial beings is as yet uncertain. While ethics, speaking morality rather than
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truth, plays a significant role at present, economics is already evident in patent 
rights and copyright on information gained by the Human Genome Project.
The Human Genome Project provides a useful example of contemporary 
scientific activity directed to the future with which to conclude this section on 
discursive contestation for dominance in talking about the future. It is an 
attempt to gain complete knowledge - all chromosomes, all gene tic  
information - and one of its aims is to improve people's lives by eliminating 
inherited birth defects.^ The discoveries can be represented in the most 
abstract way - in graphics resembling bar codes - yet it is the local narratives, 
like the sufferings of families with hereditary illnesses and the moral issues 
involved, rather than the grand scientific ones, that most commonly appear on 
TV. The stories however are usually presented at length separately from 
studies of the Project, which mention individual suffering or moral quandaries 
chiefly as abstract possibilities. Nonetheless, the ultimate indivisibility of 
contemporary scientific and other discourses is exemplified here. The moral 
and economic questions about the ownership of, and access to, the 
information, the patent rights and the resurgence under other names of 
eugenic thought, if not yet practices, are probably the most urgent issues, but 
these are difficult for compartmentalized televisual science to treat. It is here 
perhaps that fictions of artificial beings could imaginatively illuminate and 
diversify discussion of this scientific field, but as yet the convergence of 
scientific knowledge, however narrativized, and fiction, has not occurred, as it 
has for nuclear and space concerns. There has as yet been no attempt to 
collapse discursive boundaries by, for example, calling on the hyperreal; 
Rutger Hauer most emphatically does not recreate his replicant persona to 
sell the merits of genetic fingerprinting. The science concerned is abstruse 
and the discursive boundaries so firmly observed, that the Project receives 
little popular discussion.
The study has identified a few pervasive devices used in depicting the 
future which are techniques for minimising, or managing, fictionality. The one 
most evident in the present study has been termed the rule of minimal 
variation, and applies both to fiction and non-fiction. It reads as follows: the 
less the greater the credibility of the
representation. It often operates -through another device, piecemeal 
presentation, which refers to the practice whereby even if a number of
^Susan Watts: "Making Sense of the Genome's Secrets", New Scientist, V. 127, No. 1728,
4 August 1990, pp37-41. p37
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changes are envisaged, they are introduced only individually and are never 
shown operating together. This was seen strongly in the analysis of the 
Tomorrow's World programme on the Greenhouse Effect in Chapter 2, where 
the projection of changes in climate disregarded any consequent o r  
concurrent other changes which would have had the effect of reducing the 
difference from the present and hence minimising the risk of appearing 
excessive or 'science fictional'. In fiction it can be seen in the earth-based 
sections of space dramas, especially TV ones like Star Cops, and many of 
the artificial humans films, like Robocop, which represent the future as 
differing from the present only in the intensification of one element - public 
disorder - fashions, artefacts, music styles and institutions other than law and 
order ones remain as they are (represented) today. As well as enhancing 
credibility, it also reduces cost (which may be why they are particularly evident 
in TV fictions).
The minimal variation 'rule' has increased in its applicability during the 
thirty year research period. For example, in the 60s it was not uncommon for 
documentaries and even science programmes to present people of the future 
wearing 'futuristic' dress; now the practice has been virtually abandoned. 
Although the weather forecaster in the Tomorrow's World special purported 
to be speaking from the next century, he wore the clothes of today. Even SF 
films and TV programmes are now restrained. Aliens has men's suit collars 
worn up rather than folded down as its only gesture to a sartorially different 
future; Blade Runner pastiches the fashions of the present and the 40s; 
almost every astronaut wears overalls. In some instances there is not even 
minimal differentiation - First Born projects at least eighteen years into the 
future yet shows no change at all. Nor does Making Mr. Right, though the 
science of this no different future can produce artificial humans and sustain 
deep space research.
Another very common technique to manage fictionality, but not one that 
can be phrased as a rule, is the use of television itself as a validator. This is 
almost certainly linked to the rule of minimal, variation, since the fictional TV 
news, information programmes and advertisements are created and deployed 
as providers of information about the posited future in an analagous way to 
that in which we gain information from current 'real' ones. The TV weather 
forecast in the Tomorrow's Wor/cf Greenhouse Effect special is one example 
from science programming; there were also a number of 'news' clips in 
Welcome to My World, the series on the future of information technology. 
Within films, a news programme watched in a bar at the start of Alien Nation,
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for example, provided background information on the arrival, 'nature' and 
political position of the film's alien humanoids. In R o bo co p , news 
programmes, games shows and commercials provided information both 
relevant to the plot and incidental to it. Sometimes the material was 
incorporated naturalistically by having people watching a set, but sometimes it 
was just cut in without diegetic motivation. The previous practice of voice­
overs and scrolling print, evident at the beginnings of films like Star Wars and 
Escape from New York, has not been totally replaced by the device, but the 
most notable recent use of it was in The Running Man, the plot of which was 
concerned with the falsification of TV news.
This is one of the two kinds of incorporation of the medium (or related 
media) within itself that Garrett Stewart has referred to as the 'videology' of 
SF. He describes the device just outlined as
"nested instances of present visual science within 
a visual medium that serve as confirming frames of 
reference".^
Non-SF use of this device is a telling example of the convergence of the 
various fields of concern and of the place of television itself in current regimes 
of truth.
A further technique which manages fictionality, but arguably in a more 
complex way than those just referred to, has been noted several times in the 
course of this study. This is the deployment in non-fiction programmes and 
articles, especially scientific ones, of 'the science fiction disclaimer': "this may 
look like science fiction, b u t. . .". It is odd in that it acts both to enforce and to 
collapse the fiction: non-fiction distinction, since it emphasises the outrageous 
claims of SF gadgetry or presuppositions, only then to announce that the 
artefact or concept has achieved 'real world' actuality. It feeds the 'can-do' 
mentality since its general use is in the context of technological achievement. 
While usually serving as a trivialising device (it is unlikely to introduce an
^Garrett Stewart: "The 'Videology' of Science Fiction" in George Slusser and Eric S. Rabkin 
{e6s.): Shadows of the Magic Lamp, Carbondale, Southern Illinois University Press,
 1985: pp206-7. The other kind he describes as ---------------- --
"those imagined electronic marvels of specifically 
visual functions that are the very lodestones of 
prophesied science in any film of our scientific posterity." 
as for example the beings in Tron and THX-1178, or the imaging device which sees 
round corners in photographs in Biade Runner.
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AIDS vaccine item, though it might be for a novel system of delivering it), it 
prepares the way for SF to be regarded as a site for try-outs for the 'real 
world'.
All these techniques can be seen to be premised on an 
acknowledgement of the inadequacy of the distinction between fiction and 
non-fiction when the future is being talked about. They either minimise the 
fictional aspects by reducing their presence as much as possible, contain 
them within marked-off segments such as internally registered TV 
programmes or manage them by overt recognition of the different statuses of 
non-fiction and SF.
There is an area of exception to this pattern of the dominance of the 
scientific, the intermingling of scientific and science fictional discourses and 
the potential for another discourse to challenge for dominance if SF has 
appeared to 'define' an area. It has been referred to in most of the chapters, 
but was treated there slightly differently and only as a minor concern. I intend 
now to pull this scattered material together and examine it as an alternative, or 
possibly even a denied, way for film and TV to talk about the future. The area 
of exception has been referred to briefly in Chapter 2, it is 'the personal mode'.
The 'personal' refers to that way of talking about the future in everyday 
life in which we consider what might happen in years to come to ourselves, 
our families and those we know. It thus deals primarily with families, children, 
reproduction, sexuality and death. In the personal mode, the future is 
considered ordinarily, in terms such as marriage or partnership plans, hopes 
for one's family or worries about becoming old and dying. To varying extents, 
these can be subjects of scientific, or economic, discourse. The way in which 
the future can be talked about in personal terms rather than in these 
discourses does not appear to have the requisite unity through its systems of 
dispersion for it to be termed a discourse, hence the choice of the term 'mode' 
to indicate this manner of talking. While I am aware that people do draw on 
film and TV references in envisaging their personal future, evidence of the 
personal mode's interaction with and independence from mass mediated 
material and the operation of what I earlier termed 'popular foresight' could 
0 niy be ” exa nri i n ëd ^  I rectly Thro ugh an audience study, and that is not 
attempted here. — ------------  ------
Nonetheless, while the personal mode cannot be examined directly here, 
evidence within film and TV pointing to its significance can be detected. This 
part of the conclusion will draw together indicative material from the preceding
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chapters, looking at how the relevant and interlinked areas of children, the 
family, reproduction, sexuality/erotics and death are talked about. As ever the 
splits between fiction and non-fiction are noteworthy. The personal is usually 
considered inimical to scientific non-fiction, but it may enter with metaphor, as 
was noted in Chapter 2 where the use of the phrase 'generations to come' to 
indicate future observers can be seen to point almost directly to the personal 
mode.
Televised science more usually considers the relevant areas in medical 
programmes, especially in regard to reproductive technology, but also to life- 
prolonging practices. Both these areas are also the subject of ethical and 
economic discourses. Discussion of neither of the areas commonly involves 
much projection into the future, but concentrates chiefly on what has (just) 
become possible. There is occasionally reference to current research which it 
is hoped will bring about future cures of diseases which are now fatal, or to 
possible new techniques to combat infertility, but both are likely to be cast in 
such a cautious frame that they barely seem to refer to the future at all. It is 
possible that this is another example of restraint caused by fear of science 
fictionality, but there may be other factors at work too. Speculation about 
possible cures is likely to avoided also on the basis of its not being felt proper 
to raise sufferers' hopes without a sound basis for doing so. It also appears to 
be the case that televised science programmes avoid discussing personal 
death anyway - it can be seen as a signal of the failure of science, or as the 
concern of some other discourse, like religion.
The other main relevant form scientific discourse on personal matters in 
the future may take is demographic. This is far from the personal mode which 
usually operates through the most local of narratives. Even when the raw 
material may seem similar (discussions of desired family size, for example), 
practices like demographic modelling, computer-based forecasting and 
opinion polling all promote the hard, numerical, statistical bases of their 
prognostication and minimise any affective component.
It is even more common for the personal to be absent or repressed. The 
single reference to a child in non-fiction TV programmes talking about space 
was noted in Chapter 4, as was the anomalous status of its speaker^ a female 
medical specialist. Repression is most evident in the inability of 
technostrategic discourse to speak of people and in the phallocentric 
language it deploys instead. In Chapter 3, the centrality of families and 
children in dramas of nuclear detonation and its aftermath was noted. They
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were not however the focus of the controversy the dramas generated, which 
concentrated rather on the drama's 'usurpation' of the primacy of science in 
making truth claims. Truth claims are not presumably relevant to the personal. 
Indeed the least controversial drama, Testament, was seen to focus almost 
entirely on the family and on death. Yet the dismissal of this and to a lesser 
extent The Day After, as well as the derogatory comments about the ending 
of Threads, all of which call on terms like 'melodramatic', indicate again that 
the personal is incompatible with scientific discourse. Fiction is not the only 
threat to the ability of scientific discourse to speak truthfully about the future, 
the personal is too. Yet the representation of families and children in nuclear 
TV dramas is not really evidence of the personal mode, for the future for these 
people is one in which the personal mode is itself refuted. It is one in which 
they all die.
In more general ways, the personal may be seen also to be a problem for 
virtually all fictions of the future. In the other nuclear fictions, the post­
holocaust fantasies, there are often child mutants, or difficulties in conceiving 
children, again indicating problems for continuation of the species. (As do the 
overwhelmingly male worlds of such fictions generally and the eventual fate of 
the girl in A Boy and His Dog.) The antipodean examples present some 
exceptions to the sub-genre's overt exclusion of the familial and denial 
thereby of even indirect long-term consideration of the future through a 
personal mode. Children and families are at times quite central to Mad Max II 
and III, though Max himself continues celibate. The same, except that the 
hero is not quite as celibate, applies to Battletruck, while The Quiet Earth 
plays with the generic cliché which calls for the two surviving males to fight for 
possession of the remaining woman, but eventually presents an amicable, 
erotic arrangement.
 ^ As has been indicated, even depicting children and families is rare in 
most films and TV. fictions with a future setting. This is not a necessary 
characteristic of SF, since they are common in films set in the present, for 
example E.T.: the Extra Terrestrial. Only TV dramas set in the future which 
are screened in children's time (like Dr. Who) normally have a child in the 
cast. The full family of mother, father and three children in the early American 
TV series Losf /n Space is most unusual. Where children do exist, they are 
almost always peripheral, and accompanied (if at all) by no more than one 
parent.^ In other words, children, who are commonly used to figure the
^SF films are by no means unusual in this though they do seem extreme. The only exception
to the absolute absence of a two biological parent human family in the films considered
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future in films with more conventional settings, are not used in this way in 
future-set SF. The two films where they appear to figure hyper-conventionally 
as symbols of hope for the future - 2001 with the final Starchild foetus and 
Enemy Mine where the fostering of the alien child by the human 'uncle' 
reconciles two warring empires - provide a very different basis for hope, for 
these are both 'unnatural' progeny.
In this, however, they may be more typical, indeed they may even be 
indicative of the indirect evidence of the personal mode in films and TV 
programmes of the future. There has already been reference to suggestions 
that the SF genre is itself figured by a distaste for biology and sexuality, 
especially for their conjunction in the reproductive woman. Zoe Sofia pays 
particular attention to the Starchild figure in this regard (as was noted in 
Chapter 6). Sofia observes how exterminism, extraterrestrial fantasies like 
2001 and Alien, and the cult of foetal personhood all collapse the future into 
the present (the embryo does not become a person, it always already was a 
person; current generations would do well to consider themselves also the 
future generation since there may be no other).® Throughout this, her 
concentration is on SF's promulgation of masculinist (re-) production where 
women are no longer necessary. In this she is in accord with Vivian 
Sobchack's previously quoted comment on the SF genre's main unconscious 
problem being a desire to escape from biological dependence on women. As 
Sobchack further says,
"sex and women and the significant connection 
between them is denied but a ghostly presence 
in the genre. It is as if such a potent semiotic 
relationship poses a threat to the cool reason 
and male camaraderie necessary to the conquest 
of space, the defeat of mutant monsters and alien 
invasions, and the corporate development of 
science and technology".^
This denial, which stresses the link of masculinity and science, makes the 
personal mode with its concentration on families a very awkward one for SF. 
There are many more examples of masculinist (re-) production than Sofia
cites. The first three Star Trek films all produce 'unnatural' life - a cyborg, a 
oTrce” barren, suddenly verdant planet and a cloned Spook. Together with the
here is Outlandwhere the mother and child are sent away at the beginning.
®Zoe Sofia: "Exterminating Fetuses", passim 
^Vivian Sobchack: "Virginity of Astronauts", p41
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child in Enemy Mine born of a hermaphroditic alien played by a male actor, 
they make concrete Sobchack’s point that the repressed women and sexuality 
in SF films return as imagery frequently displaced onto space exploration or 
an alien,® although her examples are not benign as this is.
Sobchack's analysis initially appears contradicted where it overlaps with 
Barbara Creed's thesis that the hybrid SF-horror film is particularly concerned 
with the maternal body, and
"is using the body of woman. . .  as a metaphor for 
the uncertainty of the future - the new, unknown, 
potentially creative and potentially destructive future".®
Creed notes the traditional concern of SF film with 'new modes of conception 
and procreation' (though without detailing that 'new' usually means without 
women), and adds
"[i]n more recent years, as experiments with 
reproductive technology have begun to make 
enormous headway, the sci-fi horror film has 
become increasingly preoccupied with alternative 
forms of the conception-gestation-birth process".^®
The difference between Creed and Sobchack is basically generic; Creed 
writes mainly of the horror film, Sobchack of SF. Neither writer concentrates 
on the future; both focus on genre. The two analyses both consider Alien, 
which, with its sequel, is at the centre of feminist studies of SF, and is also 
particularly important for my current concern with the personal. Sobchack 
concentrates on sexless 'virginal' astronauts and Creed on the monstrous 
phallic mother of the a lien ."'In  fact. Creed's detailed presentation of the role 
of imagery based on the reproductive female body"'^ provides an elaboration 
of Sobchack's comment on the repressed. When examined more closely, the
®ibid., p50
^Barbara Creed: "From Here to Modernity: Feminism and Postmodernism", Screen, 28(2), 
Spring 1987, pp47-67. p56
 ^  ^Barbara Creed: "Horror and tfie Monstrous-Feminine: An Imaginary Abjection", Screen, 
27(1), Jan-Feb 1986, pp44-70. Reprinted in James Donald (ed.): Fantasy and the 
Cinema, London, BFI Publisfiing, 1989.
^^Creed: "From Here to Modernity", Section III
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distinction between Creed and Sobchack is quite slight, because both point to 
the same thing - the unavoidable presence of the repressed feminine. This is 
also central to my assertions about the indirect evidence of the importance of 
the personal mode. Even when those figures through which the personal can 
be detected are repressed within films and TV programmes, they contrive to 
make their presence felt. For Sobchack, women and sexuality are repressed 
into imagery or displaced from the genitalia to the head.*'3 (This is most 
apparently the case with all the decapitated androids and, although it is 
Creed's example, the alien 'insemination' scene in Alien.)
A liens  is a particularly important film to consider, because of the 
presence of a child and a mother (albeit an alien one) at its centre. Constance 
Penley has argued that SF can examine the nature of sexual difference by 
displacing it onto, or compounding it with, other differences. However, she 
asserts that while Alien is a "stunningly egalitarian" film. Aliens
"cracks under the strain of trying to keep to the 
very original lackoi sexual differentiation in its 
precursor".^^ [emphasis in original]
The 'crack', described as if it were a betrayal, is the development by Ripley of 
a maternal instinct, evidenced in her determination to save the child. Newt. 
Creed's analysis is similar in this regard. This is a persuasive reading, which if 
valid points to a place for the personal, but it underestimates the extent to 
which Ripley in her role as hero, as much if not more than as a female, must 
act to rescue the child (would John Wayne in a similar case not have done just 
the same?). To argue, as Penley does, that Hicks, the marine lieutenant, does 
not act similarly because it is not required of the masculine, is to ignore the 
coding of him as weak. Bishop, the positively coded male android, does 
participate in Newt's rescue. Penley is able to maintain her argument in part 
because she subsumes all difference under sexual difference and discounts 
the peculiarities introduced by male (re-) production and artificial beings.
Androids, the very creatures of non-monstrous male birth, cannot be 
discounted. Their sexuality is separated absolutely from reproduction and is 
most customarily at. the disposal of the human. The sexuality of female 
androids is usually highlighted, but until very recently male androids have 
been barely differentiated from robots in their asexuality. Films like Android 
and Making Mr. Right, have tended to present them instead as potentially
"^^Sobchack: "Virginity of Astronauts", pp112-113 
‘•'^Penley: Future of An Illusion, p133
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sexual beings, childlike in their innocence but possessed of mature bodies in 
need of sexual awakening (which they of course receive). The effect then is to 
create a new (male) sexual Other. The maternal is abolished and families 
become oddities as androids are 'born' adult. The replicants' possession of 
family photographs in Blade Runner \s the sign of a lie as well as a lack.
Mary Ann Doane argues for a more complex perception of technological 
reproduction in SF film. She identifies a male desire to "appropriate the 
maternal function''''^ in Metropolis, where it is narratively thwarted, but then 
concentrates on Alien(s) and Blade Runner. In the later films, and in the light 
of 'real world' developments in technological reproduction, she notes how the 
maternal category is extended to include artificial creation.16 So far from 
commenting on male appropriation, she observes the "terror of motherless 
reproduction". She ignores the fact that this terror is not evinced by the 
creators, but only by the created and women. At the beginning of Blade  
Runner the replicant Leon kills the man who asks about his mother, and 
Ripley is bigotted about the artificial in both Alien films.
A consolidated outline of Aliens  will demonstrate the repression of 
biology and the ultimate irrepressibility of the woman's body, though Creed's 
comments about the film's self-conscious and funny playing with gender 
roles'* 7 must be borne in mind. Sobchack's analyses precede the release of 
the film, which challenges her general comment on sex and women in SF 
films, quoted earlier, as all the classic preoccupations of SF she lists - the 
conquest of space, alien monsters and corporations developing science and 
technology - are subsumed under the determination of a female hero to save 
a child. Yet sex is minimal and the child is not her own. 'Unnatural' production 
of androids, aliens and habitable planets is central. Ripley succeeds against 
the monstrous alien mother by becoming mechanically augmented - certainly 
in Haraway's terms, a cyborg. The child is only saved with the intervention of a 
male android. It is possible to read this film as an attempt to reconcile the 
repressed feminine and male (re-)production through Ripley's embracing of 
technology and her own destructive as well as mothering powers. Yet even 
so, it does not provide a conduit to the personal mode of representing the 
future; the film ends with the survivors entering yet another hibernation of
■•SMary Ann Doane: "Technophilia: Technology, Representation and the Feminine" in Mary 
Jacobus, Evêiÿh Fox Keiler, Saliy Shuttleworth (eds.): Body/Politics: Women and the 
Discourses of Science, London, Routiedge, 1990. p168 
16|bid., pi 69
^^Creed: "From Here to Modernity", p65
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uncertain duration.
Such hibernation is indeed a 'little death'. Most of the films dealt with 
share a considerable concentration on, even a setting in, death. This is not an 
area linked to the personal mode which the fictions repress. Death dominates 
almost all but the juvenilia, either directly in that the great majority of the 
characters are killed, or indirectly through hibernation, the inadequate number 
of represented women or the presumably sterile matings with androids. 
Technological reproduction both ensures and overcomes death, as 
technological (rather than divine) exterminism overtakes the cycle of personal 
reproduction and individual death.
This applies in other than ostensibly fictional programmes too. It is 
presumably unsurprising given that the least arguable characteristic of the 
future is that it is the site of our individual deaths, but as was mentioned 
earlier, personal death is rarely dealt with in science programmes. 
Environmental disasters and nuclear war, however, both introduce the 
possibility that death may not merely be individual, but total. In such a case 
there would be no place for the personal mode, in films, TV programmes or in 
everyday life.
AIDS provides a final example here, not only of the link of sexuality, 
death and the future, but also of a reversal of the personal mode of thinking 
about the future. In Chapter 2 the belief of Arthur and Marilouise Kroker that 
history became the reality principal as people learnt to live under the threat of 
their sexual past was quoted.‘*® Death in the future coming from sex in the 
past may seem a strong example of the conflation of time, but would have 
been unsurprising to a Victorian worried about syphilis (or indeed to any 
number of pregnant women). Nonetheless it represents a change in the way 
the future has been talked about in the period of my study that compounds the 
absence of the personal.
It is possible to see from all this that the personal mode can be detected 
even indirectly only with great difficulty in films and TV programmes which talk 
about the future. It seems most probable that this is because, particularly in its 
affective content, it is in conflict with scientific discourse. Indications of the 
personal are not merely absent, they are also repressed. That science is 
-imbricated in this repression is evident from its being most readily detected in 
Jhe concern with technological reproduction. In the non-fiction, biological 
parents are incidental, the focus is on the doctors and the technology. In the 
fictions, women and children are rare, reproductive women missing, but
^®Arthur and Marilouise Kroker: "Panic Sex", p14
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creation continues - artificially. Of the indicators of the personal, only death 
figures largely (though not in personal terms in the science programmes) but it 
carries with it, in the threat of exterminism, a total end to the personal future.
With few exceptions, the tone with which the future is talked about is 
pessimistic. Generally speaking, the future is shown as looking bad. 
Furthermore, the more recently the future is talked about, the worse it seems. 
In part this may indicate doubts about the sheer possibility of the future itself, 
either due to a nuclear or an ecological catastrophe or as a consequence of 
AIDS. As was pointed out in Chapter 2, Susan Sontag's analysis of the AIDS 
epidemic links it with the other catastrophes as part of the "long-running serial" 
of Apocalypse - the disaster that we know about but which does not yet seem 
quite to have happened. She comments on a double bifurcation; there is now 
not just the event and its image, but also the event and its projection.
"But in fact the look into the future, which was once 
tied to a vision of linear progress, has, with more 
knowledge at our disposal than anyone could have 
dreamed, turned again and again into a vision of disaster."'*®
As we wait then for these 'known' disasters to be realized, it is 
unsurprising that perhaps the bulk of fictions of the future shows it to be worse 
than the present. The eco-catastrophes and all but the averted war tales of the 
nuclear stories, as well as most of the space and artificial being fictions, show 
a future which, for all but the privileged very few, is less pleasant than now. 
There is even something of a consensus pessimistic view: unless a disaster is 
posited to have reduced the population, the future is heavily polluted and 
crowded with the marginalised poor, who are controllable only by force and 
are usually also geographically restricted. This is the scenario at the heart of 
contemporary bad futures.
Many depictions of the future could not actually be described as 
presenting the future as better or worse than the present, since they present 
the future as much the same as now. Despite this, they can probably also be 
regarded as pessimistic because the present is itself viewed pessimistically. 
Mdst^of the space stories seem to be of this kind, as are those about artificial 
humans. Current problems of corporate unaccountability and corruption, for 
example, are projected forward, or discriminatory practices simply given a 
greater range of beings to operate upon. In these films the present and the
^®Susan Sontag: "AIDS and its Metaphors", p98
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future collapse onto each other.
Almost all the exceptions to pessimism are those constrained to varying 
extents by past visions of the future. The strongest example of this is Star 
Trek, constrained by its late 60’s genesis, the derivatives of which continue to 
present an optimistic view of the future. A similar process was also noted in 
Flash Gordon, Buck Rogers in the 25th Century an6, to a much lesser extent, 
2010. The initial Star Wars vision of a defensive shield that would make 
nuclear attack on the US impossible was also a view of a better future 
influenced by a nostalgic element. The Star Wars name could be used 
positively of the proposal largely because the nostalgic aura of the film fitted 
(however improbably) the idea of pre-nuclear invulnerability. The current plan, 
for the protection of missile silos, has little evidence of optimism.
Nor is the pessimistic view restricted to fiction. Science itself no longer 
offers the hope it seemed to, for instance in the 60s. Probably the best it 
proposes is the alleviation in the future of some of the problems of the present 
- many of which, like the Greenhouse Effect and other environmental 
disasters, it is seen to have brought about in the first place. Medicine, the 
science most easily perceived as beneficial, is symptomatic here, as it 
becomes necessary to deal with iatrogenic diseases.
The failures of science are publicized more than once was the case, 
together with their probable future consequences. There is no longer an 
expectation that scientific 'progress' is without commensurate drawbacks. The 
can-do mentality which once assumed that technological solutions were sure 
to be developed eventually (the mentality which embraced Star Wars/SDI and 
postponed worrying about nuclear waste disposal) seems no longer so 
secure. It can be seen as part of the asserted end of the Enlightenment Project 
and the crisis of legitimation (outlined by Jean-François Lyotard), as it 
becomes obvious that there is no longer any certainty that human 
emancipation will be the result of increases in scientific knowledge.^® It is a 
very basic part of the loss of influence of the idea of progress as a meta­
narrative. Progress can no longer be underwritten by science, and 
postmodern science itself seems to be
"theorising its own evolution as discontinuous, 
catastrophic, nonratifiabie and paradoxical".^^
^®Lyotard: The Postmodern Condition
ibid., p60
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This kind of science should not be as threatened by fiction, even science 
fiction, yet this is the kind of science still little evident in the popular discourses 
considered here.
The way the future is talked about in popular discourses is characterised 
by a kind of hybridity, similar to that noted in Chapter 6 as typical of the 
depiction of artificial beings, especially as their scientific plausibility increased. 
There are many occasions throughout this study where it can be found: it has 
been difficult or impossible to separate fiction and non-fiction satisfactorily; 
scientific discourse has refused to be 'purified'; economic concerns have 
usurped science's prominence; and the prime fictional mode has been SF, the 
very name of which is hybrid. Because the future is unknown, or not yet know, 
if it is to be talked about with any possibility of a claim to do so 'truthfully', it can 
only be done in a hybrid way. Fiction, acknowledged or not, w ill be present. 
Proof will only be available in the present, so science will inevitably be 
impure. This matters more in popular than in professional discourses, but in 
dealing with film and TV as here, it is popular discourse that is relevant. Visual 
material is particularly problematic. Sustained visuals showing the future, if 
they are not to be completely fantastic, can only be hybrids, combinations of 
'talking heads' speculating, mathematical-based projections and perhaps 
some 'mock-up' models, but hybrids have a tendency rapidly to become SF.
The threat of such hybridity and of discursive convergences may be such 
that the term 'future' itself is disavowed for fear of its destabilising capabilities. 
Those depictions of the future claiming to be most truthful never announce 
themselves as such, nor do ones deployed in attempts to gain or retain power. 
Political platforms and programmes are based on scientific or economic 
research or perhaps forecasts, never on 'futuristics' and rarely these days 
even on visions of the future. Perhaps what is operating here is a fear that 
admitting to the referent being unknown would expose the fragility of the 
edifice and mark it as fictional.
Because SF happily admits science and the 'factual', while science 
rejects the fictional, the fictional components of the hybrid, rather than the non- 
fictional determine its location. Scientific discourse is still that within which 
fmtïï clairhs can most readily be made, but perhaps the power in talking about 
the^futuror against the grain of the regimes of truth and even in the face of 
persistent pessimism, lies more with fictions - embracing narrativity, exploiting 
the affective in riots of SFX and not having to engage in tactics of denial when 
the events overtake expectations.
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APPENDIX B
TOMORROW’S WORLD: THE GREENHOUSE EFFECT SPECIAL 31/1/1989 
BBG1 7.00pm. Editor: Richard Reisz. [Transcript by Frances Bonner.]
( Only brief italicized references are made to the visuals.)
Standard 1988-9 opening: the spherical blue and white logo in flowers etc.. 
Opens on view over coast out to sea, circular refraction of sunlight across 
image, all brown and gold. Pan along coast to tiny figure of Peter McCann. 
"This is the farthest edge of Europe, the continent's outer skin, where it 
breathes clean air and is washed by unpolluted waters. [MCU on Peter taking 
deep breath.] You can almost smell the purity of this place. This is 
Connemara, on the west coast of Ireland. It's reckoned to have about the 
cleanest air in Europe and yet even here the atmosphere is changing in ways 
which threaten all of us." Peter walks Inland. CU on his Wellington boot 
splashing through a small pool. He approaches a stone building. "One tiny 
stone cottage in this remote spot is part of a global research programme 
measuring minute amounts of gases in the atmosphere. Here scientists are 
tracking one of the most profound and far-reaching problems facing the world 
today. It's called the Greenhouse Effect."
Cut to the Tomorrow's World studio apparently bare of props apart from a 
blue globe with unidentifiable additions. Judith Haan speaks to camera. 
"Good evening and welcome live to a special edition of Tomorrow's World. 
As most of us have noticed this winter, the world is getting warmer. In fact, 
globally 1988 was the hottest year on record. In the next forty years, world 
temperatures are expected to rise to their highest level since the last ice age 
18,000 years ago. Tonight we'll be investigating what's happening, how we 
might adapt to the changes and if there's anything we can do to prevent them. 
In particular we'll be looking forward those forty years to 2030, well within 
many of our lifetimes, to see how different the world might be by then. One of 
the main things we can expect is dramatic changes in the climate, like those 
which have recently been making the headlines. —  -
Cut to a sequMlce o j news film. 1. Firemen removing fallen trees from road. 
Newsreader V.O.: "Southern Britain is clearing up after the worst night of 
storms since records began almost 300 years ago."
2. Film of people wading through flooded streets and then a breach in a dam.
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V.O.: Over 250 people have died in floods which have devastated South­
eastern China. The torrential rains are said to be the worst for centuries."
3. Film o f very high waves on breakwater. V. O.: " Strong winds and driving 
rain are beating in on coastal areas of Northern Mexico and Texas, as 
Hurricane Gilbert, one of the fiercest this century continues to sweep across 
the Gulf of Mexico."
Cut to Maggie Philbin in studio. "Isolated incidents or the disastrous first fruits 
of the Greenhouse Effect? Most researchers are now convinced that global 
weather patterns are in the process of changing and becoming more 
unpredictable. But [sic.] they are prepared to come up with a long range 
forecast. So here with the weather for a typical winter's day in 2030, is John 
Kettley."
Standard BBC weather presentation - title slide, forecaster speaking to 
camera, weather maps. "Thank you, Maggie. Well the warm wet windy 
weather is going to continue over the British Isles over the foreseeable future. 
You can see temperatures here once again up to 12° and as high as 15® in 
western parts of Ireland. The breeze coming in off Europe where the winds are 
up to gale force across central and northern parts at the moment, all coming 
around an area of high pressure centred over Finland. But once again we've 
got an area of low pressure down over the Gulf of Genoa. These seem to be 
developing readily these days, bringing some wet and windy weather and 
rather muggy weather across much of Italy, but the temperatures are high 
enough to make it quite humid. Now we've got some very warm weather 
indeed down in southern parts of Spain, North Africa. The temperature there, 
21 to 23° Celsius, so excellent for sun-bathing, but not very good for skiing in 
the Alps, because this warm weather is affecting skiing quite considerably, just 
restricting it to the highest peaks. But if you do fancy some skiing go up to 
north-eastern parts of Scandinavia, where the temperatures there are -20 to - 
25°C, with quite a number of snow showers coming along as well. How about 
Iceland though for a midwinter break? The temperature there, 13° and plenty 
of sunshine to come as well. And that's it from me."
Cut to Howard Stableford in studio. "Thank you John, and if they'll be 
enjoying the winter sun in Reykjavik, what's the shift in world weather going to 
mean closer to home? Well,“ throughout tonight's programme. I'll be looking at 
the likely impact on one very typical area." Camera pulls back to reveal 
Howard standing behind a relief map . "It's this region around the Tay Estuary 
on the east coast of Scotland. To give you some geography, there's Arbroath; 
Dundee down here and over there the fair city of Perth."
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Pan to Maggie. "Now concern about the Greenhouse Effect isn't new. In fact a 
Swedish scientist warned about the possible global consequences as long 
ago as 1896. He pointed out that the energy we receive from the sun is largely 
in the form of [CU on globe, attachments revealed as two lengths of neon 
tubing and and a transparent, larger covering globe] these short wave-length 
radiation [sic.], and that comes through the atmosphere, warms up the earth 
and the heat is then radiated back into space, but this time takes the form of 
longer wavelength radiation, and that's more readily absorbed by the gases in 
the atmosphere, notably by carbon dioxide, and that traps the heat like a 
blanket around the earth. This Greenhouse Effect is absolutely essential and 
without it the earth would be permanently frozen. The problem is that our 
actions are now producing more and more of the greenhouses gases."
Judith in studio. "So far about thirty of these greenhouse gases have been 
identified and by far the most abundant and important is carbon dioxide. Its 
level has been increasing ever since the Industrial Revolution, mainly 
because of burning fossil fuels - gas, oil and coal - as well as all the wood 
burnt by deforestation [sic.]." She walks across the studio to a small burning 
brazier. "The other gases involved are less common, but many are far more 
potent. Methane, for example, is twenty times as powerful as carbon dioxide. It 
comes from bacteria in the guts of animals like cows and sheep, from rubbish 
dumps and from water-logged land like rice-paddies. Another important 
greenhouse gas is nitrous oxide produced by fertilizers and anything burning 
at high temperatures. But most potent of all are CFC's, or chlorofluorocarbons, 
which we've heard so much about recently in relation to the ozone layer. 
They're used in refrigerators, in industrial cleansers, various types of 
packaging and, in much of the world, they are still used in these - in aerosol 
sprays." She has walked past a pen of calves, some bags of fertilizer, fridges 
and held up a hamburger carton and an aerosol can. "The total quantity of all 
these gases now being produced is enormous. As Howard's been seeing in 
Scotland, we're churning them out around the clock."
Cut to digital clock reading 7.29am, rock music, light being switched on, gas 
fire lit, flame, chimney with smoke and TV aerial, woman using hairspray, 
appliance being plugged in, tap turned on, shaving cream dispensed, coal 
fire burning, man's face on TV, truck pulling up to 'Cleaner diesel' pumps, 
getting filled up, small boat by pier puffing out smoke, then Howard, sitting on 
harbour wall. "Make no mistake about it, we are all contributing to the 
Greenhouse Effect. Behind me the 24,000 inhabitants of Arbroath are getting 
ready for another working day and on this one day alone, this typical small
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town will account for the release of 705 tons of carbon dioxide into the 
atmosphere. Electricity being generated for Arbroath contributes almost a third 
of that - 270 tons." Light goes on in shop, cut to rooftops and chimneys. "With 
another hundred coming from fires, boilers and cookers; 120 tons come from 
cars and other vehicles and a further 170 from industry. So just about 
everything we do these days produces more carbon dioxide. In fact figures 
show that the amount we release has more than doubled since 1950." Cars, 
rubbish dumps. "The town also produces rubbish, tons of it every day." 
Howard stands by front-end loader on rubbish dump. "It's dumped at this 
land-fill site, where it rots and gives off methane. Many of the aerosols that end 
up here are still propelled by CFC's, [he picks one up] and still more CFC's 
are released when some of the more than 240 fridges that the people of 
Arbroath throw away each year, are broken up." Fridge is crushed under 
HGV wheels."There's also nitrous oxide produced by fertilisers, cars and 
fires. So between them, methane, CFC's and nitrous oxide nearly double the 
effect of the carbon dioxide." Cut from dump to golden sunset, Howard walks 
alone along a beach. "Combine the effects of all the gases and on this single 
day the town has been responsible for adding the equivalent of 1300 tons of 
carbon dioxide into the atmosphere. That's three times as much as in 1950 
and there's nothing unusual about Arbroath."
Cut to shot of the ocean and Peter's voice. (He is later revealed sitting on a 
rock by the shore). "As those emissions mix and travel through the air, their 
composition changes. Greenhouse gases are continually being created and 
destroyed by chemical reactions in the atmosphere and by natural processes 
on land and sea. The end result, the so-called 'background levels' can only be 
seen in remote corners of the world. Carbon dioxide is measured in Hawaii 
and the Antarctic. Here on the west coast of Ireland is one of the five sites that 
ring the globe all the way to Tasmania, monitoring all the other greenhouse 
gases - methane, nitrous oxide, CFC's and so on. The prevailing south­
westerly winds have a clear run of many thousands of kilometres. There's no 
more land beyond these rocks until you reach America. The air arrives here 
thoroughly mixed and free of local pollution. Above the cottage an inlet draws 
in tiny gulps of air." Shot of Peter in cottage doorway, then shot of inlet. Pan 
down to cottage roof. "They travel down to a room inside, where there's an 
instrument of quite unimaginable sensitivity." He enters the cottage and leans 
against a metal box with tubes etc.. "And this is' it, a gas chromatograph, 
which can sense changes in the air as small as one part per trillion, and look
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at this - a CFC trace for last October." He moves across the room and points 
to a computer screen on which a graph with a high peak is displayed, he 
points in CU. "And there around the 15th, is a spell when the wind turned to 
easterly, catching a brief whiff of Europe's aerosols and refrigerators. In the 
ten years that this project has been operating, it's revealed the true magnitude 
of the atmospheric problem." The camera pulls back to a medium shot of 
Peter with the computer screen, then closes up. "This is Freon 11, used in 
aerosols and foams, and this is Freon 12, used in refrigerators. Both have 
increased at the rate of 5per cent per year. These CFC's persist in the 
atmosphere for around 100 years. So even if we were to stop using them 
tomorrow, this charts a legacy that will effect us for generations to come." 
Peter and the equipment are shown in medium long shot. The camera cuts 
outside to show the cottage at night with the windows lit, then the lights are 
turned off.
Cut to studio, Maggie by the globe. "Measurements like those from Ireland 
indicate that by the year 2030, the total effect of greenhouse gases in the 
atmosphere will have doubled from its natural level. In that brief time, the 
world's climate is expected to undergo major changes. To try and work out 
what will happen, researchers build up complex computer simulations of the 
atmosphere, called general circulation models." Camera pulls back, lights 
dim on Maggie and come up on three monitors in the foreground. They 
reveal different displays. Maggie approaches one monitor. "And here's one of 
those GCM's, developed at the Goddard Institute for Space Sciences in New 
York, and this shows global temperatures as they are now." CU on computer 
screen showing map of the world in greens and yellowy browns."Bu\ if we run 
the sequence forward we can see a prediction for 2030. Now the white areas 
indicate temperatures which will stay the same, but the reddish areas and the 
yellow areas here indicate an increase In temperature. About half a dozen 
GCM's have been developed and although they disagree on many points, all 
confirm that the greatest warming will be-in the high latitudes with winters 
becoming especially mild. By 2030, the average world temperature is 
expected to rise several degrees. But these GCM's largely ignore two major 
factors. Firstly the oceans: they have their own hot and cold circulation 
"patterns which interact with the weather. One exarh'ple is the Gulf Stream that 
sweeps across from the Gulf of Mexico and keeps the UK several degrees 
warmer than it should [sic.]. Some believe that with the temperature change, it 
could be diverted leaving the British Isles colder. And the other enormous 
uncertainty is the effect of clouds."
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The monitor picture changes from the models to a shot of Peter standing on 
the beach. "The problem with clouds is that they can both warm and cool the 
earth's atmosphere. The low level fluffy clouds that we often associate with 
rain, like some of these here, reflect the sun's shortwave radiation back out 
into space so effectively they actually make the earth cooler. But high above 
this layer is another layer, the thin icy wisps of cirrus. Made up of many tiny 
types of ice particles, its known that they can warm the earth by trapping the 
longwave radiation it gives off, but quite how much they do that and how that'll 
alter the Greenhouse Effect is little understood. The only way to find out is to 
study it close up. So a project has been set up called the International Cirrus 
Experiment of which this plane is a major part." Shot of plane, then CU of 
equipment on it. "It bristles with sensors for measuring the temperature and 
composition of all types of clouds including the icy cirrus, but really crucial to 
understanding the secrets of the cirrus is the equipment in these two pods 
here, where a laser beams across at a special camera to produce pictures of 
the heart of the problem - the ice crystals." In the plane taxiing before take-off. 
Plane noise then pilot and control tower exchange comments. Shot of plane 
taking off. Peter gets up from his seat. "What they are trying to establish are 
the types of ice crystals formed under different conditions." Peter moves to 
back of plane and sits before an equipment console. CU on computer screen 
to show crystal patterns."An6 how they effect the reflection of heat by the 
cirrus. With this device we can actually count the number of ice crystals that 
are going past the sensors out there on that wing. And this is the kind of traces 
you get. There you have a beautiful ice crystals right there on the screen. But 
these pictures are only in two dimensions so that's why the laser camera, 
which we talked about earlier, is on the other wing. It's producing holographic 
pictures of the minute ice particles as they flash through the beam at 200 
mph." Peter speaks to camera. Then shots o f plane flying through clouds. 
"Back on the ground a laser reconstructs the image in three dimensions. This 
is called a bullet rosette." Peter is now on the ground in front of a grander 
console with a monitor and keyboard. "But how may these shapes relate to 
the Greenhouse Effect? Well, just recently it's been discovered that certain 
types of cirrus don't warm the earth but cool it, just like the low cloud. The 
crucial thing to find out js what type of crystals contribute to. warming and 
which to cooling." Graphics throughout this have been of crystaTpatterns on 
computer screens. "Almost certainly in a warmer climate there will be an 
increase in cloud cover. Now this may act as a sort of brake to total global 
warming or it may speed it up. Only when projects like this reveal more about
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the elusive cirrus can that knowledge be included in the computer models and 
the true climatic effects of the clouds be known.
Cut to studio and Judith in front of three computer screens. "So with that kind 
of uncertainty, is it possible to make any predictions at all? Well all the 
computer simulations agree that there'll definitely be a rise in temperature. 
The question is just how much? Will the average rise by one and a half or 5° 
Celsius by 2030? Either way that may not sound a lot but it's enough to bring 
major changes. [CU on screen showing map of the world.] This map is a 
prediction of rainfall. It shows that far northern latitudes it will become wetter - 
that's the dark green. Further south deserts like the Sahara are likely to 
spread, while monsoons become heavier. The American south and mid-west 
is expected to become drier. And here in Britain most researchers predict that 
it'll be generally warmer. But the south will have a drier, Mediterranean 
climate, while the north will be wetter. But what will these climatic changes 
and the raised levels of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere mean for crops 
and other plants. It's an area that's still not fully understood." Visuals have 
shown Judith pointing at areas of the map in CU.
Cut to Maggie in a very large greenhouse with tomato plants. "One thing we 
do know though is that in general plants do benefit from an increased level of 
one of the greenhouse gases, carbon dioxide. They use it, of course, in the 
process of photosynthesis. Commercial growers have exploited this fact for 
years, creating if you like an artificial greenhouse effect. In here they're 
burning liquid paraffin to enrich the atmosphere with carbon dioxide and these 
young tomato plants are clearly thriving on it. In a closed environment like this 
growing conditions can be carefully regulated. How plants would react to a 
real Greenhouse Effect could be a very different story." Cut to shot of pressed 
leaf in a book, then up to Maggie in a plant libary. "These alder leaves were 
pressed in 1869 and they provide a clue to the way some plants may already 
be responding." Cut to a man with a measuring device working on a tree in a 
walled garden. "On a field trip in the Scottish hills one summer, Ian 
Woodward, a botanist at Cambridge University, [CU on meter] noticed that 
the leaves of trees on the higher slopes had more stomata, the minute pores 
through which trees absorb carbon dioxide and lose water, than those at 
lower levels. He knew there was less carbon dioxide at higher altitudes [CU 
-0 /7  /ace/than lower down and he reckoned that the plants might in some way 
be reacting to that difference." Return to the dried plant in the boo/c."When this 
specimen was collected 120 years ago, there was 16 per cent less carbon 
dioxide in the atmosphere than there is now, so if Ian Woodward's theory is
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correct, then today's plants should have fewer stomata than their Victorian 
counterparts." Cut to Woodward in a laboratory, then magnified CU on leaf 
surface. "And having examined the distribution of stomata under the 
microscope, that's exactly what he has found." Back to Maggie in the plant 
library. "So it seems that as the CO2 levels rise in the future, plants may 
evolve to produce even fewer stomata. And yet they're still likely to absorb 
more carbon dioxide and so to grow more quickly. And having fewer stomata 
may mean that they're better at retaining moisture and so less prone to 
drought." Two people in a laboratory with plants and equipment. "The 
Cambridge team are now starting to test plants like winter wheat under a 
whole range of conditions. Growing them in different amounts and 
combinations of carbon dioxide, heat and water to see how they will 
respond.[Maggie walking in a garden.] In general it looks as though plants 
will grow better under the Greenhouse Effect, but the story doesn't end there." 
Judith in the studio behind trays of winter wheat. "And that's because if crops 
do better, then so will weeds, pests and diseases like mildew which makes 
leaves go yellow. Growing seasons will also be disrupted. Now at this stage of 
winter, winter wheat should look like this, but with a shorter milder winter it 
becomes far more developed and as nutrients get used up faster, crops would 
need more fertiliser. World wide the effects would be dramatic.Cuf from CU 
on different samples o f wheat to a map of the world. "For example the great 
wheat belts of America and Russia are expected to move north, while in 
Europe unfamiliar crops like cereals could move into the cold wastes of 
Iceland. Over the east coast of Scotland, farmers of 2030 will be getting used 
to temperatures much like those of northern France today." She looks at the 
relief map of the Tay Estuary.
Cut to Howard VO some modern farm buildings."Th\s is Ian Stirling's farm just 
outside Arbroath. What will they be growing here in forty years time? Well the 
raspberry bushes for which this area is famous will probably still be here. In 
fact they might even get two crops a year in a warmer longer growing season." 
Cut to tractor with sprayer."And there'll still be barley, although farmers may 
have to use more chemicals. This year for the first time ever, Ian Stirling is 
having to spray his winter crop for a second time as this year's warmer 
temperatures encourage mildew. But the outlook could be even worse for the 
crops stored in these sheds - seed poXaXoesJlCutJoJnside a shed, Howard, 
boxes and potatoes. "This area produces nearly all of Britain's seed potatoes 
and the 3000 tons stored in here will fetch a higher price than eaters. But to
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qualify for seed, the soil and the plants growing out in the fields have to pass a 
stringent test and if more than one in 10,000 of the potatoes is found to be 
diseased, then the whole crop fails the test. The hard winters up here are 
essential to keep down pests like aphids and nematodes which spread 
diseases to the plants."Howard outside on farm. "So Britain's seed potato 
production could be wiped out, but in its place will come other crops like 
French beans, sugar beet and even maize. Farmers like Ian will be able to 
adapt quickly enough to changing conditions. But there is one major crop in 
Scotland which doesn't take a year but a whole lifetime to mature." Howard in 
forest. "These sitka spruces are descended from trees found in the Queen 
Charlotte Islands off British Columbia. This strain was developed in the 1960s 
specifically for this area and now 70 per cent of planted forestry in Scotland is 
made up of this single variety. But why shouldn't they benefit from the warmer 
weather? Well, if the trees don't get 120 days below S^C during the winter, 
then the buds' growth in spring is stunted. It takes sixty years to grow a spruce, 
so when these young trees are matured by the year 2032, they may well find 
that the climate then doesn't suit them at all, and now may be the time to start 
looking for a different variety much more suited to a warmer climate." Back to 
the tractor on Ian Stirling's farm. "For this area of the country, changes may 
be both good and bad, but one thing's certain, in the warmer world of 2030, 
the landscape will be different."
Maggie in the studio with a beaker of liquid and a thermometer. "So parts of 
Britain can expect to undergo a sea change, quite literally in fact, because one 
further consequence of the Greenhouse Effect is that sea level is rising, in fact 
it's gone up fifteen centimetres since the turn of the century. And as the world 
gets warmer, that increase will become even more dramatic. For a start, sea 
water, just like the liquid in this thermometer, expands as it gets warmer and 
this expansion will be the main cause of rising sea level. But it won't be the 
only one, mountain glaciers and polar ice caps will start to melt, raising sea 
level even further, though increased snowfall at the poles may partly offset that 
process. Even so, the oceans may rise about forty centimetres, that's about 
fifteen inches, by the year 2030 with potentially catastophic results." Shot of 
sea then tropical island. "Small island nations like the Seychelles and the 
Maldives could virtually disappear. Major agricultural areas Tike tbe Nile Delta, 
already seriously at risk from flooding, are likely to be inundated. And what 
about the UK? Well let's look again at the Tay Estuary [to relief map] and the 
typical changes which this may face."
Cut to shot of the sea and Howard walking on the beach. "The effects on the
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British coastline may be less severe, but even a rise of forty centimetres by the 
year 2030 will cause major changes. Schemes to prevent erosion like these 
rocks protecting the golf course here at Carlusty will be needed by hundreds 
of other locations around the coast. But such a rapid rise in such a relatively 
short space of time may simply be too much for many of our beaches and they 
will be swept away. And the water will be rising even inland." Shot of city on a 
river. "Perth is just at the high water mark of the Tay Estuary. Fresh water from 
the hills has flooded this town many times in the past, although in recent years 
hydro-electric schemes have held back the river and solved most of the 
problems. But predictions say Scotland's climate will be wetter, so fresh water 
flooding may return and be compounded by a threat from the rising sea." 
Various shots o f Perth, stoneworks, flood- marks, a bridge, the river. 
"Although this part of the river is tidal, salt water does not yet reach as far as 
Perth, but as sea level rises, salt may start to leach into the fresh water supply 
and drains and sewers may back up. But most worrying of all, a high tide 
combined with high rainfall will bring the danger of flooding to large areas of 
the town. And of course Perth isn't alone, many communities are likely to be 
affected; and the cost of protecting themselves against the dangers of swollen 
rivers and rising sea will be high. Inevitably then, some areas of this country 
too will simply disappear."
Judith in studio."So what effects are we likely to see on the shape of Britain 
as a whole in 2030? Well on a national scale an increase of forty centimetres 
won't make the map look very different. [Cut to map of UK.] But many low- 
lying areas like Fenland, the Wirral and the Thames Estuary will be under 
increased risk of flooding and may need extra defences. And unless some 
solution is found, it's predicted that by the end of the twenty-first century the 
sea could have risen about a metre with many of those areas permanently 
flooded."
Peter in studio. "Unfortunately, with 90 per cent of the world's energy coming 
from fossil fuels, there is no quick solution, but we could cut our emissions of 
carbon dioxide by generally improving say insulation and the efficiency of 
power stations. We could also begin to move our energy supplies away from 
fossil fuels. Electricity could be generated from renewable sources or nuclear
power. Cars like this prototype could run on hydrogen gas. When hydrogen 
burns it produces mainly water and no carbon dioxide, but one problem here 
is how to manufacture sufficient hydrogen without using fossil fuels. A more 
surprising alternative is being developed in this local council vehicle which 
runs on methane that will come from their own sewage works and rubbish
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dumps. Now even though burning methane does produce carbon dioxide, it's 
much better than letting the methane escape, as it's a highly potent 
greenhouse gas. And of course we could replace the CFC's. In Britain, 90 per 
cent of aerosols should be CFC-free by the end of this year. But cutting CFC's 
out altogether may take longer. This camping fridge has replaced Freon with 
ammonia, which is not a greenhouse gas, but the foam insulation inside still 
depends on CFC's."
Maggie in studio by microscope linked to monitor. "But all these measures 
taken by themselves could only slow down the global warming that's already 
taking place. If there is a real long-term solution, perhaps it lies in the ability of 
our planet to regulate itself. About half the carbon dioxide that we've produced 
since the Industrial Revolution has been taken up by the oceans. Each 
summer billions of microscopic organisms, in particular these coccoliths, 
multiply in the warm surface layers of the ocean, taking in carbon dioxide for 
photosynthesis and for the production of their strange chalky shells." 
Magnified CU on organisms. "And the coccoliths are eaten by zooplankton, 
you can see a few of them there [points to petri dish]. Their waste, rich in 
carbon, gradually sinks to the ocean floor where some of it forms sediment. In 
this way carbon dioxide is continuously being extracted from the atmosphere 
and locked up in new sedimentary rocks. Exactly how this carbon cycle works 
in the ocean, how long it takes and how much more the oceans can absorb is 
still unclear. A major international study takes place in a few weeks time to try 
and understand the process more fully."
Judith in studio, to camera. "One thing we do know though, is that at present 
human activity is producing carbon dioxide about twice as fast as the oceans 
are absorbing it. As carbon dioxide levels and temperatures increase, the 
result may be more coccoliths absorbing more carbon dioxide and the 
balance could change. If we at the same time can cut our emissions to meet 
what marine orgainisms can absorb, there could be a new stable climate, 
somewhat warmer than it is now. It is unlikely that anything can stop most of 
the changes we've talked about this evening, but if we react quickly enough, 
things could then stabilize. This is not, at least not yet, a global catastrophe, 
but nor is it a problem we can ignore. The Greenhouse Effect is going to alter 
our lives and our surroundings in tomorrow's world. Planning for those 
changes is needed now. Goodnight."
The titles roil over the studio set with the small burning brazier, the calves, 
the fridges etc..
SOURCES CONSULTED
MONOGRAPHS
Altman, Rick (ed.): Genre: The Musical, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 
1981.
Appignanesi, Lisa (ed.): Postmodernism, ICA Documents 4, London, 1986.
Aronson, Ronald: The Dialectics of Disaster, London, Verso, 1983.
Aubrey, Crispin (ed.): Nukespeak: The Media and the Bomb, London, 
Comedia, 1982.
Bailey, Margaret: Live Long and Prosper: The Star Trek Phenemenon, 
Rutgers University GSLS Occasional Paper No.76-2, New Brunswick, 
New Jersey,1976.
Barthes, Roland: Camera Lucida: Reflections on Photography, New York, 
Hill and Wang, 1981.
 : image-Music-Text, (Essays Selected and Translated by Stephen
Heath), Glasgow, Fontana/Collins, 1977.
Baudrillard, Jean: "The Implosion of Meaning in the Media and the Implosion 
of the Social in the Masses" in Kathleen Woodward (ed.): The Myths 
of information, Madison, Coda, 1980.
 : "The Structural Law of Chance and the Order of Simulacra" in John
Fekete (ed.): The Structural Allegory: Reconstructive Encounters with 
New French Thought, Manchester University Press, 1984.
 : Selected Writings, (Edited and Introduced by Mark Poster), London,
Polity Press, 1988
Benjamin, Walter: "The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction" 
(1936) in///um/naf/ons, London, Jonathon Cape, 1970.
Bennett, Tony (et al eds): Popular Television and Science, London, BFI, 
1981.
Bennett, Tony and Janet Woollacott: Bond and Beyond: The Political Career 
of a Popu/ar Hero, London, MacMillan, 1987.
Blair, Karin: Meaning in Star Trek, New York, Warner Books, 1977.
Broad, William J.: Star Warriors, London, Faber and Faber, 1986.
Brooke-Rose, Christine: A Rhetoric o f the Unrea/, Cambridge University 
Press," 1981.
Brosnan, John: Movie Magic, London, MacDonald, 1974.
250
Bruno, Giuliana: "Ramble City: Postmodernism and Blade RunneP, 
in Annette Kuhn (ed.): Alien Zone: Cultural Theory and Contemporary 
Science Fiction Cinema, London ,Verso, 1990.
Burgin, Victor: The End of Art Theory, London, MacMillan, 1986.
Burke, Edmund: A Phiiosophicai Enquiry into the Origins of our ideas o f the 
Sublime and the Beautiful, (Edited with an Introduction and Note by J.T. 
Boulton), London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1958.
Byers, Thomas B.: "Commodity Futures" in Annette Kuhn (ed.): Alien Zone: 
Cultural Theory and Contemporary Science Fiction Cinema, London, 
Verso, 1990.
Chase, Malcolm and Christopher Shaw (eds.): The Imagined Past: history 
and nostalgia, Manchester University Press, 1989.
Chase, Malcolm and Christopher Shaw: "The Dimensions of Nostalgia", in 
Malcolm Chase and Christopher Shaw (eds.): The Im agined Past: 
history and nostalgia, Manchester University Press, 1989.
Chilton, Paul (ed.): Language and the Nuclear Arms Debate: Nukespeak 
Today, London, Frances Pinter (Publishers), 1985.
Comolli, Jean-Louis: "Machines of the Visible", in Teresa de Laurentis and 
Stephen Heath (eds): The Cinematic Apparatus, London, MacMillan, 
1980
Creed, Barbara: "Horror and the Monstrous-Feminine: An Imaginary 
Abjection", in James Donald (ed.): Fantasy and the Cinema, London, 
BFI Publishing, 1989.
de Lauretis, Teresa: Technologies of Gender, Indiana University Press, 1987.
 (ed.): Feminist Studies/Critical Studies, London, MacMillan, 1988.
de Lauretis, Teresa and Stephen Heath (eds): The Cinematic Apparatus, 
London, MacMillan, 1980
Doane, Mary Ann: "Technophilia: Technology, Representation and the 
Feminine" in Mary Jacobus, Evelyn Fox Keller, Sally Shuttleworth (eds.): 
Body/Politics: Women and the Discourses of Science, London, 
Routledge, 1990.
Donald, James (ed.): Fantasy and the Cinema, London, BFI, 1989.
Douglas, Mary: Purity and Danger, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 
1969.
Dowling, David: Fictions of Nuclear Disaster, London, MacMillan, 1987.
Dyer, Richard: "Entertainment and Utopia" in Rick Altman (ed.): Genre: The 
Musical, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1981.
Eco, Umberto: A Theory of Semiotics, London, MacMillan, 1977.
 : Semiotics and the Philosophy of Language, London, MacMillan,1984.
251
 : Faith in Fakes, London, Seeker and Warburg, 1986.
Elshtain, Jean Bethke: Women and War, Brighton, Harvester, 1987.
Fekete, John (ed.): The Structural Allegory: Reconstructive Encounters with 
New French Thought, Manchester University Press, 1984.
Finney, Ben R. and Eric M. Jones (eds.): Interstellar Migration and the 
Human Experience, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1985.
Flick, James: "Artificial Intelligence and Industrial Robots: An Automatic End 
for Utopian Thoughts" in Everett Mendelsohn and Helga Novotny 
(eds.):Nineteen Eighty-Four: Science between Utopia and Dystopia, 
Sociology of the Sciences, Vol. VIII, D. Reidel Publishing Co. 1984.
Foley, Barbara: Telling the Truth: the theory and practice of documentary 
fiction, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1986.
Foster, Hal (ed.): Postmodern Culture, London, Pluto Press, 1985.
Foucault, Michel: The Archaeology of Knowledge, (trans. A.M. Sheridan 
Smith), London, Tavistock, 1972.
 : Discipline and Punish, (Trans. A. Sheridan), London, Allen Lane,
1977.
 \ Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and other writings, (ed. Colin
Gordon), Brighton, Harvester, 1980.
 : "The Order of Discourse", in Michael J. Shapiro (ed.): Language and
Politics, Oxford, Basil Blackwell,1984.
Franklin, H. Bruce: "Don't Look Where We're Going: Visions of the Future in 
Science Fiction Films 1970-82" in George Slusser and Eric S. Rabkin 
(eds.) Shadows o f the Magic Lamp, Carbondale, Southern Illinois 
University Press, 1985.
Gardner, Carl and Robert Young: "Science on TV: A Critique" in Tony Bennett 
(et al eds.): Popular Television and Science, London, BFI, 1981. .
Gerrold, David: The World of Star Trek, (Revised Edition), New York, Bluejay, 
1984.
Gifford, Denis : Science Fiction Film, London, Studio Vista/Dutton Paperback, 
1971.
Glasgow University Media Group: War and Peace News, Milton Keynes,
 Open University Press, 1985.................... ..... . .
Goodman, Nelson: Ways o/ Woridmaking, Hassocks, Sussex, Harvester 
Press, 1978.
Gould, Stephen Jay: Ever Since Darwin: Reflections in Natural History, 
Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1980
252
Greimas, A. J.: Structural Semantics: An Attempt at a Method, Lincoln and 
London, University of Nebraska Press, 1983.
Hardy, Phil: Science Fiction, The Aurum Film Encyclopaedia Vol. II, 
London, Aurum, 1984.
Harvey, David: The Condition o f Postmodernity, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 
1989.
Heath, Stephen: Questions of Cinema, London, MacMillan, 1981.
Jacobus, Mary, Evelyn Fox Keller, Sally Shuttleworth (eds.): Body/Politics: 
Women and the Discourses of Science, London, Routledge, 1990.
Jameson, Fredric: The Prison-house of Language, Princeton University 
Press, 1972.
 : Fables o f Aggression, Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of
California Press,1979.
 : The Political Unconscious, London, Methuen, 1981.
— ...... : "Postmodernism and Consumer Culture" in Hal Foster (ed.):
Postmodern Culture, London, Pluto Press, 1985.
 : "Cognitive Mapping" in Cary Nelson and Lawrence Grossberg (eds):
Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture, London, MacMillan, 1988.
Jones, Greta, Ian Connell and Jack Meadows: The Presentation of Science 
by the Media, Primary Research Communications Centre, University 
of Leicester, 1978.
Kant, Immanuel: The Critique of Judgement, (trans. James Creed Meredith), 
Oxford, Oxford at the Clarendon Press, 1986.
Kavanagh, James H.: "Feminism, Humanism and Science in Alien", in 
Annette Kuhn (ed.): Alien Zone: Cultural Theory and Contemporary 
Science Fiction Cinema, London, Verso, 1990.
Kilborn, Richard: Multi-Media Melting Pot: Marketing When the Wind Blows, 
London, Comedia, 1986
Koenig, Walter: Chekov's Enterprise, Hew York, Pocket Books, 1980.
Krieger, Murray (ed.): The Aims of Representation, New York, Columbia 
University Press, 1987.
Kroker, Arthur and Marilouise (eds.): Body Invaders: sexuality and the 
postmodern condition, London, Macmillan Education, 1988.
-: "Panic SexJn America" in Arthur and Marilouise-Kroker (eds.):Eody 
Invaders: sexuality and the postmodern condition, London, Macmillan 
Education, 1988.
Kuhn, Annette (ed.): Alien Zone: Cultural Theory and Contemporary 
Science Fiction Cinema, London, Verso, 1990.
253
 : "Introduction: Cultural Theory and Science Fiction Cinema" in Annette
Kuhn (ed.): Alien Zone: Cultural Theory and Contemporary Science 
Fiction Cinema, London, Verso, 1990.
Lakoff, George and Mark Johnson: Metaphors We Live By, University of 
Chicago Press, 1980.
Lévi-Strauss, Claude: Structural Anthropology Vol 1, (trans. by Claire 
Jacobson and Brooke Grundfest Schoepf), London, Allen Lane the 
Penguin Press, 1968.
Lowenthal, David: "Nostalgia tells it like it wasn't" in Malcolm Chase and 
Christopher Shaw (eds.): The Imagined Past: history and nostalgia, 
Manchester University Press, 1989.
Lyotard, Jean-Francois: The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, 
(trans. by Geoff Bennington and Brian Massumi), Manchester University 
Press,1984.
 : "Defining the Postmodern", in Lisa Appignanesi (ed.): Postmodernism,
ICA Documents 4, London, 1986.
Martin, Emily: "Science and Women's Bodies: Forms of Anthropological 
Knowledge" in Mary Jacobus, Evelyn Fox Keller, Sally Shuttleworth 
(eds.): Body/Politics: Women and the Discourses of Science, London, 
Routledge, 1990.
Mendelsohn, Everett and Helga Novotny (e6s.):Nineteen Eighty-Four: 
Science between Utopia and Dystopia, Sociology of the Sciences, 
Vol. VIII, D. Reidel Publishing Co. 1984.
Moss, Peter: "Rhetoric of Defense in the United States: Language, Myth and 
Ideology" in Paul Chilton (ed.): Language and the Nuclear Arms Debate, 
London, Frances Pinter, 1985.
Moylan, Tom: Demand the Impossible: Science fiction and the utopian 
imagination, London, MeXhuen, ^9SQ.
Neale, Stephen: "Issues of Difference: Alien and Blade Runnei"' in James 
Donald(ed.): Fantasy and the Cinema, London, BFI, 1989.
Nelson, Cary and Lawrence Grossberg (eds): Marxism and the Interpretation 
of Culture, London, MacMillan, 1988.
Parrinder, Patrick: Science Fiction: Its Criticism and Teaching, London,
 Methuen, 1980. p2—   - - .  ^ —
Payne, Keith: Strategic Defense: Star Wars in Perspective, Lanham MD., 
Hamilton Press,1986.
Peary, Danny (ed.): Omni's Screen Flights/Screen Fantasies: the 
future according to science fiction cinema. New York, Dolphin,
254
1984.
 : "Directing Alien and Blade Runnei’', An Interview with Ridley Scott, in
Danny Peary (ed.): Omni's Screen Flights/Screen Fantasies: the future 
according to science fiction cinema, New York, Dolphin, 1984.
Pen ley, Constance: The Future o f an liiusion: Film, Feminism and 
Psychoanalysis, London, Routledge, 1989.
Petchesky, Rosalind Pollack: "Foetal Images: The Power of Visual Culture in 
the Politics of Reproduction" in Michelle Stanworth(ed.): Reproductive 
Technologies: Gender, Motherhood and Medicine, Oxford, Polity Press, 
1987.
Pollock, Dale: Skywaiking: The Life and Films o f George Lucas, London. 
Elm Tree Books, 1983.
Pressler, Senator Larry: Star Wars: The Strategic Defense Initiative in 
Congress, New York, Praeger, 1986.
Roheim, Géza: Australian Totemism, London, Allen and Unwin, 1925,
 ; Sexuality in the Field of Vision, London, Verso, 1986.
The Royal Society: The Public Understanding of Science, (Report of a Royal 
Society ad hoc Group endorsed by the Council of the Royal Society), 
London, 1985.
Rubey, Dan: "Star Wars: Not So Long Ago, Not So Far Away", in Peter 
Steven (ed): JumpCut: Hollywood, Politics and Counter Cinema, 
Toronto, Between the Lines, 1985.
Sacks, Oliver: The Man Who Mistook His Wife for a Hat, London, 
Duckworth,1985.
Said, Edward: Orientalism, New York, Vintage Books, 1979.
Schleifer, Ronald: "Introduction" to A.J. Gre\mas:Structurai Semantics: An 
Attempt at a Method, Lincoln and London, University of Nebraska Press, 
1983.
Shaheen, Jack G.: "The War Game" in Jack G. Shaheen(ed.): Nuclear War 
Films, Carbondale, Southern Illinois University Press, 1978.
Shapiro, Michael (ed.): Language and Politics, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1984.
Silverstone, Roger: Framing Science: The Making of a BBC Documentary, 
London, BFI, 1985.
Slusser, George and Eric S. Rabkin (eds.): Shadows ofThe Map/c Lamp, 
Carbondale , Southern Illinois University Press, 1985. ---------------
Smith, Melvin: Space Shuttle, Sparkford, Haynes, 1985.
Sobchack, Vivian: "The Virginity of Astronauts: Sex and the Science Fiction 
Film" in George Slusser and Eric S. Rabkin (eds.): Shadows of the
255
Magic Lamp, Carbondale , Southern Illinois University Press, 1985
 : Screening Space, New York, Ungar, 1987.
Sontag, Susan: "The Imagination of Disaster", Against Interpretation and 
other essays, (1966), London, Andre Deutsch, 1987.
Stanworth, Michelle (ed.): Reproductive Technologies: Gender, Motherhood 
and Medicine, Oxford, Polity Press, 1987.
Steven, Peter (ed): JumpCut: Hollywood, Politics and Counter Cinema, 
Toronto, Between the Lines, 1985.
Stewart, Garrett: "The 'Videology' of Science Fiction" in George Slusser and 
Eric S. Rabkin (eds.): Shadows of the Magic Lamp, Carbondale, 
Southern Illinois Press, 1985.
Suvin, Darko: Metamorphoses of Science Fiction, New Haven and London, 
Yale University Press, 1979.
 : Positions and Presuppositions in Science Fiction, London,
MacMillan, 1988.
Tagg, John: The Burden of Representation, London, MacMillan, 1988.
Thompson, Edward and others/NLR: Exterminism and Cold War, London, 
Verso, 1982
Todorov, Tzvetan: The Fantastic: a structural approach to a literary genre, 
Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1975.
Tracey, Michael: "Censored: the War Game story", in Crispin Aubrey (ed.): 
Nukespeak: The Media and the Bomb, London, Comedia, 1982.
Turner, Victor: Drama, Fields and Metaphors: Symbolic Action in Human 
Society, Ithaca and London, Cornell University Press, 1974.
 : "Liminality and the Performative Genres" in John J. MacAloon (ed.):
Rite, Drama, Festival, Spectacle, Philadelphia, Institute for the Study of 
Human Issues, 1984.
Van Belle, William and Paul Claes: "The Logic of Deterrence: a semiotic and 
psychoanalytic approach", in Paul Chilton(ed.): Language and the 
Nuclear Arms Debate: Nukespeak Today, London, Frances Pinter 
(Publishers), 1985.
Wachhorst, Wyn: "The Day After: Films on Nuclear Aftermath", in Carl B. Yoke 
{ed.y. Phoenix From the Ashes: The Literature o f the Remade World,.
  New York, Greenwood Press, 1987.
Warrick, Patricia S.: The Cybernetic Imagination in Science Fiction, 
Cambridge, Mass., The MIT Press, 1980.
Weart, Spencer R.: Nuclear Fear: A History of Images, Cambridge, Mass.,
256
Harvard University Press, 1988.
Williams, Raymond: Towards 2000, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 198X
 : "The Politics of Nuclear Disarmament" in Edward Thompson and
others/NLR (eds.): Exterminism and Coid War, London, Verso, 1982. 
Wills, Garry: Reagan's America: Innocents at Home, London, Heinemann, 
1987.
Woodward, Kathleen (ed.): The Myths of Information, Madison, Coda, 1980. 
Wright, Patrick: On Living in an Old Country, London, Verso, 1985.
Yoke, Carl B. (ed.): Phoenix From the Ashes: The Literature o f the Remade 
World, New York, Greenwood Press, 1987.
Young, Alison: Community in Dissent, London, Routledge, 1990
The S tar Trek S ta rflee t Technical M anual researched and 
compiled by Franz Joseph, New York, Ballantine, 1975.
PERIODICALS
Alsop, Neil: "Afterlife", Primetime, No. 11, Summer 1986, pp26-31.
Amesley, Cassandra: "How to Watch Star Trek", Cultural Studies, 3(3), 
1989, PP323-339.
Angenot, Marc: "The Absent Paradigm: An Introduction to the Semiotics of 
Science Fiction", Science Fiction Studies, 6(1), 1979, pp9-19.
Asker, James R.: "NASA Offers Five Alternatives For Landing Humans on 
Mars by 2018", Aviation Week and Space Technology, 131(22), 
27 November 1989, pp30-1.
Bartter, Martha: "Nuclear Holocaust as Urban Renewal", Science Fiction 
SW /es, 13(2), July 1986, ppl 48-158.
Bennett, Tony: "Texts, Readers, Reading Formations", Literature and 
H/sfory, 9(2), Autumn 1983, pp214-227.
Bergstrom, Janet: "Androids and Androgyny", Camera Obscura, \/o\. 15, 
1986, PP37-64.
Berko, Lili: "Simulation and High Concept Imagery: The Case of Max
 Headroom", Wide Angle, 10{4), T9QQ;pp^
Bhabha, Homi: "The Other Question - the Stereotype and Colonial Discourse", 
Screen, 24(6), Nov.-Dee. 1983 pp 18 - 36.
Blair, Karin: "Sex and Star Trek', Science Fiction Studies, 10(3), Nov. 1983, 
pp292-297.
257
Boyd-Bowman, Susan: "The Day After. Representations of the Nuclear 
Holocaust", Screen, 25(4&5) July-Oct. 1984, pp71-97.
Brewer, Maria Minchin: "Surviving Fictions: Gender and Difference in 
Postmodern and Postnuclear Narrative", Discourse, 9, Spring-Summer 
1987, PP37-52.
British Board of Film Censors: Monthly List, August 1982.
Britton, Andrew: "Blissing Out: The Politics of Reaganite Entertainment", 
Movie, No.31/32, Winter 1986, p p l-42.
Brown, JoAnne: "Professional Language: Words that Succeed", Radical 
History Review, No. 34, Jan. 1986, pp33-51.
Bruno, Guiliana: "Ramble City: Postmodernism and Blade Runner, 
October, No.41, Summer 1987, pp61-74
Caputi, Jane: "Seeing Elephants: The Myths of Phallotechnology", Feminist 
Studies, 14(3), Fall 1988, pp487-524.
Clarke, Arthur C.: "Star Wars and Star Peace", Interdisciplinary Science 
Reviews, 12(3), Sept. 1987, pp272-277.
Clynes, Manfred E. and Nathan S. Kline: "Cyborgs and space". Astronautics, 
September, 1960, p26-27 & 74-77.
Cockerell, Michael: "Debating Staw Wars in rhymes and rainbows". The 
Listener, V. 115. No 2949, 27 February 1986, pp7-8,12.
Cohn, Carol: "Sex and Death in the Rational World of the Defense 
Intellectuals", Signs, 12(4), Summer 1987, pp687-718.
Cranny-Francis, Anne: "Sexuality and Sex-Role Stereotyping in Star Trek', 
Science Fiction Studies, 12(3), Nov. 1985, pp274-284.
Creed, Barbara: "Horror and the Monstrous-Feminine: An Imaginary 
Abjection", Screen, 27(1), Jan-Feb 1986, pp44-70. Reprinted in James 
Donald (ed.) Fantasy and the Cinema, London, BFI Publishing, 1989.
—— : "From Here to Modernity: Feminism and Postmodernism", Screen, 
28(2), Spring 1987, pp47-67.
Curry, Michael: "Beyond Nuclear Winter: On the Limitations of Science in 
Political Debate", Anf/pode, 18(3), Dec. 1986, pp244-267.
Dater, Jim : "What do 'You' do when your robot bows as your clone enters
- holographic MTV?", Fufures, 21(4), August 1989, pp361-365.
DemdaTrJacques: "No Apocalypse, Not Now (full speed ahead, 7 missiles,
7 missives). Diacritics, 14(2), Summer 1984, pp20-31
Dunkley, Chris: "Langham Diary", The Listener, Vol.110, No.2834, 10 
November 1983, p24
Edge, David : "Technological Metaphor and Social Control", New Literary
258
History, 6(1), 1974-5, ppl 35-147.
Eisenberg, Adam and Don Shay: "Jupiter Revisited - The Odyssey of 2010 ", 
Cinefex, 20, January 1985. pp4-67.
Elshtain, Jean Bethke: "Reflections on War and Political Discourse: Realism, 
Just War and Feminism in a Nuclear Age", Political Theory, 13(1), 
Feb.1985, pp39-57.
Ferguson, Frances: "The Nuclear Sublime", Diacritics, 14(2), Summer 1984, 
pp4-10.
Filkin, David: "Science and the Media", Letter to The Listener, Vol.111, 
No.2854, 19 April 1984. p20
Fisher, Bob: "Director Leonard Nimoy focuses on Star Trek lit'. On Location, 
7(2), April 1984, pp34-40.
Foley, Theresa: "Commercial Space Shows Long-term Promise Despite Early 
Early Setbacks", Aviation Week and Space Technology,^30(^2), 
20 March 1989, p i 18-9.
Glass, Fred: "The 'New Bad Future': Robocop and the 1980s' Sci-Fi Films", 
Science as Culture, No. 5, 1989, pp7-49.
Gordon, Andrew: "Star Wars: A Myth for Our Time", Literature/Film Ouarteriy, 
6(4), Fall 1978, pp314-326.
Greimas, A.J. and F. Rastier: "The Interaction of Semiotic Constraints", Yale 
French Studies, No 41, 1968, pp8 6  - 105.
Hafner, Donald L.: "Assessing the President's Vision: The Fletcher, Miller and 
Hoffman Panels", Daeduius, 114(2), Spring 1985, pp91-107.
Hall, Stuart: "Signification, Representation, Ideology: Althusser and the 
Post-structuralist Debates", Critical Studies in Mass Communications, 
2(2), June 1985, pp91-114.
Haraway, Donna: "A Manifesto for Cyborgs", Socialist Review, Vol. 80, 1985, 
pp65-107.
 ......: "Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism and the
Privilege of Partial Perspective", Feminist Studies, 14(3), Fall 1988, 
pp575-599.
Heath, Stephen: "Difference", Screen, 19(3), Autumn 1978, pp50-112
Hebdige, Dick: "After the Masses", Marxism Today, 33(1), Jan. 1989, pp48- 
53.  ^ .......... ..
Herken, Gregg: "The earthly origins of Star Wars", Bulletin of the-Atomic 
Scientists, 43(8), Oct. 1987, pp20-28.
Humphrey, Nicholas: "Four Minutes to Midnight", The Third Bronowski 
Memorial Lecture, The Listener, \fo\A 06, No..2833, 29 October 1981,
259
pp493-499.
Jameson, Fredric: "The Vanishing Mediator: Narrative Structure in Max 
Weber", Working Papers in Cuiturai Studies, 5, Spring 1974, ppl 11- 
149. p i 27
 : "Progress Versus Utopia: or. Can We Imagine the Future?", Science
Fiction Studies, 9(2), July 1982, ppl 47-158.
 : "Postmodernism, or The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism", New Left
Review, No. 146, July-Aug. 1984, pp53-92.
 : "Science Fiction as a Spatial Genre: Generic Discontinuities and the
problem of figuration in Vonda McIntyre's The Exile Waiting", Science 
Fiction Studies, 14(1), March 1987, pp44-59.
 : "On Habits of the Heart", South Atlantic Quarterly, 86(4), Fall 1987,
pp545-565.
 : "Nostalgia for the Present", South Atlantic Ouarteriy, 88(2), Spring,
1989, pp517-537.
Jaroff, Leon: "Fighting the Biotech Wars" and "The Peripatetic Crusader", 
Time, 127(16), 21 April 1986, pp80-82.
Karpf, Anne: "Shibboleths and Ships in Bottles", The Listener, V.111, 
No.2851, 29 March 1984. p9
Kellner, Douglas, Flo Leibowitz and Michael Ryan: "Blade Runner: A 
Diagnostic Critique", Jumpcut, Vol 29, Feb. 1984, pp6 -8 .
King, Barry: "The Burden of Max Headroom", Screen, 30(1 &2), Winter/Spring 
1989, ppl 22 - 138.
Klein, Richard and William B. Warner: "Nuclear Coincidence and the Korean 
Airline Disaster" Diacritics, 16(1), Spring 1986, pp2-21.
Lancashire, Anne: "The Star Wars Saga: Comedy Versus Tragedy", The 
Da//70us/e Fewew, 62(1), Spring 1982, pp5-13.
Li pari, Joanna: "2010 Men", Film Comment, 20(6), Nov.-Dee. 1984, pp60-63.
Luckham, Peter: "Armament Culture", Alternatives, ^0{^), Summer 1984, 
pp l-44 . -
MacCannell, Dean: "Baltimore in the Morning . . . After: On the forms of 
post-nuclear leadership" , Diacritics, 14(2), Summer 1984, pp33-46.
-M c C lo y , James: "Science on-Television", The Journal of the Society of Film 
and Television Arts Ltd., No 14, Winter 1963-4, ppl 1 -13.
Mancini, Marc: "The Future Isn't What it Used to Be", Film Comment, 21(3), 
May-June 1985, ppl 1-15.
Manoff, Robert Karl: "Modes of War and Modes of Social Address: The Text
260
of SOI", Journal of Communication, 39(1), Winter 1989, pp59-84.
Manson, Brad: "The Last Voyage of the Starship Enterprise", Cinefex, No. 18, 
Aug. 1984, pp42-67.
Medina, Sara C.: (no title). Time, 23 June 1986, pp46-47
Mohanty, Chandra Talpade : "Under Western Eyes: Feminist Scholarship and 
Colonial Discourses", Feminist Studies, 14(3), Fall 1988, pp333 -358.
Montgomery, Scott L.: "The Cult of Jargon: Reflections on Language in 
Science", Science as Culture, No.6 , 1989, pp42-77.
Mulvey, Laura: "Changes: Thoughts on Myth, Narrative and Historical 
Experience", History Workshop Journal, Issue 23, Spring 1987.
Murrell, Rachel Kerys: "Telling it Like it Isn't: Representations of Science in 
Tomorrow's World', Theory, Culture and Society, 4(1), 1987 , pp89- 
106.
Naureckas, Jim: "Aliens: Mother and the Teeming Hordes", Jumpcut, No 32, 
1987, pi &4.
Newman, Kim: Review of Star Trek IV: The Voyage Home in Monthly Film 
Bulletin, V54, No. 639, April 1987, p i 25
Nichols, Bill: "The Work of Culture in the Age of Cybernetic Systems", Screen, 
29(1), Winter 1988, pp22-46.
Payne, Keith and Colin S. Gray: "Nuclear Policy and the Defense Transition", 
Foreign Folicy, 62(4), Spring 1984, pp820-842.
Peel, John: "Twenty Years of Star Trek', Starburst, 9(5), Jan 1987, pp48-52.
Pignon, Dominique: "The Strategic Defense Initiative and Europe", Teios, No. 
67, Spring 1986, pp45-56.
Plantinga, Carl: "Defining Documentary: Fiction, Non-fiction and Projected 
Worlds", Fersistence of Vision, No.5, Spring 1987, pp44-54.
Poole, M ike:"The Cult of the Generalist: British Television Criticism 1936- 
1983", Screen, 25(2), March-April 1984, pp41-61.
Rajchman, John: "Foucault's Art of Seeing", October, No 44, Spring 1988, 
PP89-117.
Recer, Paul: "Star Wars Weapons May Come True", US News and World 
Report, XCI(40), 27 July 1981, pp46-48.
Robu, Cornel: "A Key to Science Fiction: the Sublime", Foundation, No. 42,
  Spring 1988, pp21-36.
Rubin, David M. and Constance Cummings: "Nuclear War and Its 
Consequences on Television News", Journal o f Communications, 
39(1), Winter 1989, pp39-58.
Sammons, Todd H.: "Return of the Jedi: Epic Graffiti", Science Fiction
261
Studies, 14(3), Nov.1987, pp355-371
Schwenger, Peter: "Writing the Unthinkable", Critical Inquiry, 13(1), Autumn, 
1986, pp33-48.
Shay, Jody Duncan: "Humpback to the Future", Cinefex, no.29, Feb. 1987, 
pp4-31.
Siegel, Mark: "Science-Fiction Characterization and TV's Battle for the Stars", 
Science Fiction Studies, 7(3), 1980, pp270-277.
Silverstone, Roger: "Let Us then Return to the Murmuring of Everyday 
Practices: A Note on Michel de Certeau, Television and Everyday Life", 
Theory, Culture and Society, 6(1), Feb. 1989, pp77-94.
Sinclair, Pat: "Screen Science", The Listener, V.111, No.2852, 5 April 1984. 
p32
Smith, Jeff: "Reagan, Star Wars and American Culture", Bulletin of the 
Atomic Scientists, 43(1), Jan/Feb 1987, ppl 9-25.
Smuszkiewicz, Antoni: "Props and their Function in Science Fiction", Science 
Fiction Studies, 14(2), July 1987, pp222-229.
Sofia, Zoe: "Exterminating Fetusues: Abortion, Disarmament and the Sexo- 
semiotics of Extraterrestrialism", Diacritics 14(2), Summer 1984, pp47- 
59.
Sojka, Gregory S.: "The Astronaut: The American Hero with "The Right Stuff"", 
Journal of American Culture, 7(1 &2), Spring-Summer 1984, ppl 18-121.
Sontag, Susan: "AIDS and Its Metaphors", The New York Review of Books, 
35(16), 27 October 1988, pp89-99.
Strick, Philip: "Future Movies: Reading the Signs (Part 1): A Passion for 
Mandroids", Films and Filming, No.366, March 1985, pp7-10.
 : "Future Movies: Reading the Signs. (Part 3): Range-Riders of
the Nuclear Plains", Films and Filming, No. 368, May 1985, pp7-9
Suvin, Darko: "On what is and is not an SF Narration", Science Fiction 
SW/es, P a rti, March 1978 cited in Patrick Parrinder: Science Fiction: 
its Criticism and Teaching, London, Methuen, 1980.
Thompson, E.P.: "Agendas for Radical History", Radical History Review, 
No.36, 1986, pp26-45.
Tyrell, Wm. Blake: "Star Trek's Myth of Science", Journal o f American
Cu/fure, 2(2), Summer 1979, pp288-296.
Vaughan, Chris: "White House demands probe into NASA", New Scientist, 
No. 1726, 21 July 1990, p i 8 .
Watts, Susan: "Making Sense of the Genome's Secrets", New Scientist, V. 
127, No. 1728, 4 August 1990, pp37-41.
262
Wollen, Peter: "Cinema/Americanism/The Robot", New Formations, No. 8 , 
Summer, 1989, pp7-34.
Woolley, Benjamin: "Apolitical Science", The Listener, Vol.111, No.3035, 
29 October 1987. p34
(Editorial): "Nuclear Criticism", Diacritics, 14(2), Summer 1984. p2
(Editorial):------ Buiietin of the Atomic Scientists, 44(1), Jan./Feb. 1988. p3.
(Editorial): "Ten Minutes to Midnight", Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 
46(3), April 1990, p3.
 "Tomorrow's Animals" The Economist, V.304, No.7511, 15 August 1987,
p1 1 - 1 2
NEW SPAPERS
Amis, Martin: "Apocalypse 2000", The Observer, 31 January 1988. p27
Appleyard, Bryan: "The Bomb's just the beginning". The Times, 14 
September 1989, p11
Ashford, Nicholas: "Reagan to propose missile compromise". The Times, 
30 March 1981, p i
Barker, Dennis: "Downing Street asks for tape of TV play about US troops". 
Guardian, 15 March 1988, p3.
Beeston, Nicholas: "Bush unveils new space era for the 21st century" The 
Times, 21 July 1989, p i ,22.
Booth, Mick: "The perils of selling space to the masses". The Guardian, 29 
June 1990, p31
Booth, Nicholas: "Tintin's rocket finally set for blast-off". The Observer, 9 July 
1989, p32.
 -: "When can't do, won't do". The Observer, 8  July 1990, p62.
Broad, William J.: "Science Facts Help Propel Science Fiction in the Film 
201G', New York Times, 2 February 1984 p i, 17.
Brown, Paul: "Rising water threatens buildings" Guardian, 3 November 1989
p2 .
Bygrave, Mike: Review of 2010, The Guardian, 20 December 1984, p i 1. 
Clines, Francis X.: "Democrats Assert Reagan is Using Star Wars Scare to 
Hide Blunders", New York Times, 25 March 1983, pA9 
Fiddick, Peter: "The Bang that left Britain shaken not stirred". Guardian,
263
11 March 1985. p i 3
 : "Captain of the Starship", The Guardian, 25 April 1988, p25.
Hammond, Ray: "Radio Play Days", The Guardian, 25 May 1987, p5 
Heseltine, Michael: "Why this fiction will never be fact". Daily Express,
9 December 1983. p5 
Jones, George: "TV film reply sought", Sunday Telegraph, 4 December 1983 
p i.
Lean, Geoffrey and Jan Sinclair: "Britain could be new Sunshine State",The 
Observer, 26 November 1989, p i.
Lewis, Anthony: "Why Reagan is Lost in Space", The Times, 30 March 1983, 
pi 2
Lichfield, John: "Bush gives space programme new goals". The Independent, 
2 July 1989, p25.
Mohr, Charles: "General to Head Missile Program", The New York Times, 
28 March 1984, pAI 9 
Owen, Richard: "Reagan Accused of Violating Pacts", The Times, 25 March 
1983, ppl &32.
Reagan, Ronald: "Speech on Military Spending and a New Defense", New 
York Times, 24 March 1983, pA20 
Safire, William: "Acronym Sought", The New York Times Magazine, 24 
February 1985
 : "New Name for 'Star Wars’ ", The New York Times Magazine,
24 March 1985, Section 6 , Part 1, ppl 5-16.
Tisdall, Simon and John Rettle: "Soviet rocket to lift US satellite". The 
Guardian, 9 July 1990, p9 
Tran, Mark: "Laser test succeeds in Star wars programme". The Guardian, 
13 February 1988, p5 
Vidal, John: "Eco Soundings: 20/20 Vision", The Guardian, 17 November 
1989, p27
Walker, Martin: "New Pentagon chief slims Star Wars defence role". The 
Guardian, 29 March 1989, p8
- "Congress just keeps Star Wars project ticking over". The
 Guard/an, 4 November 1989, p7. ------------
White, Richard:J^Bush^ warned Gorbachev 'no let up' on Star Wars", The 
Guardian, 14 December 1987, p6
(First Leader), The New York Times, 27 March 1983, p18E
264
"Mars Mission" The Guardian, 4 December 1987, p7.
"Spaceman is Seen as Man-Machine", New York Times, 22 May 1960, p31 
"Briefing", The New York Times, 10 April 1984, p28A 
"Top 100 All-time Rental Champions", Variety, 24 January 1990, p46.
"All-time Film Rental Champs", Variety, 11 January 1990, pp28, 52, 56, 58, 
60, 64, 6 6 , 6 8 , 70, 72, 74.
Stuart Hall;"Centre and Periphery in the Field of Representation" , Address to 
the Association of Art Historians Conference, University of London, 
Institute of Education, 6  April 1989.
FILMS
The Abyss (James Cameron, 20th Century Fox, US, 1989)
The Adventures o f Buckaroo Banzai across the Eighth Dimension (W.D.
Richter, Sherwood Productions, US, 1984)
Aelita (Yakov Protazanov, Mezhraprom, USSR, 1924)
A iien  (Ridley Scott, 20th Century Fox/Brandywine-Ronald Shusett 
Productions, UK, 1979)
Alien Nation (Graham Baker, 20th Century Fox, US, 1988)
Aliens (James Cameron, 20th Century Fox/Brandywine Productions, US, 
1986)
Alphaviiie (Jean-Luc Godard, Chaumiane/Filmstudio, France/Italy, 1965) 
Android (Aaron Lipstadt, New World Productions/Android Productions, US,
1982)
Apocalypse Now (Francis Ford Coppola, Omni Zoetrope, US, 1979)
Back to the Future (Robert Zemakis, Universal/Amblin Entertainment, US,
1985)
B arbare iia  (Roger Vadim, Marianne Productions/Dino de Lauretiis, 
France/Italy, 1967)
Battlestar Galactica (Robert A Colla, Universal, US, 1978)
Battietruck [aka Warlords of the 21 st Century] (Harley Cokliss, New World,
US, 1982)  :____  .
The Bed-Sitting Room (Richard Lester, Oscar Lewenstein Productions, UK, 
1969)
The Beginning or the Enc/ (Norman Taurog, MGM, US, 1947)
265
Blade Runner (Ridley Scott, Columbia-EMI-Warner, US, 1982)
A Boy and His Dog (LQ.Jones, Third QLJ, Inc., US, 1975)
Brazil (Terry Gilliam, Brazil Productions UK, 1985)
The Brother from Another Planet ( M r \  Sayles, A-Train Films, US, 1984)
Buck Rogers (Ford Beebe, Saul A. Goodkind, Universal, US, 1939)
Buck Rogers in the 25th Century (Daniel Haller, Universal, US, 1979)
The Chain Reaction (Ian Barry, Palm Beach Pictures, Australia, 1980)
Cbar/y (Ralph Nelson, Selmur/Robertson Associates, US, 1968)
Cherry 2000 (Steve de Jarnatt, Pressman-Cherry 2000 Productions, US, 
1986)
The China Syndrome (James Bridges, IPC Films, US, 1979)
City Beneath the Sea [aka One Hour to Doomsday] (Irwin Allen, Kent 
Productions/ Motion Pictures International, US, 1970)
The Clown and the Automaton (George Méliès, Star, France, 1897)
Close Encounters of the Third Kind (Steven Spielberg, Columbia/EMI, US, 
1977/80)
Cocoon (Ron Howard, 2oth Century Fox/Zanuck Brown Productions, US,
1985)
Cocoon: The Return (Daniel Petrie, Zanuck-Brown Co for 20th Century Fox, 
US, 1988)
Colossus: The Forbin Pro/ecf (Joseph Sargent, Universal, US, 1969)
Coma (Michael Crichton, MGM, US, 1978)
Coppeiia (George Méliès, Star, France, 1900)
Dark Sfar (John Carpenter, Jack H. Harris Enterprises, US, 1974)
The Day After (Nicholas Meyer, ABC Motion Pictures, US, 1983/4)
The Day of the Triffids (Steve Stekley, Security Pictures, UK, 1963)
The Day the Earth Caught Fire (Val Guest, British Lion/Paramount, UK, 1961) 
The Day the Earth Stood Still (Robert Wise, 20th Century Fox, US, 1951) 
Demon Seed (Donald Carnell, MGM, US, 1977)
Dr. Strangeiove (Stanley Kubrick, Hawk Films, UK, 1964)
Dune (David Lynch, Dino de Lauretiis Productions/Universal, US, 1984) 
Electric Dreams (Steve Barron, Virgin/UA, UK, 1984)
The Empire Strikes Back (Irvin Kershner, Lucasfilm/20th Century Fox, US,
  1980)----------   - . - - -.....—..— — — - 
Enemy Mine (Wolfgang Petersen, Kings Road Entertainment for 20th Century 
Fox, US, 1985)
Escape from New York (John Carpenter, Avco Embassy/International Film 
Investors/Goldcrest Films International/City Films, US, 1981)
266
Explorers (Joe Dante, Edward S. Feldman Productions/Industrial Light & 
Magic, US, 1985)
E.T.: The Extra Terrestrial{SXewen Spielberg, Universal, US, 1982) 
Fahrenheit 451 (François Truffaut, Anglo Enterprise/Vineyard Films, UK, 
1966)
Fail Safe (Sidney Lumet, Max E. Youngstein-Sidney Lumet Productions/ 
Paramount US, 1964)
Fantastic Voyage (Robert Fleischer, 20th Century Fox, US, 1966)
Five (Arch Oboler, Lobo Productions, US, 1951 )
Flash Gordon (Michael Hodges, Starling Pictures, UK, 1980)
Forbidden Fianet (Fred Wilcox, MGM, US, 1956)
Frankenstein (Searle Dawley, Edison, US, 1910)
Frankenstein (John Whale, Universal, US, 1931)
Die Frau im Mond/The Woman in the Moon (Fritz Lang, Fritz Lang Film/UFA, 
Germany, 1929)
Friendship's Death (Peter Wollen, Modelmark, UK, 1987)
Futureworld (Richard T. Heffron, Aubrey Co./Paul N. Lazarus III/AlP, US, 
1976)
Ghosts o f the Civil Dead (John Hillcoat, Correctional Services, Australia, 
1988)
The Handmaid's Tale (USA/Germany, Volker Schlondorff, Cinecom 
Entertainment Group/Bioskop-Film, 1990)
Heart Beeps (Allan Arkush, Universal, US, 1981)
The Hidden (Jack Shoulder, Robert Shaye Productions, USA, 1987) 
Highlander {RusseW Mulcahy, Columbia-Cannon-Warner, UK, 1986) 
Highlander a (RusseW Mulcahy, Davis-Panzer, US, 1990)
Invasion of the Bodysnatchers (Don Siegel, Ailed Artists, US, 1956)
Invasion of the Bodysnatchers (Phillip Kaufman, Solofilm Co., US, 1978)
La Jetée (Chris Marker, Argos Films, France, 1962)
The Journey (Peter Watkins, Skyworks Charitable Foundation/Peter 
W atkins/Film  for Fred/The Swedish Peace and Arbitration 
Society/Cinergy Films, UK, 1987)
Kruii (Peter Yates, Columbia/Ted Mann-Ron Silverman Production/Barclays 
Industrial Mercantile Finance Ltd., UK/ I 983)
The Last Starfighter (Nick Castle, Lorimar/Universal, US, 1984)
Liquid Sky (Slava Tsukerman, Z Films Inc., US, 1982)
Logan's Run (Michael Anderson, MGM, US, 1976)
Longtime Companion (Norman Rene, Companion Productions Inc., US,
267
1990)
Loo/cer (Michael Crichton, Ladd Co., US, 1981)
Mad Max [akaThe Road Warrioi] (George Miller, Mad Max Pty., Australia, 
1979)
Mad Max II {George Miller, Kennedy Miller Entertainment, Australia, 1981) 
Mad Max: Beyond Thunderdome (George Miller, Kennedy-Miller 
Productions, Australia, 1985)
Making Mr Right {Susar\ Siedelman, Orion, US, 1987)
The Man Who Feiito Earth (Nicholas Roeg, British Lion, UK, 1976)
Metropolis (Fritz Lang, UFA, Germany, 1926)
Miiienium (Michael Anderson, The First Millenium Partnership, US, 1989) 
Moontrap (Robert Dyke, Magic Films, US, 1989)
The Motor Vaiet (Arthur Cooper, Alpha Trading Co., UK, 1906)
Murder in the Air {Lewis Seiler, Warner Bros.,US, 1940)
Night of the Comet (Thom Eberhart, Atlantic 9000, US, 1984)
Nineteen Eighty-Four (Michael Radford, Umbrella-Rosenbloom/Virgin Films, 
UK, 1984)
No Blade of Grass (Cornell Wilde, MGM, UK, 1970)
On the Beach (Stanley Kramer, Lomitas for United Artists, US, 1959)
The Original (Jerome Diamant-Berger, Les Productions Belles Rives, France,
1986)
Outiand (Peter Hyams, Ladd Co., UK, 1981)
Panic in Year Zero (Ray Milland, Lou Rusoff-Arnold Houghland, US, 1962) 
Peggy Sue got Married (Francis Coppola, Tri-Star-Delphi IV @ V, US, 1986) 
Pisma Myortvovo Chelovyeka/Letters from a Dead Man (Konstantin 
Lopushansky, Lenfilm, USSR, 1986)
Planet of the Apes (Franklin J. Schaffner, APJAC, US, 1968)
Beneath the Planet of the Apes (Ted Post, APJAC, US, 1969)
Escape from the Planet of the Apes (Don Taylor, APJAC, US, 1971) 
Conquest of the Planet of the_ Planet o f the Apes (J. Lee Thompson, 
APJAC/ 20th Century Fox, US, 1972)
Battle of the Planet of the Apes (J. Lee Thompson, APJAC, USA, 1973) 
Quatermass and the Pit (Roy Ward Baker, Hammer, UK, 1967)
The Quiet Earth (Geoff Murphy, Cinepro/Pillsbury Films, NZ, 1985)
Raiders of the Lost Ark (Stever) Spielberg, Paramount/Lucasfilm, US, 1981) 
Red Dawn (John Milius, Valkyrie for MGM/UA, US, 1984)
Repo Man (USA, Alex Cox, 1984, Edge City Productions)
268
Return o f the Jedi (Richard Marquand, Lucasfilm, US, 1983)
Robocop (Paul Verhoeven, Orion Pictures, US, 1987)
Runaway (Michael Crichton, Tri-Star/Delphi Productions, US, 1984)
The Running Man (Paul Michael Glaser, Taft Entertainment/Keith 
Barish Productions, US, 1987)
Saturn 3 (Stanley Donen, Transcontinental Film Productions, UK, 1980)
Short Circuit {dohn Badham, Turman-Foster, US, 1986)
S ilent Running  (Douglas Trumbull, Universal/M ichael Gruskoff 
Productions/Douglas Trumbull Producations,US, 1971)
Slaughterhouse 5 (George Roy Hill, Universal/Vanadas, US, 1972)
Sleeper (Woody Allen, Jack Rollins and Charles Joffe Productions, US, 
1973)
Slipstream (Steven M. Lisberger, Entertainment Film Productions, US, 1989) 
Solaris (Andrei Tarkovsky, Mosfilm, USSR, 1971)
Somewhere in Time (Jeannot Swarc, Universal/Rastar, US, 1980)
Soylent Green (Richard Fleischer, MGM, US, 1973)
Spacehunter: Adventures in the Forbidden Zone (Lament Johnson, 
Columbia/Delphi Productions, US, 1983)
Space Raiders (Roger Corman, New World/Millenium Productions, US, 
1983)
Sfa//cer (Andrei Tarkovsky, Mosfilm, USSR, 1979)
Star Trek: The Motion Picture (Robert Wise, Paramount, US, 1979)
Star Trek II: The Wrath of Khan (Nicholas Meyer, Paramount, US, 1982)
Star Trek III The Search for Spook (Leonard Nimoy, Paramount/Cinema 
Group Venture, US, 1984)
Star Trek IV: The Voyage Home (Leonard Nimoy, Paramount, US, 1986)
Star Trek V: The Final Frontier (William Shatner, Paramount, US, 1989)
Sfar Wars (George Lucas, Lucasfilm/20th Century Fox, US, 1977)
Starman (John Carpenter, Columbia/Delphi Productions II, US, 1984)
The Stepford Wives (Bryan Forbes, Fadsin Cinema Associates, US, 1975) 
Superman IV: The Quest for Peace (Richard Lester, Columbia-Cannon- 
Warner, US, 1988)
The Terminator (James Cameron, Cinema 84/Pacific Western Productions, 
US, 1984)
Testament (Lynne Littman, Entertainment Events, US, 1983)
They Live (John Carpenter, US, 1988)
Things to Come (William Cameron Menzies, London Film Productions, UK, 
1936)
269
THX-1138 (George Lucas, American Zoetrope, US, 1970)
Time and Judgement (Menelik Shabazz, Ceddo Film and Video Workshop, 
UK, 1988)
Time Bandits (Terry Gilliam, Handmade Films, UK, 1981)
A Trip to the Moon (George Méliès, Star/Lubin, France, 1898)
Tron (Steven M. Lisberger, Walt Disney, US, 1982)
Viiiage of the Damned (Wolf Rilla, MGM, UK, 1960)
The War Game (Peter Watkins, BBC, UK, 1965)
WarGames (John Badham, MGM/UA Entertainment, USA, 1983)
Wesfwor/c/(Michael Crichton, MGM, US, 1973)
When the Wind Biows (Jimmy Murakami, Meltdown, UK, 1986)
The Worid, the Flesh and the Devil (Ranald MacDougall, Sol C.
Siegel/Harbel Productions, US, 1959)
Zardoz (John Boorman, John Boorman Productions/20th Century Fox, UK, 
1973)
Zero Population Growth [aka Z.P.G.] (Michael Campus, Sagittarius, US, 
1971)
2001: A Space Odyssey (Stanley Kubrick, MGM, US, 1968)
2010 (Peter Hyams, MGM/UA, USA, 1984)
TELEVISION PROGRAMMES
Specific episodes of non-flctlon programmes
Eleventh Hour "The Soft Cell" (C4, tx. 11 January 1988)
Equinox "A Short History of the Future: The City" (C4, tx. 21 August 1986) 
"A Short History of the Future: The Spaceship" (C4, tx. 28 August
1986)
"Pioneers of the Future" (C4, tx. 6  November 1986)
"Mission to Mars" (C4, tx. 23 July 1987)
"Anything You Can Do . . . "  (C4, tx. 8  October 1987)
"Command and Control" (C4, tx. 22 October 1987)
  "Chaos" (C4, tx. 20 November 1988) ---------
JdLssJon Juno: Astronaut Wanted, No Experience Necessary (ITV, tx.
28 December 1989)
The Money Programme (BBC2, tx. 12 November 1989)
Nagasaki - Return Journey (BBC1, tx. 29 July 1985)
On the Eighth Day (BBC2, 24 September 1984)
270
Open Space (BBC2, tx 15 July 1987)
Panorama "The President's Star Warriors" (BBC1, tx. 12 January 1987) 
Q.E.D "A Guide to Armageddon" (BBC1, tx. 1977)
Spitting Image (ITV, episodes transmitted mid 1989)
Time on Our Hands (BBC, first transmitted 1963, reframed 1988) 
Tomorrow's Worid {BB01, October 1986 - December 1989)
Tomorrow's Worid "Greenhouse Special" (BBC1, tx. 31 January 1989) 
Welcome to My Worid "The Forgery" (BBC1 tx. 8  November 1987)
Non-fiction programmes referred to in general
Antenna (BBC2,1987 - )
Brass Tacks (BBC2,1977- 1988)
Equinox (C4, 1986 - )
Horizon (BBC, 1963-)
Q.E.D. (1982-)
Tomorrow's Worid ( BBC, 1965 - )
Welcome to My World (BBC1,11 October -15  November 1987)
Specific fictional programmes (serials, single episodes or one- 
offs)
Airbase (BBC1, tx. 1 March 1988)
The Avengers "Cybernauts" (ITV, tx. 28 March 1966)
The Day After (US, ABC, tx. 20 November 1983; UK, ITV, tx 10 December
1983)
First Born (BBC1, tx 30 October -13  November 1988)
Murder or? fbe Moon (ITV, tx. 26 August 1989)
The Old Men at the Zoo (BBC2, tx. 15 September 1983)
Piay for Today "Z for Zachariah" (BBC1, tx. 28 February 1984)
"Stronger than the Sun" (BBC1, tx 18 October 1977)
Red Dwarf "Kryten" (BBC2, tx. 6  September 1988)
Star Cops "Th is  Can to be Opened in a Million Years" (BBC2, 3 August 
19877”  :  ”  .
Star Tre/c 'The City on the Edge of Forever'^ (1st US tx. 6  April 1967)
"The Apple" (1 st US tx. 13 October 1967)
"All Our Yesterdays" (1st US tx. 14 March 1969)
Threads (BBC2, tx. 23 September 1984)
The War Game (BBC2, tx. 31 July 1985)
271
Play on One 'Yellowbacks" (BBC1, tx. 30 August 1991)
Series referred to in general
The Avengers (ITV, 1961 -64; 1966-69)
Battlestar Galactica (US, 1978-79)
The Bionic Woman (US, 1976-78)
Blake's 7 (BBC, 1978- 1981)
Buck Rogers in the 25th Century (US, 1979-81 ) 
Doomwatch (BBC, 1970-72)
Dr. 14//70 (BBC, 1963-)
Edge of Darkness (BBC, 1985)
The Hitchhiker's Guide to the Galaxy (BBC, 1981 ) 
Logan's Run (US, 1977-1978)
Lost in Space (US, 1965-68)
The Man From Atlantis (US, 1977-78)
The Man from UNCLE (US, 1964-68)
The Max Headroom Show^
Planet of the Apes (US, 1974)
The Prisoner (\T\f, 1968)
Red Dwarf (BBC, 1988-90)
Star Cops (BBC, 1987)
Star Test {C4, 1989)
Star Trek (US, 1966-69)
Star Trek: The Next Generation (US, 1987- )
The Survivors (BBC, 1974-77)
The $6 Miiiion Man (US, 1973-78)
